This wasn't for me, but I read it and I have thoughts.

I think the problem is so much simpler than the chapter illustrates (and it seems most intuitions capture). If there is a 'perfect fake' of lets say Guernica, the only difference we should be able to note between the original and this fake is that it is not the original. It was not painted by Picasso, at time X and is unique In context - it is obviously just as unique as the original in principle).
Someone purchasing Guernica for say $100millionUSD, they aren't buying a painting, per se. They are buying a biography of a painting which was commissioned in 1937, painted that year, displayed in the Pavilion, it's statement against Franco etc.. etc.. etc.. all the wya up it arriving on the auctioneers stage.

It can be made impossible to know this. But it is intuitively almost universal, from what I've seen, that one, if they knew, would be mortified by their purchase. I think the same fits with the Teletransporter. If a repllica knew they were a replica, they would spiral into a crisis. If their friends knew they were a replica, they would likely find it canny, and reject.

Someone purchasing Guernica for say $100millionUSD, they aren't buying a painting, per se. — AmadeusD

And someone paying that much to prolong their life in the same body, they aren't preserving their person, per se?

But then, what's the painting per se, and what's the person per se?

The original is always killed, and a copy constructed at the destination. Maybe deconstructing the original is needed to get all the information, and I don't know how deconstructing a living human can be seen as not killing them. Or deconstructing is not needed, but the original is destroyed so that there aren't multiple copies.

@AmadeusD

The actual problem is in figuring out which persistent self(s) exist. — Mijin

By posing this question you are importing the notion that there is a metaphysical, persistent self that may or may not persist.

By listing the facts that I did, I am claiming that these constitute the exhaustive facts of the matter. There are no additional facts about a metaphysical, persistent self that does or does not persist. The teleported person may or may not believe they persisted. The observers may or may not believe the teleported person persisted. But there are no underlying facts to support these beliefs, since there is no metaphysical, persistent self.

To repeat, these facts are:

* At every moment, we experience.
* These experiences cohere into a concept of a self.
* Via memory, these self-concepts cohere into the concept of a persistent, autobiographical self.

These are the relevant facts, full stop. You may apply them to the teleporter thought experiment, and make conclusions as you like. But you may not import fantastical notions of a metaphysical self. These aren't real, but instead are reifications of the autobiographical self concept we all have.

The original is always killed, and a copy constructed at the destination. Maybe deconstructing the original is needed to get all the information, and I don't know how deconstructing a living human can be seen as not killing them. — Patterner

Yes, again this is alluding to the position of bodily continuity and of course it makes intuitive sense. It's pretty much the paradigm that we all assume in daily life today.

The transporter does present problems for this view though.

If moving my actual atoms is needed for a successful transport...why is that? What's so special about my atoms? What if we partially use my atoms....how do we square the binary nature of me being alive or dead and the apparent continuous nature of n atoms being from the original?

By posing this question you are importing the notion that there is a metaphysical, persistent self that may or may not persist. — hypericin

If that was the way the point came across, it wasn't my intention.
I meant: the key problem with the transporter concerns persistence of the self which encompasses all of 1) whether there is any persistence 2) what kind of persistence there is and 3) what governs what kind of persistence there is.

FTR I don't believe in a soul or anything like that. I am purely talking about instances of consciousness. Though, yes, this hypothetical also presents problems for those who do believe in the soul.

By listing the facts that I did, I am claiming that these constitute the exhaustive facts of the matter. — hypericin

Right, and I am disagreeing.
To be more specific, I think this is focusing on third-person, objective facts. The situation is indeed simpler if we reduce our focus to that.
But the problem encompasses -- indeed is primarily concerned with -- the first-person, subjective facts.

I care about whether I -- this instance of consciousness -- will survive this process. Sidestepping this question doesn't answer it.

To be more specific, I think this is focusing on third-person, objective facts. The situation is indeed simpler if we reduce our focus to that.
But the problem encompasses -- indeed is primarily concerned with -- the first-person, subjective facts. — Mijin

The facts I listed are as first person and subjective as I can think of a fact being. What"first person facts" am I leaving out? I think it is the kind of fact presupposed by the question "do I survive, or does someone else exit the teleporter?" What is the "I" in the question referring to if not the metaphysical self i am denying? And so there are no additional facts here, other than the fact of the non existence of the metaphysical self.

If moving my actual atoms is needed for a successful transport...why is that? What's so special about my atoms? What if we partially use my atoms....how do we square the binary nature of me being alive or dead and the apparent continuous nature of n atoms being from the original? — Mijin

You cannot successfully transport a living person if you separate all their atoms. You have already failed, because separating all of a person's atoms means the person no longer exists.

I think it is the kind of fact presupposed by the question "do I survive, or does someone else exit the teleporter?" What is the "I" in the question referring to if not the metaphysical self i am denying? — hypericin

You believe that in daily life, any time I refer to "I" that I am making a metaphysical claim?
In any case, it's a question, so anyone disputing this depiction of a subjective self can explain why it is in error in the answer. ISTM a reasonable question to ask whether I would survive the transporter as it would be to ask whether I would survive if all my brain activity ceased for n nanoseconds (as I'll address in my below post).

You cannot successfully transport a living person if you separate all their atoms. You have already failed, because separating all of a person's atoms means the person no longer exists. — Patterner

How do you know that? Let's say there was technology that allowed me to separate and reform all your atoms within a nanosecond. Would you survive that process? If you would, what's the difference with any arbitrary duration of separation? If not, why not?

Once again: I'm not asking these questions to be an ass (that comes naturally ).
I am just illustrating that we don't have a good model for personal identity yet. Common sense notions of bodily continuity are only trivial solutions now because we don't have tech to splice / augment / duplicate consciousness.

You believe that in daily life, any time I refer to "I" that I am making a metaphysical claim? — Mijin

No, normally not, normally "I" just designates the speaker. In this question, though, it seems to designate not the speaker as such, but an implicit ghost in the machine. Each and every aspect of the speaker that "I" normally designates (body, mind, personality, self-history, relationships) survive without question. So "I" here cannot be referring to any of those.

ISTM a reasonable question to ask whether I would survive the transporter as it would be to ask whether I would survive if all my brain activity ceased for n nanoseconds (as I'll address in my below post). — Mijin

This makes it even more clear. Everything 'I' normally designates obviously survives. The question therefore implicitly appeals to the universal intuition of a ghost in the machine, and asks if it survives. The question treats a concept as if it were an ontological entity that can be destroyed, and is hardly sensible.

I say no for the same reasons you have outlined: MY mind stops having those experiences, even if a mind doesn't. The fact that someone thinks they are me doesn't mean they are. — AmadeusD

Despite what I said, I sympathize. To me the thought experiment is more real and poignant if it is less abstractly sci-fi.

Suppose you have a serious illness. In the near future, such illnesses are "treated" by creating perfect clones, minus only the defect. Mental state is set to exactly your current state. Once this is completed, the old body is painlessly killed. Would you accept the "treatment"?

Even though intellectually I would say 'yes', in truth I would certainly hesitate.

Would you accept the "treatment"? — hypericin

This is a weird one. I would want this for my loved ones, if they could accept the clone. Otherwise, I wouldn't accept it.

By posing this question you are importing the notion that there is a metaphysical, persistent self that may or may not persist. — hypericin

Not at all. The answer can, squarely, be "none". Which is my answer, in the event. I see why it looks that way though.

But there are no underlying facts to support these beliefs, since there is no metaphysical, persistent self. — hypericin

So you say.

In any case, you've ignored hte issue. You listed these 'facts' in a particular context. It seems that was unintended. All good mate :)

These aren't comparable at all, imo.

A piece of art exists under certain descriptions, as a factual object. Guernica, the one painted by Picasso in 1927 is what it is. There is 'criteria'. It is that object. I don't understand any controversy or question here.

Any other Guernica might be indistinguishable, and if one is convinced of the deception, the effect is the same. The object isn't all that important - belief about it is. I merely pointing out there is an objecting "this piece of art by this person" which creates the cache. Not the object itself

No, normally not, normally "I" just designates the speaker. In this question, though, it seems to designate not the speaker as such, but an implicit ghost in the machine. Each and every aspect of the speaker that "I" normally designates (body, mind, personality, self-history, relationships) survive without question. So "I" here cannot be referring to any of those. — hypericin

But this seems to be taking the position that I alluded to upthread as "Locke's conception"; that the critical thing is the pattern of memories, characteristics etc.
This also has issues; e.g. what if we don't delete the original, does it mean we have multiple "I"s? And how can that be, when the experiences of those I's is separate?

It's also vulnerable to the "imperfect transporter" as described in the OP.

And it also implies immortality. Because, perhaps in a trillion trillion times the universe's current age some particles randomly come together to form a brain like yours. So that's you, you're back...right?

Finally, as I said in the OP, it's fascinating that in this discussion both sides accuse the other of assuming the existence of a soul.

These aren't comparable at all, imo. — AmadeusD

It was your analogy?

I think the same fits with the Teletransporter. — AmadeusD

Between a fake piece of art and a self? Not at all. If that was an impression I gave, I apologise. That is wrong-headed and doesn't support what I'm saying at all.

My point is that a 'self' is not comparable to a piece of art, because there's an absolute limit to what's called the original piece.

Do you mean there's an absolute criterion of identity for the artwork, but not for the person?

Or the other way round?

Between a fake piece of art and a self? — AmadeusD

I do think there's a significant analogy between fake artwork and fake self, and between genuine artwork and genuine self.

Hence my initial remark:

I'm a material token, not a type? — bongo fury

Although, to be more precise, the analogy is with singular artworks (such as paintings) which are types that are uniquely instantiated (they have a unique token).

The obvious dis-analogy is with multiple artworks such as photographs and prints and texts.

You cannot successfully transport a living person if you separate all their atoms. You have already failed, because separating all of a person's atoms means the person no longer exists.
— Patterner

How do you know that? Let's say there was technology that allowed me to separate and reform all your atoms within a nanosecond. Would you survive that process? — Mijin

No. If my atoms are separated, I do not exist. You can build a replica of me, from the atoms that were once part of me, or from different atoms of the same kinds, in a nanosecond or a decade. If done perfectly, the replica would not know he wasn't me. But he wouldn't be.

Yes, but sort of at a higher level than seems we're on. I mean to say that you can't give a criteria for the 'self' to being 'self-same' isn't quite available. Whereas, the initial piece of art (in our exchange, Guernica) is exactly that piece of art, without having to establish any criteria beyond that it is itself (being painted by x at time y etc..)

I can't see that your further comments then make sense: I could not point to a 'fake self' and support my pointing. I could do so with a piece of art, given I was actually capable of spotting fakes (or, had some evidence of provenance showing it was not the original). It doesn't seem available to the one claiming 'fake self' to do so.

the replica would not know he wasn't me — Patterner

I find it quite exciting that we actually do not know whether this would obtain.

But he wouldn't be. — Patterner

I certainly agree - but humour me - is your take that there's a set of interlocking criteria (these atoms, at this time, in this configuration) that cause someone to be 'you'? Obviously, I take there is only one shot/possible 'you' in this, just asking in that form to get clear response.

the replica would not know he wasn't me
— Patterner

I find it quite exciting that we actually do not know whether this would obtain. — AmadeusD

Well, we're talking about Star Trek transporters, or whatever is similar enough. Nobody has ever materialized on any of the shows and thought they were a duplicate.

I certainly agree - but humour me - is your take that there's a set of interlocking criteria (these atoms, at this time, in this configuration) that cause someone to be 'you'? Obviously, I take there is only one shot/possible 'you' in this, just asking in that form to get clear response. — AmadeusD

Not sure you meant to word it the way I'm taking it. Nothing can cause anyone or anything to be me. I'm the only possible me. Even if a duplicate of me was made, nobody could tell us apart, and neither of us could prove that we were the original, there would still be only one original me.

I could even be a duplicate, and not know it. But I'd still be the only me.

Well, we're talking about Star Trek transporters — Patterner

Err, I don't ... think ... that's happening. But nevertheless, if I;ve missed that, it's worth noting that what Star Trek does has zero bearing on the discussion as its not one based within the restrictions of that universe.

Nobody has ever materialized on any of the shows and thought they were a duplicate. — Patterner

The entire point is to figure out whether you think the guy walking out on Mars is 'you' and then if so, how that's the case. Your position is quite clear, happily :P

You obviously don't think it is for similar reasons I don't. That's not particularly relevant, I don't think. We have no idea what B would 'think' because this is fiction, speculation and semi-nonsense all rolled into one.

Your response applies to a body well, but not a self as we can't know what that consists in (currently). But that response - It's the one i gave to Mijin in certain terms - covers any argument for bodily continuity well in this TE. Parfit's take is that there is no 'you'. There is no self - simply relation R. That relation is just psychological continuity. There need be no identity (nor could there be, on his and my conceptions). There was no identity to continue. So while intuitively, I think everything you've said makes sense, when you drill into the thought experiment, they largely don't answer much I think.

Yes, but sort of at a higher level than seems we're on. — AmadeusD

Is that, like, yes, both? You mean there's an absolute criterion of identity for the artwork, but not for the person... And it's the other way round as well? That would certainly be on a higher level than I'm on.

I mean to say that you can't give a criteria for the 'self' to being 'self-same' isn't quite available. — AmadeusD

I do appreciate that you're trying to clarify here, but evidently you don't bother read through?

Whereas, the initial piece of art (in our exchange, Guernica) is exactly that piece of art, without having to establish any criteria beyond that it is itself (being painted by x at time y etc..) — AmadeusD

Yes. Ok, and you don't think the same is true of personal identity? Whether I'm Napoleon doesn't depend entirely on my (lack of) spatiotemporal continuity with the human being leading the French troops at Waterloo? We have to establish criteria beyond that? I don't follow.

I can't see that your further comments then make sense: — AmadeusD

Yes, I must be confused.

I could not point to a 'fake self' and support my pointing. I could do so with a piece of art, given I was actually capable of spotting fakes (or, had some evidence of provenance showing it was not the original). It doesn't seem available to the one claiming 'fake self' to do so. — AmadeusD

You wouldn't seek to convince me I was deluded by pointing to evidence of provenance contradicting my claim of bodily continuity with Napoleon? By asking me to reconcile that claim with historical evidence of my more recent birth in South London, e.g., etc?

I do think there's a significant analogy between fake artwork and fake self, and between genuine artwork and genuine self. — bongo fury

Does this make sense, now? The painting is a spatiotemporally defined unit just like a person or a ship?

If so, maybe you'll see the point of this?

Someone purchasing Guernica for say $100millionUSD, they aren't buying a painting, per se.
— AmadeusD

And someone paying that much to prolong their life in the same body, they aren't preserving their person, per se?

But then, what's the painting per se, and what's the person per se? — bongo fury

No. If my atoms are separated, I do not exist. — Patterner

How do you know that any separation for any period of time means nonexistence forever?
And note, for all we know, something akin to this happens already; if time is quantum, then at every planck time your particles jump to a new position. So, if that is our universe, do I survive the planck jumps?

Well, we're talking about Star Trek transporters
— Patterner

Err, I don't ... think ... that's happening. But nevertheless, if I;ve missed that, it's worth noting that what Star Trek does has zero bearing on the discussion as its not one based within the restrictions of that universe. — AmadeusD

It's the premise of the OP. But that's a catch-all. Any other hypothetical methods of doing the same thing are fine.

The entire point is to figure out whether you think the guy walking out on Mars is 'you' and then if so, how that's the case. Your position is quite clear, happily :P

You obviously don't think it is for similar reasons I don't. That's not particularly relevant, I don't think. We have no idea what B would 'think' because this is fiction, speculation and semi-nonsense all rolled into one.

Your response applies to a body well, but not a self as we can't know what that consists in (currently). But that response - It's the one i gave to Mijin in certain terms - covers any argument for bodily continuity well in this TE. Parfit's take is that there is no 'you'. There is no self - simply relation R. That relation is just psychological continuity. There need be no identity (nor could there be, on his and my conceptions). There was no identity to continue. So while intuitively, I think everything you've said makes sense, when you drill into the thought experiment, they largely don't answer much I think. — AmadeusD

I don't think there's any need for the thread if the person walking out on Mars does NOT think he's me. In Star Trek, he thinks he is. indeed, he could not think otherwise, and is indistinguishable from me. But, as has happened on Star Trek, and could happen in scenarios we devise, the original could remain, joined by the copy, or it could be multiple copies but no original. If the original is not destroyed, then the copy is more obviously not the original, regardless of how these things are defined.


As for a self, we can only all give our opinions, I suppose. Mine is that the self is simply the subjective experience of the entirety on question. My self is the experience of this body, with these senses; this brain, with these memories; etc. The continuity of self is due to the memories.

Of course, in regards to this thread, the self of the original and the self of a copy are going to be indistinguishable. Even the copy wouldn't feel other than the original feels/felt.

No. If my atoms are separated, I do not exist.
— Patterner

How do you know that? — Mijin

How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist?

If done perfectly, the replica would not know he wasn't me. But he wouldn't be. — Patterner

Why? Because he doesn't have your soul?

If done perfectly, the replica would not know he wasn't me. But he wouldn't be.
— Patterner

Why? Because he doesn't have your soul? — flannel jesus

No. For the reasons I said. (I don't believe in any soul.)

you didn't give any reasons in that post I replied to. Did you give reasons somewhere else?

Sorry. I just realized you quoted a different post than the one I thought you I'm talking about my post immediately before your previous post.

What's interesting is that the universe doesn't have a sense of identity for things like atoms. At a fundamental level, the universe can't tell the difference between one electron and another one, one atom and another one.

So if a god steps in and separates all the atoms in your body, and then puts together a bunch of "different" atoms in the exact same arrangement half a meter to your left... who is to say that those aren't "your atoms"? Atoms have no identity, so they have just as much a claim to being your atoms as any other atoms do.