What isn't logically valid? — Leontiskos

Induction. At least my interpretation of Aristotle's induction, which relies upon a premise that there are predicates which hold for all members of a species: so it looks like we can infer up from swans to birds when noting how we compare swans with eagles and so forth.

But when it comes to applications of logic to reality then I'm afraid reality dissapoints all such attempts. There are no such things as properties which are shared by every member of a species. The concept of species is one of change and adaptation, and differentiating species is often a difficult thing to do. There are frequently examples that fall between the cracks which show how our taxonomies are just conveniences for us -- the things we can notice and track reality by -- and the very nature of nature is change, differentiation, and adaptation.

Note that I haven't said anything about how many times I've seen the swan, but rather that there is no essence of the swan for Aristotle to move from the species to the genera. This isn't framed in Humean terms.

So do you think tigers exist or not? — Leontiskos

Yeah, there are some tigers out there today.

The argument that it is impossible to move from particulars to universals is a Humean argument. — Leontiskos

I'm gonna do the same thing here that I did with Lavoisier: putting things in terms of particulars and individuals, or species and genera, isn't exactly Hume's project. They're not even talking about the same things.

If I were to relate Hume's A Treatise on Human Understanding to one of Aristotle's texts, I'd say it's a version of De Anima, or at least this would be the interesting thing to compare. That's because I don't interpret Hume as a phenomenologist but a naturalist interested in understanding how human beings work.

I'm afraid this is just one of the parts of Aristotle that I found myself in disagreement with. Now I'm more than happy to say "it's just my opinion man", but surely you find the above clear? If no essence then moving from a particular to a general is not justified because there simply isn't something which always holds for all real things.

I don't believe concepts shape the world the way Aristotle did, and I don't think his categories eternal -- and if anything I'd say that these instincts come from reading Kant rather than Hume, because Kant claims heritage to Aristotle in the notion of eternal categories which organize nature.

I disagree with Kant like I disagree with Aristotle: Concepts don't confine reality. They are made up by us and adopted for too many reasons to list. They grow and move like a garden does, or a forest, and that is always changing: now mayhaps I have it all wrong, but can you see how that conflicts with Aristotle's philosophy in a way that isn't Humean?

Because I've only invoked Hume on these forums with respect to causation and moral anti-realism -- not metaphysics like general/particular.

Got to be a simpler way to express reality. Not thinking about reality is reality. Existence is reality

.

Yeah, there are some tigers out there today. — Moliere

How do you know that? How do you know what a tiger even is? In fact, what is a tiger, and how do you know?

How do you know that? How do you know what a tiger even is? — Leontiskos

How I know it is certainly different from whether I think it. Why I think it is because I've seen them before and talked about them with others to make sure I know what I'm talking about.

I'd assert it because I have no reason not to -- unless they went extinct or some other circumstance that I'm unaware of they were alive last time I went to the zoo.

I'd say I know what a tiger is because I grew up in a community which differentiates a particular species.

But what that knowledge consists of isn't something which holds true for all tigers in the sense that there will be a time when a species is a not-tiger and a time when a species is a tiger for all species of the genera "tiger". Speciation is kind of like a slow sorites paradox -- at the level of our daily perception of the world, day-in-day-out, there seem to be stable species. This isn't something I perceived about tigers or all species, but rather a theory which guides our understanding of natural life. We notice similarities but rather than there being distinctions between a tiger and a not-tiger, which I understand essence to require given there is nothing in-between "A is a tiger or a not-tiger", we can usually point to some particular which breaks the mold, if not today then tomorrow.

Basically I'd say that tigers are the sorts of things biology studies, I've seen them before, and I know how to refer to them and generally these are things I believe exist. But there is very likely something in-between my concepts of tigers and not-tigers "out in the wild". Sometimes we just make choices about taxonomies out of conveinience "Yeah, maybe not a different thing in that way, but in this way sure" -- but that there are frequently small variations within the same group of species, and even -- if Darwinian evolution is true -- speciation events where a whole new organism comes into being then the very species we are talking about are always changing so we should expect there to be differences.

But these are not differences of accident -- the differences are part of the nature of animals given that evolution never stops.

How I know it is certainly different from whether I think it. Why I think it is because I've seen them before and talked about them with others to make sure I know what I'm talking about.

I'd assert it because I have no reason not to -- unless they went extinct or some other circumstance that I'm unaware of they were alive last time I went to the zoo.

I'd say I know what a tiger is because I grew up in a community which differentiates a particular species. — Moliere

Did you see two or three things with stripes and then decide that there must be a whole species of tigers, that are all the same? You have a universal species in your hand that you call 'tiger', and I'm wondering how you know about that sort of thing. As a Humean, surely you couldn't have come to know about panthera tigris from observing particular things!

Or if you want something more characteristically Humean, think about it this way. You see two "tigers" (whatever that is!) mating. What will their offspring be? Will it be a tiger? How do you know?

A tiger is what we call a tiger in circumstances where we both understand how to use the word "tiger".

So, to get to the titular question -- How do we know what is real?

I've answered before but like I said: we talk to one another.

That's a cop-out, to be sure.

If you follow your Humean logic consistently, then you have no idea what you mean by "tiger," you have no grounds for believing that a species of tigers exists, and you have no grounds for believing that the offspring of two tigers will be a tiger. Brilliant stuff.

This has nothing to do with Aristotle. If you accept that sort of nuclear skepticism-sophistry of Hume, then Kripke, Darwin, and Aristotle are all destroyed. It makes no difference that Darwin believed in temporary species and Aristotle believed in more permanent species. Both are undermined by Hume's "induction argument" that you try to use against Aristotle. You're dropping a nuclear bomb and hoping it only affects Aristotle's neighborhood. You need to start thinking through these ideas, rather than just wielding them in the direction of those whom it is fashionable to wield them towards.

What is Hume's induction argument?

He brings up the problem of induction, but he does it through events. Are events the same as objects, to your mind?

But just because he brings it up that doesn't mean the problem of induction is wedded to most of what I'd associate with Hume.

What I'm denying are essences, and noting how -- if that be the case -- then Aristotle's move from particulars to generals is invalid in the sense that just because the premises are true that does not guarantee that the conclusion is true since there are some cases where the conclusion will be false.

I think you're attributing more to me than I've said.

Some of the differences I see is how we treat difference. Is difference real, or is it peculiar? Is what is the same the same as what is real? What reason do we have to believe in unity when there is a plethora of logics, even?

But all you see is that if we don't accept Aristotle's solution to the problem of induction all ideas are toast and I'm a bumbling idiot. I will weld as I see fit, though -- unless I'm on someone's payroll, then I'll do whatever the boss wants.

There's a pair of arguments that I like to employ together as a kind of antinomy.

One is the problem of induction.

The other is the post-modern meta-induction: That we have been wrong before so many times justifies us in believing we're generally wrong.

One way out of the antinomy is to weaken our certainty with respect to knowledge, and flesh that out somehow. More or less that it justifies us in believing that we probably have false beliefs, but not that all of our beliefs are false -- i.e. the problem of induction still holds true.

We can justify that however -- pragmatically, because of human nature, whatever.

But if we believe that then surely we must accept that induction isn't valid -- we do it for whatever reason, but since our premises can be true and our conclusion wrong it's simply not valid.

One of the things that might sound Aristotelian, but I want to note differences, is that I'd question Hume's notion of causation.

Insofar that we're talking about billiard ball causation then it seems to hold -- in which case the sun may not rise tomorrow even though it has risen so many days before. One day it will collapse -- unless, of course, we're in some way wrong about the sun and stars and such.

But if we think of history we have a good example of a looser notion of causation that seems to produce positive knowledge through synthesis and isn't predicting anything. So what to make of the historian's use of "cause" if we deny it alltogether as something predicts events?

I'd say that I'm uncertain to what degree causation is real because of considerations such as this -- rather it seems the physicist, the biologist, and the historian all organize their ideas in a manner that differs. Including fundamental ones like causation, which we'd think probably seems important.

The surprising result is that we have knowledge even though we can note these things. This might be referred to as a "knowledge-first" approach -- seems like we know things. Sort of undeniable to my daily life, though it's fun to speculate sometimes just to see where our ideas go. But then how do we know things and what does that indicate for our world and reality?

However we answer this question I would say that in answering it we are not doing science as we practice it today. We are engaging in philosophy, and perhaps a philosophy of science or a philosophy of a particular science, but we are reflecting on the meanings of things rather than the things. We are, in some sense, asking after concepts.

But in science that's a very small part of what scientists do -- a lot of the conceptual work is in the application of ideas that have already been refined, agreed upon, and so forth. Philosophy tends to work in areas that are obscure, rather than clear, because it's good at spelling out concepts more precisely or generating new ideas for old problems or maintaining dialectical reflections between ideas.

But you don't exactly generate data in philosophy, though I wouldn't be opposed to attempts it would still seem different to me since I don't think concepts are real or universally binding, but still meaningful for all that. And you argue about who is right, but not about the theory being used. The activities feed well on one another, in particular if we pay attention to science from a historical perspective, but they are quite different.

This all to say Hume's notion of causation is obviously a limiting case that doesn't cover enough, but that doesn't mean Aristotle is suddenly correct about causation. I'd say causation is a fraught topic -- but talk of it is philosophy, not science.

Lastly: I am quite serious about my answer -- we come to know what is real by listening to others. Talking.

Science: It works because it's true, and it's true because it works.

I think you're attributing more to me than I've said. — Moliere

The fact that you wrote six posts in response makes me think that you know your approach is deeply problematic.

If you follow your Humean logic consistently, then you have no idea what you mean by "tiger," you have no grounds for believing that a species of tigers exists, and you have no grounds for believing that the offspring of two tigers will be a tiger. Brilliant stuff. — Leontiskos

If you think that you are not wielding a nuclear bomb, then explain what grounds you have for, say, believing that the offspring of two tigers will be a tiger. Aristotle, Darwin, Lavoisier, Kripke, and science and rationality generally, all believe they have firm rational grounds for their belief that the offspring of two tigers will be a tiger. Hume thinks they are all wrong, and followers of Hume such as yourself must oppose not only Aristotle, but also Darwin, Lavoisier, Kripke, and science and rationality generally.

So you have three options at this point. You can say one of the following:

• "Yes, that's right, and I accept Hume's position."
• "Yes, that's right, but I reject Hume's position."
• "No, that's not right, and therefore I can accept Hume's position while also holding that I have firm rational grounds for believing that the offspring of two tigers will be a tiger."

I think we need to figure out what to do with the nuclear bombs before we have even the smallest chance for a fruitful conversation.

The fact that you wrote six posts in response makes me think that you know your approach is deeply problematic. — Leontiskos

My goodness, Leon. Are you applying to the philosophical school of inquisition?

I wrote that much to give you more to latch onto, to show where I'm coming from, and to counter your notions of me in the hopes of communicating. But all you can see is Hume.

If I'm a Humean in your mind then even if my view is deeply problematic you aren't addressing it.

I think we need to figure out what to do with the nuclear bombs before we have even the smallest chance for a fruitful conversation. — Leontiskos

The problem of induction is just one of those classic philosophical problems that comes up -- we can ignore it and claim a tradition, like Aristotelianism, which furnishes a solution of some kind.

Another solution, similar to what I've been saying, is Popper's that scientific theories aren't exactly true, or we don't really know that they are true. Rather we know when we falsify them and we know that the next guess is just a guess which contains conditions of falsifiability.

For me I'm fine with simply asserting that we know things. I don't think that the problem of induction jeopardizes knowledge. I think that the philosophical theories, whether they be true or false, will not do anything so drastic as make all knowledge impossible.

For me I'm fine with simply asserting that we know things. — Moliere

It sounds like you have chosen option 2:

"Yes, that's right, but I reject Hume's position." — Leontiskos

That's fine, but you need to work through the cognitive dissonance inherent in objecting to other's positions on the basis of Hume's arguments, but then exempting yourself from those same objections. You'll need to work out that double standard that is so ubiquitously present in your philosophical approach. You can't just magically jump back and forth between pro-Humean and anti-Humean positions whenever it is desirable to do so.

I wrote that much to give you more to latch onto, to show where I'm coming from, and to counter your notions of me in the hopes of communicating. But all you can see is Hume. — Moliere

I'm tired of the constant evasions and circular argumentation. If you think that Aristotle cannot argue from particulars to universals, then you can't pretend to be able to do the same thing yourself (when you claim that tigers exist as a species, or that the offspring of two tigers will be a tiger). If you have a real argument against Aristotle or any other philosopher, it will have to be more than the double-standard of a Humean nuclear bomb. Until that happens, the tu quoque is a sufficient response to your nuclear option. If you don't possess an objection that does not destroy all of philosophy and all of science, then you don't possess an objection at all. :meh:

That's fine, but you need to work through the cognitive dissonance inherent in objecting to other's positions on the basis of Hume's arguments, but then exempting yourself from those same objections. You'll need to work out that double standard that is so ubiquitously present in your philosophical approach. You can't just magically jump back and forth between pro-Humean and anti-Humean positions whenever it is desirable to do so. — Leontiskos

I can and I will!

If don't possess an objection that does not destroy all of philosophy and all of science, then you don't possess an objection at all. :meh: — Leontiskos

But it doesn't do that.

We learn about what exists by listening to others. It's marvelously simple, but it brings down the grandeur of philosophy and science a few notches. Names are learned prior to any philosophizing about the nature of tigers -- we can use names without theories as to how it is a name refers.

You can't just magically jump back and forth between pro-Humean and anti-Humean positions whenever it is desirable to do so. — Leontiskos

I can and I will! — Moliere

Not if you want to be a rational human being, you can't.

We learn about what exists by listening to others. It's marvelously simple, but it brings down the grandeur of philosophy and science a few notches. Names are learned prior to any philosophizing about the nature of tigers -- we can use names without theories as to how it is a name refers. — Moliere

So your mom told you that tigers are an existing species and that the offspring of two tigers is a tiger? The problem is that at some point we need to grow up and say, "Mom, how do you know that?" If Hume is right then your mom passed on to you "knowledge" that she can't have. This is a good example of the way that you selectively deploy Hume, against Aristotle but not against your mom. "Humean objections for thee, but not for me!"

So your mom told you that tigers are an existing species and that the offspring of two tigers is a tiger? The problem is that at some point we need to grow up and say, "Mom, how do you know that?" If Hume is right then your mom passed on to you "knowledge" that she can't have. This is a good example of the way that you selectively deploy Hume, against Aristotle but not against your mom. "Humean objections for thee, but not for me!" — Leontiskos

Yes, indeed. Most of what I believe is from my mother. She was herself a Humean so I tell myself that I'm not, but you've seen my true essence. I haven't grown up, I know so little, and the toys of philosophy are never thought through or even worried about after having said my bit.

...So if your mum had never mentioned tigers you might have walked into a cage with a tiger...without knowing it's there? Or you just wouldn't know what to call it?

I'm not sure. I need a Philosopher Daddy.

But, no, I am speaking in jest.

But, no, I am speaking in jest. — Moliere

Is it concerning that it is hard to tell?

You have to either embrace Hume or reject him. You can't keep playing both sides and having it both ways. It's a waste for me to spend so much time talking to someone who will not abide by the canons of logical consistency.

You have to either embrace Hume or reject him. — Leontiskos

That's a false dilemma. We can accept the parts we agree with and not accept the parts we disagree with.

Is it concerning that it is hard to tell? — Leontiskos

Heh, I was only playing into your preconceptions according to what you said -- it's not concerning at all, but expected.

That's a false dilemma. We can accept the parts we agree with and not accept the parts we disagree with. — Moliere

We are talking specifically about Hume's argument from induction in a broad sense, namely the idea that we cannot reason from particulars to universals. That's the thing that you keep vacillating about, using it as a weapon to attack others while ignoring the fact that it would destroy your own beliefs if it were deployed consistently.

it's not concerning at all, but expected. — Moliere

It's not concerning that we cannot tell whether you are jesting? The reason it's hard to tell is because your position is so bizarre that it's hard to know the difference between something you would say in jest and something you would say in earnest.

It's not concerning that we cannot tell whether you are jesting? — Leontiskos

I mean once I get called a bumbler, an idiot, and a manbaby for a philosophical position I hold I'm afraid I can't resist the urge to crack a dry joke for myself. It is a bit funny you have to see.

We are talking specifically about Hume's argument from induction in a broad sense, namely the idea that we cannot reason from particulars to universals. That's the thing that you keep vacillating about, using it as a weapon to attack others while ignoring the fact that it would destroy your own beliefs if it were deployed consistently. — Leontiskos

I don't think that knowledge depends upon that inference being valid. The proof is in the evidence -- we generate knowledge from checking wild guesses all the time. Theories aren't generated in a methodological fashion. We don't need to know how we know in order to know that we know -- we can, from knowing that we know, look for patterns for how we know. Much in line with the Aristotelian way.

But upon doing so in our world today it doesn't really look the same as it did back then. And post-Kant we have good reason to separate metaphysics from science -- my thought is that Aristotle's notion of science is perfectly fine in his day even with the invalidity. Basically that the logical structure doesn't allow for the inference demonstrates that knowledge doesn't require necessary and sufficient conditions, or essences, in order for us to generate knowledge.

My view is a bit more pedestrian about knowledge -- it's wonderful, but very much a finite and human affair. This is much in the spirit of Kant (as was Popper, for what it's worth)

Though, also, my metaphilosophical position is one which does two readings: With the grain, and against the grain. So for every philosopher you start with the grain else you won't be addressing the arguments they are making. But then it is necessary to return and look for why people might object, or where there might be an error in the argumentation, or where some uncertainty is and what we might say in response. I call this against the grain. This is a metaphor I'm pulling from carpentry for how one is "supposed" to cut the wood, but noting in philosophy we are supposed to cut the wood the wrong way in order to see the full meaning of a philosophy.

In doing so we can lay out a particular philosophers position, but then note how we might diverge, or even just wholesale steal ideas out of the text. In order to understand the concept we reference back to the text, but philosophy is a generative activity. It is creative. We can do what they did and write our own little thoughts, inferences, suppositions, and what-have-you.

I don't think that knowledge depends upon that inference being valid. The proof is in the evidence -- we generate knowledge from checking wild guesses all the time. — Moliere

Hume's argument is a kind of exclusion of induction by exhaustive dichotomy. What is your response here supposed to be? Do you think that Hume would say, "Oh, someone told you that the offspring of two tigers is a tiger! Oh, well in that case my argument doesn't apply!" Or would he say, "Oh, you are 'simply asserting that you know things,' well in that case my argument really seems to break down. I wish I had thought of that myself!"

These strange responses you are giving me are wholly inadequate to answer Hume's argument, so I don't see how you think they are relevant.

Though, also, my metaphilosophical position is one which does two readings: With the grain, and against the grain. So for every philosopher you start with the grain else you won't be addressing the arguments they are making. But then it is necessary to return and look for why people might object, or where there might be an error in the argumentation, or where some uncertainty is and what we might say in response. I call this against the grain. This is a metaphor I'm pulling from carpentry for how one is "supposed" to cut the wood, but noting in philosophy we are supposed to cut the wood the wrong way in order to see the full meaning of a philosophy.

In doing so we can lay out a particular philosophers position, but then note how we might diverge, or even just wholesale steal ideas out of the text. In order to understand the concept we reference back to the text, but philosophy is a generative activity. It is creative. We can do what they did and write our own little thoughts, inferences, suppositions, and what-have-you. — Moliere

All I'm asking you to do is be logically consistent. If you think Aristotle falls prey to Hume, but then you can't countenance the fact that everyone falls prey to Hume, including yourself, then you are not being consistent. Your argument is literally as silly as this:

• Moliere: Aristotle uses words, and anyone who uses words is wrong.
• Leontiskos: But don't you use words?
• Moliere: Oh, yeah, but I don't count.

You don't get to exempt yourself from the criticisms you level at others. That's not how it works.