Thanks.

You missed the point of the whole text. — Jack2848

To be fair, it is often difficult to understand what you are saying. Perhaps a language issue. For example, I am not sure that I understand what you are trying to say in the following paragraph:

I meant to show how people use the same words with different meanings. If you'd say that knowledge is justified true belief. Then that's objectively not a descriptive correct statement in that case you're equally choosing a definition per your preference. As others would. — Jack2848

Do you mean to say that JTB does not correctly describe all common usages of the word "knowledge"? That would be a fair criticism, but then I don't see how your own proposal would address it.

To be descriptive and claim to be more accurate. You'd have to look at instances of when people say they have knowledge. Now and across time. And you'll see that it's belief assumed to be justified and assumed to be true. — Jack2848

But here you seem to be saying the opposite: that JTB is how people generally use the word "knowledge."

So, which is it? Does JTB capture the meaning(s) of "knowledge" or does it not?

And if JTB does reflect the current use, then what is that point of your definition? Do you wish to reform language? Clarify an ambiguity? But defining "knowledge" as, essentially, fact, true proposition, is not only redundant, but confusing as well. According to the usual meaning, knowledge requires a knower, naturally enough. But with your proposal, most of what qualifies as "knowledge" is not known to anyone!

Knowledge (beliefs assumed to be justified and assumed to be true) have often be wrong. — Jack2848

Knowledge claims are sometimes disputed, disclaimed, or proven wrong, as the case may be. The JTB proponent would deal with this issue by emphasizing the distinction between knowledge claims and knowledge as such. Justified Belief is sufficient for a knowledge claim. The Truth requirement is what is supposed to certify that the claim is merited.

But information doesn't become knowledge until it's been verified and incorporated with our data base.

Truth is not the issue. The issue is the difference between belief and knowledge. When you say "justified true belief", that's the same as a belief that has been verified so that it can become knowledge. That's far beyond a simple fact "true information". — Vera Mont

I'm not sure if verification is necessary. It seems like a very strict requirement. If a stranger tells me that their name is John, do I have to verify this (e.g. by checking their ID) before I can be said to know their name?

There seems to be a pretty good argument that "knowing that" is a type of "knowing how". — Banno

I know that in a few billion years the Sun will expand and consume the Earth.

Not really sure how to make use of this information, but I know it all the same.

Not really sure how to make use of this information — Michael

You just did.

You just did. — Banno

You're going to have to elaborate. Otherwise it seems that you're just saying that knowing that p is equivalent to knowing how to write "I know that p". Which would be such a cop-out.

Otherwise it seems that you're just saying that knowing that p is equivalent to knowing how to assert p. Which would be such a cop-out. — Michael

To sincerely say "I know that P" is to assert that P, while it would be exceeding odd to assert that P while claiming not to know the P.

That's been the line all along: "Knowing that" is a form of "knowing how".

Far form being a cop out, it's the central point here. Bits of knowledge fit in with our form of life, and so with what we do. Our knowing that the sun will expand is a part of our broader knowledge of the nature of the sun, built from our looking around and interacting with the world. It's not an isolated factoid.

Notice that it's not knowing how to just say P that is salient, but how to assert P. That involves knowing how to make use of the speech act of making an assertion, along with all the paraphernalia of truth, justification, reference and so on.

Which is what is not captured by saying that knowledge is true information.

From here you said:

Indeed, if we came across someone who said "I know that there is water in the tap", but became confused when asked to locate and turn the tap on in order to obtain a glass of water, we might well conclude that they said they knew but really didn't.

There seems to be a pretty good argument that "knowing that" is a type of "knowing how".

So given that I say "I know that in a few billion years the Sun will expand and consume the Earth" what is the "knowing how" (comparable to using the tap to fill a glass of water) that demonstrates that I do in fact know what I claim to know?

But on the example of the tap:

1. I know that the tap is working
2. I know that the tap isn't working
3. I know how to use a tap
4. I know how to prove that the tap is working
5. I know how to prove that the tap isn't working
6. I know how to assert the English sentence "(I know that) the tap is working"
7. I know how to assert the English sentence "(I know that) the tap isn't working"

It's entirely possible that (3)-(7) are all true but that (1) and (2) are both false. Therefore (1) and (2) are distinct from (3)-(7).

I know that in a few billion years the Sun will expand and consume the Earth.

Not really sure how to make use of this information, but I know it all the same. — Michael

Information is everywhere causes leave effects. Which information is relevant is dependent upon the present goal in the mind. If you had the goal to ensure the human race continues to exist beyond the Earth being consumed by the Sun you might start building and testing rockets to make humanity a multi-planetary, or multi-solar system species.

I found that a bit hard to follow, but it looks to be a galant attempt at elucidation and analysis.

The justified true belief account comes from Socrates in the Theaetetus, and even he wasn't happy with it.

You're on the right track, I think, in looking to the way we use the word "knowledge". But here's a puzzle for you: must there be one statable phrase that covers all our uses of "knowledge"? Could it be that we use the word in different ways, such that no fixed definition is both accurate and compete?

Moreover, will we say is the correct uses of "knowledge" are only those that conform to some stated definition?

At the least, that rules out any novel uses. Do we want to do that?

I re-read my comment and I could have made some bullet points or something. I hope you at least got the gist of it. But moving on to answer your questions

1. As I added in the edit in the OP and in some comments to others. I am acutely aware of different ways that we could hold the word 'knowledge'.

I've determined at least a few.

A. Knowledge= a belief assumed to be true and assumed that we (or I) have good justifications for it

B. Knowledge= justified true belief

C. Knowledge= justified belief

D. Knowledge= true information

Any of these can be work. And I'd say given the issues with language it might even be better to bypass it and just say what we mean at times.
(Take the word 'woke' how for some it entails radical behavior whereas for other awareness of social issues)
That is vastly different. And just the use of the word rather than just saying what one dislikes directly had caused much unnecessary issues.

Now from all of these options. I think 'A' is the only one that we can claim is objectively the most accurate of the four because it describes.


It can't be JTB, or true information or justified belief that is more descriptive. Because individuals or groups have called things 'knowledge'. That either wasn't true or wasn't justified. (Not really). Even our justifications at some point assume they are justified.


But in the case of A. Which acknowledges that it's an -assumption- of a belief being justified and true. This is rock solid as a description. Since then the lack of truth or lack of proper judgment of justification doesn't break the definition since it is merely an assumption.

2. Is there a definition that could help us limit whether some definitions for knowledge are acceptable and some aren't?

We could consider the negative effects of trivializing definitions. Any definition should seek to be clear. If the definition is highly inspired by psychological introspection. Then it should make clear the distinction between personal truth assumption and practical recognition of actual 'truth' .

Do you have a definition for your answer?

3.
I wouldn't rule out novel uses.
It would possibly limit new ways of understanding the process of putting out there our understanding of what is. As maybe someone has an insight we don't yet have

To be descriptive and claim to be more accurate. You'd have to look at instances of when people say they have knowledge. Now and across time. And you'll see that it's belief assumed to be justified and assumed to be true.
— Jack2848

But here you seem to be saying the opposite: that JTB is how people generally use the word "knowledge."

So, which is it? Does JTB capture the meaning(s) of "knowledge" or does it not?

And if JTB does reflect the current use, then what is that point of your definition? Do you wish to reform language? Clarify an ambiguity? But defining "knowledge" as, essentially, fact, true proposition, is not only redundant, but confusing as well. According to the usual meaning, knowledge requires a knower, naturally enough. But with your proposal, most of what qualifies as "knowledge" is not known to anyone!

I wouldn't say most common people would say knowledge requires a knower. If you ask someone on the street and as them. ''Can I put knowledge onto a piece of paper. whilst not knowing for myself it is knowledge?"

I imagine many saying something like this. "Yes because if it is knowledge as you say. Then since it is true (information). Then whether you know it or not doesn't matter. It is still true."

I've the luck in this case that I have a very ordinary job. And yet when I tell people knowledge is defined as ''justified true belief''. It doesn't sound like the first thing they think of.

Ofcourse if you ask people. Do you have knowledge? And then ask them how do you know you have knowledge? They might say . Because I have good reasons to believe it.

So knowing then is 'personally assumed justified belief' that they have knowledge (true information).

But here you seem to be saying the opposite: that JTB is how people generally use the word "knowledge."

So, which is it? Does JTB capture the meaning(s) of "knowledge" or does it not?

Hmm.
''belief assumed to be true and assumed to have justifications for"

''information assumed to be true''

''Information assumed to be true''

Those seem like the most descriptive options for what knowledge ultimately is.

Whereas JTB and ''true information'' would be more (useful) inventions rather then descriptions.

Knowledge (beliefs assumed to be justified and assumed to be true) have often be wrong.
— Jack2848

Knowledge claims are sometimes disputed, disclaimed, or proven wrong, as the case may be. The JTB proponent would deal with this issue by emphasizing the distinction between knowledge claims and knowledge as such. Justified Belief is sufficient for a knowledge claim. The Truth requirement is what is supposed to certify that the claim is merited.

With JTB.

'the earth is flat' would have been assumed to be knowledge. But then layer turned out to be justified belief. So not knowledge.
With 'true information' as definition the same would have happened.

It would have been wrongfully (but understandably) assumed to have been knowledge (TI) but then later shown wrong.

The same happens really. It's just that TI there's a clear distinction between knowing and knowledge. Knowing requires (if one is less stringent) justified belief.
And if more stringent, direct awareness of said true information.

I'm definitely not advocating (although in my initial post I seem to have had a different mood) for it having to be defined differently. But I felt like maybe we have strayed to far from a more simple definitional approach. (And this also further from applying Occam's razor)

By recognizing that for knowing we require justifications or direct awareness or x. So that we can know or reasonably assume that we have knowledge (TI). We simplify the definitions.

Are you familiar with the idea of a family resemblance? How much success would you have if you set out to define your family by listing their attributes? Blonde hair and a hooked nose, maybe, except for cousin Philippa, with their less aquiline features and mousy hair. Or all descended from Grandpa Jerome, except the adopted twins. Supose that for whatever feature you choose, there are exceptions, or you include folk that you would not want included.

The idea is that we can talk about our family, despite not being able to give a strict and explicit definition that includes all and only those members we want; and this can be generalised to claim that for some terms there is no explicit definition that sets out all and only those things that are to be included. The other example is "game" - without resorting to mere stipulation, can we provide a rule that includes all and only those things that we have described as a "game"? Not all games involve winning, nor competition, nor amusement. And yet despite this we make good use of the word.

Point being that we do not need to be able to present a definition as a prerequisite for using the word.

We use the word "knowledge" quite adequately, and widely, and yet when we try to tie it down we end up in these interminable philosophical meanderings.

So, do we need to provide a definition of knowledge at all? Perhaps it would be better to just map out the different ways we use the word, as you have begun to do.

One thing we can do is to mark the difference between knowing an believing. We can believe something that is not true. We can't know something that is not true. If you thought you knew something, but it turns out you were mistaken, then you didn't know it at all.

What's wrong with saying knowledge is a relationship between a knower and a proposition?

What's wrong with saying knowledge is a relationship between a knower and a proposition? — frank

"relationship" has a particular baggage - f(a,b) is a relationship.

But the proposition isn't related to the knowledge, so much as part of it's content.

This can be set out again in terms of substitution. if it were a relation, then substitution should be allowed - if f(a,b) and c=b then f(a,c).

But if you know that Cicero wrote De Officiis, it does not follow that you know that Tully wrote De Officiis, despite Tull=Cicero.

So knowing is substitutionally opaque. Relations, not so much.

- :up:

- :up:

- :up:

But if you know that Cicero wrote De Officiis, it does not follow that you know that Tully wrote De Officiis, despite Tull=Cicero. — Banno

Knows is an intensional operator. That knowledge has this intensional aspect puts weight to the idea that knowledge is about a relationship between a knower and an object of thought.

If you like. "relationship" would not be my choice, for the reasons given.

"Object of thought" is loaded. "Content" might be preferred.

But also, what is a "thought"? A proposition in one's mind? Is it distinct from a feeling, or an intuition, or a belief?

These are the problems with the classical approach - might call it the cognitive theory of knowledge, that are addressed by treating knowledge as embodied, as an activity.

- I would say that "relationship" simply does not have that baggage except in the context of Analytic Philosophy.

The reason I would not want to use "relationship" is because it reifies propositions. It is something a Platonist might like.

These are the problems with the classical approach - might call it the cognitive theory of knowledge, that are addressed by treating knowledge as embodied, as an activity. — Banno

But riding a bike is partly a matter of muscle memory. I don't see how the knowledge that Tully wrote X is something about the body. It seems to be about thought.

I don't see how the knowledge that Tully wrote X is something about the body. — frank

It's not not about the body either. Your body wrote the reply, making use of what you knew about Tully, in a way not that dissimilar to how you ride a bike, making use of what you know about peddles and wheels.

The classical approach is to divide "know how" from "know that", and treat of each with an utterly different account. I want to consider an alternative: that knowing involves doing, including doing speaking and thinking.

I don't see how the knowledge that Tully wrote X is something about the body. It seems to be about thought. — frank

The problem is that a name is arguably an extrinsic quality. To know some object is not the same as knowing what name certain other people use to refer to that object.

Maybe you have a nickname, and only two of your friends use that nickname. To fail to know your nickname is not necessarily to fail to know you. Banno's, "Tully = Cicero," actually means something like, "What some name as 'Tully' others name as 'Cicero'." This isn't a particularly substantial point. It pertains to names, not to things. It pertains to predication, not to relationship. Banno says:

if it were a relation, then substitution should be allowed - if f(a,b) and c=b then f(a,c) — Banno

What he requires is something more like f(a, (b,c)), such as Knowledge(Frank, (Tully, De Officiis)). The quibble is actually over the propositional predication (b,c), not the relation between knower and known. After all, Knowledge(Frank, (Tully, De Officiis)) is arguably different than Knowledge(Frank, (Cicero, De Officiis)), if names are to be constitutive parts of knowledge.

It's not not about the body either. Your body wrote the reply, making use of what you knew about Tully, in a way not that dissimilar to how you ride a bike, making use of what you know about peddles and wheels.

The classical approach is to divide "know how" from "know that", and treat of each with an utterly different account. I want to consider an alternative: that knowing involves doing, including doing speaking and thinking — Banno

There's a passage somewhere in the Old Testament that says there's no knowledge in the grave. Knowledge is about living, it's part of living, and that's not something anyone does inside their skull. I understand.

Cool.

f(a, (b,c)) is of course malformed, and even if we charitably allowed some sort of well formed interpretation - perhaps f(a,b,c) - it doesn't even address the issue of extensionality.

f(a, (b,c)) is of course malformed — Banno

According to what authority? The gods of Analytic Philosophy, who do not allow a 2-tuple within a 2-tuple? :wink:

Your whole presupposition is that one of the two relata is complex, and is therefore subject to substitution, for you are substituting a subject/part of a proposition, not one of the two relata that frank outlined. If the proposition-relata cannot be complex then your objection has no force.

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? There's factual knowledge of the objective world, which Mary in her black and white world can learn, and then there's experiential knowledge of the inner world (of what it's like to see red), which Mary, in her black and white world can't learn. Is experiential knowledge a JTB? Or do you just sort of know what x is like and cant be wrong about it? Can my knowledge of what red looks like even be expressed in terms of beliefs? The belief that red is like x must necessarily refer to an experience, which is hard to put into words. For example, I know what seeing is like, but I cannot put it in words to describe to a blind person (from birth), so how can I construct a coherent belief out of it? How do I construct a belief about my knowledge of seeing that is coherent?

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? — RogueAI

Or three?

I know that the bicycle was invented by Karl Drais
I know how to ride a bicycle
I know the feeling of falling off a bicycle

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? There's factual knowledge of the objective world, which Mary in her black and white world can learn, and then there's experiential knowledge of the inner world (of what it's like to see red), which Mary, in her black and white world can't learn. — RogueAI

Can you give an example of "factual knowledge" that is independent of "experiential knowledge"?

Studying the facts of bike riding vs actually learning to ride a bike. No matter how many facts you acquire about bike riding, you won't know how to actually ride the bike. You need experiential knowledge for that. Also, a blind person who's an expert on vision and has no idea what seeing is like. Mary's room stuff.

- Gotcha. I think there are pretty significant differences, to the extent that equivocations may be occurring (between "knowing that" and "knowing how" or "experiencing"). For example:

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? There's factual knowledge of the objective world, which Mary in her black and white world can learn, and then there's experiential knowledge of the inner world (of what it's like to see red), which Mary, in her black and white world can't learn. Is experiential knowledge a JTB? — RogueAI

Why think that perception is knowledge at all?

I would say that intention should guide us, such that if someone purports to know something, then we can treat it as a knowledge claim. Someone might claim to know via perceptions, but claims of perception are not the same as claims of knowledge, because perception is not the same as knowledge. "I perceived that the house is red," is not the same as, "I know that the house is red."

Of course we can say that someone does not, "Know what it's like to see colors," but this is a semantically varied sense of "know."

...but I am digressing:

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? — RogueAI

I think you are basically correct. I would phrase it this way, "Even if we consider know-how a kind of knowledge, it does not follow that all knowledge is of this kind."