I think Srap Tasmaner is basically saying he doesn't think at all when he's not engaging another person. I think he's saying he's not even conscious of the world around him until he discusses it, at which point a sort of negotiated narrative comes into being. — frank

In this case, even to the degree that I am engaging with another person, I am speechless.

whether the statement-type designation -- "He is the person about whom I say . . ." -- is rigid. — J

It just seems obviously not to be.

1. It has an indexical in it. I think that rules it out from the jump.

2. As phrased, it names a class of actual performance, without even a ceteris paribus clause. The obvious way to strengthen it is to shift to talk of dispositions. But c.p. clauses and dispositions have known issues.

What you seem to want is really an in-between category of "rigid-for-you".

It has an indexical in it. I think that rules it out from the jump. — Srap Tasmaner

No, Kripke and Kaplan say indexicals can be rigid designators:

It was part of my view that 'this', 'I', 'you', etc. are all rigid (even though their references obviously vary with the context of utterance. The rigidity of demonstratives has been stressed by David Kaplan. — N&N, 10, ftn

Unless you think the "demonstrative / indexical" distinction is important here? I think my example uses a genuine demonstrative. And in any case, I'm pretty sure indexicals are generally accepted as rigid. @Banno?

What you seem to want is really an in-between category of "rigid-for-you". — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think so, because I don't yet see how my designation differs from the standard model. In what way would it not be rigid for anyone, once accepted?

In this case, even to the degree that I am engaging with another person, I am speechless. — Srap Tasmaner

You'll probably need an MRI at some point. :grin: :up:

Right right. It's been years since I read this. I've got nothing to contribute on "what Kripke would say" so I'll mosey along.

Aw, you should keep following this, you have really good insights and questions.

I'll add one little note, relevant to the issues raised in the OP about essential properties.

In the collected papers of Ruth Barcan Marcus, there is a transcript of a discussion between Marcus, Quine, and Kripke, who was (iirc) at the time maybe not yet 20, and I forget who else. Anyway, I remember a specific exchange where Quine said that Kripke's approach would require bringing back the distinction between essential and accidental properties, and Kripke agreed, but didn't consider that the fatal flaw Quine did.

I think there was some bad blood later, Marcus or people on her behalf claiming that the causal theory of names was stolen from her.

Anyway it's interesting to see Quine's star student (and then later Lewis) already plunging into waters he was deeply apprehensive about.

That strikes me as more important than sorting out the Gavagai. — Banno

Some people like wrestling with the Gavagai. :razz:

Quine said that Kripke's approach would require bringing back the distinction between essential and accidental properties, and Kripke agreed, but didn't consider that the fatal flaw Quine did. — Srap Tasmaner

Srap referred me to a sentence I had uttered and I told him I wasn't sure if he meant the whole thing or the parts. You got the reference to Quine, but Srap didn't. Does that mean the reference was successful and unsuccessful at the same time?

You got the reference to Quine, but Srap didn't. — frank

Does this sentence strike anyone but frank as plausible?

Sometimes @frank I just don't see the point in responding. I'm sure you understand.

So you did get it? Fair enough.

But wait... did you get it privately? Do you allow such a thing?

Eh, I guess it doesn't matter.

If you're using "private" the way Wittgenstein did, the answer depends on the extent to which meaning arises from rule following. If it's mostly rule following, then you couldn't establish rules by yourself.

If you're just asking if you can keep some information to yourself, yes. — frank

I agree with the comments @Banno and @Srap Tasmaner made on the issue of intent regarding the way for one's own expressions (or thoughts) to refer, at least until this point in the thread (where you flagged me). The very content of this intent is something that ought to be negotiated within a broader embodied life/social context, including with oneself, and, because of that, it isn't a private act in Wittgenstein's sense. It can, and often must, be brought out in the public sphere. That doesn't make the speaker's intentions unauthoritative. But it makes them fallible. The stipulated "rules" for using a term, and hence securing its reference, aim at effective triangulation, as Srap suggested.

Another issue is relevant. Kripke's semantic externalism (that he disclaimed being a causal "theory"), like Putnam's, often is portrayed as an alternative to a descriptive theory that is itself construed as a gloss on Frege's conception of sense. But modern interpreters of Frege, following Gareth Evans, insist on the notion of singular senses, that aren't descriptive but rather are grounded in the subject's acquaintance with the referred object and can be expressed with a demonstrative expression. Kripke's so called "causal theory" adumbrates the idea that, in the champagne case, for instance, whereas the speaker makes a presupposition while referring to the intended individual that they see holding a glass, their act of reference also is perceptually grounded (or meant to be so) and is a singular sense rather than descriptive. When there is an unintended mismatch between the reference of this singular sense and the descriptive sense that the speaker expresses, then the presupposition of identity is mistaken. What it is that the speaker truly intended to have priority (i.e. the demonstrative singular sense or the descriptive one) for the purpose of fixing the true referent of their speech act (or of the thought that this speech act is meant to express) can be a matter of negotiation or further inquiry.

There's actually a funny issue with non-response I've been thinking about, since 's entreaty that I stick around. It's one of the things Lewis talks about in Scorekeeping, if I'm remembering correctly.

Suppose you ask me who that guy is holding the glass of champagne, and I realize you mean Jim, but I happen to know Jim is holding a glass of sparkling cider. I could silently correct you and just answer "That's Jim," but in doing so I will have implicitly endorsed your claim that Jim is drinking champagne.

We are again in the territory of farce.

But couldn't we get around that in the way I suggested earlier?:

We could rewrite "The man over there who I think has champagne in his glass" as follows: "The man over there about whom I say, 'He has champagne in his glass'."
— J

This way, it's a behavior, not a mental intention, and the speaker still can't be "wrong about the reference", because it doesn't depend on whether the man really has champagne, only on whether the speaker says he does. The man is being identified as the subject of a statement, not as a person with a drink in his glass. — J

Going back over this, it seems to me that the reference is now fixed by the indexical, "the man over there", and not by the description "He has champagne in his glass".

I can't tell if you mean the whole thing, or the individual parts. How can I know? — frank

By answering both and seeing to which @Srap Tasmaner responds? Answering one, and seeing if the response fits that answer?

Generally, by moving the conversation on, and seeing what the result is, and then making an inference about Srap's intent.

True. But I still referred to the tree. I don't need your buy-in for that. — frank

I wouldn't quite accept your thinking, or even talking to yourself about the tree, as a bonafide reference. I am more incline to think the prime examples of reference involve a public shared speech act, and that such self-talk is secondary. This, becasue, one does not usually need to reassure oneself that the reference being made is correct, or question what it is your are thinking about. Not that we can rule that out, but it would seem to be unusual.

We need to understand reference in the first instance by looking at fairly standard cases, then considering oddities.

That is,

I'm holding out for reference as a potentially private game. Talking, so often, is talking to ourselves, and we need all the apparatus of talking-with-others to do it. — J

seems to me to be mistaken, becasue we do not usually need any "apparatus" in order to check who it is we are thinking about. Indeed, the idea is odd.

Consider Did I know it was a picture of him?

The very content of this intent is something that ought to be negotiated within a broader embodied life/social context, including with oneself, and, because of that, it isn't a private act in Wittgenstein's sense. It can, and often must, be brought out in the public sphere. That doesn't make the speaker's intentions unauthoritative. But it makes them fallible. The stipulated "rules" for using a term, and hence securing its reference, aim at effective triangulation, as Srap suggested. — Pierre-Normand

I agree that speech is pervasively conditioned by the wider context of human life, but I don't see how we could maintain, as Srap and Banno have been doing, that a speaker has to have the buy-in of the audience in order to "successfully" refer. The triangulation they're talking about, as far as I understand them, is not about the social context, it's about the comprehension of the audience. I think you can triangulate with what you've learned about language use. Why do you need the audience's acceptance?

a singular sense rather than descriptive. When there is an unintended mismatch between the reference of this singular sense and the descriptive sense that the speaker expresses, then the presupposition of identity is mistaken. What it is that the speaker truly intended to have priority (i.e. the demonstrative singular sense or the descriptive one) for the purpose of fixing the true referent of their speech act (or of the thought that this speech act is meant to express) can be a matter of negotiation or further inquiry. — Pierre-Normand

So you're saying the champaign issue is an example of a failed reference? Is that how you take Kripke's meaning?

BTW, I know you're busy, but if you have a second and would want to tell me what you think about Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, I would so appreciate it.

By answering both and seeing to which Srap Tasmaner responds? Answering one, and seeing if the response fits that answer?

Generally, by moving the conversation on, and seeing what the result is, and then making an inference about Srap's intent. — Banno

I thought you objected to making inferences about intent?

Very interesting. Can you recall a reference for this?

Kripke does re-introduce the idea of essence, but in a form quite different to the classical approach, in being extensional rather than intensional.

You got the reference to Quine, but Srap didn't. Does that mean the reference was successful and unsuccessful at the same time? — frank

Yes!

We are again in the territory of farce. — Srap Tasmaner

To that end we ought acknowledge the limits of finding a set of conventions or rules for fixing a reference, as set out by Davidson in "A nice derangement of epitaphs".

Of course, if reference is a product of triangulation, and I think it is, then it is not private.

I thought you objected to making inferences about intent? — frank

I was noting that such inferences cannot result in certainty.

But it's important to note that this doesn't matter.

We don't need to fix the referent of "gavagai" with absolute certainty in order to get the stew, or go hunting rabbits.

So much of the conversation about fixing referents is unnecessary.

Can you recall a reference for this? — Banno

It's on the first page:

Say something that requires a missing presupposition, and straightway that presupposition springs into existence, making what you said acceptable after all. (Or at least, that is what happens if your conversational partners tacitly acquiesce - if no one says “But France has three kings! ” or ‘Whadda ya mean, ‘even George’? “)

Complete text available at the David Lewis papers.

I'm holding out for reference as a potentially private game. Talking, so often, is talking to ourselves, and we need all the apparatus of talking-with-others to do it.
— J
seems to me to be mistaken, becasue we do not usually need any "apparatus" in order to check who [or what] it is we are thinking about. Indeed, the idea is odd. — Banno

Perhaps it is, rather, but I'm certainly familiar with it. As in my "pile of papers" example (which the bolded addition is meant to capture), I find I often have to come up with a system of reference in order to keep straight what I'm trying to think about. Also, more simply, I do in fact talk to myself, both out loud and "with words in my head." Maybe "apparatus" isn't the right word, but I don't find much difference between how I do this, and how I converse with others -- including, as I say, sometimes reference-fixing.

I was noting that such inferences cannot result in certainty.

But it's important to note that this doesn't matter.

We don't need to fix the referent of "gavagai" with absolute certainty in order to get the stew, or go hunting rabbits.

So much of the conversation about fixing referents is unnecessary — Banno

That was kind of my point to Srap. As @Pierre-Normand was saying, the speaker's intentions are authoritative, but fallible.

if reference is a product of triangulation, and I think it is, then it is not private. — Banno

Not to put you on the spot, but are you saying that reference in fact requires triangulation, or only that we should reserve the term "reference" for that particular type of reference-fixing, and call my private version something else? I assume you're not denying that I do have the private experiences I'm claiming.

I think broadly you'd expect, and can find exemplars of, two ways to go on this, as usual:

(T) Language is, first, a system for organizing your thoughts; secondarily we developed ways of verbalizing our linguistically structured thoughts to each other, for obvious reasons.

(C) Language is, first, a system of communication, an elaboration of the sort of signaling systems many other species employ; secondarily we developed the ability to "internalize" an interlocutor (perhaps imaginary) and to use language to organize our thoughts.

A whole lot flows from this fundamental difference of approach. I'm not sure there's a reasonable means for choosing between them, but I tend to think what evidence there is favors (C).

Sorry - I meant the discussion between Marcus, Quine, and Kripke.

I'll dig it out. I think I know what box it's in.

Suppose you ask me who that guy is holding the glass of champagne, and I realize you mean Jim, but I happen to know Jim is holding a glass of sparkling cider. I could silently correct you and just answer "That's Jim," but in doing so I will have implicitly endorsed your claim that Jim is drinking champagne.

We are again in the territory of farce. — Srap Tasmaner

Cf.:

To use a referring expression (whether a definite description or a proper name whose meaning is fixed, a la Russell, by some definite description) to refer constitutively is to intend to refer to something one has in mind while conceiving of the intended referent under the description in question. To use a referring expression to refer parasitically is to intend to refer to something one has in mind without conceiving of that thing under the description in question—typically, because one believes for one reason or another that the description does not genuinely apply.

For example, Smith remarks to Jones about Andrew Lloyd Webber’s treatment of a particular leitmotif in Phantom of the Opera, referring to him as ‘the most significant British composer in history’. Jones, no fan of contemporary musicals, might co-opt Smith’s description and reply by saying ‘The most significant British composer in history is a hack’. In making this retort, Jones does not contradict himself, nor even impugn any other British composer by implication. Jones employs Smith’s preferred description to refer to Smith’s intended referent, even though Jones does not believe that the description is actually true of the intended referent. Smith uses the description to refer constitutively to Webber: the description constitutes part of Smith’s conception of Webber, at least on this occasion. Jones uses the description to refer parasitically: he borrows part of the conceptual content of Smith’s conception of Webber in order to refer to the man, but he does so without adopting that conceptual content as part of his own conception of Webber.

Such is the phenomenon of parasitic reference with respect to bona fide objects. It can also function, however, in connection with mere thought objects. For instance, if a child were to ask her parents how long they think it takes Santa Claus to circumnavigate the globe from his shop at the South Pole, they would not be acting irresponsibly (or not obviously so) were they to correct her by pointing out that, as they understand it, Santa’s shop is located at the North Pole. When the child uses ‘Santa’, she conceives of her intended referent as a jolly old elf who delivers toys to children at Christmas by means of a flying-reindeer-drawn sleigh, etc. But when her parents use ‘Santa’, they conceive of their intended referent as a certain fictitious character whose existence is falsely (though benignly) affirmed by parents and others. They refer to that which their daughter has in mind by borrowing part of her conception of Santa, but they do so without adopting it as part of their own conception. They do not believe that Santa lives at the North Pole, but they encourage their daughter to do so in order that the thought object to which she refers by her use of ‘Santa’ will conform with the popular conception of him. So the parents are free to assert that Santa’s shop is located at the North Pole and to deny that it is located at the South Pole without thereby committing themselves to the existence of a jolly old elf who weighs more than ninety pounds, lives north of Minnesota, and so on, because they use ‘Santa’ to refer parasitically rather than constitutively. — Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof - link to related thread