Someone purchasing Guernica for say $100millionUSD, they aren't buying a painting, per se. — AmadeusD
The actual problem is in figuring out which persistent self(s) exist. — Mijin
The original is always killed, and a copy constructed at the destination. Maybe deconstructing the original is needed to get all the information, and I don't know how deconstructing a living human can be seen as not killing them. — Patterner
By posing this question you are importing the notion that there is a metaphysical, persistent self that may or may not persist. — hypericin
By listing the facts that I did, I am claiming that these constitute the exhaustive facts of the matter. — hypericin
To be more specific, I think this is focusing on third-person, objective facts. The situation is indeed simpler if we reduce our focus to that.
But the problem encompasses -- indeed is primarily concerned with -- the first-person, subjective facts. — Mijin
You cannot successfully transport a living person if you separate all their atoms. You have already failed, because separating all of a person's atoms means the person no longer exists.If moving my actual atoms is needed for a successful transport...why is that? What's so special about my atoms? What if we partially use my atoms....how do we square the binary nature of me being alive or dead and the apparent continuous nature of n atoms being from the original? — Mijin
I think it is the kind of fact presupposed by the question "do I survive, or does someone else exit the teleporter?" What is the "I" in the question referring to if not the metaphysical self i am denying? — hypericin
You cannot successfully transport a living person if you separate all their atoms. You have already failed, because separating all of a person's atoms means the person no longer exists. — Patterner
You believe that in daily life, any time I refer to "I" that I am making a metaphysical claim? — Mijin
ISTM a reasonable question to ask whether I would survive the transporter as it would be to ask whether I would survive if all my brain activity ceased for n nanoseconds (as I'll address in my below post). — Mijin
I say no for the same reasons you have outlined: MY mind stops having those experiences, even if a mind doesn't. The fact that someone thinks they are me doesn't mean they are. — AmadeusD
Would you accept the "treatment"? — hypericin
By posing this question you are importing the notion that there is a metaphysical, persistent self that may or may not persist. — hypericin
But there are no underlying facts to support these beliefs, since there is no metaphysical, persistent self. — hypericin
No, normally not, normally "I" just designates the speaker. In this question, though, it seems to designate not the speaker as such, but an implicit ghost in the machine. Each and every aspect of the speaker that "I" normally designates (body, mind, personality, self-history, relationships) survive without question. So "I" here cannot be referring to any of those. — hypericin
Between a fake piece of art and a self? — AmadeusD
I'm a material token, not a type? — bongo fury
No. If my atoms are separated, I do not exist. You can build a replica of me, from the atoms that were once part of me, or from different atoms of the same kinds, in a nanosecond or a decade. If done perfectly, the replica would not know he wasn't me. But he wouldn't be.You cannot successfully transport a living person if you separate all their atoms. You have already failed, because separating all of a person's atoms means the person no longer exists.
— Patterner
How do you know that? Let's say there was technology that allowed me to separate and reform all your atoms within a nanosecond. Would you survive that process? — Mijin
the replica would not know he wasn't me — Patterner
But he wouldn't be. — Patterner
Well, we're talking about Star Trek transporters, or whatever is similar enough. Nobody has ever materialized on any of the shows and thought they were a duplicate.the replica would not know he wasn't me
— Patterner
I find it quite exciting that we actually do not know whether this would obtain. — AmadeusD
Not sure you meant to word it the way I'm taking it. Nothing can cause anyone or anything to be me. I'm the only possible me. Even if a duplicate of me was made, nobody could tell us apart, and neither of us could prove that we were the original, there would still be only one original me.I certainly agree - but humour me - is your take that there's a set of interlocking criteria (these atoms, at this time, in this configuration) that cause someone to be 'you'? Obviously, I take there is only one shot/possible 'you' in this, just asking in that form to get clear response. — AmadeusD
Well, we're talking about Star Trek transporters — Patterner
Nobody has ever materialized on any of the shows and thought they were a duplicate. — Patterner
Yes, but sort of at a higher level than seems we're on. — AmadeusD
I mean to say that you can't give a criteria for the 'self' to being 'self-same' isn't quite available. — AmadeusD
Whereas, the initial piece of art (in our exchange, Guernica) is exactly that piece of art, without having to establish any criteria beyond that it is itself (being painted by x at time y etc..) — AmadeusD
I can't see that your further comments then make sense: — AmadeusD
I could not point to a 'fake self' and support my pointing. I could do so with a piece of art, given I was actually capable of spotting fakes (or, had some evidence of provenance showing it was not the original). It doesn't seem available to the one claiming 'fake self' to do so. — AmadeusD
I do think there's a significant analogy between fake artwork and fake self, and between genuine artwork and genuine self. — bongo fury
Someone purchasing Guernica for say $100millionUSD, they aren't buying a painting, per se.
— AmadeusD
And someone paying that much to prolong their life in the same body, they aren't preserving their person, per se?
But then, what's the painting per se, and what's the person per se? — bongo fury
No. If my atoms are separated, I do not exist. — Patterner
It's the premise of the OP. But that's a catch-all. Any other hypothetical methods of doing the same thing are fine.Well, we're talking about Star Trek transporters
— Patterner
Err, I don't ... think ... that's happening. But nevertheless, if I;ve missed that, it's worth noting that what Star Trek does has zero bearing on the discussion as its not one based within the restrictions of that universe. — AmadeusD
I don't think there's any need for the thread if the person walking out on Mars does NOT think he's me. In Star Trek, he thinks he is. indeed, he could not think otherwise, and is indistinguishable from me. But, as has happened on Star Trek, and could happen in scenarios we devise, the original could remain, joined by the copy, or it could be multiple copies but no original. If the original is not destroyed, then the copy is more obviously not the original, regardless of how these things are defined.The entire point is to figure out whether you think the guy walking out on Mars is 'you' and then if so, how that's the case. Your position is quite clear, happily :P
You obviously don't think it is for similar reasons I don't. That's not particularly relevant, I don't think. We have no idea what B would 'think' because this is fiction, speculation and semi-nonsense all rolled into one.
Your response applies to a body well, but not a self as we can't know what that consists in (currently). But that response - It's the one i gave to Mijin in certain terms - covers any argument for bodily continuity well in this TE. Parfit's take is that there is no 'you'. There is no self - simply relation R. That relation is just psychological continuity. There need be no identity (nor could there be, on his and my conceptions). There was no identity to continue. So while intuitively, I think everything you've said makes sense, when you drill into the thought experiment, they largely don't answer much I think. — AmadeusD
How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist?No. If my atoms are separated, I do not exist.
— Patterner
How do you know that? — Mijin
If done perfectly, the replica would not know he wasn't me. But he wouldn't be. — Patterner
No. For the reasons I said. (I don't believe in any soul.)If done perfectly, the replica would not know he wasn't me. But he wouldn't be.
— Patterner
Why? Because he doesn't have your soul? — flannel jesus
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.