So - let's solve that problem! — Wayfarer

See the reply to Joshs, above.

This:

Neils Bohr: “Physics is not about how the world is, it is about what we can say about the world”. — Wayfarer

sits exactly in agreement with the view I've expressed, and contrary to your need for further metaphysics.

You are the one who wants to say more than is justified by the evidence.

What 'more'?

What 'more'? — Wayfarer

This is where you back away from your own Mind-created world.

The aim of this essay is to make the case for a type of philosophical idealism, which posits mind as foundational to the nature of existence. — Wayfarer

How? If you're going to make a point, then make it. Otherwise, you're just taking potshots.

The world is our successful interpretation and communication within our forms of life. — Banno

You see, that line could be taken from 'the mind-created world'. But it seems in conflict with:

That we cannot talk about the way the world is without thereby conceptualising it with our minds does not imply that there is no such world without our so conceptualising it. — Banno

The whole argument between Bohr and Einstein in respect of quantum physics, was Bohr's declaration that physics does not describe the world as it is, but only as it appears to us. This is what Einstein (and now, Penrose), could not accept. And point which is surely Kantian in spirit.

If you're going to make a point, then make it. — Wayfarer

I have, here:

Some folk would have you believe that consciousness is what collapses the wave function. It isn't. The function is collapsed when measured. — Banno

You would jump from "measurement involves interaction between observer and observed" to "consciousness creates reality". There's a bit of a logical gap there. Bohr's anti-realism does not imply idealism nor that consciousness creates that reality.

You would jump from "measurement involves interaction between observer and observed" to "consciousness creates reality". — Banno

I don't use the phrase 'consciousness creates reality' and you won't find it in the mind-created world OP, as it would be misreading the point.

What I will say is that measurement is a conscious act. You might say that an instrument can record data in the absence of an observer, but until that data is actually observed, it is not yet a measurement. Consciousness “creates reality” only in the sense that it constitutes our experience of the world. To talk of things “outside” or “apart from” that experience assumes a false perspective, as if we could stand outside experience itself. This is something I think Wittgenstein also understood.

The Quantum Measurement Problem* seems to be similar to Bergson's Clock. Mechanisms move one tick at a time, but humans measure Time as duration : the space between ticks. Hence, for 10 billion solar years, the expanding universe ticked along, with no one to measure that change in terms of duration (Time) or expansion (space) or importance (events) — Gnomon

The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe.

So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

Even if consciousness plays no unique role, the measurement problem remains: something distinguishes measurement interactions from non-measurement interactions, and standard quantum theory doesn't specify what that 'something' is. We still need to explain why certain physical interactions produce definite outcomes while others maintain superposition. — Wayfarer

Well, I endorse an interpretation that has a measurment problem so this is solved for me, personally.

But the measurement problem is precisely why interpretations were needed in the first place. — Wayfarer

No, the measurement problem is a result of the fact that when quantum theory was first created, people's first and perhaps natural inclination (considering the predecessors to quantum theory) was to interpret the wavefunction as the physical particle itself. If you choose to do this, you are going to come up with a measurement problem. But its also clear that you can produce coherent interpretations and formulations of quantum mechanics where you don't interpret the wavefunction as an object. Nonetheless, this habit has stuck even though it is not a necessary one. The need for interpretation does not come from the measurement problem; the measurement problem comes from assuming a certain kind of interpretation.

This puzzle can't be dissolved simply by adopting interpretations that claim it doesn't exist. — Wayfarer

It absolutely can. There exists more than one interpretation where you have point particles in definite configurations that reproduce all the predictions.

Well, I endorse an interpretation that has a measurment problem so this is solved for me, personally. — Apustimelogist

Hey, good for you!

the measurement problem is a result of the fact that when quantum theory was first created, people's first and perhaps natural inclination (considering the predecessors to quantum theory) was to interpret the wavefunction as the physical particle itself — Apustimelogist

But surely this was linked to the fact that science was in search of a or the 'fundamental particle', the basic componentry of the atom. So it is natural that this would amount to a search for a physical particle. The fact that this ended up with the uncertainty principle just is the measurement problem. And most of what i know about it comes from three books on the subject:

Kumar, Manjit. 2008. Quantum: Einstein, Bohr and the Great Debate about the Nature of Reality. London: Icon Books.
Lindley, David. 2007. Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science. New York: Anchor Books.
Becker, Adam. 2018. What Is Real? The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics. New York: Basic Books.

Why the sub-titles? What was 'the great debate about'? Why 'the struggle for the soul of science?' 'Oh, nothing really' is not an answer.

What I will say is that measurement is a conscious act. — Wayfarer

When, in the guts of the chip on which you are typing, a quantum tunnel sets off a current in a transistor, you are not aware of it. No one is. And yet the measurement has been made. You claim is false.

Your only out is to define measurement in terms of consciousness and then slide the goal post of measurement back to physical interaction.

When, in the guts of the chip on which you are typing, a quantum tunnel sets off a current in a transistor, you are not aware of it. No one is. And yet the measurement has been made. You claim is false — Banno

You have a too narrow an interpretation of consciousness. You think it something inside your head, looking out. But the chip, the theory, and all of the componentry of that experiment, are products of the mind.

You have a too narrow an interpretation of consciousness. You think it something inside your head, looking out. But the chip, the theory, and all of the componentry of that experiment, are products of the mind. — Wayfarer

The failure of that argument is I hope obvious to those reading on - whomever they are. You've expanded "consciousness" to include everything humans ever thought about or created, thus rendering the term useless. If you define everything as consciousness, then trivially, consciousness is all that exists. The ultimate ad hoc justification for a defeated hypothesis.

the chip, the theory, and all of the componentry of that experiment, are products of the mind. — Wayfarer

Just explain to me what about this statement was incorrect? And the fact that data is not information until it is interpreted? I'm simply stating that you can't see the world from some position external to your own being-in-the-world. You will find plenty of analogies for that idea in Wittgenstein, whom you know far better than I.

But surely this was linked to the fact that science was in search of a or the 'fundamental particle', the basic componentry of the atom. So it is natural that this would amount to a search for a physical particle. The fact that this ended up with the uncertainty principle just is the measurement problem. — Wayfarer

But you can interpret the wavefunction in other ways coherently. From my perspective, fact that people decided to try to interpret it as the physical particle is misplaced. They could have decided to interpret it differently from the beginning and no measurement problem would have existed. The measurement problem is not an inherent part of quantum theory, it is a property of certain interpretations. The only reason it seems so widespread is a knee-jerk inclination of how to view it. The uncertainty principle can be interpreted purely statistically.

↪Joshs While "grammar is a product of the mind", it is also embedded in the world. Rather than being forced to choose between realism and idealism, we might reject the framework that juxtaposes the two. The world is our successful interpretation and communication within our forms of life. — Banno

You’re sounding like a phenomenologist. All you need to do is drop the ‘successful’. After all, is t that just one more piece of grammar?

From my perspective, fact that people decided to try to interpret it as the physical particle is misplaced. They could have decided to interpret it differently from the beginning and no measurement problem would have existed. — Apustimelogist

But don't you see how momentous that decision would be? The admission that the fundamental particles of physics are not themselves physical? That you choose not to see this, is not any kind of argument.

You’re sounding like a phenomenologist. — Joshs

Yes, I noticed that. I'm sure it was a slip. ;-)

It's the far-reaching conclusion - the chip, the theory, and all of the componentry of that experiment, are products of the mind - therefore...?

Do we conclude that everything is a product of mind - but then you say "I don't use the phrase 'consciousness creates reality'"; but you do "posits mind as foundational to the nature of existence" and "quantum mechanics really is magic".

You are expressing a sentiment rather than providing an argument - it's your account that is incoherent, not my response.

And in frustration at your lack of clarity my responses become increasingly uncharitable.

Perhaps we might proceed by looking for points of agreement. We both reject reductionism and scientism and those metaphysics that deny a place for mind at all. We both see science as not addressing the question of what to do.

You’re sounding like a phenomenologist. — Joshs

Must you think in terms of 'isms"?

That success is our agreement.

The admission that the fundamental particles of physics are not themselves physical? — Wayfarer

Where is the support for this pretence?

See the problem?

Perhaps we might proceed by looking for points of agreement. We both reject reductionism and scientism and those metaphysics that deny a place for mind at all. — Banno

Right. I am basically arguing against the popular view, or myth, of mankind as the 'accidental outcome of the collocation of atoms' (Bertrand Russell), a 'mere blip in the vastness of space-time' (Hawkings), and so on. Within that view, the mind is indeed the product of impersonal material forces, basically an accident. But that extends into popular culture as well. Some of the responses to the original post express that: what is real is what existed long before us and will continue after our extinction. Humans appear within that as mere epiphenomena. These are the roots of nihilism but they appear perfectly natural to a great many people nowadays. That is what I call the 'outside view': taking the attitude grounded in science as being normative, as if we see ourselves as objects from 'outside'. It is not realising that all of science itself is a human activity that relies on the human perspective, as phenomenology realises.

And in frustration at your lack of clarity my responses become increasingly uncharitable. — Banno

Here are your objections to idealism, and my response to them:

Firstly, how is it that there are novelties? How is it that we come across things that are unexpected? A novelty is something that was not imagined, that was not in one's "particular cognitive apparatus". If the world is a creation of the mind, whence something that is not a product of that mind?

Second, how is it that someone can be wrong? To be wrong is to have a belief that is different to how the world is, but if the world is their creation, that would require someone to create a world different to how they believe the world to be. How can we make sense of this?

Finally, How is it that if we each create the world with our particular cognitive apparatus, we happen to overwhelmingly agree as to what that construction is like? So much so that we can participate on a forum together, or buy cars made in Korea. — Banno

Novelty emerges from new external data interacting with our fixed frameworks. In the Kantian view, while the mind supplies the framework for experience, it must work in tandem with the manifold of sensory impressions. The unexpected quality of new data is what we call “novelty.” It doesn’t imply that the mind conjured it from nothing—it simply had to update its organization in response to an input that wasn’t fully anticipated.

Error occurs when our interpretations fail to match that data. When someone holds a belief that is incorrect, it is because there's a mismatch between their mental constructs and what is going on. Although our experience is structured by the mind, it still emanates from the external world. A belief is in error when that mental structure misrepresents or fails to adequately capture the sensible data. This can sometimes result in cognitive dissonance and there are a multitude of opportunities for that in today's world.

Consensus arises because we all operate with fundamentally similar mental structures. This preserves the objectivity of the external world while acknowledging the active role our minds play in organizing experience.

Remember my argument is that what we regard as mind-independent has an ineluctably subjective element or ground, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis (that is the Kantian aspect). Not that the world is 'all in the mind' in the simplistic sense in which you are inclined to interpret it. I'm arguing against 'objectivism' in the sense propogated by scientific materialism which is very influential in today's culture.

anyway enough out of me for now, I have mundane duties to attend to, bye.

Whereas, even if humanity is a "mere blip" and "an accident", it is we who provide values, who decides what is worthwhile; and what is not, and that mind is the product of impersonal material forces does not detract from that value.

You seem to supose that unless humans have some special cosmic status or mind is foundational to reality, then human life becomes meaningless. That's textbook Naturalistic Fallacy.

Your reply to the novelty argument admits that there is something "external" to mind, conceding the point.

Your reply to the error argument either reduces truth to mere consistency or it also concedes that there is again more than just mind. If it reduces truth to mere consensus then it remains that there is no possibility for error - the truth is just what we agree to, and so this melds with the argument from consistency.

Your reply to the consensus argument is dependent on consistent "mental structures", which are the very things in question - how is it that we agree that we are discussing philosophy on an internet forum, unless we are indeed discussing philosophy on an internet forum, and there are things such as keyboards and screens and undersea cables and language in addition to our discussion.

The trick is to move past the realism/idealism dichotomy to see how we are embedded in a world that puts restrictions on what we (the plural is very much intended) can say and do.

There remains the problem of how idealism avoids solipsism. We know about other minds as a result of our interaction with them, which it precisely the same way in which we know about the world. IF you throw away a world outside of mind, you throw away along with it your access to other minds.

This is the part were we agree that there is something external to the mind, and then you loop around and claim that we can only know about it using the mind.

Well, yes, but that is not idealism.

Your reply to the novelty argument admits that there is something "external" to mind, conceding the point. — Banno

It's not conceding the point. In the very first paragraphs of the mind-created world I spell it out: 'First is the criticism that ‘idealism says that the world is all in the mind’ — the implication being that, were there no mind to be aware of an object, then the object would cease to exist. Even very eminent philosophers have (mis)understood idealism in this way.' I will include you in that august company. I never claimed to reduce the world to the individual's mind, nor to show that the mind is a constituent of the natural world, but to show that any claims about the nature of the world contain an ineliminably subjective element, which itself is not revealed in the empirical data.

Well, yes, but that is not idealism. — Banno

I say that the point is that cognitive science, and the Charles Pinter's book Mind and the Cosmic Order, have validated some essential insights from philosophical idealism.

It's not conceding the point. — Wayfarer

Yeah, it is. You are now agreeing that there is more than just mind - that the mind does not created the world, but perhaps structures it. That's a step down from the mind-created world.

...any claims about the nature of the world contain an ineliminably subjective element — Wayfarer

Claims are made by minds, so of course claims involve minds. What is not justified here is the further step that says mind is a requirement for there to be a world at all.

But don't you see how momentous that decision would be? The admission that the fundamental particles of physics are not themselves physical? That you choose not to see this, is not any kind of argument. — Wayfarer

But you can say the wavefunction is just mathematical object that is describing the behavior of physical particles without being identical to them. You can use an evolving probability density function to describe the behavior of a single particle undergoing diffusion, the evolving probability density function is not the particle itself.

Claims are made by minds, so of course claims involve minds. What is not justified here is the further step that says mind is a requirement for there to be a world at all. — Banno

Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists for us only in so far as it is consciously reflected and considered by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being. — C G Jung

Without consciousness there would, practically speaking, be no world, for the world exists for us only in so far as it is consciously reflected and considered by a psyche. Consciousness is a precondition of being. — C G Jung

Yes, the difference between truth and belief. So we've gone back two pages.

Note that this is a seperate point - the simple truism that we can only know how things are by looking at how things are. It ignores the difference between somethings being true and being known to be true. A common bit of antirealist rhetoric. — Banno

Jung isn’t collapsing truth into belief. He’s pointing out the phenomenological fact that “world” always means world-for-us. The stone on Mars is there whether or not we know it, but the very notion of “there being a stone on Mars unbeknownst to us” is already an act of consciousness. So the distinction between truth and belief itself only arises within consciousness. That’s what Jung means by consciousness as a precondition of being.

But it would be a mistake to think that therefore the rock could not fall unless there is a mind present - that the rock's fall is inherently a mental phenomena.

That we cannot talk about the way the world is without thereby conceptualising it with our minds does not imply that there is no such world without our so conceptualising it. — Banno

You’re right that it would be a mistake to claim the rock literally can’t fall unless a mind is present. But the point is subtler: in order to say “the rock falls when no one is around,” you’ve already had to call it out, to mark it as “that rock.” You’re implicitly comparing the object with your idea of it. But from where can you make that comparison, if not within experience?

Kant explains the dilemma: to check whether cognition agrees with the object, you’d need access to the object apart from cognition — which is impossible, since you only ever have the object as cognized.

Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognizing it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object. — Kant, 1801. The Jasche Logic, in Lectures on Logic

So yes, there may well be a world beyond our conceptualisation, but it’s not the world we can ever talk about. Which is what I mean by trying to 'stand outside experience'.

Jung isn’t collapsing truth into belief. — Wayfarer

That's the consequence of your interpretation of Jung. You can't say '“world” always means world-for-us', because other people are as much a part of the world as are trees and rocks. What you might be able to do is say "world-for-me", which would indeed be to collapse truth into belief.

And of course the notion of there being a stone on Mars is mind-dependent - it's a notion, after all; but again that is about a propositional attitude - a notion - and not about the rock.

Consciousness is a precondition of being spoken about, doubted, a notion, a proposition, and so on. But that is a very different thing to a conscious mind being needed for there to be a rock.

This is repetitive. We are always already embedded in the world. That does not mean that the world in some way needs consciousness.