I don't think he hopes to apply it to reality as much as he's making a point about logic.

It's a subtle point, but he wasn't talking about reality as much as how we talk about reality -- logic.

I don't think this is a good way to do philosophy, or what most people do in philosophy -- but he wasn't claiming a conspiracy theory as much as speaking a false assumption. — Moliere

Even if that is true, the mountain of quibbles does not actually succeed in showing that water is not H2O. When chemists or philosophers say that water is H2O they are not claiming that every natural body of liquid that anyone labels 'water' is pure, undiluted H2O. :worry:

My example would be Kripke’s attempt to show “water is H2O” is a posteriori necessary truth. This is not a demonstration of something true of realty but a construction of his imagination that he hopes applies to something in reality. — Richard B

The point that Kripke is making is untouched by such quibbles. Kripke is not making any claim about the percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water.

I get what you saying, but he should stick with symbols, a = a. But as soon as you step into this messy world and use words like “water” and “H2O”, the gloves come off.

I don't think he hopes to apply it to reality as much as he's making a point about logic. — Moliere

Er, it is crucial to understand that Kripke's claim is not merely logical. If it were merely logical then it would not be a posteriori at all. That it is not merely logical is much of the point.

The point that Kripke is making is untouched by such quibbles. Kripke is not making any claim about the percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water. — Leontiskos

Er, it is crucial to understand that Kripke's claim is not merely logical. If it were merely logical then it would not be a posteriori at all. That it is not merely logical is much of the point. — Leontiskos

Certainly, signs used in expression like "a = a" will express their meaning through their use. Where I find Kripke lacking is the usefulness of applying such an idea to the real world. He believes that once science, our knowledge, sets up this identity up, it is an a posteriori truth. But as I explained examining our common usage of the word "water", and how science in practice uses the concept "H20". This identity is not set up. On one side, "water" need not refer to any single thing, and on the other side refers to a scientific construct that currently has some predictive value when particular technology is applied to determine what a observable liquid may contain.

When you are reading Kripke on this issue, if you don't begin with an interest in developing the notion of rigid designation, then his whole project will be opaque to you. In general you first have to understand what a philosopher is really doing if you are to understand their reasoning. And if you provide a critique of a philosopher which has no relation to what he is really doing then the critique will fall away without anyone taking notice.

(What a philosopher is really doing = that philosopher's proximate telos. It is "What they are really up to." The percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water has nothing to do with Kripke's telos.)

From Naming and Necessity Kripke says, "Let's consider how this applies to the types of identity statements expressing scientific discoveries that I talked about before-say, that water is H2O. It certainly represents a discovery that water is H2O. We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste, (though the taste may usually be due to the impurities). If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from the water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say some water wasn't H2O? I think not. We would say instead that just as there is fool's gold there could be fool's water; a substance which, though having properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be water."

He says "It certainly represents a discovery that water is H2O." This is incorrect. Science did not discover that "water is H20". By applying scientific theory, we discovered that liquids we typically call "water" we can detect molecules we call "H2O". "Water is H2O" is more of a philosophical construction, striped of its meaning from ordinary and scientific use. Consequently, we are just left bare with a the logical expression, "a = a".

He says, "We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste, (though the taste may usually be due to the impurities). If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from the water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say some water wasn't H2O? I think not." I think so, this is called D2O.

He says "We would say instead that just as there is fool's gold there could be fool's water; a substance which, though having properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be water." Well in fact, D2O is called heavy water, so some water is H2O and some water is D2O."

I will end by quoting Norman Malcom in his article "Kripke and The Standard Meter",

"Kripke presents acute criticisms of theories about names, references, designations, and so, that have been put forward by other philosophers. Judging, however, by two of the principal illustrations of his own theory, namely, heat and the standard meter, that theory too won't hold much water. One may be reminded here of Kripke's nice observation that being wrong "is probably common to all philosophical theories."

I was saying much the same thing. — J

Good, good. So we might have some agreement that there is no paradox in talking about the "pre-linguistic" world.

So back to

Essentially, what we want to know is whether "a reason" must cash out to "an obligatory cause" of holding a particular belief. This is troubling, as discussed on the thread. — J

So, not so sure about the "obligatory".

I agree.

What we discussed in that thread isn't Aristotle's answer to the question Wittgenstein took up, just an ancillary point that the positive skeptic's position is self-undermining. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Which, of course, was Wittgenstein's response. So I remain puzzled as to what it is you are actually proposing. However, it's a big topic and as you say, peripheral to this thread, so we might leave it there.

unless you have more to add?

Deuterium is, of course, an isotope of hydrogen. It follows then that D₂O is a isotopologue of H₂O.

Hence, heavy water is water.

It seems odd to say that science did not discover that water is H₂O. We used the terms "water", "Hydrogen" and "Oxygen" prior to the discovery. There's two ways to think about it. In the first, "water" refers to a particular substance, and science uncovered its deeper essence. On this view, water = H₂O is a necessary truth, discovered empirically. Profound metaphysical stuff. The other way to think about it, the meaning of "water" is based on its place in our dealings with it — that it is clear, potable, etc. On this view, saying water is H₂O is just a shift in how we describe it.

Different ways of talking about the same stuff. Are we obligated to say one is right, the other wrong? I don't see why.

Another interesting aside.

However, it's a big topic and as you say, peripheral to this thread, so we might leave it there. — Banno

:up: :up:

On this view, water = H₂O is a necessary truth, discovered empirically. Profound metaphysical stuff. — Banno

To keep whittling away, or should I say quibbling away, at this idea that "water is H20", I like to provide a quote from Sketches of Landscapes by Avrum Stroll,

"The discussion brings us to the category mistake argument. To simplify the discussion, I shall speak only about the collection of H2O molecules. The most important point to be made in this connection is that not all collections of such molecules are water. It depends on the nature of the collection, and this to a considerable degree is determined by such factors as air temperature and atmospheric pressure. Some collections are rigid, hard, and cold to the touch (ice I through ice VII). Some are liquid, tepid, and not solid. Ordinary persons call the latter aggregations "water" and the former "ice". It is a category mistake to infer from the fact that a particular collection of H2O molecules is water that every such collection is water. This seems to be the mistake that Putnam and Kripke have made throughout their discussion of water.

It leads to another. "Water' does not mean H2O, as they assert. For if it did and because water and ice are both composed of H2O, it would then follow that the meaning of "water" would be ice. But this is clearly false. Since ice and water have different properties, the former being rigid and the latter nonrigid, the two are not identical. Therefore, if "water" meant "ice, "water" could not mean water. Once again, we see that Kripke and Putnam are misled by their identity thesis into an incorrect linguistic theory."

I think Kripke and Putnam seem to be saying that each and every water molecule is H2O. But expression like this seems tautologous and insignificant, not profound metaphysically. I am reminded of what Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus,

"5.5303 Roughly speaking, to say of two things that are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all."

To keep whittling away... — Richard B

I'm happy to join in. Is ice still water? Good question.

I don't find Stroll convincing. Ordinary people do say things such as "Take care, the water froze to ice overnight". And here they might be puzzled if you suggested that the water and the ice are different things. Freezing is the sort of thing that water does in the cold, after all. It's not utterly improper to say that ice is frozen water, and thereby mean that ice is one type of water amongst others.

We might, of course, simply choose to use "water" to refer only to the liquid, and "ice" to refer only to the solid. We might equally choose or stipulate that "water" is the genus of which "ice" is a species.

And there is the alternate mentioned above - to accept that either view is valid, and the choice discretionary. That there is no fact of the matter, but just two slightly different ways of using the words "water" and "ice".

It's this anti-essentialist last that I take as the better account.

But I am also happy to go along with Kripke and say ice is one of the various states in which we can find water, and that necessarily, all water is H₂O, as might suit the circumstances. This seems to me the better way to think about essentialism, if one must. Perhaps by keeping what's useful in essentialism, and let go of what’s dogmatic.

Going back to the Klima article, to my eye Kripke’s modal account of essence, grounded in rigid designation and necessity de re, renders traditional Aristotelian essences unnecessary. It explains essential properties through semantics and logic, not metaphysical natures. For Christian philosophers, especially Thomists, this is a threat: metaphysical essences underpin the real distinction between essence and existence, the intelligibility of creation, and arguments for God's existence. Without real essences, classical theism loses its metaphysical scaffolding. Gyula Klima’s work is a strategic response—aiming to reclaim Aristotelian essence as a metaphysical foundation that grounds, rather than depends on, modal necessity. His goal is not only to preserve essence but to defend a metaphysical worldview in which nature, teleology, and God remain intelligible in light of modern philosophical developments.

It’s a form of special pleading, in that it reintroduces Aristotelian essence as necessary without sufficiently justifying that move in neutral or broadly acceptable terms. To sympathetic readers (especially Christian metaphysicians), it will seem like a vital recovery of lost depth. To others, it looks like a philosophical backdoor for preserving theological-metaphysical commitments that the Kripkean revolution had already made optional.

But that's the sort of thing I would say, isn't it, being a godless heathen.

It's a point about how there are a posteriori necessary truths -- it doesn't say that water is H2O; it's not relying upon the science for its point. Only if water is H2O then it is necessarily H2O, and this was a process of discovery from terms we previously would not have associated with H2O.

I think I'd push against the notion that D2O is water, after all, because it's not potable. Basically the "D" is a lot more different from "H" even though the only difference is the addition of a neutron.

It's a point about how there are a posteriori necessary truths -- it doesn't say that water is H2O; it's not relying upon the science for its point. Only if water is H2O then it is necessarily H2O, and this was a process of discovery from terms we previously would not have associated with H2O. — Moliere

This is how I read Kripke as well. The truth, if it is true, that water is H2O comes first, before invoking necessity.

I think I'd push against the notion that D2O is water, after all, because it's not potable. — Moliere

Well, here the "is" is open to interpretation. D2O isn't called water; it's called heavy water, which is meant to remind us of the family connection with what we do call water. We can, and do, also call it deuterium, with no reference to "water" at all. The Kripkean approach is, I think, intended to help us distinguish between which "is" questions are about essences, or properties like "potability," and which are about uses of words. Another way of saying this:

Different ways of talking about the same stuff. Are we obligated to say one is right, the other wrong? I don't see why. — Banno

As noted in the other thread, PA just lays out the challenge to scientific knowledge and demonstration. The full justification of the solution spans a good deal of the corpus because it involves the way man comes to know, and a sort of "metaphysics of knowledge."



The problem with this sort of "argument from psychoanalysis" is that they are very easy to develop. One could create the same sort of argument re attacks on teleology. Moderns come to define freedom in terms of potency. Determinant telos is a threat to man's unlimited freedom. Hence, they set out to develop a philosophy where everything is ultimately grounded in the human will, in "pragmatism," etc. (and so appetite and choice—will). Pace arguments to the effect that people "cling to teleology because it makes them feel good," Nietzsche is by far and away the best selling philosopher of our era it would seem. He dominates bookstore shelves and popular discussions of philosophy. Far from being "terrified" of such views, the masses have been inclined towards them (Nietzsche no doubt is spinning in his grave). Likewise, far from facing despair from his "universe devoid of meaning and purpose," Bertrand Russell, despite his sorted personal life, sometimes seems to elevate himself above famous saints in moral standing by having the courage to accept this.

Afterall, if there is psychological comfort in teleology, there is no doubt also psychological comfort in: "nothing one does is ever truly good or bad," or "we decide," etc.

Such arguments might be plausible, or even true to varying degrees, but they don't actually address the real issue at hand.

Essentially, what we want to know is whether "a reason" must cash out to "an obligatory cause" of holding a particular belief. This is troubling, as discussed on the thread.
— J
So, not so sure about the "obligatory". — Banno

It's a big topic, probably not for this thread. One interesting way of phrasing the issue: If realism depends upon epistemic positions that must be taken on pain of self-contradiction, would that mean that even the most apparently entrenched philosophical disagreements not only are in principle resolvable, but must be so? In short, if you start from premises you believe you can show to be foundational, does that commit you to also saying that everything that follows is rationally obligatory? That you are caused to so reason?

As noted in the other thread, PA just lays out the challenge to scientific knowledge and demonstration. The full justification of the solution spans a good deal of the corpus because it involves the way man comes to know, and a sort of "metaphysics of knowledge." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I understand, and I don't expect you to do my Aristotle homework for me! Would it be possible, though, to point me toward the particular passages you describe thus?:

"'justification must end somewhere,' and Aristotle himself suggests this is an old problem by the time he is writing about it."

I'm very curious to see how Aristotle framed this problem.

In short, if you start from premises you believe you can show to be foundational, does that commit you to also saying that everything that follows is rationally obligatory?

What would the opposite of this be? You start with premises that are foundational and then refuse to affirm what follows from them?

So:
P
P→Q

But then we affirm:
~Q, or refuse to affirm Q.

Yes, this is what most people would call "irrational." No?

That you are caused to so reason?

[/quote]

It seems obvious that people can contradict themselves, no? So there is a sort of arbitrary freedom here. But this seems to make reason extrinsic to the rational nature, a source of constraint rather than the very means by which finite natures can transcend their finitude by questioning current belief and desire. So, I might simply disagree with the anthropology that makes this "causing" problematic. Such a causation isn't even determinant though, since people can simply act inconsistently if they chose to .

Well, here the "is" is open to interpretation. D2O isn't called water; it's called heavy water, which is meant to remind us of the family connection with what we do call water. We can, and do, also call it deuterium, with no reference to "water" at all. The Kripkean approach is, I think, intended to help us distinguish between which "is" questions are about essences, or properties like "potability," and which are about uses of words. Another way of saying this: — J

Huh, that's interesting.

I'd be inclined to say "potability" is, in large parts, what people mean by "water", though not always. In a way this is just a choice on how to use "water", from my perspective. We can include D2O or exclude D2O insofar that we understand one another.

Which might put a spanner into Kripke. Point 1 about how "if water is H2O" -- it's not, if we include D2O, for instance. Unless we say that D2O is just a name for a variant of water, and it has 2 hydrogen molecules after all, with a little extra.

What would the opposite of this be? You start with premises that are foundational and then refuse to affirm what follows from them? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, that would be ruled out, so the opposite would indeed be irrational. That's why indisputably foundational premises might be abandoned in favor of something closer to epistemic stance voluntarism. This may not be a worry for you, but many philosophers, myself included, are concerned about the consequences of rational obligation which do seem to follow, as you correctly show, from allegedly indisputable premises. The idea that there is only one right way to see the world, and only one view to take about disagreements, seems counter to how philosophy actually proceeds, in practice, and also morally questionable.

But this seems to make reason extrinsic to the rational nature, a source of constraint rather than the very means by which finite natures can transcend their finitude by questioning current belief and desire. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm getting confused by "rational nature" and "finite nature" and "transcend their finitude". Could you rephrase in more ordinary terms? Are you talking about objectivity and subjectivity?

The cause/reason issue is complicated. Maybe the right backdrop for it is the picture we commonly have of ourselves as thinkers. We give reasons, not causes, for what we think. Why is this? What difference does this way of talking point to? And would a strong epistemology of rational obligation mean that we were wrong in doing this?

Which might put a spanner into Kripke. Point 1 about how "if water is H2O" -- it's not, if we include D2O, for instance. — Moliere

Yes, maybe not a spanner exactly, but we can see that Kripke is working with some (unquestioned?) assumptions about who determines what something is -- scientists, in this case. He's willing to go along with the decision that H2O is water and D2O is not. That's reasonable, but it needs to be noticed as part of K's method.

it's not relying upon the science for its point — Moliere

If it's not relying upon the science then apparently Kripke would have made the exact same argument in 1700, before the science had occurred. Is that your claim?

It's a point about how there are a posteriori necessary truths -- it doesn't say that water is H2O — Moliere

A necessary truth is true. If it is necessarily true—a posteriori—that water is H2O, then it is true that water is H2O.

@Moliere

I want to revisit our short but illuminating discussion, since it is such a clear model for what tends to happen on TPF with discussions of essentialism. You made three basic claims, and the second and third were meant to contest essentialism:

1. The essentialist would be likely to say that water is H2O (or that water is always H2O).
2. Water was not H2O before 19th century chemistry.
3. "Water" nor "H2O" "pick out" what water or H2O is.

Now let’s look at three equivocal senses of essentialism:

1. The essentialist would be likely to say that water is H2O (or that water is always H2O).
1a. The essentialist would say that the term “water” signified H2O before 19th century chemistry.
1b. The essentialist would say that the description “water” “picks out” what water is.

Now you began the discussion with (1), which was a great start. (1) is certainly true. But then you immeditely began to equivocate between (1), (1a), and (1b). (2) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1a). And (3) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1b). But (1a) and (1b) are pretty clearly strawmen, and so there are no arguments being leveraged against the actual thesis that you yourself set out, namely (1).

That’s a good snapshot of what seems to always happen in these discussions. It's also why my so-called "transcendental error" is apparently not an error at all. Those who call it an error are relying on straightforward equivocations in their arguments.

If it's not relying upon the science then apparently Kripke would have made the exact same argument in 1700, before the science had occurred. Is that your claim? — Leontiskos

Seems a bit outlandish, so I certainly couldn't claim that.

But I'd put it in historicist terms -- we can imagine Kripke being transplanted to another time with different concepts being taken seriously, but really we couldn't claim what he'd claim at that time at all. He was in his time, and made the claims he did in his time.

Hrmm... if so then I've done so without meaning to.

I'm still committed to essentialism being 1.

1. The essentialist would be likely to say that water is H2O (or that water is always H2O). — Leontiskos

And I'd attribute a misunderstanding on my part of what you're looking for -- I thought I was cogently arguing for my point rather than it having three different meanings.

The framing of the infinite regress of justifications is in Posterior Analytics I.2, although I think it might show up elsewhere. Aristotle answers that justification does stop, but it stops in a different form of knowing (of which he actually has many in his anthropology). This is covered in Posterior Analytics II but I hesitate to say that this is "the argument" because its plausibility is greatly enhanced by the work done in De Anima, the Physics, and the Metaphysics.

The beauty of this solution is that it is very broad, and can largely be argued as flowing from the primacy of actuality over potency (without which, arguably, being would be incoherent and wisdom a lost cause anyhow). But, I think a difficulty here, when one reads a work like De Anima is the desire to see it as some sort of contemporary empirical theory, which it sort of is, but this isn't really where its value lies. The basic notion of potential in the mind being actualized by the form (act) by which anything interacts with it in this way and not that way is perhaps more important that the exact typology/psychology of the senses (the faculties) that Aristotle develops. I think that one can accept that things like "the common sense" and the "cogitative faculty" get "something right" without having to be overly committed to them (similar to Plato's parts of the soul, which are useful as a psychology, but less so if they become as sort of ridged description). In terms of connecting this broad framework to the contemporary sciences of physics, perception, and information, you'd need to look to contemporary Aristotlians and Thomists.

On a side note, a while back I came across this interesting dissertation on the more Platonic/Plotinian/Augustinian conception of noesis: https://theses.gla.ac.uk/2741/

No, that would be ruled out, so the opposite would indeed be irrational. That's why indisputably foundational premises might be abandoned in favor of something closer to epistemic stance voluntarism

And in virtue of what is a stance adopted? Reason? Sentiment? Aesthetic taste? Sheer impulse?

If stances are adopted according to reason, then you have the same problem. If they are adopted according to some standard that is irrational, you seem to have an irrational relativism.

This may not be a worry for you, but many philosophers, myself included, are concerned about the consequences of rational obligation which do seem to follow, as you correctly show, from allegedly indisputable premises. The idea that there is only one right way to see the world, and only one view to take about disagreements, seems counter to how philosophy actually proceeds, in practice,

If they are disputable they will certainly be disputed, hence "how philosophy actually proceeds." That someone claims that a premise is indisputable does not make it so.

and also morally questionable.

I don't get this one. How so?

I'm getting confused by "rational nature" and "finite nature" and "transcend their finitude". Could you rephrase in more ordinary terms? Are you talking about objectivity and subjectivity?

A rational nature, as in "possessing a rational soul," or a will and intellect. But we need not accept those exact distinctions, just that man has an intellectual appetite for truth (including knowing the truth about what is truly best). For Plato, and a great deal of thinkers following him, it is the desire to know what is "really true" and "truly good" that moves us beyond the given of what we already are, taking us out beyond current beliefs and desires (what we already are).

If we did not have a desire for truth itself (the "love of wisdom"), if "all men do [not] by nature desire to know," then we would only ever learn things accidentally as we uncritically and unquestioningly followed our sensible appetites (a sort of slavish unfreedom). In this psychology, rationality is a prerequisite for freedom. Freedom is not constrained by "being 'forced' to do what is rational," but rather, because reason always relates to the whole (it is "catholic") it draws us out beyond ourselves (there is an ecstasis in knowing, "everything is received in the manner of the receiver," but the knower is also changed by knowledge). Because knowledge changes the knower (knowing by becoming), the freedom to become is deeply bound up in rationality, whilst ignorance is a limit on freedom.

And would a strong epistemology of rational obligation mean that we were wrong in doing this?

Wrong in doing what exactly, not affirming truth? That truth is preferable to falsity seems like a prerequisite assumption for even concerning oneself with epistemology. One ought to seek truth because truth is more desirable.

Yet we might suppose that people have a right to make mistakes, or to be wrong. This is often part of the learning process. Wisdom, knowledge, these involve understanding, so it would not make sense to "force people to affirm what they do not understand." Yet neither would it make sense to deny that they can be wrong.

One of the problems with relativism as a nice solution to disagreements is that it doesn't actually allow "everyone to be right" anyhow. It says that everyone who isn't a relativist (most thinkers) is wrong. If you tell the non-relativist, "no, you can be right too, it's just that it's simply 'true for you'" they shall just reply: "but I maintain that it is true for everyone, not that it is 'true for me.'"

One interesting way of phrasing the issue: If realism depends upon epistemic positions that must be taken on pain of self-contradiction, would that mean that even the most apparently entrenched philosophical disagreements not only are in principle resolvable, but must be so? — J

I think you have been asking some good questions of late. This is one of them. :up:

I would phrase it this way: <If foundational premises are known to all, and if every proposition is either true or false only in virtue of foundational premises, then every rational error is a self-contradiction>.

The problem I see with your phrasing is that "realism" is not enough for your "pain of self-contradiction," since realists need not claim that every truth is epistemically transparent.

In short, if you start from premises you believe you can show to be foundational, does that commit you to also saying that everything that follows is rationally obligatory? That you are caused to so reason? — J

How about, "If you start from premises you believe to be true, does that commit you to also accepting everything that validly follows?" Yes, that's actually called logical soundness.

Whether or not we are "caused" to be rational is a mystery and a paradox.

No, that would be ruled out — J

Would it be ruled out on pains of "obligation"? That is the question you are asking yourself. If you think it is "morally objectionable" to say that a conclusion logically follows from a set of premises, then it is in no way clear how, "That would be ruled out."

The idea that there is only one right way to see the world, and only one view to take about disagreements, seems counter to how philosophy actually proceeds, — J

Is it, though? If philosophy didn't hold that there is only one right way to see the world, then philosophy would not be a unified discipline. Philosophy actually presupposes that every philosopher can fruitfully talk with every other philosopher. There are no incommensurable philosophers. So I think philosophy proceeds according to the belief that there is only one right way to see the world. If you didn't think there was a right way then you wouldn't argue at all.

I thought I was cogently arguing for my point rather than it having three different meanings. — Moliere

Well here are two claims. Do you agree or disagree with them?

(2) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1a). And (3) does not contest (1); instead it contests (1b). — Leontiskos