Actual knowledge can't be divorced from the whats, hows and whys of the physical world. — Vera Mont

Yep. Very much so. Knowledge is embedded in what we do, in ways well beyond the place of information.

Can you explain in virtue of what a belief would be "justified" without any reference to truth? How does logic "justify" a belief without reference to logic's relationship to truth in particular?

It seems to me that this will be difficult. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It seems to me that any proof that logic provides must be confirmed by some observation. 2 + 2 = 4 are just scribbles on a page. What do the scribbles refer to in the world to make 2 + 2 = 4 useful and true? 2 + 2 = 4 is true, but why is it true? It's because we observe and categorize similar objects into groups so that there can be more than one of some thing. If everything were unique and there were no categories then there would only ever be one of anything and 2 + 2 = 4 would be meaningless. The idea of quantities is dependent upon the idea that things share a particular "essence" or "substance" to be grouped into similar categories to then say that there is a quantity of that particular "essence" or "substance", like cows, rocks and stars.

The point made is that in order to be said to know something, it's not usually enough to have the information; one also should be able to act on that information. — Banno

The information one possesses could be memories where one used the information before and was successful in accomplishing some goal with that information, and would probably solve the present problem as well being that both circumstances are similar.

If one cannot know how to ride a bike, then how does one learn to ride a bike? Don't forget that possessing information doesn't necessarily mean ones is conscious of the information as learned information is typically stored unconsciously until needed. Once one learns to ride a bike all the movements required are handled subconsciously. But this cannot be said while learning to ride a bike as one is fully conscious of every movement and one's balance as one observes one's actions and the effect of those actions, and repeat. This is what the learning process is. Once the task is learned most of the actions are governed subconsciously allowing the mind to tend to other things.

. Very much so. Knowledge is embedded in what we do, in ways well beyond the place of information. — Banno

Do you take the assessment of the truth value of a proposition as knowing-how knowledge, equivalent to juggling balls? Seems evaluating statements requires cognitive grasp of concepts.

it's not usually enough to have the information; one also should be able to act on that information.

It is enough for "knowing that." Someone who wakes up during an operation, but finds themselves immobilized , is obviously aware of the fact that their anesthesia is not working and that they are in pain regardless of their ability to do much of anything.

At the end of Braveheart, the prince's wife tells evil old King Longshanks, who has just had a stroke and is immobilized, that she plans on deposing his weak son and that the child she is pregnant with was sired by another man and that his line ends with him. But he can't really do anything about it, because of the stroke.

It can hardly be that he has to act in order to know though. For one, this would imply that we don't know things until we act on them, and yet why would we act on things we don't yet know? This would place the uninformed will prior to the intellect. We would "know by doing."

Knowing is an act of thinking though and thought does not necessitate any particular outward action.

So what do we conclude?

That not all knowledge is of arts. Knowledge of sculpting is revealed in sculpting. Knowledge of sailing is revealed in the art of sailing. Knowledge of shipbuilding is exercised in building ships. But this is not true of all forms of knowledge.

Do you take the assessment of the truth value of a proposition as knowing-how knowledge, equivalent to juggling balls — Hanover

If it's a detailed instruction on how to juggle balIs, yes. I can believe that a statement or instruction or description is true, but I can't know it unless I test it by some independent means. Verify the statement through other sources, follow the instruction and succeed in the endeavour, examine the described object through my own senses.

Seems evaluating statements requires cognitive grasp of concepts. — Hanover

Yes. And how are cognitive grasps formed? Sensory input+experience+learning+memory+reflection. They're made in the web of knowing the world.

A shame. — Banno

Our lovely, sweet, passive-aggressive Banno.

Another solution would be to dispense with the word, "true" as a descriptor of knowledge. Knowledge would be justified beliefs, and beliefs are justified by both observation AND logic. Beliefs would only be justified by one or the other, or neither. Knowledge requires confirmation from both. — Harry Hindu

I agree with the first sentence. With the rest of it, you lost me a bit.

Do you take the assessment of the truth value of a proposition as knowing-how knowledge, equivalent to juggling balls? Seems evaluating statements requires cognitive grasp of concepts. — Hanover

But aren't concepts an aspect of engaging the world? Even if I was beheaded and one last concept passed through my noggin, the meaning of that thought is inextricable from my better days of seeking and finding, trying and failing, etc.

Equating cognitive grasp of propositions to an experiential event necessarily eliminates any non-empirically based propositions, with the obvious examples being the analytical and I'd submit also the modal, which was the topic of another thread with @Banno from which I've not yet recovered.

That is, you're going to suggest now that I know of the counterfactual possible world based upon the actual world despite the fact that the possible world is defined as the non-actual not experienced world?

This is just to say propositional truth need not be how-to truth, and taking the position it must be in 100% of the cases seems a task that will fail given the creativity of your opponent in offering counters. If though, as I suspect, there is a hidden tautology here, meaning I am searching for the white penguin when you define penguins as black, I'd like to fast forward to the big reveal so I can see where it ends.

Equating cognitive grasp of propositions to an experiential event necessarily eliminates any non-empirically based propositions — Hanover

I don't think we can say cognition and behavior are identical. That makes no sense.

What do you think is happening when a person grasps a concept?

What do you think is happening when a person grasps a concept? — frank

Understanding occurs. It's within the mystical parameters of consciousness which AI lacks yet seems to outperform us on.

I don't demand language for conceptual grasp. That strikes me as contrived to eliminate metaphysical messiness.

Understanding occurs. It's within the mystical parameters of consciousness which AI lacks yet seems to outperform us on.

I don't demand language for conceptual grasp. That strikes me as contrived to eliminate metaphysical messiness. — Hanover

Good answer.

Knowledge of sculpting is revealed in sculpting. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Revealed to witnesses by the product, yes. But the sculptor's knowledge was acquired gradually, by learning the concept of sculpture, assimilating information about the potential, properties, vulnerabilities and hazards of the medium, the tools and the processes, perhaps watching someone else do it, integrating this multitude of facts (true information) into his neural network, with tags for retrieval at need, and then practicing the required actions on real materials, until finally a sculpture emerges.

This is just to say propositional truth need not be how-to truth, and taking the position it must be in 100% — Hanover

Lots of things are 100% true that I can never know. More things are true that I believe with 90-99% certainty, but don't know. There is an even greater number of facts of which I am in possession, which are at some stage of the verification and integration process on their way to becoming knowledge... unless I forget them before the process is finished.
My objection is not to the truth value of a proposition, but the assumption that true information is knowledge.

Knowledge doesn't need to be about how; that's just one kind - practical knowledge. The input of one's own senses and internal functioning is another kind - direct internal knowledge. The second kind doesn't need further study, since it's already integrated: it's established in the material body as well as in the mind. Sensations are known without reference to language or concept.

Statements about the mechanics of a bicycle and how riding one is done may all be true information, and you may grasp the concepts and believe the statements. You can justify that belief by checking whether the source has been reliable (memory), comparing it with other independent sources (validation) and examining an actual bicycle for congruence with the description given and watching people ride bicycles (observation). You can know that bicycles exist, are intended for transportation and powered by a rider. You still won't know how to ride a bike until you learn the necessary physical actions. They're different categories of knowledge.

Theoretical knowledge doesn't require the last step, but any information that cannot be verified physically still does require checking against background information (what you already knew), the credentials and possibly the motivation of its source (judgment based on knowledge of external factors) plausibility (prior familiarity with the concepts, logic and context) and then integration into one's cranial data-base before it's one's own knowledge.

We can define the word knowledge in various ways.
Let's say someone x tells someone z , say Jane with all the right details (true information and thus propositional knowledge) how to ride a bycicle.

Jane can't ride. Not ever. She just can't learn it. (Just like an ant couldn't or some other creature with different cognitive abilities or physical restraints) She is the extremely rare human being that can't ride a bicycle. Yet most humans that take the propositional knowledge (true Information) are able to use it in order to ride the bycicle. And if we'd give purposefully incorrect information. This non propositional knowledge would have most people unable to learn how to ride a bicycle (at least when applying the incorrect knowledge, such as waving at strangers while sitting on the curb)

So what we learn is not that propositional knowledge or true Information isn't true information.

What we learn is that applying propositional knowledge which is the conceptual attempt to describe ability knowledge. But that for most it is close enough if the task isn't too difficult, to reach ability knowledge with the initial propositional knowledge combined with enactment over time.

And we learned that propositional knowledge won't necessarily lead to ability knowledge because 1. Prop knowledge is conceptual so just like a map isn't the land but can still help (for those that can read maps and so on) and 2. Ability knowledge is probably some kind of neuronal connection. And the learner has to have the physical ability both cognitively and qua physique to perform it.

So we learn propositional knowledge or true information exists. And that because it is different from the physical thing (neuronal connections of ability knowledge) it can cause issues for some. The exception that can't learn to ride a bicycle shows their inability to perform it. And the ones (most) that follow the wrong instructions and fail and then follow the right instructions and succeed over time confirm that propositional knowledge for learning how to ride a bicycle can often lead to ability knowledge because it is close enough to ability knowledge for most.

'I am writing my first post on this board'' is true and is knowledge.
— Jack2848
Sez you, who made it true by Direct experience. I have no way of testing the statement. (You might have had 18 different online personae over the years.
(Welcome, or welcome back, whichever applies.)

''The truth value we can imagine not depending on your perception otherwise we'd have contradictions galore. Surely we can make a distinction between truth assumption by person x vs our recognition that x could be false anyway. (In a practical way)
— Jack2848
Exactly, which is why a piece of information, however true and correct, is not knowledge until it's verified by comparison to previous experience, tested against logic and probability and incorporated into a personal data-base. When you experience and remember something, it becomes part of your knowledge. When you communicate it to someone else, it doesn't necessarily part of their knowledge.

See. Earlier you said something is made true by direct experience. In other cases in short translation you say that we need justified true belief for knowledge. But since from what you said it follows that you're position at least how it's presented here is that 'the truth maker' is not something like 'p if p'. But rather direct undoubtedable experience. Or justified true belief.

But then the belief would become true because of justifications and belief rather than that you'd have good justifications for believing that x is true, or is the case.

I get that there's no physical property called 'truth'. But it serves a function. The function is to understand something like p if p. Regardless of whether I have a direct experience of p or wether you have justifications and a belief that p.

So either you stick to the idea that truth is made by justifications and belief or direct experience. Or truth is a tool we use to conceptually understand that a proposition can 'be true'' regardless of opinion. (So what you said in the later post). Or you keep both in the exact way as presented and contradict yourself. Since then you'd say that information x is true regardless of opinion. And that it's only true if you have good reasons to believe it. But surely people often thought from a 1st and collective 1st person perspective that they had good reasons to believe it. And surely that didn't make it true. Surely the earth wasn't flat just because people had good reasons to believe it at the time.

If a proposition is true then it is true information. So if we'd use the word knowledge for that then sure.
— Jack2848
But I'm not using one word when I mean a different word. Why should I?

You missed the point of the whole text.
I meant to show how people use the same words with different meanings. If you'd say that knowledge is justified true belief. Then that's objectively not a descriptive correct statement in that case you're equally choosing a definition per your preference. As others would.

To be descriptive and claim to be more accurate. You'd have to look at instances of when people say they have knowledge. Now and across time. And you'll see that it's belief assumed to be justified and assumed to be true.

Why? Knowledge (beliefs assumed to be justified and assumed to be true) have often be wrong.

You might say that those people only thought they had knowledge (and here you could have in mind JTB)
And that's true. But then you've intorduced a new definition and are no longer descriptive. This is what I tried to explain but you seem to not have fully understood it. Perhaps that's because I was being too vague.
Anyway. Once we move away form the descriptive the claim that you have the correct account dissapears. Since now I can claim equally that knowledge is to be defined as ''true information'' . Or something other

And then I can say that people only thought they had true information (knowledge) but didn't.

And it would be useful a definition but equally incorrect in a descriptive way.

sweet, passive-aggressive Banno. — T Clark

No more than

...to tell the truth, I don’t really care about what it means to know how to do something. — T Clark

By ignoring knowhow you are protecting your ideas from critique, rather than willingly exposing them to analysis. As I said, that's a shame.

Do you take the assessment of the truth value of a proposition as knowing-how knowledge — Hanover

Pretty much. Working out what is true and what isn't, is an activity, something we do. We look around, we do the calculation.

equivalent to juggling balls? — Hanover

...not so much...

Seems evaluating statements requires cognitive grasp of concepts — Hanover

"cognitive grasp of concepts..." You are said to grasp a concept if you can show that you understand it. You show that you grasp the concept of bike riding by riding a bike, or at least by recognising a bike rider.

To grasp a concept is being able to act in certain ways.

Good to see you doing some analysis.

We might require of a definition that it explicitly sets out what is and what isn't included in the definends. Sometimes we can do just that. For some definends, all we can do is set out a family resemblance, listing the things that are sometimes included, sometimes not, and understand that there may be exceptions.

Treating knowledge as strictly Justified True Belief will have as a consequence the contradictions that result in threads such as this.

Better then to look at the sort of things that are and are not included in knowledge, at how the word is used, rather than just stipulating a definition. Our use of words tends to exceed any such stipulation.

So sure, Longshanks knew what would happen, and yet couldn't act on that knowledge. It's the abnormality of his not being unable to act in this case that makes it startling and exceptional; and dramatic.

If you prefer, while knowledge doesn’t logically require the ability to act (as Longshanks shows), it normatively and ordinarily includes that capacity.

To know something and not be able to act on it is the exception, and a performative contradiction.

Yep.

Knowledge doesn't need to be about how; that's just one kind - practical knowledge. The input of one's own senses and internal functioning is another kind - direct internal knowledge. The second kind doesn't need further study, since it's already integrated: it's established in the material body as well as in the mind. Sensations are known without reference to language or concept. — Vera Mont

This is also good. Wittgenstein pointed out that we do not know we have a pain, we just have a pain - and here he is using "know" as justified true belief, and pointing out that it makes little sense to talk of justifying to oneself that one is in pain - since what counts as the evidence is just the pain itself.

And yet it also makes little sense to say that one is in pain yet doesn't know one is in pain.

This fits in with knowhow. One is said to know how to ride a bike once one rides a bike. The justification is the act.

The upshot? Folk sometimes supose that knowhow is an exceptional case of knowing that; that propositional knowledge is central. It's the other way around. Propositional knowledge is s special kind of knowhow.

I think I agree, but I'm not sure what the conclusion was.

...the modal, which was the topic of another thread with Banno from which I've not yet recovered. — Hanover

:grin: Meta is in worse shape, thanks to you.

To grasp a concept is being able to act in certain ways. — Banno

Suppose I know P, but I never act on it. How am I different from a person who knows P, but can't act on it?

This is an old philosophical problem with the concept of potential energy.

I found that a bit hard to follow, but it looks to be a galant attempt at elucidation and analysis.

The justified true belief account comes from Socrates in the Theaetetus, and even he wasn't happy with it.

You're on the right track, I think, in looking to the way we use the word "knowledge". But here's a puzzle for you: must there be one statable phrase that covers all our uses of "knowledge"? Could it be that we use the word in different ways, such that no fixed definition is both accurate and compete?

Moreover, will we say is the correct uses of "knowledge" are only those that conform to some stated definition?

At the least, that rules out any novel uses. Do we want to do that?

It seems obvious that there is a difference between a person who can act on their knowledge and the person who cannot. The salient question would seem to be whether the difference is on account of some external constraint or not. What other kind of constraint could there be on a person who knew something and yet was unable to act on that knowledge?

...potential energy... — frank

Potential energy is creative accounting for physicist. They invented it in order not to falsify the principle of the conservation of energy. :wink:

Suppose I know P, but I never act on it. How am I different from a person who knows P, but can't act on it? — frank

You're not.

Perhaps we can assume honesty, and you said that you know, while the person who doesn't know also says that they don't know. But saying you know amounts to acting on your knowledge...

So that question might not be as simple as it at first seems.

:up:

Earlier you said something is made true by direct experience. — Jack2848

Not that much earlier, and not quite as you put it. The experiencer of a sensation knows that sensation to be true, without making any statement. It's not made true and it's not information; it's true because it's inside of the experiencer. It's not true for anyone else. It can be communicated to others and they may believe it, but they cannot know it.

But since from what you said it follows that you're position at least how it's presented here is that 'the truth maker' is not something like 'p if p'. But rather direct undoubtedable experience. Or justified true belief. — Jack2848

Truth-maker? No, I never referred to any such thing. What I said was that a statement may be true and we can believe it, which makes it our belief. But information doesn't become knowledge until it's been verified and incorporated with our data base.

Truth is not the issue. The issue is the difference between belief and knowledge. When you say "justified true belief", that's the same as a belief that has been verified so that it can become knowledge. That's far beyond a simple fact "true information".

I meant to show how people use the same words with different meanings. — Jack2848

I'm all too keenly aware of that. If it gets much more lax, we might as well give up on verbal communication, since any word can mean whatever anyone chooses.

I agree with the first sentence. With the rest of it, you lost me a bit. — T Clark

If you understand the relationship between rationalism vs empiricism then all I am saying is that knowledge is supported by integrating both rather than treating them as a dichotomy. Beliefs are supported by only one or the other or neither.

The conclusion was that for information to be used, it has to be stored somewhere first.