Do you mean that our experience confirms it? If not our experience, then what? — Ludwig V

Traffic lights. Their very existence presupposes a commonality of perception. And they're everywhere! As is art, colour coded electrical wires, signs saying Keep Off the Grass! etc. This very sentence assumes your ability to see, and psychologically translate perception into meaning similar - if not identical to, that which it is intended to convey.

In most instances, particularly traffic lights, the meaning of the external object is intentionally clear. Certainly, images can be intentionally obscure - like the duck/rabbit illusion, and that does demonstrate the operation of psychological models through which perception is interpreted.

However, the subjectivist takes the implications of the existence of interpretational models far too far - and does so with the intent of casting the validity of perception into doubt, to undermine the empirical basis for scientific knowledge.

Yes, but given the way that physics conflicts with common sense, it is important to point out that observations themselves tell us that some observations are wrong, mistaken, misleading and that observations themselves enable us to correct those mistakes - usually. — Ludwig V

Does physics conflict with common sense? I don't think it does. Certainly not Newtonian physics; it's very intuitive. Relativity gets a bit weird, but at velocities approaching the speed of light. And quantum physics gets weird, but again, by virtue of being as small and lightspeed is quick! It's hardly surprising that conditions far removed from our experience, to the absolute extremes of velocity and scale, are difficult to understand in common sense terms.

Traffic lights. Their very existence presupposes a commonality of perception. And they're everywhere! As is art, colour coded electrical wires, signs saying Keep Off the Grass! etc. This very sentence assumes your ability to see, and psychologically translate perception into meaning similar - if not identical to, that which it is intended to convey. — karl stone

.. and you interpret all that in dualistic terms. But that's an interpretation, not a fact.

However, the subjectivist takes the implications of the existence of interpretational models far too far - and does so with the intent of casting the validity of perception into doubt, to undermine the empirical basis for scientific knowledge. — karl stone

I'm not a subjectivist and I don't doubt the validity of perception as such, though I do doubt the validity of some of my perception - often rightly.

Does physics conflict with common sense? I don't think it does. Certainly not Newtonian physics; it's very intuitive. Relativity gets a bit weird, but at velocities approaching the speed of light. And quantum physics gets weird, but again, by virtue of being as small and lightspeed is quick! It's hardly surprising that conditions far removed from our experience, to the absolute extremes of velocity and scale, are difficult to understand in common sense terms. — karl stone

In one sense, it is not possible that they conflict. But people think they do, so an explanation is in order. It is true that Newtonian physics is intuitive now. But it wasn't before he came up with it and many people found it seriusly counter-intuitive. Ditto Relativity.

.. and you interpret all that in dualistic terms. But that's an interpretation, not a fact. — Ludwig V

Not dualistic in the sense a subjectivist infers or employs dualism. I accept there's an object world, and subjective experience of it. I'll answer the subjectivist argument, but for me - subjective experience can be shown to be aligned to an objective reality.
Indeed, how could it be otherwise - given that our senses are evolved to negotiate a world that could kill us, and consequently remove us from the evolutionary development of our senses?
Observation of objective phenomena (i.e. an apple falling from a tree) allows us to derive knowledge of how things work, (planetary motion) and re-apply that knowledge in different circumstances, (rocket science) to create technologies that function. If you introduce ideas of the subjective variability of perception then rocket science wouldn't work.

I'm not a subjectivist and I don't doubt the validity of perception as such, though I do doubt the validity of some of my perception - often rightly. — Ludwig V

What do you mean by perceptions here, exactly? Are you referring to raw sense data? Or the entire process of observation and interpretation of observations? Because sure, we might misunderstand what we see. But that's different from questioning the validity of raw sense perception - to reality.

In one sense, it is not possible that they conflict. But people think they do, so an explanation is in order. It is true that Newtonian physics is intuitive now. But it wasn't before he came up with it and many people found it seriously counter-intuitive. Ditto Relativity. — Ludwig V

At one time, people believed the Earth was stationary. It actually feels as if the Earth is stationary to someone stood on the surface. Thing is, the relative motions of planetary bodies in space is a subtly different question to why the Earth seems stationary to someone stood on the surface.
In short, it is not what we are observing that's mistaken, but our understanding of observations.

The sun appears to rise and set; that's how we think about it. But in fact the Earth is rotating.

Similarly, you can drop a ball from a tower and it will appear to fall straight down. But in absolute space, the trajectory is curved. It actually falls a good distance from... where the base of the tower was when the ball was dropped from the top. Only the base of the tower has also moved in absolute space.

If you were travelling at the speed of light, relativity would make perfect sense, he said, ducking out of even attempting to explain relativity!

All this is supplemental to the point, that there's really no alternative to accept the dualistic nature of subjective experience of an objective reality. It's what we make of that fact that matters. And what I'm saying is that subjectivists since Descartes have had an anti-science agenda.

Is my “red” your “red”?: Evaluating structural correspondences between color similarity judgments using unsupervised alignment
Genji Kawakita1,2,7 ∙ Ariel Zeleznikow-Johnston3,4,7 ∙ Ken Takeda1,7 ∙ Naotsugu Tsuchiya3,4,5,6,8 naotsugu.tsuchiya@monash.edu ∙ Masafumi Oizumi1,8,9 c-oizumi@g.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Whether one person’s subjective experience of the “redness” of red is equivalent to another’s is a fundamental question in consciousness studies. Intersubjective comparison of the relational structures of sensory experiences, termed “qualia structures”, can constrain the question. We propose an unsupervised alignment method, based on optimal transport, to find the optimal mapping between the similarity structures of sensory experiences without presupposing correspondences (such as “red-to-red”). After collecting subjective similarity judgments for 93 colors, we showed that the similarity structures derived from color-neurotypical participants can be “correctly” aligned at the group level. In contrast, those of color-blind participants could not be aligned with color-neurotypical participants. Our results provide quantitative evidence for interindividual structural equivalence or difference of color qualia, implying that color-neurotypical people’s “red” is relationally equivalent to other color-neurotypical’s “red”, but not to color-blind people’s “red”. This method is applicable across modalities, enabling general structural exploration of subjective experiences.

In math we can form an induction which is valid by starting with a particular case and then proving that it holds for all cases so that the individual number, say n=0, holds for all n +1, and so on.

But with Aristotle I think of his categories more like trees in set theory where the trees are increasingly wider sets that encompass the lower sets as their species -- so there are individuals, but then sets become individuals, and we can make inferences about the world because these sets aren't just a means for us to organize our thoughts, but rather are depictions of the world as it is -- so that the induction which takes place from an individual, like a human, can hold for the more general category when we utilize that individuals essence that fits within a wider category.

Does this make any sense at all?

EDIT: Though if we were to build a tree of Aristotle's concepts it would look "inverse" because there'd be one node at the top -- being -- under which all the other genera are species, and at the bottom you'd have all the individuals which the sets "contain"

The hylomorphism that he espouses makes sense of why one could do this with respect to reality.

In math we can form an induction which is valid by starting with a particular case and then proving that it holds for all cases so that the individual number, say n=0, holds for all n +1, and so on. — Moliere

Well, it's not that a number holds for the iterative set, but rather that a relation or function holds for the iterative set. But yeah, that's close.

But with Aristotle I think of his categories more like trees in set theory where the trees are increasingly wider sets that encompass the lower sets as their species — Moliere

I think that's right but it seems different from mathematical proofs from induction.

so there are individuals, but then sets become individuals, and we can make inferences about the world because these sets aren't just a means for us to organize our thoughts, but rather are depictions of the world as it is — Moliere

Right, though a species is not a set if we wish to speak more carefully.

so that the induction which takes place from an individual — Moliere

Here is the crux of what I question. "Aristotle places an individual into a species via induction, therefore he is involved in a mathematical proof from induction."

Why do you see what you describe of Aristotle's method as "mathematical induction"? Because I could give a very simple argument, using your own premises, to show that it is not: <Mathematical induction is logically valid; Aristotle's induction is not logically valid; therefore Aristotle's induction is not mathematical induction>. Hence you are simultaneously claiming that Aristotle's induction is and is not mathematical induction (because you keep saying that it is, and yet you deny that it is valid in the way that mathematical induction is valid).

Does this make any sense at all? — Moliere

It's an argument, which is exactly what I've been asking for. :up:
So yes, it makes sense, although I am not convinced that it is correct.

Well, it's not that a number holds for the iterative set, but rather that a relation holds for the iterative set. But yeah, that's close. — Leontiskos

Fair.

Right, though a species is not a set if we wish to speak more carefully. — Leontiskos

How would we differentiate it? It looks a lot like set theory to me.

Why do you see what you describe of Aristotle's method as "mathematical induction"? — Leontiskos

Because, for him, the genera are real. When he moves up the chain there's no such thing as a black swan, for instance. It's different from mathematical induction in that it's about concretes, but it's like mathematical induction because the sets are real and the induction is thought to apply to all cases, which is what secures the claim to validity. Also, since I'm thinking about these as sets, where a genera is only a more general set than some given species, so I think he quite literally thinks the world is structured like his categories. There's still a basic material, but it requires some form -- like a cause -- in order for something to be real. This makes sense for him because ultimately where we end up is in a finite universe which is produced by the mind of God thinking himself into being. So the categories are a part of our world, and not just our experience, and certainly not just a way of ordering our thoughts. That's why there wouldn't be any invalidity in moving up, inductively -- the categories have an essence which makes it to where there's no problem making an inference from the particular to the general.


For myself I think of these as ways of ordering our thinking rather than as an ontology. The world isn't constrained by our logic, and frequently demonstrates this. But it's easier to see that when we have so much knowledge that no one person will ever be able to dwell on it. In Aristotle's day it makes sense to continue the research programme he set up in the manner that he did.

Basically because we can always be wrong when we follow a procedure of induction it's never valid -- there is at least one case where the inference could be false, where we are mistaken about the object we are talking about, so it fails to the basic definition of validity. But since it doesn't structure reality itself that's not as big of a deal for me.

Okay, fair enough. I am not familiar with Lavoisier so that reference isn't informative to me. So you are saying that Lavoisier worked with precise instruments and Aristotle did not? That is the difference I see you pointing to. — Leontiskos

Aristotle worked with what he had -- but I'm not sure he had instruments at all, to be honest. His instrument was logic, description, empiricism, and interpretation of prior works on the subjects he was interested in.

I'm saying Lavoisier's contribution to our intellectual heritage is scientific because he was building instruments to test theories and discover what the empirical formula for water was in a way that convinced the rest of the scientific community.

Building instruments in accord with a theory does not look like philosophy, to me -- at all. So he serves as a contrast case to Aristotle who was a philosopher-scientist -- Aristotle is an empiricist, but he was born before a time when measurement was theorized at all. So it makes sense that he'd think there's a continuity between science and philosophy.

banno If I may chime in with a related question. I seem to be missing an understanding about what a property is. I can see that whatever name that object (i.e. the eiffel tower) has is distinct from any of the properties that it has qua physical object. But if "a" refers to a, then it seems to me to follow that a is referred to by "a". So if the former is a property of "a" then the latter must be a property of a? You and J seem to agree that "a" does have a property of referring to a, but that although a is referred to by "a", that does not constitute a property. I don't see why not. I do see that one could not use it to identity the reference of "a", because it would be circular, but that's a different matter, isn't it? — Ludwig V

So what is a property? Fair question. Logicians use "property" in a slightly different way to Aristotle.

What is "'a' refers to a" about? At a naive level we might suppose that since the sentence predicates "'a' refers to..." to a, then a is an individual with the property of being referred to as 'a'. It's not much of a property. Aristotle and others added various ad hoc ideas here in an attempt to make it work. Formal logic does something quite different.

A property in extensional formal logic is just a set of things. So the property of being red is just the grouping of individuals that are red, the property of being in Australia is just the things that are in Australia, and that's all. The property of being red = the set of all red things. This captures only which objects fall under a predicate, not why or how.

The predicate “is referred to by ‘a’” defines a singleton set: {a}, so in this stripped-down view, it could be called a property — because a is in the set. However, singleton sets carry no information or weight. It's trivial, it's not discoverable by empirical means, it's neither intrinsic or necessary that "a" refer to a.

Do we count it as a property, then?

The point made earlier, in amongst a bunch of other stuff, is that in predicate calculus, properties are thought of as represented by the letters f,g,h... and so on. So f(a) says that a has the property f. Such systems are given an interpretation by assigning individuals to the individual variables.

We have the list of predicate variables, "f","g","h"; and the list of individual variables, "a","b","c"...

We assign a property, say f, to some individual, say a, by writing f(a).

We assign an interpretation to this syntax by assigning an individual to each of the individual variables, a to "a", b to "b", and so on.

So, assigning a property to an individual happens in a different part of the logic to assigning a name to an individual.

For these two reasons, having a name is not usually considered as having the property of having that name. Being referred to by a name is not part of the logical property structure — it belongs to the semantic interpretation.

The first argument:

I don't think dualism is an assumption. It's a description of a state of affairs. — karl stone

A description. So you are saying that it's an empirical observation? What is it we are observing here...

I understand what it means to observe the sky, or the horizon, or the sound of the sea. I'm not sure of what it could mean to observe internal and external worlds. I see the sky with my eyes, hear the sea with my ears - what sense do I use to observe my own mind? And who is it that is doing the observing of that mind, if not my mind...?

That all seems very odd. A long stretch.

The second argument:

Senses that are evolved to enable us to survive; and thus, demonstrably accurate to external reality. — karl stone

I'm not at all keen on Donald Hoffman, a chap with whom you have some points in common, but one point he makes is that there need be no relation between what the evolved mind presents to us and what is "out there". Indeed, his conclusion is quite the opposite. Evolution selects not for veridical perceptions, but for fitness-enhancing ones — and these two are not only distinct but often incompatible. We cannot assume that perceptual accuracy correlates with survival success.

When one decides on one's enemy - subjectivism, perhaps, whatever that is - one tends to see them everywhere. One might find oneself criticising an argument that hasn't been presented.

Isn't it rather that in order to make an observation at all, you become an observer seperate from what you are observing?

, , , ...so one might find oneself at pains to demonstrate something that is not at issue.

The first argument:
I don't think dualism is an assumption. It's a description of a state of affairs.
— karl stone
A description. So you are saying that it's an empirical observation? What is it we are observing here... — Banno

We observe a state of affairs. The state of being conscious of a world existing externally to ourselves. Is it an empirical observation? Yes and no. You cannot confirm my observations of this state of affairs. You can only report a similar experience of an 'I' - looking out through your eyeholes. Is that sufficient for empiricism?

I understand what it means to observe the sky, or the horizon, or the sound of the sea. I'm not sure of what it could mean to observe internal and external worlds. I see the sky with my eyes, hear the sea with my ears - what sense do I use to observe my own mind? And who is it that is doing the observing of that mind, if not my mind...? — Banno

Apparently not. If you don't know what it is to observe internal and external worlds - then you cannot even confirm similar experience of a subject/object distinction. I can only assume you must be some sort of robot.

That all seems very odd. A long stretch. — Banno

Beep boop, beep beep beep boop!

The second argument:
Senses that are evolved to enable us to survive; and thus, demonstrably accurate to external reality.
— karl stone
I'm not at all keen on Donald Hoffman, a chap with whom you have some points in common, but one point he makes is that there need be no relation between what the evolved mind presents to us and what is "out there". — Banno

His 2015 TED Talk, "Do we see reality as it is?" argues that our perceptions have evolved to hide reality from us.

I'm not familiar with his work, but he's not the only university professor arguing for a subjectivist understanding of perception. There's an entire industry dedicated to - telling us there's no such thing as colour, for example. That colour is subjectively constructed. Something I cannot reconcile with the physical reality of the different wave-lengths of different colours of light.

I don't think the question is very well framed. Obviously we don't see reality as it is. Our sight is confined to a tiny portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. We hear a small auditory range. Better put, the question would be - Is what we see real?
And the answer is yes. How could it be otherwise? We could not have survived as a species if our senses were inaccurate to reality. Limited certainly, but not false.

Evolution selects not for veridical perceptions, but for fitness-enhancing ones — and these two are not only distinct but often incompatible. We cannot assume that perceptual accuracy correlates with survival success. — Banno

A Lamarckian, is he? He cannot be a Darwinian. He imagines that evolution knows the blacksmith son will need big muscles? It's just not how evolution works. The surviving adult organism passes on traits that allowed for their survival to their offspring; while those traits that didn't allow for survival are extinguished from the genetic line. Consequently the senses are sufficiently veridical to enable survival; based on prior selection. They're not predictive of what will, in future constitute fitness.

When one decides on one's enemy - subjectivism, perhaps, whatever that is - one tends to see them everywhere. One might find oneself criticising an argument that hasn't been presented. — Banno

One might find oneself scratching one's head, wondering what you're talking about? I'm not looking for enemies. I'm looking for truth. I find enemies of truth; but that's incidental to what I'm doing.

Isn't it rather that in order to make an observation at all, you become an observer seperate from what you are observing? — Banno

I find myself observing unbidden, such that I am not making an observation or becoming an observer - but an observant being, prior to, during and after any particular observation. I have not become an observer, because I already was one. The subject/object dualism is the prevailing state of affairs; a description of that state - of being inwardly conscious of an external reality. I make very little of it in an empirical worldview - subjectivism is a near irrelance compared to the significance of objectivism. That is, an external world with definite physical characteristics, to which the organism must be physiologically, behaviourally and intellectually correct to survive.

Ok. Since you have it all worked out, I'll leave you to it.

Ok. Since you have it all worked out, I'll leave you to it. — Banno

I was expecting an even longer response, and dreading my even longer response to your even longer response. I respect your initiative in breaking the cycle.

Well, you are not the first to present this sort of account, a scientists setting to rights the poor benighted philosophers.

It's easy to provide an answer when you haven't understood the issue.

Hang around for a bit, see if you notice anything odd or problematic in what you've decided. Then we might have an interesting chat.

I'm not familiar with his work, but he's not the only university professor arguing for a subjectivist understanding of perception. There's an entire industry dedicated to - telling us there's no such thing as colour, for example. That colour is subjectively constructed. Something I cannot reconcile with the physical reality of the different wave-lengths of different colours of light. — karl stone

Shameless plug for my original post The Mind Created World which is all about this topic.

What do you mean by perceptions here, exactly? Are you referring to raw sense data? Or the entire process of observation and interpretation of observations? Because sure, we might misunderstand what we see. But that's different from questioning the validity of raw sense perception - to reality. — karl stone

I mean the latter. Raw perceptions are a myth - a construction from our recognition that there are interpretive processes at work. The moment that the light or sound or whatever arrives at our sense organs, the process of selection, editing and interpreting begins. A perception that was raw could not be perceived by us, and a perception that can be perceived by us is not raw.

All this is supplemental to the point, that there's really no alternative to accept the dualistic nature of subjective experience of an objective reality. — karl stone

Can we just concentrate on this? It doesn't help me much, because I don't understand what you are tryinng to say. It is true that experience of an objective reality requires two poles. That's because it is a relationship. The perceiver (subject) experiences the reality (object). I don't see that any metaphysical consequences follow.
To see what I mean, look at Descartes' argument. He points out that we can distinguish between mind and body and so concludes that they are two distinct things and thence that they are different substances. He interprets "distinct" in a specific way and the metaphysics grows from that. But there is no need to interpret "distinct" in that way.

Well, you are not the first to present this sort of account, a scientists setting to rights the poor benighted philosophers. — Banno

I'm sure I've explained how Galileo was right; while Descartes wrote Meditations as a preemptive defence against impeachment by the Inquisition. I'm not a scientist setting philosophers to rights. I'm a philosopher of science; a Galilean objectivist seeking to reimagine the philosophy that would have resulted had the Church welcomed Galileo as discovering the means to establish valid knowledge of Creation.

It's easy to provide an answer when you haven't understood the issue. — Banno

My inadequacy to the task is something I struggle with; the impossibility of rewriting 400 years of European philosophical history in the course of Galilean objectivism. It is however, the terms in which I arrived at a Magma Energy solution to the climate and ecological crisis - while left winged subjectivist accounts run aground upon Marxist Limits to Growth.

Hang around for a bit, see if you notice anything odd or problematic in what you've decided. Then we might have an interesting chat. — Banno

How very Cartesian of you!

I mean the latter. Raw perceptions are a myth - a construction from our recognition that there are interpretive processes at work. The moment that the light or sound or whatever arrives at our sense organs, the process of selection, editing and interpreting begins. A perception that was raw could not be perceived by us, and a perception that can be perceived by us is not raw. — Ludwig V

Whereas an evil demon who maybe keeps our brain in a jar is a justifiable methodological device? Net down for your serve again!
There are sound waves that strike our eardrums causing them to vibrate; light that strikes our eye, to which the organism is responsive. So far we are talking about pure physics.
From there we transition to evolutionary biology, to describe the physiological response of an organism evolved in relation to reality, that must be sufficiently correct to reality to facilitate survival.
Thereafter, we are into psychological interpretation, across the brain/mind distinction. I'd suggest subjectivism lies mostly within the realm of the latter - the mind as opposed to the brain, and less yet organs of sensory perception.

Take your average perceptual illusion; like the duck/rabbit - it is an ambiguous image. The mask illusion is quite compelling - we see an inside out mask facing outward, but put a mark on the face and the illusion disappears!
The point being, interpretational models are not subjective. Consider the conservation of quantity in developmental psychology; something infants 2-3 are unable to understand, but then suddenly grasp at the age of 4. They're not subjectively constructed interpretational models, but largely in the realm of the brain function of an organism able to survive within a physical environment.
The subjectivist takes the implications of a distinction between sense data and interpretation too far.

Can we just concentrate on this? It doesn't help me much, because I don't understand what you are trying to say. It is true that experience of an objective reality requires two poles. That's because it is a relationship. The perceiver (subject) experiences the reality (object). I don't see that any metaphysical consequences follow.
To see what I mean, look at Descartes' argument. He points out that we can distinguish between mind and body and so concludes that they are two distinct things and thence that they are different substances. He interprets "distinct" in a specific way and the metaphysics grows from that. But there is no need to interpret "distinct" in that way. — Ludwig V

You don't help me much; arguing the subjectivist perspective while denying you're a subjectivist. Could you pick a lane? When you say, "I don't see any metaphysical consequences follow" who are you saying that as? A Cartesian, or not a Cartesian?
What I'm trying to say is that sure, the subject exists, but it is of almost no consequence. Valid observation of an external reality is demonstrably possible. Were it otherwise, we'd be extinct. We are clearly able to negotiate the physical world, and only in the most deliberately ambiguous circumstances are our perceptions, and/or perceptual models unable to process what we see. I'm saying that your assertion:

I do doubt the validity of some of my perception - often rightly. — Ludwig V

...is overstated. Assuming you are of adequate health, it's extremely rare that your perception is not accurate to reality.

In order to give a coherent interpretation to these systems, Kripke taught us to use possible world semantics. In a way all this amounts to is a process to group the predicates used previously. So we said earlier that "f" stands for {a,c,e}, and to this we now add that in different worlds, f can stand for different sets of individuals. So in w₀ "f" stands for {a,c,e}, while in w₁ f stands for {a,b}, and so on in whatever way we stipulate - w₀ being world zero, w₁ being world one, and so on. Now we have added a semantics to the syntax of S4 and S5. — Banno

Thanks for this. It does make sense. I'll have to take it for granted that there are no other successful interpretations. I know that logicians accepted this as the only viable possibility.

For these two reasons, having a name is not usually considered as having the property of having that name. Being referred to by a name is not part of the logical property structure — it belongs to the semantic interpretation. — Banno

Many thanks for this. I can see the sense in it.

if I additionally ask about how "a" comes to stand for the Eiffel Tower, we can't answer that in terms of the interpretation of "a" -- that is, the various properties that can now be predicated of a based upon our interpretation. We have to move to a different level and talk about how or why "a" has the reference it has, which is not a feature or property of a, any more than my name is a property of me. — J

But part of my puzzlement was because of an apparent asymmetry between referring to something and being referred to by something. You don't explicitly say much about "a". But fixing the reference must involve both "a" and a. So I would have thought that "a"'s referring to a is also not a property of "a". Is that right?

And to this we might add a third level, where we seek to understand what we are doing in a natural language by applying these formal systems. — Banno

OK. So now the question whether the concept of a rigid designator is part of the formal system and must be assessed in that context, or part of natural language and assessed in that context. (There's something odd about classifying philosophical logic as "natural language", so perhaps we need a third alternative - not quite natural, not quite formal, but bridging.)

For these two reasons, having a name is not usually considered as having the property of having that name. Being referred to by a name is not part of the logical property structure — it belongs to the semantic interpretation.
— Banno
Many thanks for this. I can see the sense in it.

if I additionally ask about how "a" comes to stand for the Eiffel Tower, we can't answer that in terms of the interpretation of "a" -- that is, the various properties that can now be predicated of a based upon our interpretation. We have to move to a different level and talk about how or why "a" has the reference it has, which is not a feature or property of a, any more than my name is a property of me.
— J — Ludwig V

If I'm understanding @Banno correctly, he's agreed with, and explicated, my talk about a "different level." To say, "The fact that 'a' has the reference it has is not a feature or property of a" is basically the same as saying, "Being referred to by a name is not part of the logical property structure -- it belongs to the semantic interpretation." Or so I believe, and if that's wrong, it's on me, since Banno has been perfectly clear.

But part of my puzzlement was because of an apparent asymmetry between referring to something and being referred to by something. You don't explicitly say much about "a". But fixing the reference must involve both "a" and a. So I would have thought that "a"'s referring to a is also not a property of "a". Is that right? — Ludwig V

The thing is, "a" has no properties at all. It's a name. So there is actually a symmetry of sorts! "'a' refers to a" is not a property of a, and "a is the reference of 'a'" isn't a property of "a", not because it isn't included in the list of "a"'s properties, but because there is no such list.

If I'm understanding Banno correctly, he's agreed with, and explicated, my talk about a "different level." To say, "The fact that 'a' has the reference it has is not a feature or property of a" is basically the same as saying, "Being referred to by a name is not part of the logical property structure -- it belongs to the semantic interpretation." Or so I believe, and if that's wrong, it's on me, since Banno has been perfectly clear. — J

I can see that it is not part of the first level. "Semantic interpretation" looks like the second level.

And to this we might add a third level, where we seek to understand what we are doing in a natural language by applying these formal systems. So for propositional logic, we understand the p's and q's as standing for the sentences of our natural language, and T and F as True and False. For predicate logic, we understand a,b,c as standing for Fred Bloggs, the Eiffel tower and consumerism, or whatever. — Banno

For what it's worth, I think reference is on the third level, because that's where we encounter the Eiffel Tower etc. I expect Banno will put us right.

The thing is, "a" has no properties at all. It's a name. So there is actually a symmetry of sorts! "'a' refers to a" is not a property of a, and "a is the reference of 'a'" isn't a property of "a", not because it isn't included in the list of "a"'s properties, but because there is no such list. — J

I suspected as much.

I'll have to take it for granted that there are no other successful interpretations. — Ludwig V

A good point. If there were alternate explanation, what might they look like?

There's a generalisation of possible world semantics that turns out to be predicate calculus. That is, what can be expressed in modal logic can be expressed just in predicate calculus, after Montague and van Benthem. Strictly, modal logic is not an extension of predicate logic, but a fragment of it.

So if there are other ways of formalising modal logic, if they are as strong as possible world semantics, they will still be a subset of predicate calculus.

Roughly, any other alternative interpretation would be equivalent to possible world semantics.

...an apparent asymmetry between referring to something and being referred to by something. — Ludwig V

Yep. There's a difference between using a name to refer and inaugurating a name. Two different speech acts. Referring to something is a different sort of activity to making it that some word is used to refer.

The inauguration of a name involves a status function, one way or another. The word comes to "count as" the thing.

So now the question whether the concept of a rigid designator is part of the formal system and must be assessed in that context, or part of natural language and assessed in that context. — Ludwig V

My inclination is to think about the interpretation as something we do with the syntax, as an activity. If that's on track, then we use a name as a rigid designator. The name is a string of letters until used as a rigid designator. The string of letters is a part of the syntax of the system, the use as a rigid designator, to name something, is a part of the semantics of the system.

I somewhat regret suggesting a third level, since the gap between a formal modal and a natural language is no where near at the level of the gap between a syntax and a semantics.

"Being referred to by a name is not part of the logical property structure -- it belongs to the semantic interpretation." — J

More accurately, being a name is not part of the syntax, but part of the semantics, of the model being used. The model may be formal, or it may be part of a natural language. Modelling is a part of logic.

How would we differentiate it? It looks a lot like set theory to me. — Moliere

In set theoretic terms, one thing we could say is that every species is a subset and every genus is a superset. Another difference is that the species/genus schema is not predicated on the bare particulars of modern logic. That is a nominalist innovation. See for example the last quote provided <here>.

Because, for him, the genera are real. When he moves up the chain there's no such thing as a black swan, for instance. It's different from mathematical induction in that it's about concretes, but it's like mathematical induction because the sets are real and the induction is thought to apply to all cases, which is what secures the claim to validity. Also, since I'm thinking about these as sets, where a genera is only a more general set than some given species, so I think he quite literally thinks the world is structured like his categories. There's still a basic material, but it requires some form -- like a cause -- in order for something to be real. This makes sense for him because ultimately where we end up is in a finite universe which is produced by the mind of God thinking himself into being. So the categories are a part of our world, and not just our experience, and certainly not just a way of ordering our thoughts. That's why there wouldn't be any invalidity in moving up, inductively -- the categories have an essence which makes it to where there's no problem making an inference from the particular to the general. — Moliere

I'm wondering if you can make sense of that bolded portion? "Aristotle's induction would be valid given his presupposition of X, but since X is false it is invalid." It actually seems that if your account is correct, then what is at stake is not induction at all, but rather a disjunctive syllogism. In that case it is only a matter of determining which "category" the phenomena in question belongs to, which is much different even from mathematical induction.

But I think I understand your general thrust. "Aristotle looks at one swan and sees that it is white. Then he looks at a second and sees that it is white. After doing this 100 times, he infers that every subsequent swan will be white, and that's like mathematical induction."

That's intelligible, but I just don't think it's what Aristotle is doing. It's what Hume understands by induction, not Aristotle, which is why I pointed to Hume at the beginning of this chapter of our conversation. Aristotle's view is represented by the essays I linked <here>.

Simplified, Aristotle is basically saying that familiarity breeds understanding. If we become familiar with swans then we will begin to understand swans. There is no guarantee for Aristotle that there are no black swans. There is no Humean induction.

Basically because we can always be wrong when we follow a procedure of induction it's never valid -- there is at least one case where the inference could be false, where we are mistaken about the object we are talking about, so it fails to the basic definition of validity. — Moliere

I think recently said something that parallels your basic error in this. With Hume you think analysis is possible and legitimate but synthesis is impossible and illegitimate. Aristotle's epagōgē ("induction") is a matter of synthesis; of moving from the particular to the universal. Sime helpfully identifies the false assumptions underlying anti-synthesis thinking, but it is also worth noting that no one actually believes Hume, not even himself. No one actually believes that familiarity does not breed understanding, and no one believes that there are no truths about species. If Hume were right then we could not even say that swans can fly, or that swans can honk. For the Humean there is no possibility of saying, "We can't know that swans are white, but we can know that swans can fly and honk."

Roughly, any other alternative interpretation would be equivalent to possible world semantics. — Banno

OK. But when I hear "There's a possible world in which P", I understand this to be equivalent to "It is possible that P". So far, I haven't identified any difference that matters in my world. Am I right?

I somewhat regret suggesting a third level, since the gap between a formal modal and a natural language is no where near at the level of the gap between a syntax and a semantics. — Banno

Well, from my point of view, the question where natural language sits in relation to the formal system is important. I don't think the difference between the two gaps is a problem at all.

OK. But when I hear "There's a possible world in which P", I understand this to be equivalent to "It is possible that P". So far, I haven't identified any difference that matters in my world. Am I right? — Ludwig V

Yep. Not seeing the relevance.

Modal logic can be translated into FOL thus:
□A → ∀w′ (R(w, w′) → A(w′))
◇A → ∃w′ (R(w, w′) ∧ A(w′))
Where:
w and w′ are world variables,
R is the accessibility relation.

That is, necessarily A means that A is true in every accessible world, and possible A means that there is an accessible world in which A is true.

...the question where natural language sits in relation to the formal system is important. — Ludwig V

It's an important question. Note that there need be - indeed, there cannot be - a systematic relation between the two in the way there is between a system of syntax and a stipulated model for that syntax.

That's why the enterprise of the Tractatus couldn't work.

What we can do with formal logic is to show the coherence of some fragments of natural language.

What we can do with formal logic is to show the coherence of some fragments of natural language. — Banno

I can see that. I can also see room for a good deal more philosophy. But I think that going there would be a bit off topic for this thread. Thank you for all your help.

Another difference is that the species/genus schema is not predicated on the bare particulars of modern logic — Leontiskos

Judging by your quote I'd say that this is really just where I disagree with Aristotle -- there's no such thing as essences.

So while I understand that within his system of philosophy he believes that induction is valid, and this is due to things having an essence -- i.e. there is some needed common traits or relationships which are shared by each member of the genera.

But, OK -- yes, that's a difference in terms of the philosophy. I don't think Aristotle is a Quinean or anything of the sort when considering his whole system -- but conceptually the various species and their genera look a lot like sets.

For Aristotle I would just add that there are ontological conditions to the sets, whereas today we'd prefer to abstract to the logic alone and leave the ontology undefined so that we could then speak clearly about what exists.

Make sense?

Simplified, Aristotle is basically saying that familiarity breeds understanding. If we become familiar with swans then we will begin to understand swans. There is no guarantee for Aristotle that there are no black swans. There is no Humean induction. — Leontiskos

I'm only using that as a familiar example.

You would agree that there is an essence which a swan possess which makes the swan a swan according to Aristotle?

Whatever the essence is for Aristotle there is an essence that can be discovered, and I think that's what secures his knowledge via the empirical method. He can know about every member of the set because of these necessary and sufficient conditions which make a tiger what a tiger is.

Whereas I would say that it's in the very logic itself that makes the move from species to genera invalid. There is no essence that holds all tigers together, a what-it-isness which makes the tiger a tiger.

So I'm not talking about being wrong in the sense of error as much as I'm saying there is no valid construction of induction because there is nothing to universalize. This is a big difference between my understanding of Aristotle, vs. Darwinian, biology. The species aren't as distinct as what Aristotle's method indicates -- they slowly morph over time and we update our taxonomies the more we learn, but this isn't a logically valid move.

Familiarity with swans will help us to understand swans, and if we happen to notice that all birds have wings then we might say that the essence of birds is "has wings", and since all swans are birds all swans have wings since that is what holds for all birds.

In such a world, if you could correctly identify an essence -- what holds for all the tigers, or whatever species/genera is under discussion -- then moving up to a more encompassing category would appear entirely valid.

So, in my understanding of Aristotle at least, I can understand why he believes it's valid. It's not like he didn't know what validity was. However, I think he is wrong about essence, and what you end up with for any process of induction is never a logically valid move. It's a guess. Hopefully an educated guess, but a guess all the same -- and the taxonomies we write about animals are our way of understanding life rather than the essence of life.

I don't think I've said anything Humean here -- if I were I'd be talking about relationships between events or the wash of perception or the emotional grounding of inference or something. But I'm just saying that Aristotle is wrong about essences, and that's what masks the invalidity of going from a particular to a general. The allusion to mathematical induction is to say that it appears to me that Aristotle treats inductive knowledge of particulars in the same manner that we treat inductive knowledge of math -- i.e. there is some conditions which hold for all tigers, and once we know that from some tigers we will have knowledge of all tigers in their essence, if not in their particulars/accidents.

Or I could be wrong about the role of essence in Aristotle. But at least this is how I'm understanding it. Does it make sense to you?

For Aristotle I would just add that there are ontological conditions to the sets, whereas today we'd prefer to abstract to the logic alone and leave the ontology undefined so that we could then speak clearly about what exists.

Make sense? — Moliere

I would say that some philosophers follow Quine today. Not sure how many. I think there are less than you suppose.

Whereas I would say that it's in the very logic itself that makes the move from species to genera invalid. There is no essence that holds all tigers together, a what-it-isness which makes the tiger a tiger. — Moliere

So do you think tigers exist or not?

The problem here is that you keep opposing even a Kripkean essentialism (for example, by saying that water is not H2O). If you think that water or tigers have no necessary properties, then you oppose not only Aristotle but also Kripke, and your critique really has nothing to do with Aristotle per se. And I am really not convinced that your critique has anything to do with Aristotle per se.

So I'm not talking about being wrong in the sense of error as much as I'm saying there is no valid construction of induction because there is nothing to universalize. This is a big difference between my understanding of Aristotle, vs. Darwinian, biology. The species aren't as distinct as what Aristotle's method indicates -- they slowly morph over time and we update our taxonomies the more we learn, but this isn't a logically valid move. — Moliere

What isn't logically valid? Again:

No one actually believes that familiarity does not breed understanding, and no one believes that there are no truths about species. If Hume were right then we could not even say that swans can fly, or that swans can honk. For the Humean there is no possibility of saying, "We can't know that swans are white, but we can know that swans can fly and honk." — Leontiskos

Do you think swans exist? Do you think swans can fly? Do you think swans can honk?

Familiarity with swans will help us to understand swans, and if we happen to notice that all birds have wings then we might say that the essence of birds is "has wings", and since all swans are birds all swans have wings since that is what holds for all birds.

In such a world, if you could correctly identify an essence -- what holds for all the tigers, or whatever species/genera is under discussion -- then moving up to a more encompassing category would appear entirely valid. — Moliere

The problem with your construal is that it isn't induction at all. It is not an inference at all, but a tautology. "I have seen three swans and they all have wings; therefore three swans have wings." Or, "I have seen every swan that currently exists, and they all have wings; therefore every currently-existing swan has wings." No induction is occurring here, much less any inference at all. If you go from "all tigers" to "all tigers" then you haven't made a move at all, and you have certainly not moved to a "more encompassing category."

(Note too that the deeper problem with your Humean approach is that it can't even recognize a single swan or tiger in the first place. It hasn't conceived the problem of how the word 'tiger' is upbuilt in the first place.)

So, in my understanding of Aristotle at least, I can understand why he believes it's valid. It's not like he didn't know what validity was. However, I think he is wrong about essence, and what you end up with for any process of induction is never a logically valid move. It's a guess. Hopefully an educated guess, but a guess all the same -- and the taxonomies we write about animals are our way of understanding life rather than the essence of life. — Moliere

I don't think you understand Aristotle. Again:

But I think I understand your general thrust. "Aristotle looks at one swan and sees that it is white. Then he looks at a second and sees that it is white. After doing this 100 times, he infers that every subsequent swan will be white, and that's like mathematical induction."

That's intelligible, but I just don't think it's what Aristotle is doing. It's what Hume understands by induction, not Aristotle, which is why I pointed to Hume at the beginning of this chapter of our conversation. Aristotle's view is represented by the essays I linked <here>. — Leontiskos

You seem to be a Humean who thinks that Kripke could never have warrant to claim that water is H2O. And of course this means that you also oppose Aristotle and Darwin, who are also involved in similar claims. Darwin makes universal claims about species as well, after all. It makes no difference that species evolve. All such species-claims, whether Kripke's, Darwin's, or Aristotle's must be opposed by a Humean like yourself. So the topic here is really Hume, not Aristotle.

I don't think I've said anything Humean here -- if I were I'd be talking about relationships between events or the wash of perception or the emotional grounding of inference or something. But I'm just saying that Aristotle is wrong about essences, and that's what masks the invalidity of going from a particular to a general. — Moliere

The argument that it is impossible to move from particulars to universals is a Humean argument.

Or I could be wrong about the role of essence in Aristotle. But at least this is how I'm understanding it. Does it make sense to you? — Moliere

It makes sense to me that you are falsely attributing the thing that Hume critiques to Aristotle. It also makes sense to me that, as a Humean, you would oppose all knowledge of species, whether Kripkean, Darwinian, or Aristotelian. I just don't think you walk the walk and absent yourself from believing species-propositions.