That'd be a rule which I agree with that I wouldn't want to do. That is, I'd say putting yourself on a pedestal is a bad thing -- where I somehow gain immunity to criticism and you somehow are more vulnerable to criticism. — Moliere

That you grant yourself the ability to contradict yourself while denying others the ability to contradict themselves would be one example.

What instruction do I require? What would that do, other than make me agree with you? — Moliere

These are the words of every headstrong student to their teacher. This mindset is precisely what precludes learning and knowledge.

I require instruction, and there are many places I can go for it. If one does not recognize that not every position is equally correct, then they cannot learn anything, they cannot know anything, and they are by definition not teachable.

That you grant yourself the ability to contradict yourself while denying others the ability to contradict themselves would be one example. — Leontiskos

I don't grant myself that ability, though. That's your interpretation which I'm attempting to demonstrate as false.

You have your stories about why it is I do, which you've posted, but I don't believe those stories are true.

I don't know how to respond to them, though.

These are the words of every headstrong student to their teacher. This mindset is precisely what precludes learning and knowledge. — Leontiskos

It does, you're right.

So here on TPF the only way a teacher-student relationship can develop is by some mutual understanding. What I've called trust.

I trust you are pursuing the truth, else I wouldn't put up with all of this frustration that you likely mutually feel :D

Earlier I said something about the teacher-student relationship -- mostly to note that on TPF we have to start at a position of equality even if you know you know more than the interloctor.

We are all equal here, and have to build ways of learning/teaching from that paradigm, rather than the usual paradigm.

And I hope I've demonstrated my willingness to be a student at this point. There are more examples than @Banno, tho he might be the only one who cares enough to chime in on that.

Earlier I said something about the teacher-student relationship -- mostly to note that on TPF we have to start at a position of equality even if you know you know more than the interloctor.

We are all equal here, and have to build ways of learning/teaching from that paradigm, rather than the usual paradigm. — Moliere

Let me repeat this:

If one does not recognize that not every position is equally correct, then they cannot learn anything, they cannot know anything, and they are by definition not teachable. — Leontiskos

If we do not admit that knowledge exists, that some things are right, and that some things are wrong, then we have banished ourselves to ignorance.

We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. Democratic culture balks at the words "inferior" and "superior," but they are apt and useful words. Some of my philosophical superiors on TPF would include Paine, apokrisis, and Pierre-Normand. If you look at my discussions with them you will see that I am very deferential and open-minded; that I am much more careful and precise in my reasoning. That discrimination between superiors, inferiors, and equals is very important if one is to progress. This is why @J discriminates between professional philosophers and non-professional philosophers. He sees that the former have more to teach him than the latter, and hence demand a more docile and teachable disposition.

Note too that if @Count Timothy von Icarus and I were either "monists" or pluralists, then would be unable to accept my criticism and improve his paper. He could not have learned anything new if he hadn't presupposed that not everything is equally correct. In that case his paper would never be able to increase or decrease in quality. One sentence would be as good as any other. Recognizing the fact of intellectual inequality is indispensable for everyone who is interested in the intellectual life. Those near the bottom of the totem pole are most tempted to reject this fact, and this is why such people are in special need of humility.

(I've made this reasoning more precise in previous posts, such as <this one>.)

We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. — Leontiskos

I know this is a standard way of looking at the world, especially as a teacher.

We can't "make everyone equal" in the factual sense, but we can treat everyone equally in the evaluative sense. And, in fact, I think we learn more from doing that. It's the small voices, the different perspectives, the things thought false that usually bring about some new way to answer the old questions.

Democratic culture balks at the words "inferior" and "superior," but they are apt and useful words. — Leontiskos

I think this is more in your imagination than true -- capitalism is deeply hierarchal. "inferior" and "superior" are the words you wouldn't use on the basis of the faux-equality of liberal-capitalism, but the hierarchical relationship is there. And I'd equate, in our day and age, liberalism with capitalism.

"Superior" and "inferior" are used all the time when it comes to money and power -- maybe not in those words, but they'll say something like "I'm not so sure about that person in this respect..." -- whenever money or power are at stake "inferior/superior" is a concept, even if not named as such.

Some of my philosophical superiors on TPF would include Paine, apokrisis, and Pierre-Normand.

Heh. I like all of them -- we've had our bouts before and I know I'm different from each. But I thank them for their contributions to this website and my mind. They're wonderful posters.

@apokrisis and I have a longstanding difference that I don't know how to work through. @Paine and I simply get along, so far as I know. @Pierre-Normand pursued the profession where I did not, but we've had fruitful conversations with respect to philosophy before.

I myself don't care to be a superior. But I don't want to be considered an inferior, either, unless I sign up for it. I have to accept that I must be a student in order to learn from a teacher here. In the extreme: If I did not do so then every post would be part of my belief system. I think that's the sort of thing you've been noting as bad: where the standards are so loose that you can say anything at all to anyone at all at anytime for whatever reason.

Hopefully, in this description, you see I agree that's a problem.

If you look at my discussions with them you will see that I am very deferential and open-minded; that I am much more careful and precise in my reasoning. That discrimination between superiors, inferiors, and equals is very important if one is to progress.

I don't think it is very important as much as it's a habit of philosophy. It works, but there's other ways of doing philosophy. I think teacher-student is an important relationship, but not in the hierarchical sense exactly. Or, at least, here on TPF we have no choice but to try to build those relationships without hierarchy -- we really are just some strangers on the internet who happen to like reading philosophy.

This is why J discriminates between professional philosophers and non-professional philosophers. He sees that the former have more to teach him than the latter, and hence demand a more docile and teachable disposition.

Oh, I have no problem with people wanting to differentiate between the good and the bad. We have to at some point, right? Else we'll get stuck in paralysis.

I only think that in so deciding we don't express something so universal as "Standards of knowledge for all time and space and thinkers" -- seems a stretch now. A tempting stretch, but a stretch nonetheless.

We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. — Leontiskos

I know this is a standard way of looking at the world, especially as a teacher. — Moliere

I gave an argument and you basically appealed to your "equality doctrine" and classed it as, "A standard way of looking at the world" - that as a way of dismissing or marginalizing it. What you should do instead is address the argument.

<If we view everyone as equal then we are prevented from learning, because we are prevented from seeing that someone else knows something we do not.>

I have to accept that I must be a student in order to learn from a teacher here. In the extreme: If I did not do so then every post would be part of my belief system. I think that's the sort of thing you've been noting as bad: where the standards are so loose that you can say anything at all to anyone at all at anytime for whatever reason.

Hopefully, in this description, you see I agree that's a problem. — Moliere

Okay, but is it true to view it as a problem or is such a view merely, "A standard way of looking at the world"?

Oh, I have no problem with people wanting to differentiate between the good and the bad. We have to at some point, right? Else we'll get stuck in paralysis. — Moliere

Okay good, this is precisely the point. "Superior" and "inferior" are relative terms for "good" and "bad." It is literally impossible to differentiate between good and bad without differentiating between superior and inferior.

I only think that in so deciding we don't express something so universal as "Standards of knowledge for all time and space and thinkers" -- seems a stretch now. A tempting stretch, but a stretch nonetheless. — Moliere

It's actually pretty obvious that there are universal standards for knowledge. Like truth, for instance. Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false. That's a standard for knowledge. What is the dogma that militates against such obvious facts?

I gave an argument and you basically appealed to your "equality doctrine" and classed it as, "A standard way of looking at the world" - that as a way of dismissing or marginalizing it. What you should do instead is address the argument. — Leontiskos

I thought I did, but I'll try again.

We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. — Leontiskos

Making everyone equal does not prevent learning. At least as a default assumption in a conversation -- I'll admit that hubris is bad, that headstrong students are often wrong, and other such mistakes -- but here we have to assume that we've all at least read some philosophy and the best way to proceed isn't teacher-student, but peer to peer. At least as a default.

Only upon agreeing to certain ways of arguing could we teach one another, I think? Even if that be "I am the student"

Okay, but is it true to view it as a problem or is such a view merely, "A standard way of looking at the world"? — Leontiskos

Here I'd be frustrating and say both/and -- but I'm still trying to find a place where we can actually talk rather than do the merry-go-round.

Okay good, this is precisely the point. "Superior" and "inferior" are relative terms for "good" and "bad." It is literally impossible to differentiate between good and bad without differentiating between superior and inferior. — Leontiskos

Eventually we'll disagree again on this. :D -- "what is superior, the beautiful or the sublime?" is the first question that comes to mind.

It's actually pretty obvious that there are universal standards for knowledge. Like truth, for instance. Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false. That's a standard for knowledge. What is the dogma that militates against such obvious facts? — Leontiskos

That's a good example, but not one I'm ready to go into in this thread. I'll concede that knowledge is true for the most part. It's that "for the most part" that I imagine we'll disagree. But I also think that so far out there that it'd take us so far astray as to start a new thread of thought.

Making everyone equal does not prevent learning. — Moliere

You don't give any arguments for that assertion. Be that as it may, I will give you another argument for my own position.

If I am to learn something from another person, then I must see that that person knows something that I do not know. If someone knows something that I do not know, then we are not equal. He knows more than me, and therefore has more knowledge than I do. Our knowledge is not equal, particularly on the matter under consideration.

You are probably wanting to appeal to this:

We can't "make everyone equal" in the factual sense, but we can treat everyone equally in the evaluative sense. — Moliere

This is incoherent, although it is hard for the Western liberal to understand. Suppose I gave you two pieces of wood and said, "Make them equal, not in the factual sense, but in the evaluative sense." This is just hand-waving.

If I see that someone has knowledge that I do not have, then they are not my equal (with respect to the knowledge in question). They might be my equal in some other way. They might be the same height as I am, for instance. But they are not my equal in knowledge, which is precisely what we are talking about. My inferiors might possess knowledge that I do not have, but they will be less likely to possess it on any given occasion than my superiors. That is why I pay more attention to my superiors.

Here I'd be frustrating and say both/and — Moliere

Then you've contradicted yourself again. You've said it's true but not truer than anything else, so to speak.

Eventually we'll disagree again on this. — Moliere

So do you think it is coherent to say, "X is good, Y is bad, and X is not superior to Y"?

Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false. — Leontiskos

That's a good example, but not one I'm ready to go into in this thread. I'll concede that knowledge is true for the most part. It's that "for the most part" that I imagine we'll disagree. But I also think that so far out there that it'd take us so far astray as to start a new thread of thought. — Moliere

I said, "Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false." Apparently you think that sometimes, "Knowledge is supposed to be false and not true." I think that's crazy, but we can leave it for another day, as you say.

I think this is more in your imagination than true -- capitalism is deeply hierarchal. "inferior" and "superior" are the words you wouldn't use on the basis of the faux-equality of liberal-capitalism, but the hierarchical relationship is there. And I'd equate, in our day and age, liberalism with capitalism

Indeed. It's sort of a weird mix of both though. Because of the washing out of cultural norms and institutions by capitalism and liberalism, and liberalism's banishment of non-liberal approved virtues (which are quite thin) from education and public life, and the presumption of "equality" and a "classless society," people become hyper focused on a narrow range of status symbols. Fukuyama addresses this. When everyone becomes "equal," people strive for new ways to rise above the crowd. But not all of these will be healthy.

Hence, the heavy focus on wealth, elite education, status, and increasingly, sex as one of the last forms of validation not to be fully commodified or driven from the culture. As participation in civic organizations, churches, unions, etc. have collapsed, and become more precarious, people have fewer sources for thymos outside the market (or the "sexual market"). In my whole career I have had a single person ask me for a raise on the grounds that they needed more money due to personal issues. I have had countless people ask for raises with seemingly no concern for the money, because they took it as a sign of worth (and indeed, self-help books for careerists stress this heavily).

I read an article in the Atlantic a while back on this sort of thing. Cultural balkanization and the replacement of America's particular blend of Protestant Christianity with a secular liberal capitalist ethos had eroded its pretensions to be a classless society because all appeals to excellence were slowly boiled down to market power. Even the cachet of elite taste has increasingly waned. The exemplar tech bro or stock trader is not possessed of the elite tastes of past ruling classes.

This is problematic in the way all status obsessed societies are, but more so. First, because of capitalisms' intense short-termism and insatiable hunger for growth, which courts ecological disaster, but also on wholly aesthetic grounds. Homer already knew his arete obsessed Greeks were missing something, that the quest for glory was ultimately hollow. But at least there was some beauty in it. With capitalism we get the ugly reign of quantity, without the thymotic glory of warrior cultures, or more appealingly, the sublimation of that violence into high art, or things like the Japanese tea ceremony. The knight, samurai, or the hoplite certainly has more going for them than the Wall St. suit.

I partially blame firearms and high explosives for making war increasingly a crap shoot that is no longer dependent on physical abilities. It's a sort of kinetic Marxism! The Japanese had the right of it in banning guns in favor of the katana. :rofl: :cool:

Kinetic Marxism will be the topic of my upcoming thread where we argue for the return of the battle axe and flail—a wholly unique argument for gun control.

There is no need for appeals to authority because the answer can be made obvious. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I muse, I want to say that for @J and the intersubjectivists/democrats, knowledge is conceived as a kind of democratic vote. These are the rules for how knowledge is generated:

1. We ask a question.
2. Everyone gets one vote, and only one vote.
3. One must simply vote. It is not permitted to give reasons alongside one's vote.
4. Whichever position wins the most votes wins the "knowledge election."

Obviously on this democratic view everyone is perfectly equal, and therefore there is absolutely no "authoritarianism." Rule 3 may seem odd at first, but I think someone like @J or @Moliere actually sees reason-giving or argument-giving as illegal, because it gives one person more power than the others. After all, if one reason or argument is more compelling than others, then the person wielding that reason or argument will effectively have a greater say over the final outcome. They would have "more votes" to cast, so to speak, and this would make the process undemocratic. This inequality would be inimical to intersubjective agreement conceived in a democratic fashion.

This would explain why @J is so particularly opposed to demonstrations, i.e. arguments from foundational premises. Demonstrations are characteristically strong arguments, and therefore create even more inequality than a mere argument. The point more generally is that rule 3 can be more grievously or less grievously transgressed. A demonstration is a grievous transgression of rule 3. A simple argument is less grievous. A mere opinion less grievous still. Least grievous of all would be the waffling claim:

I think maybe position Z could possibly be a slight bit better than the other positions on offer, even though all the positions are very beautiful and very true and very thoughtful. All the positions are equal, but I just have an inkling of a sensation that position Z might be more equal than the other positions. ...In my ever so very humble opinion!

...we might even be able to allow this sort of waffling assertion, given that it is such a mild transgression of rule 3.

On this view mathematics is not a problem, not because it trades in objective arguments, but rather because everyone agrees when it comes to mathematics. We only look at the votes, and the mathematical vote is unanimous. Thus we don't really care whether people give arguments for mathematical positions, given that it isn't a close race. That some people are effectively "casting more votes" than others isn't a big concern given that a few votes won't sway the election.

Contrariwise, on @J's subjectivist view music is also not a problem, because it is a matter of taste. It is not a matter of knowledge and therefore no vote needs to be taken, and we know that it is not a matter of knowledge because if a vote were taken there would be no clear winner (petitio principii).

The real problem for @J comes in fields where the vote is contested, and this is precisely what we would expect from a theory of intersubjective-democratic knowledge. It is the same problem that most besets democracies. For example, in the field of ethics there are strong coalitions and substantial pluralities, and what this means is that the race is close. In mathematics the race is not close so we don't need to worry about cheaters who violate rule 3. In ethics the race is close and we really do need to keep an eye on cheaters who violate rule 3. Thus particular attention and effort must be expended to make sure that no one gives arguments—much less persuasive or strong arguments!—when it comes to fields like ethics, politics, etc. It is precisely in those areas that we must put a particular emphasis on the democratic dogma, "All positions are intrinsically equal. We will vote to decide, but it is impermissible give arguments alongside one's vote. The giving of arguments presupposes that not all positions are intrinsically equal."

(Obviously this whole conception ignores the reason mathematics generates more consensus than matters of taste do, but I think this sort of reasoning really is at play in @J's worldview.)

I don't think that's accurate. The position strikes me more as a sort of virtue epistemology in search of clear virtues. It isn't against argument and reasons, it just denies overarching standards for them, or even general principles. My thoughts are that it describes good discourse, but in very vague way that doesn't rule out bad discourse.

The difficulty I see is different. First, a very robust pluralism insulates claims from challenge. This is sort of the opposite of democratization; it's atomization. If someone issues a successful challenge to your position, or if you are unable to make any good arguments against theirs, you can simply fall back on: "well, there are many equally valid narratives, even if they contradict one another, so there is nothing to worry about here."

The issue of an inappropriate democratization of truth comes up in two ways if there is vagueness though.

A. There is no way to exclude anyone. We can say "we only allow reasonable objections," but if the standard for "reasonable" is weak or different in each instance, then we will have difficulties justifying exclusion unless everyone already agrees with us.

This is precisely what has let "race realists" be so effective in their evangelism. They come ready to fight with their studies, government statistics, etc. This is not to say they always act in good faith, but they do make appeals to evidence. And then they get rejected out of hand as beyond the pale. Yet, due to other difficulties, the culture generally lacks the resources to show why they are beyond the pale in a credible way. The result is that it looks to would-be-converts that the race realists' case is stronger than it really is because the opposing side seems to be forced into abandoning argument in favor of authoritarianism (and indeed actual censorship in academic settings).

B. Given certain assumptions about language, what you're describing can happen. Because if what we're talking about is primarily words and not being, and words just mean 'how they are currently used," then everything is necessarily democratized in a way. Socrates' debates about the true meaning of justice make no sense if "justice" is just a token in a game, and others don't use the token the way he does. Clearly, he isn't using the token right, so he must be wrong. At best, he can propose that it is useful to the community to use the token differently.

But that's very different from excluding reasons. Reasons are discussed. I suppose though that reasons arguably lose their purchase without any clear principles. "You're just engaged in post hoc rationalization, political bias, appeals to emotion, contradicting yourself, your premises are false, your argument isn't logically valid," etc. doesn't necessarily work as a "reason" if these are not considered to be illegitimate in general, but only illegitimate on a case by case basis.

@Moliere has given us the best example here. If falsifying your data and lying isn't always bad discourse, but only bad on a case by case basis, then the response to "you just faked that data," can plausibly be: "sure, so what?" So to for "your premises are false," or "your argument is not logically valid." And yet, if there are no general principles, these would presumably have to be appropriate in at least some cases.

But I do not think @J and @Banno are likely to agree on that one. I have to imagine that "it isn't ok to just make up fake evidence to support your claims," is going to be something most people can agree upon, granted that, on the anti-realist view that good argument is simply that which gets agreement, and all knowledge claims are simply power battles, it's hard to see how justify this since it would seem that faking data is fine just so long as it works.

Eugenics or racial anthropology, 100 years ago, were given a respectful hearing, but also immediately questioned and debated. — J

Good response.

There's also the problem, that if "sciences are based on per se predication", we need an explanation of "per se predication". I've not seen a satisfactory account.

I don't think that's accurate. The position strikes me more as a sort of virtue epistemology in search of clear virtues. It isn't against argument and reasons, it just denies overarching standards for them, or even general principles. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But what does it mean to not be against arguments and reasons but deny overarching standards? Isn't rationality itself an overarching standard? I certainly couldn't be for squirrels but against mammals, given that squirrels are mammals.

I agree with most of your post, but I don't think it contradicts what I've said. Granted, I was trying to give a sort of microcosm of the reasoning, so that probably needs sussing out. For example:

The difficulty I see is different. First, a very robust pluralism insulates claims from challenge. This is sort of the opposite of democratization; it's atomization. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Note that the position I set out both insulates claims from challenge and results in atomization. I don't think either are incompatible with democratization. So this is an example of how I think you are right and yet it does not clash with what I've said.

But let's look at a place where it might clash:

But that's very different from excluding reasons. Reasons are discussed. I suppose though that reasons arguably lose their purchase without any clear principles. "You're just engaged in post hoc rationalization, political bias, appeals to emotion, contradicting yourself, your premises are false, your argument isn't logically valid," etc. doesn't necessarily work as a "reason" if these are not considered to be illegitimate in general, but only illegitimate on a case by case basis. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's right, and we could revise 3 so that it doesn't exclude reason-giving, but instead excludes certain forms of reason-giving. I want to say that however we devise 3, it will eschew strong attempts to rationally influence others. As I tried to illustrate with the more- and less-grievous transgressions, at some point a line will be drawn, and that line will have everything to do with the Expectation of Rational Bindingness (ERB). Someone who thinks that rationality binds us and that we ought to be persuaded by (good) arguments will have a higher ERB. Someone who thinks that rationality does not bind us and who disagrees that we ought to be persuaded by arguments—however good—will have a lower ERB. They will also differ on whether and to what extent good and bad arguments exist in the first place.

To give an example, someone who gives an argument and expects their interlocutor to be persuaded by the argument will tend to have a higher ERB than someone who gives an argument but doesn't really expect their interlocutor to be persuaded. And a moral realist will have a higher ERB than a moral non-realist by definition, at least with respect to moral arguments and claims.

In @J's utopia everyone has relatively low ERBs, and therefore the intentional strength of arguments will be limited. Combative argumentation will be non-existent, given that no one has a strong sense of the bindingness of rationality or of their own arguments.

Rule 3 is merely a limit case which illustrates the asymptote. If someone prefers that everyone have a low ERB, and there are no limiting factors on that preference, then they will prefer rule 3. But there will of course be values that are in competition with that preference:

I am saying that if something is incoherent, then there must be two parts that can be shown to fail to cohere. — Leontiskos

So if someone wants a world with low ERBs, but they also want a world where people reason together, then the asymptote of rule 3 will not be ideal. (This is literally one of the fundamental conflicts in @J's thought).

But the reason I don't think much of what you said conflicted with what I said, is because the motivations that you identify are largely all consistent with the motive for a low overall ERB. For example, the desire for there being, "No way to exclude anyone," is, "different from the desire for excluding reasons," but it is not inconsistent with the desire for excluding reasons, and both are bound up with the desire for a low overall ERB.

The wrinkle in what I am saying is that the desire for a low overall ERB is not an end in itself, and therefore it must be instrumental to some further end. Nevertheless, this is part of the problem with @J's approach, namely that it conflates means and ends, and is not able to identify its own ends. Further, the democratic paradigm seems obvious and invasive. I would want to say that the atomization and the restrictions on reason are part and parcel of that democratic paradigm, and are not opposed to it.

Moliere has given us the best example here. If falsifying your data and lying isn't always bad discourse, but only bad on a case by case basis, then the response to "you just faked that data," can plausibly be: "sure, so what?" So to for "your premises are false," or "your argument is not logically valid." And yet, if there are no general principles, these would presumably have to be appropriate in at least some cases.

But I do not think J and @Banno are likely to agree on that one. I have to imagine that "it isn't ok to just make up fake evidence to support your claims," is going to be something most people can agree upon, granted that, on the anti-realist view that good argument is simply that which gets agreement, and all knowledge claims are simply power battles, it's hard to see how justify this since it would seem that faking data is fine just so long as it works. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good point. @Banno would agree that falsifying data is impermissible, and is not good practice vis-á-vis inquiry. I'm not sure whether @J would agree. He would doubtless avoid giving a clear answer. He would certainly not disagree, as @Moliere did.

But in reality anyone who holds to a firm rational standard such as this is evincing a high ERB with respect to that standard in question. So a clear and consistent @J would say, "We must strive for low ERBs, with the exception of things like the falsification of data." This is parallel to Popper's idea that, "We need to be tolerant except for when we don't." What is occurring is a clash of two different values or standards, and what is required is an attempt at reconciling the two conflicting values. In this thread we have seen a refusal to try to reconcile the two values or even recognize them, and this makes it easy to vacillate between the two (or three, or four...) in an ad hoc way.

The position strikes me more as a sort of virtue epistemology in search of clear virtues. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Following this:

Since this word "arbitrary" has come up so consistently, I'm wondering if possibly some of us are using it to mean different things. But I'm going to use it to mean "not based on any particular reasons; like a throw of the dice." On that understanding, I would answer the second question this way: "It doesn't, but if the discipline is longstanding and has smart, experienced practitioners, quite quickly the demand for good reasons will channel the discussion away from arbitrary and unfounded practices. Furthermore, just about no one presents their views in this way." — J

Right, so this is an appeal to a sort of virtue epistemology. Virtues are principles, so I can get behind that. However, I don't think "smart" and "experienced," are necessarily good virtues here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why do you see this as a virtue epistemology? Here is what I think is required for a virtue epistemology in the way you are intending:

1. Intersubjective agreement grounds knowledge.
2. Virtuous classes will more reliably produce knowledge intersubjectively.
3. We ought to be virtuous; or we ought to look to the virtuous class and not the non-virtuous class.

It looks like @J accepts (1) and (2) but not (3), and without (3) I don't think you have virtue epistemology. @J presumably wouldn't admit that the virtuous class is better than the non-virtuous class, given that this would require an "over-arching standard."

It would be hard to overemphasize the importance of this sort of thing:

And stretching a point, you can even call this authoritarian: If you say otherwise on a test, the teacher will flunk you! But there's nothing pernicious about any of this. It comes with the territory of an accepted formal system. — J

Is it authoritarian or isn't it? And is authoritarianism pernicious or isn't it? Do you see how you are unable to answer such simple questions? — Leontiskos

When someone uses evaluative terms but claims to be using them in a value-neutral way, you're in trouble. This is true whether the evaluative terms are positive ("virtue") or negative ("authoritarianism"). The person who talks about the non-pernicious authoritarianism is manipulating language in a very problematic way.

This is another way to understand why it is fraught to simply assume that @J is doing "virtue epistemology." Virtue epistemology takes for granted the normativity that @J is vacillating on.

What about the framing (context) do you like? — Fire Ologist

I thought this was sensible:

But really, if we are all agreeing with each other that arbitrariness is bad, and arguing over whether that which prevents arbitrariness is better framed as either ‘an absolute’ or ‘a context’, maybe we should pause on the distinction between absolute truth and context, and not keep trying to distinguish what happens to arbitrariness as between context defined statements versus absolutely defined statements. — Fire Ologist

I took you to mean that trying to pin down "arbitrariness" was less important than the distinction being made between absolute truth and contextual truth. But maybe that's not what you meant.

, @Moliere,

Somewhat famously, Feyerabend argued that Galileo manipulated or selectively interpreted his data—particularly with regard to the telescope—to press the case for heliocentrism. At the very least, Galileo made use of rhetorical and polemical tools to press his case.

The discussion has moved on to scientific method. I'll argue that there is no algorithmic method that produce science, that rather science is a social enterprise involving open criticism and shared information, a poster-boy for Davidson's triangulation.

If you think there is an algorithmic scientific method, all you need do is present it.

I'm sure you know what I'm going to say!: "Brownian motion" as the only alternative here is yet another either/or binary, about as useful as "absolute" and "arbitrary." Couldn't we allow that something in between is more characteristic of how such practices actually work?

"Brownian motion" as the only alternative here is yet another either/or binary, about as useful as "absolute" and "arbitrary." Couldn't we allow that something in between is more characteristic of how such practices actually work?

Sure. Did you have a principle in mind in between?

It's not a binary. It's only down to Brownian motion if one denies any determinant principles that guide discourse whatsoever. For instance, is simply faking your data bad inquiry, or is it sometimes acceptable? If even this is ruled out as a principle because everything is case by case consensus building, I'm not sure how there can be any determinant structure to good discourse.

"Reasonableness" is at least something. But how do we know when someone is "reasonable." From what I can tell, this is also up to case by case consensus building. So it seems like individual opinions groping towards consensus all the way down.

One thing to note here is that epistemology is in some sense normative. It's about what leads towards knowledge. So, when you object that "well, real world discourse sort of looks like this," that's like objecting to "rape is wrong," because "in the real world there are rapists." Nor do normative standards entail "forcing belief." Indeed, belief cannot be coerced in many cases, only assent. The point is not that all people follow epistemic standards, but that some forms of discourse are more likely to lead to knowledge than others. If it wasn't the case that some kinds of discourse were more likely to lead to knowledge than others, then I can hardly see how being "reasonable" would matter.



Is that supposed to be a counter example? As in, "if Galileo did it and he had a good theory, then sometimes it's ok to just lie and make up observations?"

I don't know if it counts as an "algorithm,' but sure, good scientific inquiry means not falsifying your data, not arguing from false premises, and not using invalid arguments.

Arguments of the form:
All squirrels are mammals.
All dolphins are mammals.
Therefore, some squirrels are dolphins.

For instance, don't demonstrate their conclusion. They don't become part of good inquiry because the conclusion is true.

There might, in some cases, be other ethical concerns that warrant falsifying data perhaps, but that wouldn't be the same thing as it being part of a good epistemology.

Given the misrepresentation in your last reply to me, I'm somewhat reticent to bother continuing this chat.

What progresses science is not adherence to some set of rules.

"Ah!" Says Tim, "but what do you mean by progress... if you are going to progress, you must already know what progress is..."

Yawn.

No, Tim, you don’t need a final theory of progress to recognize when something works better, explains more, predicts more reliably, or opens new avenues of inquiry. Scientists manage to get on with things without resolving metaphysics every morning. Progress is what happens when a community, through criticism and collaboration, refines its grip on the world—even if it never gets a God’s-eye view of it.

Asking a question is now misrepresentation? I didn't get what the point of the example was.

I'm not talking about a final theory, merely basic principles like "it's not ok to just make up your observations" or "good arguments don't start with false premises and are valid ." Or, considering your objection just now, how about, "it isn't acceptable to misrepresent positions?"

Do those not always obtain? If not, when wouldn't they obtain?

I'm sure you know what I'm going to say!: "Brownian motion" as the only alternative here is yet another either/or binary, about as useful as "absolute" and "arbitrary." Couldn't we allow that something in between is more characteristic of how such practices actually work? — J

Getting you to answer questions is like pulling teeth. That's why a theory like "Brownian motion" has to be postulated. Because you won't give honest answers to simple questions.

If you were to move from principles in the strong sense to heuristics, we might have some agreement.

“It’s not okay to make up data” is a good rule of thumb, yes, but the history of science is full of edge cases where selective, embellished, or even downright faulty data played a productive role. Galileo’s telescopic observations, Newton’s bucket, Eddington’s eclipse photos—all involved choices that wouldn’t survive a modern methods review.

The issue isn’t that anything goes, but that what counts as "okay" or "not okay" is itself historically and contextually shaped. There is no algorithm for scientific legitimacy, but a community negotiating standards as it goes.

So I agree it’s not acceptable to misrepresent positions—but even that relies on shared context and trust, not a principle mechanically applied.

Context is always necessary, absolutely.

Imagine an Aristotelian who only allows the use of Aristotelian logic.

This Aristotelian insists that all valid reasoning must proceed via syllogism . . . etc. — Banno

This is interesting, and let me generalize it to avoid unnecessary rancor. The question is, What's the difference between "reasoned rejection" and "methodological foreclosure" when it comes to defending the basic tenets of a philosophical system?

What catches the eye are the verbs: only allows and insists. It seems that the proponent of the system ought to give some reasons why they won't allow, why they insist. And ordinarily, that's what we want from any philosopher, not mere assertions. But it does get uncomfortable at the level of first principles, because someone may want to say, "This is the bottom line. Your request for reasons is out of order, because a reason implies an explanation for why something is the case, and if we truly have a bottom line here, then there is no explanation."

How to proceed? After all, this isn't necessarily wrong. I think a great deal depends on the tone of the conversation that ensues, as you say here:

I think the issue is methodological - not about what you believe but what you do with it. — Banno

If only allowing and insisting is done in quotes, so to speak, that can make for a rich, productive conversation, perhaps one that helps the interlocutor see why the system's proponent chooses that bottom line, and encourages them to suggest their own. The hassles begin when the expectation is rather that the system must be right, on pain of faulty reasoning or some such. That kind of insistence, I prefer to steer clear of, as it's so uncharacteristic of the good philosophers I like.

Sure. Did you have a principle in mind in between?

It's not a binary. It's only down to Brownian motion if one denies any determinant principles that guide discourse whatsoever. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The thing is, once you acknowledge that there are perhaps intermediate, context-derived principles or standards . . . there's little left to disagree about! That's all I've been saying. You've seemed to fall back so often on "either we have an absolute, context-independent standard in all cases, or it's random chaos!" that I had to keep trying to draw attention to the middle ground.

As for a principle in mind in between . . . once again, for what field of discourse, for what practice? We need the context. Maybe literary criticism, or non-profit grantmaking? I know something about both of those (plus musicology :wink: ).

Galileo’s telescopic observations, Newton’s bucket, Eddington’s eclipse photos—all involved choices that wouldn’t survive a modern methods review.

Sure, and many similar moves led to things like the approval of drugs that led to birth defects, toxic chemicals in kid's drinking water, etc. That invalid arguments can sometimes have true conclusions doesn't make them valid arguments, and that falsified data can sometimes support true conclusions doesn't make falsifying data good practice. And indeed, since it makes more sense to falsity data when one cannot support one's claims because they are false, it's probably more likely in cases where the conclusion is false.

As an objection to "falsifying data is always wrong," this is the same conflation of normative standards and actual practice I mentioned above. It's the equivalent to objecting to "rape is wrong," because "but there are rapists," or "sometimes good people are born from rape."

The issue isn’t that anything goes, but that what counts as "okay" or "not okay" is itself historically and contextually shaped. There is no algorithm for scientific legitimacy, but a community negotiating standards as it goes.

I will grant that there is a gray area in some fields. In political science, people often select case studies on the dependent variable. But the quantitative analysis is also often window dressing.

However, I think it's inappropriate to conflate "anything that wouldn't pass a current methods board," with "knowingly just making shit up" (which does happen, see recent news). I find it hard to imagine how the latter is ever good inquiry, even if we might justify it ethically on other grounds using some bizarre counterexample. But counter examples don't disprove principles, they merely show that there can be things worse than the violation of a principle that justify its violation.

But here is the bigger issue:

There is no algorithm for scientific legitimacy, but a community negotiating standards as it goes.

Would it be the case that, so long as a community agrees, making up data is good inquiry and a path towards knowledge?

I don't think it would be. So, the issue isn't just about what some community agrees. If some community does agree that falsification is ok, they're going to tend to come to false conclusions.

Community agreement doesn't keep out the case where the community agrees with falsifying data. But that isn't a bizarre counter example, there are plenty of real world examples, e.g. some "race realists," some anti-vaccine advocates, etc., who consider themselves a sort of epistemic community and are so convinced of the truth of their conclusion that they don't see any problem with falsifying data. This was also true with "socialist genetics." Not only was falsification allowed, people were positively pressured into it. And the result was a great deal of deaths.

So what would be the objection here: "but that's not the real community, the real community is the broader scientific community?" How is that claim justified? If community practice is the ultimate justification of all standards, then communities define themselves, and are presumably infallible within themselves.

The question is, What's the difference between "reasoned rejection" and "methodological foreclosure" when it comes to defending the basic tenets of a philosophical system? — J

If the system being discussed is used to determine what counts as "reasoned rejection", then we have "methodological foreclosure".

In the example, the Aristotelian system sets out what it is to be reasonable as accepting LEM. So it methodologically forecloses on paraconsistent logic.

What happens next? If Aristotelian logic is taken as final, paraconsistent logic is anathema. Alternately, we could admit that paraconsistent logic is incompatible with Aristotelian logic, and carry on seeing where paraconsistent logic leads.

So if Aristotelian logic provides the "an absolute, context-independent standard in all cases" it forecloses on paraconsistent logic.

I don't think it would be. So, the issue isn't just about what some community agrees. If some community does agree that falsification is ok, they're going to tend to come to false conclusions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. That's not down to the community failing to accept a principle, but a mismatch between what the community says is the case and what is the case. It's a failure of triangulation, not of principle.

The language game of doing science is embedded in the world, which provides the boundary. It's the reason not just anything will go. The community doesn't reject making data up becasue it breaks some Grand Principle, but because doing so bumps up agains reality. It's a methodology, not a normative principle. Scientific communities don’t reject making up data because it violates a timeless rule; they reject it because it doesn’t work.

As for a principle in mind in between . . . once again, for what field of discourse, for what practice? — J

This whole approach is misguided, namely your idea that we need to look at one single field. The whole question is about overarching relations, both of the whole and between fields. Zooming in on one field will never answer such a question. Looking at an isolated part will never tell you about the whole qua whole, nor will it tell you about relations between parts. This appeal to look at a single field in isolation is another prelude to evasion.

The thing is, once you acknowledge that there are perhaps intermediate, context-derived principles or standards . . . there's little left to disagree about! That's all I've been saying. You've seemed to fall back so often on "either we have an absolute, context-independent standard in all cases, or it's random chaos!" that I had to keep trying to draw attention to the middle ground. — J

There are two questions:

1. Are there context-independent standards?
2. Are there context-dependent standards?

You have refused to answer the first question for 17 pages. Every time you are asked about the first question you dodge and start talking about the second question.

If the way the world is requires that epistemic communities follow certain standards to avoid false conclusions, that sounds a lot to me like the grounds for a principle.

What's the objection here? "The way the world is makes it so that falsifying your data and lying isn't a good way to reach knowledge, but that doesn't make not just making up your observations a valid epistemic principle because..."

What's the end of that sentence? The only one I can think of is "because sometimes making up your observations to fit your conclusions is a consistent way to achieve knowledge," which seems clearly false.

Yep. That's not down to the community failing to accept a principle, but a mismatch between what the community says is the case and what is the case. It's a failure of triangulation, not of principle.

Yes, a mismatch that wouldn't exist if they had accepted the principle.

Also, even if you imagine some bizarre case where people just so happen to consistently make up fake observations that support true conclusions, this still wouldn't be a good counter example because presumably holding true opinions in virtue of observations you just lied about isn't constitutive of knowledge.

If the way the world is requires that epistemic communities follow certain standards to avoid false conclusions, that sounds a lot to me like the grounds for a principle. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The world doesn't require anything.

"The way the world is makes it so that falsifying your data and lying isn't a good way to reach knowledge, but that doesn't make not just making up your observations a valid epistemic principle because..." — Count Timothy von Icarus

No!

Again, that is not what was said.

The way the world is will show that your data is made up, not that some mooted principle is true.

The point being made here must be very far form how you understand things to be, for you to repeatedly make such misinterpretations.