Now here's the problem: there has to be a line somewhere between transported or not. Because, while "degree of difference" might be a continuous measure, whether you survive or not is binary (surviving in a imperfect state still counts as surviving).
And it seems impossible, in principle, to ever know where that line is, as that line makes no measurable difference to objective reality. And it's also totally arbitrary in terms of physical laws; why would the universe decree that, say, X=12,371 means being transported with brain damage and X=12,372 means you just die at the source? — Mijin

I think that while X is a continuous measure, what is left of brain function after being transported doesn't physically function such that a difference of one missing atom will correspond to a meaningful difference in considering whether or not one has survived. That is to say that the brain probably functions in terms of structures and stuff that would exist at something like (potentially knowable) thresholds and not so much according to small changes in X. If one's brain functions could be determined after going through the transporter, even independently of knowing X, and they are more or less the same as they were before the transportation, then I'd say that they have "survived". You could, of course, ask at what capacity of one's original brain function one would need to be after being transported to be considered to have survived, and I would say we are on more solid ground with that than with worrying about a measure like X.

Sorry if that's kind of a boring answer to it.

humorously, both sides of the debate tend to accuse the other of believing in souls. — Mijin

Asking for a friend... I personally wouldn't dare chip in without having yet got around to reading Parfitt. But your clear exposition got me, sorry, got my friend thinking that if I politely decline use of your machine it's because I know full well that anyone waking up in a different (spatiotemporally non-overlapping) body and/or world is mistaken if they believe they are a continuation of me?

I'm a material token, not a type? So not a soul botherer?

It's not that it's a boring answer @ToothyMaw, and I thank you for it, but I still don't think you're quite getting my point.

Today, yes, if someone has brain damage we can talk about the degree to which that person's personality and other attributes have been preserved. It's the same person, it's just arbitrary how much we consider that person to have the same qualities as before.

However, in the transporter scenario, there's a binary that we've introduced: either you've survived the process -- whether or not you have brain damage -- or you simply died on the source plate, lights out. Remember I am talking about your own perspective. So if Picard uses the transporter, I am talking about the perspective of the Picard that entered at the source, not whether the rest of the bridge crew considers it to be the same Picard.

And there seems no basis for the universe to choose where to set such a line, nor for us to ever know where it is. It's not a refutation of the transporter working per se, it's just showing that there are a number of absurd entailments.

I am sorry but I hate this problem. Why would anyone assume the Star Trek transporter could ever possibly work? If one assumed it could possibly work, one could assume any number of solutions to any number of assumed problems.

That said, if one assumes scattering all of the atoms in a living cell doesn’t irreparably disintegrate the cell, and if one assumes one can put all of those atoms back in place and that the cell would just jump start into functioning again (why do we assume you can transport atoms any faster than whole cells anyway, why don’t the atoms need to be broken apart into light waves or something, but…), then the transport process is just me being me while moving very far very fast and the differences between me before transport and me after transport are like the differences between me before walking across Europe and me after - things lost along the way and things gathered making me new with each step.

there has to be a line somewhere between "transported" and "not transported". Because, while "degree of difference" might be a continuous measure, whether you survive or not is binary — Mijin

I think that is the age old metaphysical question of identity and change. Transporter or not; surviving or not - these are ways of saying “what is ‘me’ when ‘me’ is a changing thing?” What about “me” survives one minute to the next no matter what process of change is occurring?

The fact that you can say things like “Abe Lincoln appears at the destination” makes the whole thought experiment utterly impossible to help think through this metaphysical issue. What is “Abe Lincoln” in the first place is the same question as “what appears at the other end of the transporter”, which are the same questions as “are what appears at this end of the transporter and that end of the transporter the same thing or two different things.”

The question is “what is an individual thing, or, what gives it an identity over time?”

This is Aristotle, or Heraclitus. Transporter confuses the confusing issue further. I think.

Today, yes, if someone has brain damage we can talk about the degree to which that person's personality and other attributes have been preserved. It's the same person, it's just arbitrary how much we consider that person to have the same qualities as before.

However, in the transporter scenario, there's a binary that we've introduced: either you've survived the process -- whether with brain damage or not -- or it's simply lights out. And there seems no basis for the universe to choose where to set such a line, nor for us to ever know where it is. It's not a refutation of the transporter working per se, it's just showing that there are a number of absurd entailments — Mijin

Okay, well I think this is different from your claims in the OP. I thought you were claiming that because the continuous measure X doesn't present a clear line at which one can be considered to have survived or not, we cannot set a line at which one can be considered to have survived at all.

Okay, tell me what you think is wrong with this answer just to make sure that we are on the same page: we might be able to introduce some sort of criteria for determining if someone could be considered to have survived based on the survival of brain function as a result of a certain X. If they pass a cognitive test at a certain X after being transported, then we can say that at that particular X, the person that was transported survived. Thus, it is no longer arbitrary (at least in terms of small differences in X not corresponding to meaningful differences in brain functioning) given we can determine how much someone must be the same after being transported to be considered to have survived.

I think that this resolves the question of drawing a line at which we can say someone survived transportation, even if it entails some amount of arbitrariness.

However, in the transporter scenario, there's a binary that we've introduced: either you've survived the process -- whether or not you have brain damage -- or you simply died on the source plate, lights out. — Mijin

Honestly I think it's the same question with or without transportation.

That occurred to me too, actually. Getting bonked on the head with a rock could be substituted for a transporter (for that part of the problem).

EXACTLY!

Even without injury, or misplaced atoms from a transporter accident, even thinking about a perfect transporter and the question of continuity of consciousness...

I actually think there's an argument for consciousness NEVER being continuous, period. Like even just you, now, not being transported. There's an argument that the you that is experiencing the middle of this sentence now is a different you than the one experiencing the end of the sentence now. That continuity of experience is equally illusory in a way, all the time.

It's an interesting thought and I do find it genuinely compelling.

We all go through an imperfect transporter, literally every moment of our lives. Your body is not physically identical to itself from one moment to another: it evolves continuously in time. And yet, we customarily consider our personal identity to be invariant, at least over reasonably short stretches of time.

Over longer stretches, the invariance of personal identity is more dubious, though. Am I the same person at fifty as I was when I was five? (Or, to put it in your stark terms, did I survive the process of aging?) Legally and conventionally, I am considered to be the same person, but physically and mentally, we are so far apart as to make such an identification almost meaningless. But if I am not the same person as my past self, is there a precise boundary in time between the two identities? Or is there a precise number of microphysical or psychological differences that delineates such a boundary?

To sharpen the issue even further, consider that a stroke or dementia can alter a person's memory and personality much quicker than normal aging, so that people close to them note that they are literally a different person from the one they remember.

So, what does that imply for personal identity? If you hold to a view of an identity as something objectively existing atomic entity, then you must bite the bullet and maintain that there is a fact of the matter in each of these cases about whether the identity survives or perishes in the transition, even if no amount of reasoning or observation will allow us to nail it down.

But if you view personal identity as conventional and constructed, then the problem is dissolved. On that view, there isn't an objective fact to be nailed down. This view also suggests that paradoxical thought experiments, such as the transporter or the replicator thought experiments, are uninformative precisely because of their exoticism. If our understanding of personal identity is shaped by convention and intuition, then we should expect our understanding to break down in scenarios that break with convention and intuition.

We all go through an imperfect transporter, literally every moment of our lives. Your body is not physically identical to itself from one moment to another: it evolves continuously in time — SophistiCat

As if right on cue! After my last post.

I actually think there's an argument for consciousness NEVER being continuous, period. Like even just you, now, not being transported. There's an argument that the you that is experiencing the middle of this sentence now is a different you than the one experiencing the end of the sentence now. That continuity of experience is equally illusory in a way, all the time. — flannel jesus

We all go through an imperfect transporter, literally every moment of our lives. Your body is not physically identical to itself from one moment to another: it evolves continuously in time. And yet, we customarily consider our personal identity to be invariant, at least over reasonably short stretches of time. — SophistiCat

Both of you make really good points, but I'm not sure if the transporter issue is totally resolved by this. Do the two of you think that a shrunken down interval of time could exist such that the mental processes responsible for our continuity of identity could be totally invariant over that interval?

I think there are small enough intervals of time such that nothing has changed in your brain to make you feel any different than the moment before. Even then, the argument would be that this is simply a new moment with a new you who is, in every consciously relevant way, the same as the old you.

I think there are small enough intervals of time such that nothing has changed in your brain to make you feel any different than the moment before. Even then, the argument would be that this is simply a new moment with a new you who is, in every consciously relevant way, the same as the old you. — flannel jesus

I mention it because if one were able to be fully transported within one of these intervals (such that identity is invariant or nothing happens in the brain), then we have a phenomenon distinct from the flow of change in identity due to it being "conventional and constructed" because identity considered as such is invariably related to the passage of time. Thus, I think we would have to consider whether or not being transported in itself would result in loss of identity in a way that common experience doesn't quite entail - even if we generally accept the idea of identity the two of you put forward.

Honestly I think a lot of this went over my head, and I don't see the question.
From the beginning it is we as humans who have defined the word transportation. The universe doesn't follow our definition but its own laws. I assume the transporter would follow or abuse these laws to work. as such there is no line for the universe to define a successful transportation. It is a line for us humans to define what we consider a successful transportation whether or not the transportation followed the laws of the universe. Losing an ear could be considered fine, losing fingernails could be considered failure. That is up to humans to define, not the universe.
Of course as earlier I said a lot of this was going over my head.
My words are useless if you are already discussing what the line should be as humans.
Or something else entirely about consciousness.
I would also like to state I did not understand the original problem.

Now here's the problem: there has to be a line somewhere between "transported" and "not transported". Because, while "degree of difference" might be a continuous measure, whether you survive or not is binary (surviving in a imperfect state still counts as surviving).
And it seems impossible, in principle, to ever know where that line is, as that line makes no measurable difference to objective reality. And it's also totally arbitrary in terms of physical laws; why would the universe decree that, say, X=12,371 means being transported with brain damage, and X=12,372 means you just die at the source? — Mijin

It makes a little sense to me now. Are you saying that living is the measure for successful transportation?
I also don't think I understand the line you mention. If X is referring to Atoms out of place at the destination. Nothing determines which atoms these are. If it is completely random then there cannot be a specific number as the atoms come from random places of the body.
This is quite an interesting question, and it really gets my blood pumping.
I think however that without any specific information on the transporters workings any answer we come to would be based entirely on the additional statements or conditions you make.

I actually think there's an argument for consciousness NEVER being continuous, period. Like even just you, now, not being transported. There's an argument that the you that is experiencing the middle of this sentence now is a different you than the one experiencing the end of the sentence now. That continuity of experience is equally illusory in a way, all the time. — flannel jesus

Absolutely. Every time I have discussed, or seen discussions of, the transporter problem, it seems both sides assume that continuity of consciousness is real, and the question is just whether it's preserved through this process. But yes, it occurs to me that there's a third option; that there's never continuity of consciousness.

It seems an unpleasant option -- the me that is typing the last word of this sentence is a different entity to the one that typed the first -- but we have to admit, it's the one that fits the known facts right now. It's immune to all of the arguments against the other positions.

I am sorry but I hate this problem. Why would anyone assume the Star Trek transporter could ever possibly work? If one assumed it could possibly work, one could assume any number of solutions to any number of assumed problems. — Fire Ologist

Well it's just a thought experiment. We also can't make Laplace's demon.

A difference though is that personal identity is an issue that will eventually be relevant to human technology. Because, even if transporters are impossible, brain augmentations, splicing etc seem pretty feasible within just the next few centuries. And, if strong AI is true, then transporter-like processes will be absolutely trivial as long as we have sufficient storage to make duplicates.

Okay, tell me what you think is wrong with this answer just to make sure that we are on the same page: we might be able to introduce some sort of criteria for determining if someone could be considered to have survived based on the survival of brain function as a result of a certain X. If they pass a cognitive test at a certain X after being transported, then we can say that at that particular X, the person that was transported survived. Thus, it is no longer arbitrary (at least in terms of small differences in X not corresponding to meaningful differences in brain functioning) given we can determine how much someone must be the same after being transported to be considered to have survived. — ToothyMaw

I still don't think you're following me, sorry. I am talking 100% about the first-person perspective of the person going into the transporter. You are talking about what is observable or measurable to third-parties.

In the original, vanilla transporter problem, where the transporter makes perfect copies, it's a given that the person at the destination is identical in every way to the person went in, such that Kirk's colleagues see no discontinuity in their interaction with him, and Kirk is convinced he's just been transported.
This premise is not a solution to the philosophical problem though, because that problem concerns the first person perspective of the Kirk entering at the source. From his own point of view, did he survive?

I am inferring from your answers that probably your position is that, no, the source person is dead, and our focus is just on whether we should consider the facsimile close enough to treat it as Kirk. Right?

We all go through an imperfect transporter, literally every moment of our lives. — SophistiCat

I agree.

There is the “Ship of Theseus” paradox -if you replace one board on a ship, it’s still the same ship; but if over time you replace all of the boards, one by one, at what point does it become a new ship or is it still the same ship after all of the boards have been replaced.

Pre-star trek transporter problem.

Like the birth of a caterpillar, then it enters the cocoon, then becomes a butterfly, orbit is the same creature?

Or the swimming tadpole becomes the tree climbing frog.

@Mijin -your line between you being transported or not is certainly an interesting philosophical problem, but I just think all of the sci-fi of transporters of scattered atoms recombined totally confuses an issue that has perplexed mankind since a person fist said “Hey, it’s me.”

Identity is the line between this and that.

Over time (or over space in the case of a transporter) the line between this identifiable one and that identifiable new one is stretched and broadened.

In a way, I am reborn at each new moment and each new moment is a brand new me.

In another way, I can only make this observation, because something I also call “me” persists and remains across many moments. It’s like two clocks are going at the same time in order for ‘me’ to recognize new “me’”.

From his own point of view, did he survive? — Mijin

See that is the problem with the transporter problem - that is a fact question. You’d have to ask him. You’d have to run him through a test transporter and ask him. What else is a ‘me’ but the one subject who reports when you ask “who’s there?” Once transported, If he couldn’t tell whether or not he died and was reborn, or died and was duplicated, or didn’t die at all, who else could possibly determine that and how? What or who would care?
You’d have to run the experiment, or just think about the Ship of Theseus.

Both of you make really good points, but I'm not sure if the transporter issue is totally resolved by this. Do the two of you think that a shrunken down interval of time could exist such that the mental processes responsible for our continuity of identity could be totally invariant over that interval? — ToothyMaw

To my mind, identity is a concept with fuzzy boundaries, but at the same time, invariance over time and space is an important part of it; identity is the key word here. Me five minutes ago is not just someone very similar to me now: we are one and the same person. The same is also true for other things: the chair on which I now sit, the city in which I was born. The very idea of an identifiable person or object implies and requires such invariance.

But this idea of endurance of identity can come under strain. As things change, it becomes harder to maintain it. Paradoxical thought experiments can also strain this idea, but for reasons that I explained earlier, I find this unsurprising and, frankly, not very interesting (they could become interesting and relevant if they ever become reality, but we will cross that river when we get to it).

Again, the metaphysical challenge to identity arises only if you are committed to the idea of sharp-edged essences of things. They are not that challenging if identity is constructed. But I admit that that in itself can be a hard thing to swallow.

where the transporter makes perfect copies, it's a given that the person at the destination is identical in every way to the person went in, such that Kirk's colleagues see no discontinuity in their interaction with him, and Kirk is convinced he's just been transported. — Mijin

But so (by hypothesis) will any number of duplicates be convinced of their continuity with Kirk. So what? I'm convinced I'm Napoleon.

But so (by hypothesis) will any number of duplicates be convinced of their continuity with Kirk. So what? I'm convinced I'm Napoleon. — bongo fury

That was the point. I was explaining that duplicates being convinced they are the original, and third-parties believing the duplicate is the original, doesn't solve the philosophical problem of what happened to the original; whether they were in some sense "transported" or simply killed.

what happened to the original; whether they were in some sense "transported" or simply killed. — Mijin

My original question was (because I'm curious), if we answer "quite obviously the latter", how does that convict us of

believing in souls. — Mijin

?

Oh ok.
Yes this is just an IME thing, so no worries if you disagree. But often when there are debates on the transporter problem, and you have the people forming into two groups of either "transported" or "killed" (and, as I say, no-one but me seems to occupy the third group of "no continuity even before the transporter"), the rhetoric is often like this:

"What connects the person at source to the person at the destination, instead of them being separate entities? What was actually transported? Is it a soul?"
Vs
"What does the person at the destination lack in order to be you? Is it the soul? If it makes a difference whether we literally move the individual atoms, does that mean you're suggesting that the atoms held the soul?"

an IME thing — Mijin

Independent medical exam?

What does the person at the destination lack in order to be you? — Mijin

Spatiotemporal continuity (with me).

If it makes a difference whether we literally move the individual atoms, does that mean you're suggesting that the atoms held the soul?" — Mijin

Held the continuity, yes. I suppose a one atom at a time transportation would destroy it, though. (Is this what Parfitt discusses?)

"no continuity even before the transporter" — Mijin

How not?

... By way of focusing on consciousness? I don't see that as crucial to the question whether I am personally continuous with spatiotemporally non-overlapping replicas.

Independent medical exam? — bongo fury

In my experience

Spatiotemporal continuity (with me). — bongo fury

Why does that matter? And how, precisely, do we define it? Because of course it is vulnerable to the same sort of "imperfect copy" problem that I talked about in the OP. Whether I am alive or not is binary (NB: alive but damaged is still alive), but whether I as an organism have spatiotemporal continuity with an entity at a past state of the universe is something less clear. Does it matter whether it's the same atoms? What proportion of atoms must be in the same state?

It occurred to me that there is a parallel here with some realist and anti-realist positions in metaethics. One influential but controversial position is that of the error theory. Error theorists about ethics are realists, i.e., they believe that ethical propositions say something about objectively existing entities or properties. They also maintain that no such entities or properties exist, which makes ethical propositions erroneous.

I think @Mijin (and perhaps @flannel jesus) are error theorists about personal identity. My position (and @Fire Ologist's?) would be more akin to anti-realism.

I'm a material token, not a type? So not a soul botherer? — bongo fury

I have wrestled with Parfit, and his teletransporter for a couple of years now.

I think this is the correct answer to the branch-line case. Any "one" who is me, yet occupied different atoms and extracts difference resources from the environment to maintain homeostatis, and occupies a different "moment' in space, cannot be me.

Whether this is true of the original case, I am yet to decide, but in principle, the transporter cannot transport me without "taking" me. And I agree, this gets around the Soul (further fact) problem.

There is the “Ship of Theseus” — Fire Ologist

I think this is a really stupid 'paradox' personally. A ship is "that ship" because of what people call it. There isn't, that I can see, a physical boundary to the identity of a utility/object. The identity of a 'person' is what's interesting, and we run into all sorts of problems because almost everyone has the intuition that "they" are non-physical (or, a further fact, in Partfitian terms) and ride around in a physical substrate. This said, I think many sorities problems are also stupid:
A heap of sand obtains once at least once grain of sand is suspended above the surface in question by other grains of sand. I cannot understand why this isn't a totally adequate answer that shows that people are silly and like to argue.

Again, the metaphysical challenge to identity arises only if you are committed to the idea of sharp-edged essences of things. — SophistiCat

I'm unsure. Identity, by definition, has those edges baked in. If we want to jettison personal identity then i agree.

At any rate, Parfit treats this problem at length when talking about surgeries replacing molecule by molecule, a person's brain. The conclusion is that the x literally doesn't matter. What matters is the outcome, and whether 0 or 1 obtains. ***That is, for Parfit, as long as there's a 1 (for him, relation R) on the other side of whatever process, then identity is irrelevant. "you" will continue. This is unsatisfying, but appears to be hte logical conclusion***.

There's an argument that the you that is experiencing the middle of this sentence now is a different you than the one experiencing the end of the sentence now. — flannel jesus

But lets be real - its a really tortured and unhelpful argument I think. We can't explain much of anything without continuous consciousness. Unless we want to go Parfit's way and just say "this isn't important, look over here instead" (as do Austin and Searle) I can't see a way to argue that there isn't continuity in consciousness.

I pause there to note that I see a difference between "continuity of consciousness" and "continuous consciousness". There's a continuity in a Playstation Memory Card re-booting and providing continuing as to wherever the saved game was left off.

why would the universe decree that, say, X=12,371 means being transported with brain damage, and X=12,372 means you just die at the source? — Mijin

***

It wouldn't. That would 'merely' be the case, if so. This relates back to the starred passage above.

Well, if the transporter didn't kill you when you entered at the source (such that now there are two "yous"), everyone would call the machine a people fax instead of a transporter and you would be the original and the person at the destination would be the facsimile. Thus the "transporter" isn't a transporter at all, it's a fax machine that destroys originals.

I had this thought too but not as clearly worded