He analogizes a physical principle with a semantic concept — Wolfgang
And then he assumes organisms have the ability to calculate probabilities. — Wolfgang
1. what does this have to do with prediction — Wolfgang
2. what do you want to do with such a general statement — Wolfgang
A model endures if it can be shown that it creates a system that actually possesses consciousness. — Wolfgang
It would be best to ask an organism whether it actually uses algorithms. — Wolfgang
when a system does such-and-such, you declare it to be conscious. — bert1
Each theory interprets optical illusions differently, since all are underdetermined, i.e. they have no empirical explanatory power. — Wolfgang
Theories of consciousness usually start with an unproven assumption and then build a theory around it. This assumption is neither empirically confirmed nor even verifiable – and therefore such a theory is not only unscientific but also epistemically useless.
[...]
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) claims that consciousness arises from and is identical with integrated information.
The second example is Predictive Coding [...] [it] claims that organisms minimize uncertainty. — Wolfgang
It claims that organisms minimize uncertainty. This claim cannot be empirically confirmed. — Wolfgang
Physical energy and semantic uncertainty belong to entirely different descriptive levels; they have nothing to do with each other. — Wolfgang
Elite batting or return tasks show anticipatory control because neural and sensorimotor delays demand feed-forward strategies. That is perfectly compatible with many control-theoretic explanations (internal models, Smith predictors, model predictive control, dynamical systems) that do not require Bayesian inference or a universal principle of “uncertainty minimization.” From “organisms behave as if anticipating” it does not follow that they literally minimize epistemic uncertainty. — Wolfgang
Sliding between these domains without a strict translation rule is a category error. — Wolfgang
Between physics and semantics there can be no bridge law, only correlation. — Wolfgang
f “organisms minimize uncertainty” is to be an empirical claim rather than a post-hoc description, it must yield a pre-specified, falsifiable prediction that (i) distinguishes the FEP/predictive-coding framework from alternative non-Bayesian control models, (ii) is measurable in the organism itself (not only in our statistical model), and (iii) could in principle fail. — Wolfgang
The issue is the illegitimate conceptual leap from physical energy flow to semantic uncertainty, and from probabilistic modelling to biological reality. That’s precisely the confusion I am objecting to. — Wolfgang
Between physics and semantics there can be no bridge law, only correlation.
A physical process can correlate with a semantic event, but it can never translate into or cause it. The relationship between brain and mind is therefore not causal, but correlative — two complementary descriptions of one and the same dynamic viewed from different epistemic perspectives.
That is why such theories can never be verified even in principle. There is no possible experiment that could demonstrate a causal transition from a physical process to a semantic or experiential one. — Wolfgang
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.