I'm fine with all of this, except I'm not sure that consciousness "accounts for" the higher level properties in the same way that micro properties and chemical properties do. Those seem like genuine bottom-up structures. Or maybe it's just that we're used to this kind of metaphorical image, so it appears clear to us. But consciousness doesn't seem to "account for" rules and math in the sense that these higher-level structures somehow are supported by consciousness. This, perhaps, is where consciousness really reveals itself as unique, and uniquely unlike any physical structures. You just can't draw a 3D map of the structures and say, This is how they connect. If consciousness does support, or account for, higher-level structures, we don't yet know how, or in what mode we ought to think about a term like "support".

This, perhaps, is where consciousness really reveals itself as unique, and uniquely unlike any physical structures. — J

I think this is huge.

Consciousness does account for the rules of baseball. There can't possibly be another explanation for the Infield Fly Rule, the rule about hitting a foul ball when you have a full count, four balls is a walk, nine innings in a game, three outs per side per inning, and endless more.

But, certainly, as you say, the accounting is not the same as physical accounting. It's not the same as the way micro properties account for liquids and solids. Even if we can't, at least can't always, predict what physical things will happen under specific conditions, we can understand it after the fact. And, if we have the same circumstances, we will get the same results.

There's no way anyone could have predicted or calculated what the rules of baseball would be before the game was invented, or even what the rules would settle on after people were already playing it. And there's no looking at the rules now, and seeing how they couldn't have turned out any other way.

Should we expand the way we think of "accounts for"? Should we use a different phrase, since it's a different kind of accounting? "Conscious accounting"? "Variable accounting"?

But, certainly, as you say, the accounting is not the same as physical accounting. It's not the same as the way micro properties account for liquids and solids. — Patterner

Yes, glad you agree that this is crucial.

Should we expand the way we think of "accounts for"? Should we use a different phrase, since it's a different kind of accounting? "Conscious accounting"? "Variable accounting"? — Patterner

Good questions. I think it's partially a matter of terminology, as is often the case when we're dealing with philosophical usages that are either shopworn or unclear. It may go deeper than that, though. I'm not convinced we even have the right concepts yet, to which we could then seek to apply helpful terminology. This is the "way we think of 'accounts for'" that you reference.

It's easier to point out what's wrong with the physical-accounting analogies than to replace them. My only possibly useful suggestion is to stick with simple analogies, such as the baseball game, where we're pretty sure some "conscious accounting" is going on, and try to carefully tease out what happens and why. Are we sure this will reveal anything about consciousness itself? No, but in the absence of a traditional scientific apparatus of inquiry, we need to be open-minded and optimistic about what we can learn.

Meanwhile, I would add (though you probably don't agree) that the scientists should go full steam ahead in their efforts to explain consciousness from a biological perspective. If it keeps failing, that will be informative.

Are we sure this will reveal anything about consciousness itself? No, but in the absence of a traditional scientific apparatus of inquiry, we need to be open-minded and optimistic about what we can learn. — J

That's the attitude we need. If anything exists that cannot be found with our physical sciences, but we refuse to use any tools other than our physical sciences...

Meanwhile, I would add (though you probably don't agree) that the scientists should go full steam ahead in their efforts to explain consciousness from a biological perspective. If it keeps failing, that will be informative. — J

No, I quite agree. Not only because I might be wrong, but also because we will doubtless learn all kinds of other things while looking for this answer. Things that are, in the grand scheme of things, more important than solving this mystery. For me, nothing is more fascinating than this. But if an attempt to solve this that has no hope of succeeding helps with Alzheimer's?

But I do think there's no hope of finding any biological/physicalist answer, so I think more thought should be put into other approaches.

Sounds like the belief of the cat the mouse is behind the stove is as dependent on language as my belief that the milk is in the fridge is dependent on cows (if it's cowmilk) - as a cat-external factor (and one the cat might only dimly understand to begin with). Why, then, are we talking about language and not, say, gravity. The stove's existentially dependent on many, many things, few of which seem part of the present belief. — Dawnstorm

Well, I'm talking about the idea of existential dependency upon language use but not gravity because the former is relevant to our process of understanding and setting out the evolutionary progression of belief whereas the latter is utterly irrelevant for such an endeavor. Existential dependency upon language is a tool(factor) that helps establish the contours of evolutionary progression as it pertains to the emergence and evolution of belief over time, which in turn is relevant to whether or not one belief can cause another.

I didn't see it that way at all. You do not look foolish to me. Becoming aware of our own false belief seems like an accomplishment. I mean, we're all aware of our own fallibility, aren't we?
— creativesoul

I didn't become aware of a false belief in that case... — Dawnstorm

Okay. I assumed that you believed what you wrote, as it was written. Afterwards you agreed that it wasn't true, and that statements using "all" do not typically reflect your beliefs. Understood. It now seems to me to have been a case of being loose with language. You've remarked on precision as well. That's fine. We can move beyond that tangent if you like. No problem here.

Truth, for me, tends to erode meaning — Dawnstorm

That's a statement worthy of a topic in its own right.

What's the difference between using the English language and using the English language like one knows it is a nominative-accusative language?
— creativesoul

There is none. — Dawnstorm

This is a very odd reply, especially given the great detail that followed carefully drawing a distinction between the two uses of "knowing" involved in your claims. It's an equivocation fallacy. It is unacceptable to use two completely different senses of the same term in the same argument. At best, unnecessary confusion ensues.

Is it your claim that all English users know that English is a nominative accusative language before they become aware of that background belief?

I'm still a bit unclear on what the point was, even though you reiterated that it's an important one. Could you set it out clearly as well as the relevance it has to our discussion?

This is what "behavioural implicature" means to me. A perspectival imputation. Basically: linguist:native speaker = human:cat. And since I'm a pretty staunch relativist, I'm fairly sure there's no way around behavioural implicature. — Dawnstorm

Are you saying that when we attempt to set out the cat's beliefs it is a case of imputing our own perspective into the cat, and that the linguist does much the same thing when imputing their own perspective upon native English speakers? To me, that's anthropomorphism in the case of the cat and is to be avoided at all costs. The avoidance of which is a key component/feature of the very methodology I'm working from.

This harks back to the pivotal role that language use has in some thought/belief formation, but not others. If there is some thought or belief that is existentially dependent upon the thinker/believer being capable of using language, then it cannot be the case that a language less creature is capable of having such belief, and hence imputing such belief onto a language less creature is a mistake. The same is true of imputing knowledge that English is a nominative accusative language to a speaker who doesn't know what counts as a nominative accusative language and hence has no clue what those words mean.

...

So, how does this notion of behavioural implicature deal with the fact that behaviour alone is indeterminate regarding that?
— creativesoul

Via an iterative process of situational compatibility. Behavioural implicature is reinforced when our expectations are met. — Dawnstorm

We all know, I presume anyway, that a mouse is incapable of contemplating the consequences of the double slit experiment.
— creativesoul

Under behavioural implicature the question is: what sort of behaviour from a mouse would have you question this piece of "knowledge"? We're not coming at this from a neutral postion. We make working assumptions until they fail us. I mean, I certainly wouldn't assume that a mouse was reading this thread, just because I catch it looking at the screen... — Dawnstorm

But why not? There are unspoken presuppositions at work here. If a mouse was capable of reading this thread, then there would be no trouble with assuming such a thing because you caught them looking at the screen. So what, exactly, is it that stops you from attributing such capabilities to the mouse? What sort of behaviour would the mouse need to display in order to question whether or not they could read this thread?

You see the problem here?

There is an underlying notion of thought/belief at work.

If we are to attribute thought and belief to another creature, we ought to have at least a well-grounded idea and/or standard regarding what sorts of creatures are capable of forming which sorts of beliefs.
— creativesoul

What sort of commonalities do we start off from here, each of us, to begin with? I mean, in this thread I'm not even quite clear yet what counts as a "thought". — Dawnstorm

Indeed. The underlying concept/notion/idea is hard at work in each of our contributions. Setting that out in a way that makes sense regarding of all the times we use the terms is key.

By my lights, all thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things. The differences involve what those things are. As it pertains to our offshoot here, the thing that's in focus is language use and things that are existentially dependent upon language use.

... Part of the problem here is scope...

If you remove language what remains? — Dawnstorm

Correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable.

What does it mean to say: "the cat believes there's a mouse on the mat"? — Dawnstorm

It's a question that's more about the speaker's terminological use. I've answered it already.

Any question, any answer, any puzzlement around this always comes from a particular perspective... — Dawnstorm

Yes. Understanding any given perspective requires accepting the speaker's definitions, and subsequently seeing how well they hold up to scrutiny, including how well they are able to articulate/explain the evolutionary progression of belief.

This is a very odd reply, especially given the great detail that followed carefully drawing a distinction between the two uses of "knowing" involved in your claims. It's an equivocation fallacy. It is unacceptable to use two completely different senses of the same term in the same argument. At best, unnecessary confusion ensues. — creativesoul

I do apologise for the confusion, but I don't really know how to do better. I'll try, but I'm not confident I'll succeed in being clear here. First, when I said "there is none", what I meant is this:

If you become aware of the linguistic discouse around nominative-accusative languages, you've learned nothing new about using English. You now know that English is one type of language, and there are others. This is not knowledge included in using English. It might help you with learning other languages, such as Basque, but it won't have any impact on your using English.

So:

Is it your claim that all English users know that English is a nominative accusative language before they become aware of that background belief? — creativesoul

Almost. It's not necessarily a background belief, but it's definitely practical knowledge. That's what makes things difficult here. You act as if English is a nominative-accusative language and so do other native speakers, and that's why linguists can come up with the theory. When you learn English as a small child, you internalise the language as a nominative-accusative language. Everyone around you acts as if English is a nominative-accusative language, and so you learn to act like that, too.

As long as you're not aware that things could be different, you have no reason to theorise about what you're doing. Let's say you're Fench, and you have Basque neighbours, and you try to learn Basque. Basque will work in a highly un-intuitive way for you, so this is how you become aware that something you've taken for granted cannot be taken for granted. You now have the impetus to create a theoretical body of knowledge centred around that difference. Your focus is going to be what speakers of Basque are doing, but you'll need to approach this from within what you know about French: from the difference.

You create new practical knowledge about Basque; you don't create new practical knowledge about French. You create new theoretical knowledge that puts the two languages in relation. If you're an autodidact, here, you may never have heard the linguistic terms. Your take may be different from the linguists', so may not even have use for the terms. Who knows?

This is why I kept emphasising: "in the sense that they use it that way."

So:

Are you saying that when we attempt to set out the cat's beliefs it is a case of imputing our own perspective into the cat, and that the linguist does much the same thing when imputing their own perspective upon native English speakers? To me, that's anthropomorphism in the case of the cat and is to be avoided at all costs. The avoidance of which is a key component/feature of the very methodology I'm working from. — creativesoul

I think perspectival bias is inevitable; without it things stop making sense. So, yes, that's what I'm pretty much saying. I, too, would like to avoid anthropomorphism, but my methodology would be strip back what's human about our perspective as much as we can so things still make sense. We need to peel back some of what we know until we go from anthropmorphism to a, maybe, mammal-centred perspective. I recognise this is hard. Me insisting that in a cat-human framework a mat isn't a mat is part of that. We need to stip back as much of the matness as we can and then bring back in as much as we think is warranted, with the bottom-line being what we think we have in common with cats.

This is far from infallible. So see here:

But why not? There are unspoken presuppositions at work here. If a mouse was capable of reading this thread, then there would be no trouble with assuming such a thing because you caught them looking at the screen. So what, exactly, is it that stops you from attributing such capabilities to the mouse? What sort of behaviour would the mouse need to display in order to question whether or not they could read this thread? — creativesoul

That is the very question.

"Unspoken presuppositions": Yes.
"If a mouse was capable...": My methodology doesn't even assume a mouse is incapbable of reading. Me "certainly not assuming that" is a data-point, too. And uncovering the presuppositions is important. As many as you can discover, and as many as you can handle without losing the grounding that allowys you to think.
"What sort of behaviour...": the sort of movements that would suggest to me that the mouse is following something from top right to bottom left. I have bad spatial perception, so judging the field of vision of a mouse would be hard. But if it would cock the head back and forth in line-break intervals...

A key point here is that we're not communicating with mice via text. If we did (say in animal-language experiments) we might have to expand the semantic field of what it means to "read". We have only the one concept, but it's been developed for inter-human context rather than inter-species contexts.

***

I've gone back and re-read some of your posts about existential dependency on language. I think there's something in there I don't quite understand, but I can't put my finger on what questions to ask.