An Exploration Between the Balance Between State and Individual Interests
By: @i like sushi

Liberty can be broadly divided into two traditions: the freedom of the individual to govern themselves, as advocated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the freedom of the individual under state protection, as expressed by Thomas Hobbes. Analyzing the views of Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper reveals their opposition to these positions. Popper critiques the Utopian engineering of both Hobbes and Rousseau (Popper, 1962), while Berlin proposes a solution based on oppositional balance rather than favoring one tradition over the other, promoting pluralism over monism. Berlin views societal problems as having multiple, conflicting solutions rather than singular, absolute answers. Consequently, the best form of liberty is context-dependent, shaped by the prevailing social order, making it difficult to determine a universally optimal state to strive for. Instead, the focus should be on the adaptability of a state and the level of liberty its citizens can handle. Generally, individual liberty is deemed more valuable than state authority. Schiller’s ideas on aesthetics, combined with Habermas’s emphasis on communication, provide a framework for a pluralistic, flexible, and aesthetically driven democratic space for rational public discourse on social and political issues. This approach can help mitigate extreme political shifts by fostering unity and fluidity through beauty, a universal and neutral medium, rather than through ideological mandates based on rigid institutional structures.

Popper coined the terms closed society, describing a form of human society where authority and social order were viewed as rigid and rooted in tradition, and open society, emphasizing the importance of rational thought, individualism, and self-determination in shaping social order (Popper, 1962). Berlin coined the terms negative liberty, which concerns the extent to which others, particularly the state, can interfere with or obstruct individual freedoms, and positive liberty, which involves the question of who or what governs or enables individual freedom (Berlin, 2002, p. 169). These two distinctions can be observed within the ideas of Rousseau and Hobbes.

For Rousseau, while it may not be entirely accurate to claim he is looking for a return to the wild, his concept of civil liberty is meant as a replacement for natural liberty. This civil liberty is envisaged as a unity spouting from the natural state of remote peoples coming together under a general will. In light of the concepts of closed society and positive liberty there is alignment with Rousseau’s position regarding the general will adjacent to Berlin’s positive liberty and a clear wish to return to humanity’s natural state conveyed as closed society re-imagined through the idea of self-governance. In Hobbes, there is commonality when it comes to taking on the form of a closed society yet the direction of Hobbes in comparison to Rousseau is antipodal, moving toward negative liberty instead of positive liberty; being more favourable to individual protection from outside forces rather than having all members of society forced to collectively adhere to a universal law.

Rousseau’s vision is of a self-governed collective focused on the common good of all as opposed to individual and private interests. The arguments for such collectivism are that private property over collective state control can be seen as open to greed and therefore economic tyranny. For this reason the principles behind the ideas of collectivism can appear attractive. The greatest strength of humans is how they can achieve more collectively than individually. The idea of the social contract gives freedoms to people by way of opening up opportunities that would be impossible among a free-wheeling group of individuals seeking opposing personal aims. The division of labour has given many the advantage of leisure in which to pursue their own personal interests rather than having to contend with nature in a perpetual cycle of survival. Although the social contract is not a legally binding one it exposes something about human communication and interaction - that is we are able and willing to negotiate and reconcile differences if the overall outcome is better for us than our starting position. In contrast Hobbes’ scheme was far more dictatorial in its flavour. His idea was one where an elite ruling body shaped the state in exchange for its protection. In today’s world this sounds more like a racketeering project than a form of liberal government, yet in this era of social, political and religious upheaval the opportunity for stability was far rarer than today. It is in light of the historical context Berlin, being a proponent for negative liberty due to its inclination towards pluralism, in his words, “Pluralism, with a measure of ‘negative’ liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than … the ideal of ‘positive’ self-mastery by classes or peoples, or the whole of mankind.” (Berlin, 2002, p. 216), could be said to favour a Hobbesian model over Rousseau’s, but it could also be argued that he would be sympathetic to both views as reflections of the times they lived in.

Popper is opposed to both Rousseau and Hobbes as they avoid the formation of an open society by reverting to essentialist views that shift away from human rationality towards historicist schemes adding feelings of inevitability which are more or less what Popper would frame as forms of Utopian engineering (Popper, 1962, p. 161). That said, Rousseau and Hobbes are diametrically opposed in how they envisage their utopian social orders, with the former favouring a collective general will while the latter sought to implement absolute sovereign rule under which a larger degree of individual agency would be feasible, so although Popper opposes Hobbes’ model it leans more toward open society than Rousseau’s ideology which seeks to subordinate individual freedom under some presupposed natural condition framed as a collective general will.

Friedrich Schiller’s aesthetic views map onto the models of Rousseau and Hobbes. Describing the state of humans prior to individuation he states that they either “devour things greedily” or “bats them away” (Schiller, 2016, p. 90), they are in servitude to the formal and material impulses (Schiller, 2016, p. 91); and then echoes Hobbes stating humanity was ruled by “trouble and fear” (Schiller, 2016, p. 92). Unlike Hobbes, Schiller believes in countering fear with beauty rather than dominating paternalistic rule over humanity’s failings. In contrast, Schiller outlines a stark critique of Rousseau’s optimistic portrayal of humanity returning to a state of nature through collectivism, “the rule of conformity becomes tyranny against the individual … extinguishing … the final flickers of autonomy and individuality” (Schiller, 2016, p. 25). He then goes on to highlight what is likely the biggest mistake of liberal thought, that people beckon freedom irrespective of the burden of responsibility, “fearful of liberty, … one will either submit to an easy servitude or, brought to despair by pedantic tutelage, escape to a state of nature lacking all constraint” (Schiller, 2016, p. 25).

Friedrich Schiller offers a remedy to the conflicting opinions of Hobbes and Rousseau in regards to human nature through his concept of true freedom being obtained via the playful impulse. Hobbes’ view can be said to embody Schiller’s material impulse whereas Rousseau’s favours the formal impulse (Schiller, 2016). Both concepts of liberty outlined by them follow the scheme of historicism and the belief in some essentialist given that grounds their views.

When it comes to creating a blueprint for the ideal societal liberty, the differences in such schemes lie in how far they lean toward individual liberty or collective liberty. Many utopian ideals are presented and all of them are left wanting either in the justification of their aims, the responsibility given or taken, or in viewing some form of enforced equality. As Popper remarks, this predicament has been with us since the birth of civilization in our move away from the state of nature—closed society—toward the state of reason—open society (Popper, 1962).

All forms of liberty have orbited this fissure since in political life. Many forms of liberty have been proposed, yet any real attempts of implementing them result in tyranny through some utopian dream via “canvas cleaning” (Plato, 1987) or the ossification of institutions that were put in place to usher in the proposed utopia. Both Auguste Comte and Karl Marx envisaged an ‘epochal’ historicism that dictates and guides social evolution. The inevitability with which they professed their ideas is strongly indicative of what Popper pointed out as a form of political prophesying (Popper, 1962). Such ideological inclinations give followers the satisfaction of absconding from responsibility and acting with unabashed authoritarian rule in the belief that their view is unremitting and unbreakable. This is the stark warning Popper gives us in his analysis of Utopian engineering (Popper, 1962, p. 167).

No matter how grandiose a vision for the future may be, it is essentially useless, if not dangerous, to pursue such a vision with active intent. The attraction of utopian engineering is in its image of a perfect world, yet the picture painted is full of unobtainable goals. The danger then becomes the fanaticism of those enamored by such ideas striving eternally at all costs over the bodies of others. Even a piecemeal engineering approach through to some utopian ideal offers up hazards due to the impossibility of judging the size of incremental steps towards an infinitely distant dreamland. Schiller correctly points out in his analogy of a watch, “When a craftsman repairs a time-piece he can still its wheels; but the living clockwork of the state has to be repaired ... while still in motion” (Schiller, 2016, pp. 8–9). Popper’s solution here was to focus piecemeal engineering on institutions rather than whole political schemes (Popper, 1962, p. 167), but this too seems flawed if such steps are taken with the monolith of utopia looming in the background. Berlin’s contention appears more compelling due to its sceptical nature, emphasizing how rational solutions to differing societal problems can conflict.

For instance, the contemporary pedagogical idea of safe spaces to protect students from harmful topics contrasts with the idea of exposing students to difficult and contentious ideas. From a rational perspective, both views have merit, but one does not win out over the other. The current societal colossus, as an edifice of human construction, has taken on a disembodied authority of its own. Where once the city-state was the tool of the members of society, it has grown in strength and depth, taking on certain anthropomorphic attributes from its first conception up to the present age. Often the state has acted as a makeshift remedy for the displacement of humanity from nature, but it acts as a poor substitute—never able to fulfill its utopian promise—and, inversely, attempts to revert to some natural state have also been futile in the brutal light of reason. Here Schiller offers, “Taste alone introduces harmony into society, because it fosters harmony in the individual” (Schiller, 2016, p. 110).

Marx rails against aestheticism, framing it as a form of bourgeois fetishism, which is rather contradictory as he also complains about the commodification of art. While Marxism seems inherently flawed, there is certainly weight to numerous problems pointed out by Marx. The commodification of works of art shows how the material impulse can subdue the playful impulse—what Marx calls fetishism. Schiller divulges the potential of the playful impulse: “… man is elevated to a unity of quantity … into a unity of ideas that comprehend the entire realm of phenomena. With this … we are no longer in time … in a never-ending succession … the judgement of all minds is expressed by our own” (Schiller, 2016, p. 57), emphasizing that art is not a mere bourgeois luxury but integral to humanity. The individual, without moral or political concerns, neither focuses on the material nor the formal impulses, emphasizing “… he is only a complete man when he plays” (Schiller, 2016, p. 57).

Much like Comte, Schiller saw clearly the problem of overextending reason at the expense of the emotive aspects of human life. A further comment on the overextension of rationalism comes through Byung-Chul Han, where he outlines the seeming progression of modern life— inundated with wave after wave of information—reverting humanity to a more animal nature in a concrete jungle: “The society of laboring and achievement is not a free society” (Han, 2017, p. 19), echoing Schiller’s point: “He senses only the fetters that reason lays upon him, and not the unending liberation that it gives him” (Schiller, 2016, p. 93). Han also suggests that a human state of rest comes in opposition to utility and achievement: “… the day of in-order-to is not sacred, but rather the day of not-to … The interval is a time without work, a time of, and for, play …” (Han, 2017, p. 34), as Schiller talks of “tranquility in fatigue” in the “raw state of nature” (Schiller, 2016, p. 90).

While Berlin, Popper, and Habermas have ideas about social and individual freedoms, it seems Schiller is the one who manages to span both rational and moral thought while revealing that liberty lies beyond them in the playful impulse of aesthetic sensibility. “The political legislator … cannot falsify art” (Schiller, 2016, p. 29). Schiller does not look to construct institutions but rather to create associations whereby the playful impulse can guide the restructuring and construction of public institutions passively, rather than actively with Habermas’s critical debate in the public sphere. What Schiller lends to Habermas’s idea here is a means to loosen up rational discourse and prevent ossification within the abstracted realm of the public sphere through the introduction of the playful impulse. There is even room to argue that the playful impulse preceded freedom of expression through the conduit of aesthetic critique in the salons and coffee houses, even though Habermas viewed the art critique as “a kind of shadowy public sphere” (Eagleton, 2004).

Emphasis on the individual, then, using this to form associations rather than institutions or doctrines, provides society with a means to bridge the gap between the material and formal representations of the world. Building on this idea, Oscar Wilde says: “It is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors.” … “The only excuse for making a useless thing is that one admires it intensely. All art is quite useless” (Wilde, 2001, Preface). There is clearly no derision for art here. Taste compels reason to dictate the value of art, yet it cannot, and so combines with moral attitudes to declare some work of art as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ rather than as true or false. This shows the inclination of propaganda as it appeals to feelings. This is all a deceit, though, as art is neither good nor bad, and taste is neither good nor bad. These declarations are merely the material and formal impulses wrestling with a realm they cannot influence. Taste is refined and shaped by experience but it is outside the judgment of reason and morals when it comes to beauty. Beauty has naught to say about morality nor rationality. What is beautiful is beautiful. All the moralising and reasoning in the world cannot change the impression of beauty on the individual taste. We cannot fool ourselves about beauty. Where beauty appears in our lives, we acknowledge it without the necessity of moral or rational judgment.

In conclusion, any idealisation of liberty expressed within a state lies exposed to the slippery slope of utopian engineering. Therefore, true individual liberty, through Schiller’s aesthetic sensibility, provides a mediating association that can inculcate necessary changes to institutions and prevent them from stagnating by facilitating a means of universal discourse between a plurality of ideas expressed within the public sphere.


Bibliography

Berlin, I., 2002. Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eagleton, T., 2004. The Ideology of the Aesthetic. Oxford: Blackwell.

Han, B.-C., 2017. The Burnout Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Habermas, J., 1991. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Plato, 1987. The Republic. Translated by D. Lee. Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics.

Popper, K., 1962. The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume I – The Spell of Plato. 4th ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Schiller, F., 2016 [1795]. On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Translated by K. W. Alexander. London: Penguin.

Wilde, O., 2001. The Picture of Dorian Gray. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions.