That'd be a rule which I agree with that I wouldn't want to do. That is, I'd say putting yourself on a pedestal is a bad thing -- where I somehow gain immunity to criticism and you somehow are more vulnerable to criticism. — Moliere
What instruction do I require? What would that do, other than make me agree with you? — Moliere
That you grant yourself the ability to contradict yourself while denying others the ability to contradict themselves would be one example. — Leontiskos
These are the words of every headstrong student to their teacher. This mindset is precisely what precludes learning and knowledge. — Leontiskos
Earlier I said something about the teacher-student relationship -- mostly to note that on TPF we have to start at a position of equality even if you know you know more than the interloctor.
We are all equal here, and have to build ways of learning/teaching from that paradigm, rather than the usual paradigm. — Moliere
If one does not recognize that not every position is equally correct, then they cannot learn anything, they cannot know anything, and they are by definition not teachable. — Leontiskos
We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. — Leontiskos
Democratic culture balks at the words "inferior" and "superior," but they are apt and useful words. — Leontiskos
Some of my philosophical superiors on TPF would include Paine, apokrisis, and Pierre-Normand.
If you look at my discussions with them you will see that I am very deferential and open-minded; that I am much more careful and precise in my reasoning. That discrimination between superiors, inferiors, and equals is very important if one is to progress.
This is why J discriminates between professional philosophers and non-professional philosophers. He sees that the former have more to teach him than the latter, and hence demand a more docile and teachable disposition.
We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. — Leontiskos
I know this is a standard way of looking at the world, especially as a teacher. — Moliere
I have to accept that I must be a student in order to learn from a teacher here. In the extreme: If I did not do so then every post would be part of my belief system. I think that's the sort of thing you've been noting as bad: where the standards are so loose that you can say anything at all to anyone at all at anytime for whatever reason.
Hopefully, in this description, you see I agree that's a problem. — Moliere
Oh, I have no problem with people wanting to differentiate between the good and the bad. We have to at some point, right? Else we'll get stuck in paralysis. — Moliere
I only think that in so deciding we don't express something so universal as "Standards of knowledge for all time and space and thinkers" -- seems a stretch now. A tempting stretch, but a stretch nonetheless. — Moliere
I gave an argument and you basically appealed to your "equality doctrine" and classed it as, "A standard way of looking at the world" - that as a way of dismissing or marginalizing it. What you should do instead is address the argument. — Leontiskos
We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. — Leontiskos
Okay, but is it true to view it as a problem or is such a view merely, "A standard way of looking at the world"? — Leontiskos
Okay good, this is precisely the point. "Superior" and "inferior" are relative terms for "good" and "bad." It is literally impossible to differentiate between good and bad without differentiating between superior and inferior. — Leontiskos
It's actually pretty obvious that there are universal standards for knowledge. Like truth, for instance. Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false. That's a standard for knowledge. What is the dogma that militates against such obvious facts? — Leontiskos
Making everyone equal does not prevent learning. — Moliere
We can't "make everyone equal" in the factual sense, but we can treat everyone equally in the evaluative sense. — Moliere
Here I'd be frustrating and say both/and — Moliere
Eventually we'll disagree again on this. — Moliere
Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false. — Leontiskos
That's a good example, but not one I'm ready to go into in this thread. I'll concede that knowledge is true for the most part. It's that "for the most part" that I imagine we'll disagree. But I also think that so far out there that it'd take us so far astray as to start a new thread of thought. — Moliere
I think this is more in your imagination than true -- capitalism is deeply hierarchal. "inferior" and "superior" are the words you wouldn't use on the basis of the faux-equality of liberal-capitalism, but the hierarchical relationship is there. And I'd equate, in our day and age, liberalism with capitalism
There is no need for appeals to authority because the answer can be made obvious. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think maybe position Z could possibly be a slight bit better than the other positions on offer, even though all the positions are very beautiful and very true and very thoughtful. All the positions are equal, but I just have an inkling of a sensation that position Z might be more equal than the other positions. ...In my ever so very humble opinion!
Good response.Eugenics or racial anthropology, 100 years ago, were given a respectful hearing, but also immediately questioned and debated. — J
I don't think that's accurate. The position strikes me more as a sort of virtue epistemology in search of clear virtues. It isn't against argument and reasons, it just denies overarching standards for them, or even general principles. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The difficulty I see is different. First, a very robust pluralism insulates claims from challenge. This is sort of the opposite of democratization; it's atomization. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But that's very different from excluding reasons. Reasons are discussed. I suppose though that reasons arguably lose their purchase without any clear principles. "You're just engaged in post hoc rationalization, political bias, appeals to emotion, contradicting yourself, your premises are false, your argument isn't logically valid," etc. doesn't necessarily work as a "reason" if these are not considered to be illegitimate in general, but only illegitimate on a case by case basis. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I am saying that if something is incoherent, then there must be two parts that can be shown to fail to cohere. — Leontiskos
Moliere has given us the best example here. If falsifying your data and lying isn't always bad discourse, but only bad on a case by case basis, then the response to "you just faked that data," can plausibly be: "sure, so what?" So to for "your premises are false," or "your argument is not logically valid." And yet, if there are no general principles, these would presumably have to be appropriate in at least some cases.
But I do not think J and @Banno are likely to agree on that one. I have to imagine that "it isn't ok to just make up fake evidence to support your claims," is going to be something most people can agree upon, granted that, on the anti-realist view that good argument is simply that which gets agreement, and all knowledge claims are simply power battles, it's hard to see how justify this since it would seem that faking data is fine just so long as it works. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The position strikes me more as a sort of virtue epistemology in search of clear virtues. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Since this word "arbitrary" has come up so consistently, I'm wondering if possibly some of us are using it to mean different things. But I'm going to use it to mean "not based on any particular reasons; like a throw of the dice." On that understanding, I would answer the second question this way: "It doesn't, but if the discipline is longstanding and has smart, experienced practitioners, quite quickly the demand for good reasons will channel the discussion away from arbitrary and unfounded practices. Furthermore, just about no one presents their views in this way." — J
Right, so this is an appeal to a sort of virtue epistemology. Virtues are principles, so I can get behind that. However, I don't think "smart" and "experienced," are necessarily good virtues here. — Count Timothy von Icarus
And stretching a point, you can even call this authoritarian: If you say otherwise on a test, the teacher will flunk you! But there's nothing pernicious about any of this. It comes with the territory of an accepted formal system. — J
Is it authoritarian or isn't it? And is authoritarianism pernicious or isn't it? Do you see how you are unable to answer such simple questions? — Leontiskos
What about the framing (context) do you like? — Fire Ologist
But really, if we are all agreeing with each other that arbitrariness is bad, and arguing over whether that which prevents arbitrariness is better framed as either ‘an absolute’ or ‘a context’, maybe we should pause on the distinction between absolute truth and context, and not keep trying to distinguish what happens to arbitrariness as between context defined statements versus absolutely defined statements. — Fire Ologist
"Brownian motion" as the only alternative here is yet another either/or binary, about as useful as "absolute" and "arbitrary." Couldn't we allow that something in between is more characteristic of how such practices actually work?
I'm sure you know what I'm going to say!: "Brownian motion" as the only alternative here is yet another either/or binary, about as useful as "absolute" and "arbitrary." Couldn't we allow that something in between is more characteristic of how such practices actually work? — J
Imagine an Aristotelian who only allows the use of Aristotelian logic.
This Aristotelian insists that all valid reasoning must proceed via syllogism . . . etc. — Banno
I think the issue is methodological - not about what you believe but what you do with it. — Banno
Sure. Did you have a principle in mind in between?
It's not a binary. It's only down to Brownian motion if one denies any determinant principles that guide discourse whatsoever. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Galileo’s telescopic observations, Newton’s bucket, Eddington’s eclipse photos—all involved choices that wouldn’t survive a modern methods review.
The issue isn’t that anything goes, but that what counts as "okay" or "not okay" is itself historically and contextually shaped. There is no algorithm for scientific legitimacy, but a community negotiating standards as it goes.
There is no algorithm for scientific legitimacy, but a community negotiating standards as it goes.
The question is, What's the difference between "reasoned rejection" and "methodological foreclosure" when it comes to defending the basic tenets of a philosophical system? — J
I don't think it would be. So, the issue isn't just about what some community agrees. If some community does agree that falsification is ok, they're going to tend to come to false conclusions. — Count Timothy von Icarus
As for a principle in mind in between . . . once again, for what field of discourse, for what practice? — J
The thing is, once you acknowledge that there are perhaps intermediate, context-derived principles or standards . . . there's little left to disagree about! That's all I've been saying. You've seemed to fall back so often on "either we have an absolute, context-independent standard in all cases, or it's random chaos!" that I had to keep trying to draw attention to the middle ground. — J
Yep. That's not down to the community failing to accept a principle, but a mismatch between what the community says is the case and what is the case. It's a failure of triangulation, not of principle.
The world doesn't require anything.If the way the world is requires that epistemic communities follow certain standards to avoid false conclusions, that sounds a lot to me like the grounds for a principle. — Count Timothy von Icarus
"The way the world is makes it so that falsifying your data and lying isn't a good way to reach knowledge, but that doesn't make not just making up your observations a valid epistemic principle because..." — Count Timothy von Icarus
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