But it is so impenetrable... taking forever to say the obvious. I do kinda get it.

The "rule following argument," like the many other empiricist arguments from underdetermination, relies on presupposing empiricism's epistemic presuppositions and its impoverished anthropology (which denies intellectus from the outset). Since these arguments lead to all sorts of radical conclusions: that words do not have meanings in anything like the classical realist sense, that they cannot refer to things, that induction—and thus natural science—is not rationally justifiable, that we cannot know if the sun will rise tomorrow, that we don't know when we are performing addition instead of an infinite number of other operations, that nothing like knowledge as classically understood can exist, etc., one might suppose that the original premises should be challenged. Indeed, epistemic presuppositions that lead to this sort of skepticism would seem to be self-refuting; they cannot secure even the most basic, bedrock knowledge we possess. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't recognise what I understand of the discussion of rules that came from PI and Kripke's Wittgenstein in this paragraph. It's as if you are talking about something quite other. To my eye it misrepresents that argument.

No progress here, then.

Edit: I just went back over the last few posts in this discussion. We are indeed talking past each other. Care to look for common ground?

I started looking but forget where I read it -- Adorno said something about how philosophy is all about seeing the obvious in different ways, so that what is obvious has different conclusions based upon how we think about the obvious.

I only kinda get it cuz of my background interests and reading. I liked this bit that I don't remember where it was at cuz it made lots of sense to me -- philosophy often delves into the obvious and sometimes looks pedantic, while there is a point we miss.

True, Kripkenstein doesn't say language isn't meaningful. They're just saying meaning can't come down to rule following.

Well, I'm intrigued by the acceptance of messiness. Just not sure why it has to be obtuse. If he stuck to "antagonism" instead of "contradiction" things might be easier. But too many threads, too many replies to write...

"Reasons" seem entirely divorced from causes because "causes" in mechanistic philosophy of nature are reduced to bare, inscrutable brute facts. When causes are intelligible, there is no unbridgeable gap between the two.

David Bentley Hart has a good section on this from "Everything is Full of Gods:"

Actually, I’m not even sure that the modern picture yields a cogent notion of causation, let alone mentality. Once the whole concept of cause had been reduced from an integral system of rationales to single instances of local physical efficiency, causality became a mere brute fact—something of a logical black box. As is so very much a part of the peculiar genius of the modern sciences, description flourishes precisely because explanation has been left to wither. Hume certainly understood this. Once the supposedly spectral causal agencies of the old system had been chased away, he found causality itself now to be imponderable, logically nothing more than an arbitrary sequence of regular phenomenal juxtapositions. It presumed no abiding substrate of continuity—no prime matter—and no formal or final laws of intrinsic order. It had lost the rational necessity of an equation or syntactically coherent predicative sentence. The earlier understanding of causal relations faded into the obscurity of an occult principle whose only discernible logic is “it happens.”

So now we’re presented with the experience of a mind “in here” in each of us, which seems to function by a series of rational connections, and a mechanical world “out there,” which seems to function by accidental concatenations of unthinking material forces; and we’re asked to adopt a unified theory that collapses the former into the latter, however implausible that seems.

By contrast, there was at least a logic of change in the Aristotelian model—the integral logic of potentiality and actuality. It was a basic principle that, in any finite causal relation, change occurs in the effect, not in the cause itself. But, of course, in the realm of the finite, agent and patient functions are impossible to confine each to a single pole of any causal relationship. When two finite substances are involved in a causal relation, that is, each undergoes some change, because each is limited and lacking in some property the other can supply, and so each functions as both a cause and an effect in that relation. Each actualizes some potential latent in the other. Ice melts upon a burning coal but also cools the coal; and neither can affect the other without also being affected in turn.

Each—to use a term slowly gaining more credence in the philosophy of science—has a disposition to a state that the other has a faculty for making active. But, of course, “disposition” here is just another word for "potential.” Causality in that way of seeing things isn’t just the extrinsic application of efficient force, merely randomly inducing a reaction, but an equation reached by addition and subtraction, so to speak: an intricate harmony of intrinsic dispositions and extrinsic occasions, one event
awakening and being awakened by another.

I'm not clear on the purpose of this. It seems clear that some premises are more plausible than others, and the premise that all others are conspiring against one would count as one of the least plausible imaginable. I've already said that reason consists in conclusions being consistent with premises, and also that premises should be consistent with human experience taken as whole, since that is the condition into which we are inducted in growing up.

Just pointing out that consistency is not enough for rationality. Also, the madman's premises are consistent with his experience of human life. But you seem to be appealing to some sort of democratization here. I am not sure if that works either.

For instance, in the Beyond the Pale thread, you said racism was beyond the pale because it was irrational. Yet you hold science up as a paradigm here. But modern science, peer review and all, affirmed racism in many respects into the middle of the 20th century. This position passed the test of consistency and popularity.

The vagueness here just seems like it might make it easy to paint positions one doesn't like as either "irrational" or as just "faith-based" matters of taste (thus privatizing them and rendering them irrelevant if they can be barred from public life, education, or political influence on these grounds), no?

I would just as soon not have to argue that the racist is being irrational (although in some cases they might be), but simply that they are wrong. Indeed, if they were always irrational, it wouldn't do much good to try to argue the point.

To my eye it misrepresents that argument.

It doesn't even represent them lol, aside from pointing out that they are arguments from underdetermination, which they are. Such arguments are very old. Plotinus levels one that might fit in with modern Anglo-empiricist thought against Sextus Empiricus (although as a reductio). Such arguments have been known for ages, but they were never considered serious threats to knowledge, whereas they play a dominant role in 20th century Anglo-American thought.

Why is this? Because of very different starting points about what what can constitute evidence. But the bull in a china shop destructiveness of arguments from underdetermination seem like they should be enough to disqualify epistemic standards that let them run rampant.

Such arguments are very old — Count Timothy von Icarus

Are they? Or is this about having a hammer and seeing only nails? It's easier to only see the arguments they have encountered previously.

As previously, I don't recognise what I understand of the discussion of rules that came from PI and Kripke's Wittgenstein in what you have said.

Are they?

Yes, that's the idea behind equipollence. Phyrronean skepticism relies on a sort of underdetermination and Hume is specifically riffing off this, although he takes it in the direction of hedonism instead of seeking ataraxia. They aren't just similar, they're directly historically related.

The empirical tradition begins in ancient skepticism (where it gets its name). That the modern reformulation tends towards skepticism is not surprising.

Yes, that's the idea behind equipollence. Phyrronean skepticism relies on a sort of underdetermination and Hume is specifically riffing off this, although he takes it in the direction of hedonism instead of seeking ataraxia. They aren't just similar, they're directly historically related.

The empirical tradition begins in ancient skepticism (where it gets its name). That the modern reformulation tends towards skepticism is not surprising. — Count Timothy von Icarus

None of this has anything to do with Wittgenstein or Kripke.

I thought the same thing.

Have there been no advances in philosophy or logic in the last few hundred years?

Have there been no advances in philosophy or logic in the last few hundred years? — Banno

We live in a very different world. They didn't even have the number zero.

They didn't even have the number zero. — frank

:gasp:

Then there might be some benefit accruing to those who pay attention to more recent thought? There might be something new in Kripke or Wittgenstein?

Or is it that now, we have nothing? :wink:

Yes, practice changes, but there is the Davidsonian limitation that if it were to change to much it would cease to be recognisable as a practice. One supposes that in order to count as a practice it must be recognisable as such.

Then there's the difference between psychology and sociology. Treating logic as the result of psychological preference fails in much the same way as does grounding it in intuition - it doesn't take shared action into account. And then there's the further step of accounting for the normatively of logic, which might be doable if it is treated as a community activity. Logic is a shared, not a private, practice. ↪Tim
seems to miss this point.

That's the classic Wittgensteinian response to accusations of psychologism or even behaviourism.

Then there's the problem that the conclusion - that logic is contingent - doesn't follow directly form the premise - that logic is relative. So taking the extreme, it doesn't follow, from logic being associated with practice, that logic is random.

So from Wittgenstein we might see logic as a practice, and from Davidson we might see it as a constitutive restraint. But you have drawn my attention to is that these views may not be mutually exclusive. — Banno

I agree, although it seems to me that a critic would say that relativism does straightforwardly entail contingency. But I suppose there are shades of contingency; logic as relative to practice is certainly not arbitrary or random.

Anyway, it parallels my own criticism of Grayling's critique of On Certainty, though it's about knowledge rather than the ground of logic. Grayling thinks the relativism in OC implies that "What is true for me might not be true for you," and thus has no power against scepticism, but this is to miss the point that the activities in which we know things are shared and non-arbitrary. Grayling is looking for absolute certainty, where certainty should be enough. Similarly, Husserl wanted logic to be pure, absolute, and timeless.

As for Adorno, I won't torture you with him any more, not right now anyway.

Yeah - Graylingstein: Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty

Perhaps your point parallels my "what counts as a hinge proposition is not dependent on the structure of the proposition but is a role it takes on in the task at hand". Its not that "What is true for me might not be true for you" but that "if we are going to do this together, we need to act in this way..."

I will go back to Adorno sometime, to see if he can be made a bit more analytic...

For instance, in the Beyond the Pale thread, you said racism was beyond the pale because it was irrational. Yet you hold science up as a paradigm here. But modern science, peer review and all, affirmed racism in many respects into the middle of the 20th century. This position passed the test of consistency and popularity. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Racism was not held on account of the science but on account of sedimented centuries old prejudices, some of them religious. For example when the Christian first settlers came to Australia they justified treating the indigenous folk as less than human on the basis that they were Godless heathen savages.

Has there been any actual scientific evidence that some races are superior to others? I don't think so. What could such evidence even look like? Science is not in the business of providing evidence for qualitative judgements.

You are basically presuming to impugn science for the fact that some people, and probably even some scientists, held unscientific attitudes. They did not hold such attitudes on account of the science but in spite of it.

Perhaps your point parallels my "what counts as a hinge proposition is not dependent on the structure of the proposition but is a role it takes on in the task at hand". Its not that "What is true for me might not be true for you" but that "if we are going to do this together, we need to act in this way..." — Banno

:up:

And what it gets us, to use Moyal-Sharrock's words, is "objectivity without absolutism." (But maybe you prefer not to bring in objective/subjective)

The position of phenomenology is interesting because it seems to overlap on all sides. Husserl said logic was grounded in the completely non-arbitrary and non-contingent intuition of the transcendental (the transcendental ego and all that) but later went towards intersubjective validation (like constitutive restraint) but never dropped the former. Later phenomenology did drop the former and went with the latter, along with sociality and embodiment.

Well, these are just rambling thoughts.

Have there been no advances in philosophy or logic in the last two thousand years? — Banno

Philosophy is footnotes to Aristotle?

:D

I get that feeling at times -- tho I disagree with it of course.

Later phenomenology did drop the former and went with the latter, along with sociality and embodiment. — Jamal

So later phenomenology decided to be right rather than wrong, got it. :naughty:

So later phenomenology decided to be right rather than wrong, got it. — Moliere

Transcendental idealism seemed like a good idea at the time. :grin:

:rofl:

Given what we're reading -- I can excuse it because Husserl was before Auschwitz, and even suffered due to a certain H. turning him into the Nazi party.

I poke fun at Husserl cuz I get irritated with him, but I ought not cuz any of us who take modern phenomenology seriously owe a debt to him.

I sort of get the feeling sometimes people don't take him as seriously as they should because he couldn't make up his mind, but of course, that willingness to rethink is commendable. Adorno said that whatever concepts Husserl came up with, from start to finish it was all so much idealist and reified paraphernalia (he took him seriously though, so I don't want to suggest a dismissive attitude on Adorno's part).

Adorno said that whatever concepts Husserl came up with, from start to finish it was all so much idealist and reified paraphernalia (he took him seriously though, so I don't want to suggest a dismissive attitude on Adorno's part). — Jamal

:D

I'll cap it there for tonight. I can't say either way, but the idea makes me smile cuz it makes sense -- tho I suspect I could find a point of disagreement along the way.

I suspect I could find a point of disagreement along the way — Moliere

That's what we're here for! But yeah, I'm going to stop taking this thread any further off-topic. :up:

The rule following argument is an argument from underdetermination. These arguments have been made for millennia. That's the relation. If you or at @Banno want to explain how it doesn't rely on underdetermination, be my guest. It does. Try at least offering more that: "that's not right!" with absolutely zero elaboration and defense of the objection.

My other point was that Wittgenstein and Kripke both come from a tradition deeply shaped by Hume. Hume read, and specifically followed up on the ancient tradition. That's a well-documented historical fact. The idea that: "nope, the two traditions are not related because the number zero didn't exist back then," is supposed to be ... what exactly? Something like: "Actually, that specific historical fact and intellectual connection doesn't matter because:

A. "Logic has changed since ancient times (no, I won't lay out the slightest argument on how this applies to anything you've written, even though I am replying to a statement that has nothing to do with logic)" (a complete non sequitur)

B. "Ha, they didn't even have the number zero!" (another complete non sequitur)?

I'll help you and Banno actually try to respond to content instead of just making unrelated, contentless snipes (and bizarrely challenging factual historical claims about intellectual history). Here is a summary of Wittgenstein's rule following argument:

"Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox challenges the idea that we can understand and consistently apply rules because any action can be made to seem to conform to multiple, even contradictory, rules. It raises questions about whether there's an objective fact of the matter about what rule someone is following, and how we can be certain we're following the rule we think we are."

"This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule"."

Explain how the summary is wildly inaccurate or not an argument from underdetermination. Particularly, explain how Kripke's interpretation vis-á-vis the quaddition example isn't about underdetermination.

It is though. That's the whole point, that an infinite number of rules are always consistent with any previous set of observations/actions. Kripke calls this something like "one of the most original paradoxes in the history of skepticism." It isn't. This shows an almost all encompassing ignorance of the history of skepticism. It has been made in various forms for thousands of years. The application to rule following in particular is original (although Hume's argument covers rule-like descriptions of nature in the same way), but earlier blanket attacks on induction would cover rule following on almost identical grounds.

These arguments were not previously taken as particularly serious. That has to do with different starting assumptions by which they are vetted, and assumptions about what counts as evidence. That's my point. Analytic philosophy is not uniquely presuppositionless. It's presuppositions are what make arguments for underdetermination undefeatable, whereas they were considered straightforwardly defeatable in previous epochs.

The rule following argument is an argument from underdetermination. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You seemed to think the conclusion of his argument is skepticism. In fact, it's just a question: if meaning doesn't come from rule following, where does it come from? He has his own answer. If you noticed in his essay, he encourages professors to offer this question to their students as a vehicle for contemplating the private language argument and how it impacts all historic rule following.

My other point was that Wittgenstein and Kripke both come from a tradition deeply shaped by Hume. — Count Timothy von Icarus

True, in large part their philosophical world developed out of a reaction against British empiricism.

It seems the problem with hermeneutics lies in specifying what criteria there could be for a reading to count as a correct reading. — Janus

Yes. And this encompasses the equally difficult question of whether there is only one correct reading. This becomes especially important when we extend hermeneutics from the interpretation of texts to the interpretation of experience, a la Gadamer and Ricoeur. What is valuable and freeing about hermeneutics, I think, is that it challenges the "one correct version" of things, all down the line. Gadamer and Ricoeur (and others) strive to find the middle ground between rejecting a kind of quasi-scientific, deductive method of interpreting experience, but also not falling into an anything-goes relativism about what counts as "correct."

But let's say we found a middle ground we could justify. Would "the meaning of X," using such a hermeneutic, be said to be knowledge? I think so. Our ordinary discourse speaks uncontroversially about "knowing what X means." And anyone is entitled to say, "That's not what I meant!" and be understood. To leap several steps ahead, I'm exploring whether the meaning of an allegedly mystical experience can be the subject of correct interpretation.

What could it mean to say I know the theory of relativity is correct beyond saying that there is reliable evidence that it works? — Janus

Quite so, but for me, the non-physicist, the reliable evidence is not Einstein's equations but my evaluation of the competence and sincerity of those who understand those equations. A very different kind of evidence, and yet I insist that I'm justified in saying that I know the theory is correct.

I'll insist that there can be no "pre-linguistic metaphysical practice" that we cannot put into words post-hoc; otherwise how could we be said to recognise it as a practice? — Banno

I was saying much the same thing. I don't think we even need the "post-hoc" qualification. Language can start with non-metaphysical uses, and build its boat on the ocean, as it goes along, concerning more philosophical uses. The idea is that the practice develops with the language, and vice versa. This is meant to counter the hypothesis that the relevant linguistic structures were there first, causing the metaphysical thinking to be what it is. And of course, as you say, the mirror hypothesis of "metaphysical thinking" starting before language seems unlikely as well.

You seemed to think the conclusion of his argument is skepticism

No, Kripke is driven to a "skeptical solution" (his term) which learns to live with the paradox, as opposed to a "straight solution" which dissolves the paradox. Quine is similarly led to several skeptical solutions by arguments from underdetermination. My point is that people used to think perfectly good straight solutions to these arguments existed. This is because they had a different anthropology and understanding of rationality, different epistemic presuppositions about what could be used as evidence in philosophical argument, and different metaphysical presuppositions.

Which starting points are more correct is a complex question. My point is merely that the need for skeptical solutions doesn't come from some space of presuppositionless thought. It becomes acute in the 20th century in the analytic tradition because of certain presuppositions. Continentals often reject these, although it seems they are also often quite happy to give Anglo-Americans "the rope they use to hang themselves with" on these points.

Wittgenstein's theory of hinge propositions in On Certainty might also be considered a skeptical solution. Wittgenstein is unknowingly retreading the ground of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics re "justification must end somewhere," and Aristotle himself suggests this is an old problem by the time he is writing about it.

Aristotle considers Wittgenstein's solution (very broadly), and arguably considers switching to a coherence definition of truth (the circle of syllogisms), but is able to reject both for a straight solution. But this is because he has different starting points, not because he is better or worse at logical argumentation.

No, Kripke is driven to a "skeptical solution" (his term) which learns to live with the paradox, as opposed to a "straight solution" which dissolves the paradox. — Count Timothy von Icarus

How would you describe that solution?

Wittgenstein is unknowingly retreading the ground of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics re "justification must end somewhere," and Aristotle himself suggests this is an old problem by the time he is writing about it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We discussed Aristotle's argument from PA on the "Epistemic Stances" thread. I argued that the reasoning was faulty, and concluded by saying:

"So this would not be a powerful enough conclusion to show that discursive knowledge is possible (one of the original premises of the argument as you gave it). In this version there is no longer a piece of discursive knowledge to point to. So perhaps this doesn’t get you (or Aristotle) where you’d like to go."

You never replied, but it did leave me wondering whether you agreed. I'd invite both you and @frank to have a look at the last page of that thread, beginning from where you introduce the PA, and tell me if you still believe Aristotle's reasoning holds up.