I don't think I quite understand this:

The question J and I are wondering about is: how far does this go? When does speech about a proper name become nonsense because a contradiction has arisen between an assertion and something essential about the object of the assertion? How did Kripke handle this question? — frank

The reference is entirely subjective.
A human is saying your words and it will obviously fall to that persons view. In brief terms its just a lie, and I don't understand why you are putting extra emphasis on this.
I generally do not understand, so if you are willing to explain please be happy to.

The reference is entirely subjective.
A human is saying your words and it will obviously fall to that persons view — Red Sky

That's what Kripke is describing here in lecture 2:

1, To every name or designating expression 'X', there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties q> such that A believes 'q>X'.

2. One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely.

3. If most, or a weighted most, of the q> 's are satisfied by one unique object y, then y is the referent of 'x'.

4. If the vote yields no unique object, 'x' does not refer. •

5. The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the q>' s' is known a priori by the speaker.

6. The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the q>' s' expresses a necessary truth (in the idiolect of the speaker).

For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate. — Naming and Necessity, Lecture 2 p.71

What picture of naming do these Theses ((1)-(5)) give you? The picture is this. I want to name an object. I think of some way of describing it uniquely and then I go through, so to speak, a sort of mental ceremony: By 'Cicero' I shall mean the man who denounced Catiline; and that's what the reference of 'Cicero' will be. I will use 'Cicero' to designate rigidly the man who (in fact) denounced Catiline, so I can speak of possible worlds in which he did not. But still my intentions are given by first, giving some condition which uniquely determines an object, then using a certain word as a name for the object determined by this condition — ibid p.79

@J Would you agree that #6 of the theses explains how an object obtains necessary properties? It's a matter of the speaker's intentions. That's at least one way..

I don't understand why you are putting extra emphasis on this. — Red Sky

It's just because the issue of reference became a hot topic in analytical philosophy, starting with Russell and Frege, who advocated that names are symbols for a collection of descrtiptions, through Quine who claimed reference can't really be fixed. It's just part of this ongoing philosophical debate about how speech works.

The subjectivity/circularity issue is perhaps even clearer in what Kripke goes on to say here:

If one was determining the referent of a name like 'Glunk' to himself and made the following decision, 'I shall use the term "Glunk" to refer to the man that I call "Glunk"', this would get one nowhere. One had better have some independent determination of the referent of 'Glunk'. — 73

Pretty clearly, you can't cite the fact that you refer to something as X as the criterion or determination for why you do so!

Would you agree that #6 of the theses explains how an object obtains necessary properties? It's a matter of the speaker's intentions. That's at least one way.. — frank

Yes, one way, and on one understanding of necessity (a priori). And notice how we're forced to phrase it: the object obtains the properties. Is this magic? :smile: Can this be what Kripke literally means?

BTW, do you take "in the idiolect of the speaker" to be Kripke just being careful (like "in language L"), or is he making some additional point?

Yes, one way, and on one understanding of necessity (a priori). And notice how we're forced to phrase it: the object obtains the properties. Is this magic? :smile: Can this be what Kripke literally means? — J

This isn't about necessity in general. It's that when I pick an object, like the pillow with the red button, I'm only looking at possible worlds where that object exists. There are possible worlds where the pillow doesn't have a red button, but I don't care about those. For the purposes of my communication, the red button is necessary because it's in all the possible worlds I'm paying attention to. I magically made the red button necessary by fiat.

BTW, do you take "in the idiolect of the speaker" to be Kripke just being careful (like "in language L"), or is he making some additional point? — J

He's saying that when I rigidly designate an object, like the pillow with the red button, you're supposed to pick up on what I mean by it. It's all about me and my intentions as a speaker. I think we recently had a thread where we were talking about Quine's inscrutability of reference and someone kept saying, "but doesn't intention pick out the thing?" Naming and Necessity is an effort to flesh out that idea, among other things. The distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators becomes valuable when he starts talking about the mind-body problem. It cuts through some fog.

This isn't about necessity in general. It's that when I pick an object, like the pillow with the red button, I'm only looking at possible worlds where that object exists. There are possible worlds where the pillow doesn't have a red button, but I don't care about those. For the purposes of my communication, the red button is necessary because it's in all the possible worlds I'm paying attention to. I magically made the red button necessary by fiat. — frank

Yes. In fact, maybe we should say, not that the object now has the properties, but rather that those properties (which were always there) are now made necessary. That way we can work our stipulative magic without the illusion of adding or subtracting properties to what we're talking about.

He's saying that when I rigidly designate an object, like the pillow with the red button, you're supposed to pick up on what I mean by it. It's all about me and my intentions as a speaker. — frank

I think this is a good explanation, thanks. It broadens "idiolect" to include not merely the language that happens to be spoken, but the particular idio-syncratic intentions of the speaker.

Cool, so I'll give an explanation for why Kripke might be ok with the proposition that I could have been Obama. There are a couple of options for how we interpret the word "I" in that statement.

1. I am defined as the frank who was born at a certain place and time of certain parents.

2. I am defined as a mind that can occupy any living body. Here think of Charlie Kaufman's Being John Malkovich, in which the image of the mind as a puppet master recurs, and the main character travels through a tunnel that leads to John Malkovich.

So if the reference of my proposition is 1, then the proposition is false, because we would have a contradiction. If the reference of my proposition is 2, does that work? The problem is that I'm defining myself as my mind, but I'm defining Obama as his body. This is the conundrum of Kaufman's movie.

But since the references of the objects in the proposition are set by intention (whose intention is another cool question), we could have it that the proposition does refer to me as my mind, and Obama as his body, so it works. I think my argument might be a little flimsy. What do you think?

Heh. I like that movie a lot too. Trying to remember . . . doesn't the main character co-inhabit JM's body along with JM? (Though neither can "speak" to the other.) MC doesn't gain control of what JM does; he's like an epiphenomenal consciousness, along for the ride and watching the world through JM's senses. So it isn't an exact parallel to the situation you're imagining, which would require JM's mind to vanish and MC to take over for him. Or I could be misremembering.

Anyway . . . does your situation play by Kripkean rules? Let me paraphrase what I think you're saying: You, frank, can fix references as you see fit, and as long as someone -- J, let's say -- accepts what you're doing, the two of us know what we're talking about. And in this case, you have the breathtaking audacity to fix the reference for "frank" one way and the reference for "Obama" another! "frank" will refer to a mind, "Obama" to a body. Using that interpretation (borrowing from @Banno here), either one of us can indeed say "frank could have been Obama," because we know what we've agreed that would mean, and there's no contradiction involved.

So far, so good. I think Kripke would be on board too, in the very limited sense that you and I, as a mini-community, can agree to speak as we see fit. But the picture thus described faces challenges.

The first is that the "argument" can only work for you and me. It can't be used to persuade anyone who won't use our idiolect. Which leads to the second: Naturally we'll be asked why the references of "frank" and "Obama" should be fixed in such radically different ways. This would amount to asking, "Why should I join you two in this particular reference-fixing?"

I see a non-serious and a serious answer to this. The non-serious answer is, "Well, it's an ad hoc way of allowing us to speak about the possibility that frank could have been Obama." A reason, admittedly, but not a very good one, since nothing of philosophical interest follows from such ad-hocness.

The serious answer is, "We all know how to use phrases like 'if I were you' and 'if I'd been Obama'. Our idiolect explains, in simple terms, what those phrases mean, and why they're so handy. When we use them, we're automatically adopting an interpretation of each term that allows one to 'be in' the other. Then, when no longer needed, we drop that interpretation and go back to our usual usage. All this is so common as to be literally unremarkable. You could call it a type of equivocation, but it's useful, not confusing." (This isn't my own preferred analysis of how 'if I were you' works, BTW.)

So, two questions: First, is this allowed? And second, At what point do we need to step in and protest that such reference-fixing is ludicrously out of step with how the world is?

I think it is allowed. Again, two people can agree to talk any way they want, as long as they don't expect agreement from others. But now your OP question arises:

how far a rigid designator can be stripped of properties and still be valuable. — frank

This example isn't so much a matter of being stripped of properties as it is of being saddled with absurd ones. In our mini-community, we wish to maintain that some subset of persons (which includes frank) are minds, and another subset (which includes Obama) are bodies. I don't know how we'd get that off the ground, as we "look out at the world," to use your phrase. Just for starters, how do you tell the difference? Well, radical solipsism, maybe.

So let me stop, before I confuse myself, and say that the difficult question lies right here: What does Kripke's view about reference commit us to, concerning metaphysics? Because "the world" is metaphysics. You can't jump from how we use language and logic to how such use relates to the world without bringing along your basket of metaphysical assumptions -- about physics, about causality, about realism, about how we know stuff about the world, and much more. When we ask whether our "frank/Obama" idiolect could represent a picture of our world, not just a possible world, we're asking a metaphysical question, IMO.

I see a non-serious and a serious answer to this. The non-serious answer is, "Well, it's an ad hoc way of allowing us to speak about the possibility that frank could have been Obama." A reason, admittedly, but not a very good one, since nothing of philosophical interest follows from such ad-hocness. — J

It wasn't ad hoc. It's what I was thinking about from the beginning of our discussion. I really don't know how the world works. I normally think about it as a tree of possibilities.

This example isn't so much a matter of being stripped of properties as it is of being saddled with absurd ones. — J

It's just straight Descartes. That we can't say the mind is necessarily identical to the body was mentioned by Kripke in N&N. I'm guessing his restraint about metaphysical pronouncements is due in part to Wittgenstein's influence.

It wasn't ad hoc. It's what I was thinking about from the beginning of our discussion. — frank

Sorry, didn't mean to say that you were bringing it up in an ad-hoc way here. Rather, if someone were to ask you, "Why opt for the bizarre reference-fixing schema with 'frank' as a mind and 'Obama' as a body?" and you were to reply, "Oh, I did that so I can say that it's possible for me to have been Obama," that would be ad hoc, or makeshift, or at any rate not the sort of answer the questioner was presumably looking for. Because it only defers the real question, "Yes, of course, but why do you want to say that?"

It's just straight Descartes. That we can't say the mind is necessarily identical to the body was mentioned by Kripke in N&N. — frank

The absurdity I was referring to isn't Cartesian dualism -- nothing absurd about that, though I don't subscribe.

No, I was pointing to the idea that identity could in one person's case be mental and in another physical -- or maybe "arbitrary" is a better word than "absurd." I took you to be raising that in order to see if it was consistent with Kripke's views on reference -- which I think it is, for the "mini-community" that uses that idiolect. Were you additionally suggesting it as a real possibility? Not a Cartesian one, at any rate!

Because it only defers the real question, "Yes, of course, but why do you want to say that?" — J

Why do you say that's the real question? When Kripke says Nixon could have lost the election, would you say we need to know why he would say that?

Were you additionally suggesting it as a real possibility? — J

What do you mean by "real" possibility?

Because it only defers the real question, "Yes, of course, but why do you want to say that?"
— J

Why do you say that's the real question? When Kripke says Nixon could have lost the election, would you say we need to know why he would say that? — frank

Yes, I think so, if we're wondering whether to speak the same idiolect. And K can give the answer, "Because I want to bring out the character of rigid designators, and show what 'N could have lost the election' means." Compare to your being asked, "Why opt for 'frank' as a mind and 'Obama' as a body?" If you reply, "Because that lets me talk about the possibility that I could have been Obama," we then have to decide if "that lets me talk about X" is a good reason. I'm suggesting that it's a genuine, if trivial, reason, but defers the interesting question of why you'd want to talk that way. Whereas the Nixon example is not about "this lets me talk about N losing the election," but about, more directly, "this lets me explain rigid designators." But perhaps there is a comparable reason one could give for your example -- I admit I haven't thought this through in depth.

Were you additionally suggesting it as a real possibility?
— J

What do you mean by "real" possibility? — frank

I should be fined for using "real", against my own strictures. :smile: Let me rephrase: Were you suggesting the "frank=mind / Obama=body" structure as something that might reflect how things stand in our world? I was assuming you were not, but only using the example to probe Kripke.

I'm suggesting that it's a genuine, if trivial, reason, but defers the interesting question of why you'd want to talk that way. — J

Science fiction is fraught with disembodied minds being transferred around, like an uploaded version of a person subsequently downloaded to a clone and whatnot. In fact one of the first books I read as a child was by Jack Vance and had the plot of a guy who wakes up in a body and can't remember what happened in his last iteration. A murder mystery ensues. If you recall, in the Matrix movies an AI manages to download himself into a human. I'm just used to that kind of thing.

Were you suggesting the "frank=mind / Obama=body" structure as something that might reflect how things stand in our world? — J

I guess it could be. I don't know. Heidegger would say no, I think Adorno would say yes, the issue being whether the self and the environment it evolved in are inextricable. What do you think?

What do you think? — frank

The default assumption is that what goes for one, goes for all, if the property in question is putatively essential (as "identity" would be). If I am a mind, why would any other person be anything else? If tiger A is a mammal, why would tiger B be a bird? etc. I'm calling this an assumption, because there's nothing that immediately shows it must be true, but it would take some powerful reasons to unseat it, I think. Remember, we're talking about our world, not just a possible, "idiolecty" world. In our world, we don't declare one person to be a mind, another a body, except maybe in some unusual cases of brain death or similar perplexities. At any rate, we don't do it when there is no other difference between the two.

Ah, but perhaps we should, if the key difference is between "I" and everyone else. That would be the solipsistic possibility I referred to earlier. Maybe there aren't any other minds! But I don't think that's in the spirit of what you're examining.

What does Adorno say about this? And can you say more about how we might understand persons, if they can be categorized as either minds or bodies, depending?

The default assumption is that what goes for one, goes for all, if the property in question is putatively essential (as "identity" would be). If I am a mind, why would any other person be anything else? If tiger A is a mammal, why would tiger B be a bird? etc. I'm calling this an assumption, because there's nothing that immediately shows it must be true, but it would take some powerful reasons to unseat it, I think. Remember, we're talking about our world, not just a possible, "idiolecty" world. In our world, we don't declare one person to be a mind, another a body, except maybe in some unusual cases of brain death or similar perplexities. At any rate, we don't do it when there is no other difference between the two. — J

I see what you're saying. There are definitely situations where concise, unambiguous language is required, like in the repair instructions for a spaceship. Otherwise, language is pretty metaphoric, poetic, unconsciously Shakespearean. I guess it depends on the situation.

Maybe there aren't any other minds! — J

For thousands of years there have been people who believed the universe is one giant mind. Some physicists think it's actually a black hole inside a bigger universe, which might also be a black hole. Craziness all around.

What does Adorno say about this? And can you say more about how we might understand persons, if they can be categorized as either minds or bodies, depending? — J

Negative Dialectics circles around the idea of the unification of subject and object, sometimes known as mind and body. A dialectical approach says they have to be mutually dependent, and this leads to the idea that the separation is an illusion, if one truly had their shit together, one would see that the two are one. Heidegger could be interpreted as seeing it that way. Adorno disagreed with the rush to some sort of mystical marriage of the opposites because one is apt to become blind and numb that way. Leave the mind and body, soul and Christ, self and world, however you put it, alone. They're separate in our consciousness for a reason. There are necessary dramas playing out, much of which really hurts. Stop trying to bypass it and let that pain transform us.

I actually agree with you. It's pretty strained to say that I could be Obama. It probably just means I'm giving advice, "if I were you..." :grin:

I actually agree with you. It's pretty strained to say that I could be Obama. It probably just means I'm giving advice, "if I were you..." :grin: — frank

Yes, either "Here's what you should do . . ." or "Here's what I would do if I found myself in your situation . . ." Interesting that the first is about "you", the second about "me".

This might be a good moment to go back to one of your original questions:

When does speech about a proper name become nonsense because a contradiction has arisen between an assertion and something essential about the object of the assertion? How did Kripke handle this question? — frank

"Elizabeth Windsor was born of different parents" -- would that be an example?

I'd like to hear your thoughts. And are there some target passages from N&N you think we should look at?

Would you agree that #6 of the theses explains how an object obtains necessary properties? It's a matter of the speaker's intentions. That's at least one way.. — frank

I'm not sure I would agree with that, assuming I understand what you mean.

What is a matter of the speaker's intentions, according to Kripke, isn't what properties the object they mean to be referring to has by necessity (i.e. in all possible worlds) but rather what properties it is that they are relying on for picking it (by description) in the actual world. This initial part of the reference fixing process is, we might say, idiolectical; but that's because we defer to the speaker, in those cases, for determining what object it is (in the actual world) that they mean to be referring to. The second part of Kripke's account, which pertains to the object's necessary properties, is where rigidity comes to play, and is dependent on our general conception of such objects (e.g. the persistence, individuation and identity criteria of object that fall under their specific sortal concept, such as a human being, a statue or a lump of clay). This last part (determining which properties of the object are contingent and which are essential/necessary) isn't idiolectical since people may disagree, but may also be wrong, regarding what the essential properties of various (kinds of) objects are.

Regarding the essentialness of filiation (e.g. Obama having the parents that he actually has by necessity), it may be a matter of metaphysical debate, or of convention (though I agree with Kripke in this case) but it is orthogonal to his more general point about naming and rigidity. Once the metaphysical debate has been resolved regarding Obama's essential properties, the apparatus of reference fixing (that may rely on general descriptions, and then rigid designation, still can world very much in the way Kripke intimated.

"That man over there with champagne in his glass", if interpreted as a rigid designator, doesn't fix an immutable description, but rather fixes an abstract storage location (an address) for containing mutable descriptions.

The logic of naming and necessity is essentially that of the type system of C++. Hence rigid desgination per-se doesn't imply metaphysical realism nor does it make assumptions about the world. Such speculative conjectures rather belong to the causal theory of reference.

In C++, Kripke's example becomes

/*initialize a constant pointer (i.e. rigid designator) called 'that_man' to the address of a string variable*/
string * const that_man = new string("has champagne");

/*print the value of the address that is rigidly designated by "that_man"*/
cout << that_man; //that_man = 0x2958300 (say)

/*print the value of the variable at 0x2958300*/
cout << *that_man; // *that_man = "has champagne"

/*change the incorrect value of the string variable at 0x2958300 to the correct description*/
*that_man = "has water";

/*try to use that_man non-rigidly to refer to another man*/
string * const another_man = 0;
that_man = another_man; //error: assignment of read-only variable 'that_man'

What is a matter of the speaker's intentions, according to Kripke, isn't what properties the object they mean to be referring to has by necessity (i.e. in all possible worlds) but rather what properties it is that they are relying on for picking it (by description) in the actual world. This initial part of the reference fixing process is, we might say, idiolectical; but that's because we defer to the speaker, in those cases, for determining what object it is (in the actual world) that they mean to be referring to. — Pierre-Normand

Right. Once I've picked out an object from the actual world, though many of its properties might be contingent, for my purposes they're essential to the object I'm talking about. Right?

The second part of Kripke's account, which pertains to the object's necessary properties, is where rigidity comes to play, and is dependent on our general conception of such objects (e.g. the persistence, individuation and identity criteria of object that fall under their specific sortal concept, such as a human being, a statue or a lump of clay) — Pierre-Normand

Why couldn't rigidity come into play regarding a contingent feature of an object?

Say X is a pillow with a red button. Broadly speaking, the button is a contingent feature. But any pillow that doesn't have the button is not the pillow I'm talking about. The button is essential to X.

Regarding the essentialness of filiation (e.g. Obama having the parents that he actually has by necessity), it may be a matter of metaphysical debate, or of convention (though I agree with Kripke in this case) but it is orthogonal to his more general point about naming and rigidity. Once the metaphysical debate has been resolved regarding Obama's essential properties, the apparatus of reference fixing (that may rely on general descriptions, and then rigid designation, still can world very much in the way Kripke intimated. — Pierre-Normand

True.

When does speech about a proper name become nonsense because a contradiction has arisen between an assertion and something essential about the object of the assertion? How did Kripke handle this question?
— frank

"Elizabeth Windsor was born of different parents" -- would that be an example? — J

I think so, yes.

Right. Once I've picked out an object from the actual world, though many of its properties might be contingent, for my purposes they're essential to the object I'm talking about. Right? — frank

Saying that they're essential "to the object [you're] talking about" is ambiguous. It admits of two readings. You may mean to say (de re) of the object you are talking that it neccessarily had those properties. That isn't the case, ordinarily. The pillow you are talking about could possibly (counterfactually) have had its button ripped off. In that case, of course, you could have referred to it differently. But it's the same pillow you would have referred to.

On its de dicto reading, your sentence is correct. But then the essentialness that you are talking about belongs to your speech act, not to the object talked about. Say, you want to talk about the first pillow that you bought that had a red button, and you mean to refer to it by such a definite description. Then, necessarily, whatever object you are referring to by a speech act of that kind, has a red button. But this essentialness doesn't transfer to the object itself. In other words, in all possible worlds where your speech act (of that kind) picks a referent, this referent is a pillow that has a red button. But there also are possible worlds where the red-buttoned pillow that you have picked up in the actual world doesn't have a red button. Those are possible worlds where you don't refer to it with the same speech act. In yet other words (and more simply), you can say that if the particular red-buttoned pillow you are talking about (by description) hadn't had a red button, then, in that case, it would not have been the pillow that you meant to refer to.

Why couldn't rigidity come into play regarding a contingent feature of an object?

Good question. I'm a bit busy. I'll come back to it!

I see what you're saying. So with that in mind, @J is right that I can't become Obama because there would be a conflict in necessary properties of me versus him, and that comes down to what's necessary about being a human.

With some wild metaphysical shenanigans we might be able to work it out that Obama is the next stage of my existence, parenthood isn't what we think it is, etc. That wouldn't be excluded by Kripke, because he wasn't weighing in on the nature of the universe. But that's the only point that's made by insisting that I could become Obama, that the universe could work differently than the way we think it does. Do you agree with that?

But that's the only point that's made by insisting that I could become Obama, that the universe could work differently than the way we think it does. Do you agree with that? — frank

I agree, but in that case we're talking about epistemic possibilities, or epistemic humility.

I agree, but in that case we're talking about epistemic possibilities, or epistemic humility. — Pierre-Normand

:up:

Thanks for chiming in here, very helpful. I was going to say something about de re / de dicto at this point too. We can stipulate a property that's necessary de dicto without making any commitments about its de re characteristics. And Kripke seems rather nonchalantly to cross this bridge, as you say:

The second part of Kripke's account, which pertains to the object's necessary properties . . . — Pierre-Normand

I'm not sure what to say about this. Is "our general conception of such objects" good enough to be going on with? I agree that Kripke seems to think it is. Or maybe that's a bit unfair -- he does try to analyze these conceptions, but it seems to me that he's doing so in terms of how we talk about them, so there's one foot back in de dicto contingency and necessity.

I hope this conversation will continue to work on this, because I'd like to come out with a better understanding of whether Kripke is really an "essentialist" in some semi-Aristotelian sense.

"Elizabeth Windsor was born of different parents" -- would that be an example?
— J

I think so, yes. — frank

OK, still working on this.

I can say that Obama might be a robot, but I can't say that Obama could have been a robot. Doesn't that show that the properties of the rigid designator are set by the speaker? Or maybe not, maybe it's just that the exact object is picked out by the speaker. The properties follow from there.

When does speech about a proper name become nonsense because a contradiction has arisen between an assertion and something essential about the object of the assertion? How did Kripke handle this question? — frank

Before we get to nonsense and contradiction, I want to understand a little better what Kripke is saying about reference. Here's the passage you quoted:

'The man over there with the champagne in his glass is happy', though he actually only has water in his glass. Now, even though there is no champagne in his glass, and there may be another man in the room who does have champagne in his glass, the speaker intended to refer, or maybe, in some sense of 'refer', did refer, to the man he thought had the champagne in his glass. — Naming and Necessity p.24,25

What happens if we change the designation to "The man over there who I think has champagne in his glass is happy"? That's where Kripke himself winds up: "The speaker intended to refer . . . to the man he thought had the champagne in his glass." Has the speaker still made a mistake in reference? I think we have to say no. The reference is now based on something the speaker thought, not something that is the case about Mr. Champagne. The speaker can point out Mr. Champagne to me, explain that the man is being designated according to a belief the speaker has about him, and we can both usefully talk about that man and no other. Whether or not Mr. Champagne really has champagne coudn't be relevant.

So how should we describe this difference? Is it a version of de dicto / de re? Sort of. We could rewrite "The man over there who I think has champagne in his glass" as follows: "The man over there about whom I say, 'He has champagne in his glass'." Certainly the fact that the speaker says this about Mr. Champagne is not a necessary de re property. But it is necessary that he say this in order for the designation to refer.

Thinking out loud, really. Does this make sense?

I would only add that "the one holding a glass of champagne" is said for the audience's benefit. I can look at someone and silently think "asshole" and I know who I mean, no hoops jumped through. If I gesture, for you, at someone and say "asshole", you might need clarification about which of the people over there I disapprove of. Hence "the one holding ..." or even "the one holding - what is that? Is that champagne?"

Point being it's not exactly a matter (de dicto) of what the speaker thinks, but really of what the speaker thinks the audience will think. "The guy holding what you would probably think is champagne, but I saw the bottles and ..."

I can't remember if Kripke gets there, and I'm not looking at the book, sorry. But reference is a matter of triangulation, not just what pertains to the speaker or pertains to what she speaks of.

But it is necessary that he say this in order for the designation to refer. — J

:grin: Yes, I think that's what @Pierre-Normand was pointing out about my pillow example:

On its de dicto reading, your sentence is correct. But then the essentialness that you are talking about belongs to your speech act, not to the object talked about. Say, you want to talk about the first pillow that you bought that had a red button, and you mean to refer to it by such a definite description. Then, necessarily, whatever object you are referring to by a speech act of that kind, has a red button. But this essentialness doesn't transfer to the object itself. In other words, in all possible worlds where your speech act (of that kind) picks a referent, this referent is a pillow that has a red button. — Pierre-Normand

But reference is a matter of triangulation, not just what pertains to the speaker or pertains to what she speaks of. — Srap Tasmaner

Reference is set by the speaker.

This raises the question, Could there be a private language of reference? I don't see why not. Sometimes I talk to myself, and need to keep track of things that are relevant only to me. Let's say I have to organize 12 books whose titles I no longer remember. I might recognize their covers, though, and think, "That's the one Jane gave me", "I got that one at Brentano's" etc. I now know how to refer to them. Sure, I could teach someone else how to do it to, but do I need to, in order simply to fix the reference for each?