they are principally unverifiable — Wolfgang
From “organisms behave as if anticipating” it does not follow that they literally minimize epistemic uncertainty. — Wolfgang
Sliding between these domains without a strict translation rule is a category error. — Wolfgang
subjective experience — Wolfgang
This generality immunizes it against falsification and therefore removes it from the domain of empirical science. — Wolfgang
You cannot speak of “prediction” or “inference” without presupposing a model that experiences something to be predicted or inferred. — Wolfgang
This raises the simple but essential question:
What is Friston’s theory actually for?
What does it allow us to know that we did not already know?
If it is neither empirically testable nor conceptually coherent, it remains a formal metaphor — a kind of mathematical cosmology of life that explains everything and therefore nothing.
A theory that can be applied to all systems explains no system in particular; it produces not knowledge, but only a symbolic sense of connectedness. — Wolfgang
A real theory of consciousness must instead explain the transition from physical stability to autocatalytic self-reference — Wolfgang
If it does not, it becomes irrelevant to the problem it is most often cited for. — Wolfgang
:100:↪Mijin The so-called “hard problem” of consciousness must first be characterized properly, because it contains two fundamental category errors.
The first is the one already mentioned: it conflates two descriptive levels — the physical and the semantic — and then asks how one could possibly “give rise” to the other. This question is not profound; it is ill-posed.
The second is subtler: it assumes that mind must arise from matter, when in fact it arises from life.
If you reduce a physical system, you end up with particles.
If you reduce a living system, you end up with autocatalytic organization — the self-maintaining network of chemical reactions that became enclosed by a membrane and thus capable of internal coherence.
That is the true basis of life: the emergence of a causal core within recursive, self-referential processes. — Wolfgang
More or less the 'non-reductionist physicalist, embodied functionalism' story I tell myself too.From there, consciousness can be understood evolutionarily, not metaphysically.
At the neurophysiological level, one might say that in associative cortical areas, sensory inputs converge and integrate into dynamic wholes.
Through recursive feedback between higher and lower regions, the system begins to form something like a mirror of itself.
When these integrated representations are re-projected onto the body map, they generate what we call feeling — the system’s own state becoming part of its model of the world.
In that sense, consciousness is not something added to matter, nor an inexplicable emergence; it is the self-reflection of an autocatalytic system that has become complex enough to model its own internal causality.
Of course, this is not a “solution” to the hard problem in the usual sense — because no such final solution exists.
But it offers a neurophysiological direction that might lead toward a satisfactory description:
not a metaphysical bridge between mind and matter, but a consistent account of how recursive, life-based systems can generate the conditions under which experience becomes possible.
:up: :up:But you think consciousness is real.
— bert1
I hear people talking about it all the time. Just not very meaningfully. And certainly not at all scientifically — apokrisis
When you speak of a “bridge mechanism,” you already presuppose that there is a level of description where semantics becomes physics. — Wolfgang
But semantic reference, intentionality, or subjective experience are not additional physical phenomena that arise through complexity. They are descriptions that belong to a different epistemic domain. — Wolfgang
So when you say that biophysics “has already provided the bridge,” I would say: it has provided the conditions of correlation, not the transition itself. What you call a “bridge” is in truth an interface of perspectives, not a mechanism. — Wolfgang
Modern philosophy has thus taken on the character of a stage performance. When David Chalmers, with long hair and leather jacket, walks onto a conference stage, the “wow effect” precedes the argument. Add a few enigmatic questions — “How does mind arise from matter?” — and the performance is complete.
Koch and Friston follow a similar pattern: their theories sound deep precisely because almost no one can truly assess them. — Wolfgang
The second is subtler: it assumes that mind must arise from matter, when in fact it arises from life.
If you reduce a physical system, you end up with particles.
If you reduce a living system, you end up with autocatalytic organization — the self-maintaining network of chemical reactions that became enclosed by a membrane and thus capable of internal coherence.
That is the true basis of life: the emergence of a causal core within recursive, self-referential processes. — Wolfgang
The moment such a statement is made, it leaves the purely formal domain and enters the empirical one — Wolfgang
a framework so flexible that any observation can be redescribed post hoc as free-energy minimization. — Wolfgang
If organisms truly sought to minimize surprisal, they would remain in dark, stimulus-free environments. — Wolfgang
To avoid this absurdity, the theory must implicitly introduce meaning — assuming that the organism “wants” stimulation, “prefers” survival, or “seeks” adaptation. But these are semantic predicates, not physical ones. Hence, the principle only works by smuggling intentionality through the back door — the very thing it claims to explain. — Wolfgang
Hohwy concedes that FEP is better seen as a framework than a theory. — Wolfgang
it is a semantic conflation. — Wolfgang
what they literally mean;
if they are literal, they presuppose an experiencing subject. — Wolfgang
That is precisely what renders it incoherent. — Wolfgang
Free energy minimization gives you a framework where you can write down the equations describing the conditions for a system to maintain its own existence over time. That might not be interesting for a rock. But I think thats quite interesting for more complicated self-organizing systems. Its a framework for describing what complex self-organizing systems do, like choosing to Describe physical systems as following paths of least action.
...as a unifying theory of self-organization, it does exactly what it says on the tin, and its impossible for it to be any more precise empirically because the notion of a self-organizing system is far to general to have any specific empirical consequences. Exactly the same for a "general system's theory". Nonetheless, this theory is fundamentally describing in the most general sense what self-organizing systems do, and gives you a formal framework to talk about them which you can flesh out with your own specific models in specific domains. — Apustimelogist
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.