We have intrinsic moral value and thus we are not physical things

Clarendon

If our reason represents us to be intrinsically morally valuable, it is telling us that our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties. That is 'being morally valuable' is a 'resultant' property- something is morally valuable 'because' it has certain other features.

If something is intrinsically morally valuable, then - by definition - it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is. This is why intrinsic moral value must supervene on some or all of a thing's essential features.

Yet as our reason does not represent shape, size, or any other physical property essential to extended things to be relevant to our moral value, it is representing us not to be extended things. To put it another way, if we are physical things then our intrinsic moral value would have to supervene on some of our essential features.....but it doesn't. Thus we are not physical things.

Maybe it will objected to this argument that the essential property that makes us morally valuable is our consciousness. However, consciousness is clearly not an essential attribute of a physical thing - at best it would be an accidental property of one. So as our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties, then it can't be that one if, that is, we are a physical thing.

This is not to deny that consciousness may be an essential attribute of the kind of thing we are. Nor is it to deny that it may be the property in virtue of which we - the things that have it - are morally valuable. The point is that as consciousness is not an essential property of physical things, then we can conclude that the kinds of thing that are essentially conscious are not physical things.

Does this argument work? I think it does, but perhaps I am mistaken.

Banno

↪Clarendon

Nice.

Can you clarify what it is to be morally valuable? Does having a moral value "supervene on some of our essential properties", or is it itself a property? IF "it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is" then isn't moral value a property of the thing - the kind of thing that it is - rather than something that supervenes on a property?

On the one hand, a thing has some set of properties and the moral value of that thing supervenes on at least some of those properties, while on the other, the moral value just is a property of the thing.

So isn't supposing that a thing can have an intrinsic moral value denying that values supervene on properties?

Banno

↪Clarendon

Excellent first post, by the way. Welcome.

Clarendon

↪Banno

Thank you for your reply.

That something is morally valuable would be a property of that thing. But it would be a supervenient property, meaning that it is resultant from some of the thing's other properties. The difference, I take it, between something being 'intrinsically' morally valuable and 'extrinsically' morally valuable is that in the former case the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing, whereas in the latter case it is not.

So all moral value - whether possessed intrinsically or extrinsically - supervenes on something's other features. But intrinsic value supervenes on something's essential features. I think that's right, anyway.

Banno

↪Clarendon

An example, maybe: suppose, for the sake of the discussion, that moral value is an attitude adopted towards some thing. Then we might say that having a moral value supervenes on a given act, and on the attributes of that act.

The moral value of a thing is, for the purpose of the argument, an attitude towards that thing that supervenes on it.

Can we say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing in question? That seems to be what would be implied by "it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is"...

180 Proof

↪Clarendon

'Consciousness' is spatiotemporal (i.e. embodied, causal) and therefore physical (i.e. a very rare kind of physical process). Also, whether or not 'we are conscious', we are bodies and therefore physical beings (i.e. biological organisms). "Moral values", however, are
non-physical (i.e. abstractions).

Clarendon

↪Banno

No, I wouldn't say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing. Rather, something essential to the thing is what is responsible for my valuing attitude.

To use my valuing of something as an example, if I value something intrinsically, then I would be valuing it due to something essential to it, whereas if I value something extrinsically, then I would be valuing it due to something non-essential about it. Were I to say that I find something intrinsically valuable, then, I would be saying that I value it due to some of its essential properties, rather than saying that my valuing of it is an essential property of that thing.

Applied to moral value, for something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it - the thing - to have moral value due to some its essential properties. I think that's correct anyway.

Banno

No, I wouldn't say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing. Rather, something essential to the thing is what is responsible for my valuing attitude. — Clarendon

Yes, I see that. So you are right here:

Were I to say that I find something intrinsically valuable, then, I would be saying that I value it due to some of its essential properties, rather than saying that my valuing of it is an essential property of that thing. — Clarendon

Here you show again that the value supervenes on the property. It appears to me that what you have shown is that the idea of something's having an intrinsic value doesn't work in this scheme.

To be forthright, if the value is a property of the thing, then it can be intrinsic to the thing. But if instead it is a seperate property that does not belong to the thing but supervenes on the properties of that thing, then it is not a property of the thing.

In your argument I think you move from one to the other. So rather than showing that we are not physical things, perhaps you've shown that values are not intrinsic properties of things.

To my eye, what all this shows is the poverty of the notion of a property. Better by far to talk of predicates.

T Clark

Yet as our reason does not represent shape, size, or any other physical property essential to extended things to be relevant to our moral value, it is representing us not to be extended things. To put it another way, if we are physical things then our intrinsic moral value would have to supervene on some of our essential features.....but it doesn't. Thus we are not physical things. — Clarendon

Welcome to the forum. I might argue that people do not have intrinsic moral value, but I won’t do that here because I want to keep to the terms of your OP.

I don’t understand why a person cannot have both moral value and an essential physical nature.

The difference, I take it, between something being 'intrinsically' morally valuable and 'extrinsically' morally valuable is that in the former case the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing, — Clarendon

I don’t understand the basis of the claim that something being intrinsically morally valuable implies the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing. Alternatively, I might claim that it is God‘s judgment that people have intrinsic moral value. I think it would be fair to characterize that as an essential property. That brings us back to the possibility of having both a physical and a non-physical nature.

I guess what this boils down to is that I don’t see you’ve demonstrated your claim from the OP.

Leontiskos

If our reason represents us to be intrinsically morally valuable, it is telling us that our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties. That is 'being morally valuable' is a 'resultant' property- something is morally valuable 'because' it has certain other features.

If something is intrinsically morally valuable, then - by definition - it is morally valuable because of the kind of thing it is. This is why intrinsic moral value must supervene on some or all of a thing's essential features.

Yet as our reason does not represent shape, size, or any other physical property essential to extended things to be relevant to our moral value, it is representing us not to be extended things. To put it another way, if we are physical things then our intrinsic moral value would have to supervene on some of our essential features.....but it doesn't. Thus we are not physical things.

Maybe it will objected to this argument that the essential property that makes us morally valuable is our consciousness. However, consciousness is clearly not an essential attribute of a physical thing - at best it would be an accidental property of one. So as our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties, then it can't be that one if, that is, we are a physical thing. — Clarendon

I think this is an interesting argument that could be reworked to be valid and even sound. The idea is something like, "Our moral value does not derive from any physical attribute, therefore we are more than merely physical."

This is not to deny that consciousness may be an essential attribute of the kind of thing we are. Nor is it to deny that it may be the property in virtue of which we - the things that have it - are morally valuable. The point is that as consciousness is not an essential property of physical things, then we can conclude that the kinds of thing that are essentially conscious are not physical things.

Does this argument work? I think it does, but perhaps I am mistaken. — Clarendon

The counterargument would seem to be something which is essentially conscious and essentially physical. Or else, if your premise, "consciousness is not an essential property of physical things," means that no physical things are essentially conscious, then I would object to such a premise.

But what do you mean when you say, "X is an essential property of Y"?

Clarendon

↪Leontiskos

I am glad you think the argument has some merit.

I mean by "X is an essential property of Y" metaphysical essence - so, something that makes it the kind of object it is. I would take shape and size to be essential properties of physical objects, whereas 'colour' does not seem to be (though that is just to illustrate what I mean, but it would not affect my case if colour was an essential attribute of physical things).

I agree that if physical things are essentially conscious then that would stop the argument. But consciousness does not seem to be an essential feature of physical things. Those who believe us to be physical things do not - I think - typically hold that we are essentially conscious. Consciousness would then have to be held to be a feature of all physical things (and by extension, they would have to hold that all physical things are equally intrinsically morally valuable - which seems false).

My premise that consciousness is not an essential feature of physical things is not equivalent to denying that any physical things are conscious, for it is consistent with consciousness not being an essential feature of such things that nevertheless, some have that feature (just as, by analogy, if colour is not an essential feature of physical things, that does not prevent physical things from having colour). However, if the argument as a whole is sound, then I think it would establish that no physical thing is conscious. For if we are morally valuable because we are things of a sort that are conscious, then that would be an essential property of the kinds of thing we are, and as that is not an essential feature of physical things, the sorts of thing that have consciousness would have been demonstrated to be non-physical.

Tom Storm

If our reason represents us to be intrinsically morally valuable, it is telling us that our moral value supervenes on some of our essential properties — Clarendon

I don’t have a background in philosophy, but I’m wondering on what grounds we would say that we possess intrinsic moral value? What exactly is intrinsic moral value?

Philosophim

↪Clarendon

Objectively, we are objects so that can't be the reason. Have you ever considered that we are inherently valuable because we are objects instead of nothing?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

Copernicus

Morality is an abstract concept that, alongside psychology, is a physical construct made by hormonal and neural activities.

We have intrinsic moral value and thus we are not physical things

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