If matter is fundamental and moves according to the laws of nature, and consciousness is an emergent property from matter. Consciousness, therefore, cannot be caus — MoK

I do not believe consciousness is an emergent property of matter. That is the very point of this thread. Consciousness is fundamental, not emergent.

The idea is that consciousness is always present. In everything, everywhere, at all times — Patterner

You haven’t presented any reason for why you would think that.

Also, some would argue that when one is in general anesthesia consciousness temporarily ceases (I believe that those who experienced general anesthesia report a different 'feeling' when they 'wake up' than the feeling they have when they wake up from sleep. Also, even in deep sleep it seems to be that there is a level of attentiveness which is absent in that state). So, if consciousness can temporarily cease, when it 'restarts' is it the same consciousness or not? — boundless

I am saying consciousness does not cease when one is in general anesthesia. The experience is of an anesthetized person. Which is very different from the experience of a person whose brain is working normally, sensory input going where it normally goes, stored input from the past being triggered, information processing systems and feedback loops working, etc. It is not the consciousness that is different between the anesthetized and awake person. it is the level of functioning of the person's brain that is different. The key is is that the functioning of the person's brain does not create consciousness.

The idea is that consciousness is always present. In everything, everywhere, at all times
— Patterner

You haven’t presented any reason for why you would think that. — Wayfarer

Not in this thread. I've given my reasons often, though. I don't take part in many other kinds of discussions here. But I am hoping to have discussions with the starting point, even if only for the sake of argument, that consciousness is fundamental. I don't want to present the reasons why I think it is, have someone say why those reasons are wrong, back-and-forth back-and-forth. That's what the discussions are usually about.

in order to avoid the absurdity of referring to atoms as sapient or sentient. — Gnomon

I agree that that is absurd. But I do not equate consciousness with sapience or sentience. I can say atoms are conscious without meaning they are sapient or sentient.

OK, sorry I missed your response to sushi.

How could we tell the difference between being causal, and simply identifying with something causal? — frank

Sorry. I'm not sure I understand your question, so my response might be a non sequitur. is this something along the lines of, as I said above, if you can't tell the difference, what difference does it make?

OK, sorry I missed your response to sushi. — J

No worries. I'm hoping to see half the posts here. :grin:

You haven’t presented any reason for why you would think that.
— Wayfarer
Not in this thread. — Patterner

Well, you should. If you want to make an OP it has to stand on its own two feet, especially for a major topic such at this.

I don't think you're actually open to discussions. You're stipulating what others must accept as the case, before having the discussion. You say, you don't want to engage in the back-and-forth or give reasons for why you are saying it. So - are you talking to yourself?

I am saying consciousness does not cease when one is in general anesthesia ... the functioning of the person's brain does not create consciousness. — Patterner

These claims are demonstrably false.

:up:

I do not equate consciousness with sapience or sentience — Patterner

Define (non-sapient, non-sentient, non-mental) "consciousness" with an example that contrasts "consciousness" with non-consciousness.

Fwiw ...

What "makes us conscious" is the (rarified) arrangements of our constituent "particles" into generative cognitive systems embedded-enactive within eco-systems of other generative systems. Afaik, all extant evidence warrants that 'consciousness' is an emergent activity (or process) of complex biological systems and not a fundamental (quantum) property like charge, spin, etc. — 180 Proof

:up: :up:

Most threads dealing with consciousness, regardless of their intent, soon turn into debates about Physicalism vs Idealism vs Panpsychism vs... I obviously can't keep the thread on the track, or system of tracks, I want. — Patterner

But that is the nature of this subject. Panpsychism, by definition, is a philosophical theory of mind, alongside materialism and idealism. You don't get to change that. It's like saying, let's discuss supply-side economics, without talking about economics.

There is no detail to consciousness. The consciousness of different things is not different. Not different kinds of consciousness, and not different degrees of consciousness. There's no such thing as higher consciousness. — Patterner

This is self-evidently false, and yet you then declare that you have no interest in discussing the possibility that it is mistaken with anyone. You basically want to dictate what others might say, in advance.

In short: Consciousness is subjective experience. I have heard that wording more than any other, but I prefer Annaka Harris' "felt experience". — Patterner

This is a critique of Harris' panpsychism: Panpsychism: Bad Science, Worse Philosophy, Medium (requires registration).

This article critically examines Annaka Harris’s contribution to the popular resurgence of panpsychism—the view that consciousness is a fundamental property of matter. While philosopher Philip Goff argues for panpsychism as an alternative to the explanatory failure of materialism, Harris claims to remain a materialist while advocating for a form of consciousness-as-inherent-to-matter. To address the "combination problem"—how scattered micro-qualia could yield a unified conscious subject—she denies the existence of the self altogether. In her view, consciousness is just content arising, like bubbles in a pot, with no unified subject or experiencer. (My view is that in this, she draws on a popular but inaccurate interpretation of Buddhist philosophy, likely taken from her husband Sam Harris, who espouses a kind of Buddhist materialism: the notion that "the Buddha says there is no self." In fact, the Buddhist principle is that "all phenomena are devoid of self" (anatta), which is a much more subtle principle. Saying there is no self tout court completely undercuts any possibility of moral agency. It is, in fact, a form of nihilism, which was always rejected in Buddhism.)

The article contends that Harris’s move dissolves the very phenomenon needing explanation—coherent, first-person conscious experience—by asserting it to be an illusion. Moreover, it notes that the appeal to panpsychism, while framed as scientifically open-minded, ends up preserving the ontological blind spots of materialism in a new guise. Her reliance on common-sense distinctions (e.g., socks and rocks aren’t conscious) sits uncomfortably beside her claim that all matter entails consciousness.

By way of concusion, the author suggests that if one truly wishes to move beyond materialist assumptions, it must be done with a philosophical framework—such as idealism—that can account for the unity, structure, and intelligibility of consciousness, rather than erasing them in favor of a scattered field of unintelligible qualia.

Define (non-sapient, non-sentient, non-mental) "consciousness" with an example that contrasts "consciousness" with non-consciousness. — 180 Proof

The idea is that there is no non-consciousness. Everything is experiencing. Some things experience sapience, sentience, mental. I don't know what percentage of living things experience each of those things. I don't suspect many non-living things experience any of them.

However, all things, living and non, experience.

I think the mistake we have made is equating consciousness with things like sapience, sentience, and mental. Which is understandable, because those are things we experience. I would say those are the defining characteristics of the species; the things that are unique, sometimes in degree and sometimes in kind, to humans.

But it lead us wrong. It made us think this is what consciousness is, yet has not even lead to a definition that all can agree on. What is consciousness. What is human consciousness? My position is that there is no such thing as "human consciousness". There is only the consciousness of each human. Human X experiences being biologically male, 6 feet tall, having perfect pitch, having sickle cell anemia, being great with the ladies, on and on. Human Y experiences being biologically female, having an eidetic memory, having arachnophobia, and loving pecan pie. Human Z experiences being biologically female, has no measurable IQ, has been wheelchair bound since birth, and has the brightest smile when you talk to her.

The idea is that there is no non-consciousness. Everything is experiencing. — Patterner

Compare:

"The idea is that there is no non-matter. Everything is material."

The interesting thing about both these positions is that they can't be argued either for or against. They both involve an interpretation or construal of their key term -- "consciousness" and "matter" -- in such a way as to mean "everything there is." So all one can reply is, "OK, that's what you mean," but it's hard to know where to go from there. I guess one can say, "Almost nobody else means that," but that's not an argument, it's an expostulation.

I wonder, then, why you want to say this. It pretty much forecloses discussion.

The idea is that there is no non-consciousness. — Patterner

Yes, but that "idea" doesn't define (or describe it in a way that discerns it from its negation / absence): according to you, what is consciousness?

Interestingly, I have usually read that 'consciousness' is a specific kind of 'mind'. So, for instance, a bacterium has a very rudimentary 'mind' but it isn't 'conscious'. — boundless

I know what you mean. And it seems easy to say no for bacteria and yes for humans. But those kinds of things that I've read never say how consciousness comes into the picture. As David Eagleman says in this video,

Your other question is, why does it feel like something? That we don't know. and the weird situation we're in in modern neuroscience, of course, is that, not only do we not have a theory of that, but we don't know what such a theory would even look like. Because nothing in our modern mathematics days, "Ok, well, do a triple interval and carry the 2, and then *click* here's the taste of feta cheese. — David Eagleman

and Donald Hoffman says in this video,

It's not just that we don't have scientific theories. We don't have remotely plausible ideas about how to do it. — Donald Hoffman

we have no idea.

I'm interested in another idea. I don't know where it could lead. I don't know if it can lead anywhere. There are many theories about consciousness. Many internally consistent, but unprovable. But I don't see discussions about this idea. Debates between adherents of different theories giving pros and cons of each, but not discussion about a given theory. I think it could be interesting.

I wonder, then, why you want to say this. It pretty much forecloses discussion. — J

It doesn't foreclose discussion about the idea that consciousness is fundamental, and that it is simple, undifferentiated experience. It means a different way of viewing consciousness. But such things are not unheard of. People do thought experiments all the time, taking something as given, and seeing where it leads. Was Mary's skin tone pure white? Did she never scrape herself and see red blood? Preposterous. But we don't say that. We say, "Ok, we have someone who, despite having perfectly normal eyes, optic nerves, visual areas in the brain, etc., Has never seen anything but black and white."

There is something to be said for this, but hard to do so without entering realms you wish to steer clear of.

In some sense we can frame those that say consciousness is emergent as being onboard with the idea of universal consciousness as the 'property' of consciousness exists by some means it is just that they cannot elaborate on the how or why to any significant extent. Perhaps they would be willing to talk of a latent consciousness sitting and waiting for a certain amalgam of mundane matter through which to flourish?

I think where you could come to meet the more common expression of 'consciousness' is to understand it as 'emerging'/'awakening'.

However, all things, living and non, experience. — Patterner

This is going to be problematic in expressing your thoughts I feel. The word we have for this is 'exist' not 'experience'. I think if you expressed your thoughts more along the lines of reestablishing what we mean by 'exist' it would get your view point across more clearly.

I think you may also need to address some problems of reductionism here when expressing these ideas. What I mean is we are all, as is everything, made up of parts and these parts are all 'experiencing'/'existing' items. The problem herein is that you say 'rock' or 'person,' but are we then to say that this or that molecule, wavefunction or organ is 'experiencing'/'existing' separate from or entangled with the experiencing of a mental subject?

It could be that consciousness is a fundamental part of the universe that can morph from one form to another. We know this is the case with Energy and Matter so I see no reason to assume that there are no other key elements that make up all we know of given our limited scope of the entire existence of the universe.

This is certainly an interesting and rich landscape to explore but due to this it is also prone to blind speculation - a large reason I stay clear of discussions on consciousness.

What have you read on this subject? I have just started reading Ian McGilchrist's 'The Matter With Things' and feel you may find some useful discussions in this. If short of time I recommend watching an interview or two with him or reading Philosophy Now Issue 164 (which focuses on him and other sin this area; although I confess I have not read the articles in this issue yet).

I have carefully read your reflections, and I am very impressed with how deep and passionate you are discussing the nature of consciousness. Especially inspiring is the clarity with which Patterner articulates the idea of ​ ​ the fundamentality of consciousness, and the variety of perspectives that you all bring. I want to offer another look at this topic and ask: what if consciousness is not a substance or a property, but a process? Let me clarify, based on your ideas, and see where this can lead us.

Patterner, you remarkably described consciousness as a universal "sensory experience" inherent in everything from stones to people. Your analogy with vision, where consciousness remains unchanged, and only what is realized changes, is very bright. But what if consciousness is not something static, like a property or essence, but a dynamic process that manifests itself only in systems that can actively interact with the world? For example, in organisms with neural networks or behavioral responses, where consciousness is associated with information processing, adaptation or reflection.

You mentioned that a stone "survives itself" like a stone, but does not have mental activity, perception or movement. But what if it is the lack of active interaction that makes the idea of ​ ​ stone consciousness functionally redundant? If consciousness is a process associated with dynamics (for example, perception, feedback or choice), then a stone whose existence is static and determined by external physical laws may not need consciousness. Even if we assume that he has some kind of "experience," it does not affect his being - unlike, say, a person or animal, where consciousness is associated with adaptive processes.

Which brings me to another thought covered in the discussion, like plants. Tree growth is a process, but it is genetically programmed and does not involve active choice or reflection. But what if consciousness arises only where there is an opportunity to manipulate the environment or react to it at your own "discretion"? Then plants whose dynamics are deterministic may not require consciousness, even if we admit that they have some basic experience.

My idea is that consciousness as a process is associated with the dynamics of interaction and adaptation. This eliminates the need to ascribe consciousness to static or strictly deterministic systems such as rocks or plants, and focuses us on what makes consciousness meaningful - its role in active being. But what if this approach helps us avoid a substantialist framework in which consciousness is seen as "something" - be it a universal property or an emergent quality?

One hypothetical explanation for consciousness in the "consciousness is fundamental" category is proto-consciousness. I wrote about about this in my Property Dualism thread. All particles, in addition to physical properties like mass and electrical charge, have an experiential property. So every particle experiences itself. And particles functioning as a unit experience as a unit.

Ok, I’m on board now. I agree with your idea that consciousness is fundamental, but I think it needs teasing out a bit. The way I do this is to break apart the preconditioned ideas around the subject. To see the issue from a fresh perspective.

Let me suggest that physical material, the physical universe (that we know, I’ll call it X) is an artificial construct. That the real world Y is immaterial, there are things, beings, space, time, things happen, just like in X, but there is no physical material. In Y there is an equivalent to material, because there are forms and there is extension in time and space. But this material is composed of ideas, concepts, axioms, consciousness and experiences. Things that we typically (here in X) see as mental states and processes.

Now X, being artificial requires a whole series of technologies and infrastructure to produce and maintain. But also it requires, or produces constraints, because it is very rigid and dense. One of those constraints is that consciousness can’t easily be transposed and requires biological structures to bring it into that world. The reason why we see consciousness, ideas, concepts experiences as mental states is because the only place in X where they happen is in biological brains. Whereas in Y, they are everywhere, in everything and form the very material of that world. Remember Y is real, X is artificial.

It's important to disassociate consciousness with anything mental. I believe we have been confusing the two things all along.

Agreed. Consciousness is a state, mental activity is differing types of computation.

I am saying consciousness does not cease when one is in general anesthesia. The experience is of an anesthetized person. Which is very different from the experience of a person whose brain is working normally, sensory input going where it normally goes, stored input from the past being triggered, information processing systems and feedback loops working, etc. It is not the consciousness that is different between the anesthetized and awake person. it is the level of functioning of the person's brain that is different. The key is is that the functioning of the person's brain does not create consciousness. — Patterner

I am not a physicalist myself but it's controversial to assume that an 'anesthetized person' has consciousness. Even more problematically, you also abscribed some form of consciousness to a 'dead person'. Let's concede that, indeed, in some sense there is consciousness in both cases. My question is: is the 'consciousness' of a 'dead person' the same entity of the 'consciousness' of the 'living person' before she died? Is the 'consciouesness' of the 'anesthetized person' the very same entity of the 'consciousness' of the person when she was in a normal, waking state? Do the 'dead person' and 'anesthetized person' have a unitary, private experience?
Or are different entities of the same type?

Notice that the 'privateness' of our experience, of our 'consciousness' is something to be addressed even in a panpsychist model. If all my constituents have their own 'consciousness', how does that explain the arising of 'my' consciousness, which seems separate from 'theirs'?
Going back to the 'anesthetized person', even a panpsychist might say that while in that state there is no 'consciousness' of the 'whole person' but only of its parts.

You say that 'consciousness is fundamental'. In order to have a meaningful discussion it's also IMO important to clarify what we mean by 'consciousness' and provide a clear model for it. Do you think that, for instance, there is one fundamental consciousness or that there are many distinct consciousnesses? Do you think that any composite object has its own consciousness or only some composites have consciousness?

Sorry for the many questions, but I'd like to understand more your view.

... we have no idea. — Patterner

In a way, I agree.

But we can make reasonable assertions IMO by analysing the behavior of inanimate objects and living beings. In the latter case, we do see that the behavior has charateristics that seem unique to living beings, which seem to point to the fact that, for instance, even the simplest life forms seem to behave as 'wholes' and in a purposeful way. This might be wrong, of course. But it does seem so. It seems to me a reasonable deduction.

Debates between adherents of different theories giving pros and cons of each, but not discussion about a given theory. I think it could be interesting. — Patterner

Yes, I agree. Also, theories that are presented are mostly vague.

according to you, what is consciousness? — 180 Proof

Consciousness is subjective experience. That's all. Everything experiences it's own existence.

if it is casual, what exactly causes?

I wonder, then, why you want to say this. It pretty much forecloses discussion.
— J
It doesn't foreclose discussion about the idea that consciousness is fundamental, and that it is simple, undifferentiated experience. — Patterner

But what can now be said about it? It's either true or it isn't, and we don't have any way of evaluating which. Moreover, if everything is consciousness, we can't talk about what it might be like if some thing(s) were not. The position prevents us from being able to specify an alternative.

A word about defining consciousness.

Consciousness isn't a definable object or property, but a grammatical background (grammar in a Wittgensteinian sense), a requirement for the possibility of thought, language, and knowledge.

It's not something we know about, but something we presuppose in all knowing. Like Wittgenstein's hinge propositions, consciousness is not justified by evidence but functions as an unspoken certainty that underlies our epistemic and linguistic practices.

Its meaning doesn't emerge from some strict definition, but from a network of overlapping uses, what Wittgenstein would call a family resemblance concept

This view is contrary to both reductive physicalism and metaphysical idealism, not by denying the reality of consciousness, but by refusing to treat it as an object within the system of knowledge. Instead, consciousness is more akin to what Wittgenstein called a condition of sense, something that does not appear in our representations of the world but is presupposed by the act of representing itself. In this way, to search for a definition of consciousness is to misunderstand its role: it isn't a fact among facts, but the logical space in which facts become meaningful. Like the rules of a game that cannot be played without them, consciousness is both indispensable and typically unnoticed, except when we're having this kind of discussion.

There is something to be said for this, but hard to do so without entering realms you wish to steer clear of. — I like sushi

Aside from having the same old debate that everyone has had so many times, I'm not to much of anything.

In some sense we can frame those that say consciousness is emergent as being onboard with the idea of universal consciousness as the 'property' of consciousness exists by some means it is just that they cannot elaborate on the how or why to any significant extent. — I like sushi

Yes. many say it just happens, that it emerges from the physical,but don't suggest how. Eagleman and Hoffman say we don't even nlknow where to start. I'm suggesting there is a property that explains that it doesn't just happen, it doesn't emerge. It is there all along.

However, all things, living and non, experience.
— Patterner

This is going to be problematic in expressing your thoughts I feel. The word we have for this is 'exist' not 'experience'. I think if you expressed your thoughts more along the lines of reestablishing what we mean by 'exist' it would get your view point across more clearly. — I like sushi

Yes, it is problematic, because I'm suggesting something very different from what isbso commonly assumed. i'm saying that, without consciousness being there from the beginning, things would simply exist. And, even beings with our mental abilities would not be conscious. We would be automatons.

I think you may also need to address some problems of reductionism here when expressing these ideas. What I mean is we are all, as is everything, made up of parts and these parts are all 'experiencing'/'existing' items. The problem herein is that you say 'rock' or 'person,' but are we then to say that this or that molecule, wavefunction or organ is 'experiencing'/'existing' separate from or entangled with the experiencing of a mental subject? — I like sushi

Yes, that is, indeed, what I am saying. There is no conflict between the molecule experiencing itself and the large group of molecules with many different information processing systems and feedback loops that is me experiencing myself. There doesn't seem to be any conflict even in the famous split brain cases, where two different systems with separate mental abilities share some sub-systems.

It could be that consciousness is a fundamental part of the universe that can morph from one form to another. We know this is the case with Energy and Matter so I see no reason to assume that there are no other key elements that make up all we know of given our limited scope of the entire existence of the universe. — I like sushi

Can you elaborate on this idea of consciousness morphing?

This is certainly an interesting and rich landscape to explore but due to this it is also prone to blind speculation - a large reason I stay clear of discussions on consciousness. — I like sushi

You are wise. B:grin: Yes, every hypothesis or theory is speculation and assumption.

What have you read on this subject? I have just started reading Ian McGilchrist's 'The Matter With Things' and feel you may find some useful discussions in this. If short of time I recommend watching an interview or two with him or reading Philosophy Now Issue 164 (which focuses on him and other sin this area; although I confess I have not read the articles in this issue yet). — I like sushi

I have many books. But I can't find any that answer the question of how it happens. It just does. People like Tse, Damasio, and Gazzaniga even begin their books by saying we do not know. I particularly like Damasio, though. I'll look at McGilchrist. Thank you.

But what can now be said about it? It's either true or it isn't, and we don't have any way of evaluating which. Moreover, if everything is consciousness, we can't talk about what it might be like if some thing(s) were not. The position prevents us from being able to specify an alternative. — J

I don't know what can be said about consciousness in regards to any hypothesis. They are either right or wrong. No?

But I'm not saying everything is consciousness. I'm saying everything is consciousness.

How could we tell the difference between being causal, and simply identifying with something causal?
— frank
Sorry. I'm not sure I understand your question, so my response might be a non sequitur. is this something along the lines of, as I said above, if you can't tell the difference, what difference does it make? — Patterner

Maybe? Is there some right answer to what you should identify with? I'm sure most people have the experience of witnessing a thunderstorm and feeling a kind of empathy with the forces swirling around above. Or watching the sunset. Maybe that isn't a kind of neurosis, but rather awareness of a deeper kinship to the universe around us. We can feel it, so why not identify with it?

I don't know what can be said about consciousness in regards to any hypothesis. They are either right or wrong. No? — Patterner

Yes, but other hypotheses allow a basis for discussion about how you'd tell.

But I'm not saying everything is consciousness. I'm saying everything is consciousness. — Patterner

Typing mistake here, I assume? Or else you're getting super woo-woo. :smile:

Yes, it is problematic, because I'm suggesting something very different from what isbso commonly assumed. i'm saying that, without consciousness being there from the beginning, things would simply exist. And, even beings with our mental abilities would not be conscious. We would be automatons. — Patterner

So you are looking at the univserse as a clockwork machine without the input of consciousness? I think when we are getting to such far flung thoughts we have very little to work with and even rational thought dissolves.

It is a bit like the whole issue of framing morality that is talked about often enough. The means of measuring may simply be impossible via material methods. Until there is a new paradigm I do not see things changing too much.

The best any of us can do is investigate the phenomenon of consciousness firsthand and inform ourselves about the work of physicists and cognitive neuroscientists (to name but two fields of interest!).

I am mostly of the mind that the very term consciousness is far too nebulous for current purposes. Until someone comes along and reconceptualises the broad phenonemon of consciousness I do not expect any real progress for quite some time. I personally believe Husserl was somewhat on the right track even though I am not really in agreement with what he believed could be achieved through his phenonemological approach.

One term always stuck out to me - I think Damasio or possibly Colin Renfrew mentioned it - the archiac term of 'ken'. I think utilising this kind of concept more universally in academia could lead to new approaches. The language within these sciences does certainly need clear delineations but often I find this can take away from a more wider-lens perspective on the matter under investigation.

Can you elaborate on this idea of consciousness morphing? — Patterner

I meant nothing more than Consciousness could be a to something else (Space-time or something) as Matter is to Energy. Was just speculation. It does nto seem we are much closer to understanding Consciousness as some fundamental form just yet and maybe it isn't. Maybe we will live to see a breakthrough.

Consciousness, to me, is a mental event. Mental events cannot be coherent on their own unless you can explain how a mental event at one point in time could cause a mental event related to the former event later!