Jamal, I truly appreciate you engaging with the topic; albeit incredibly mediated from the OP. I genuinely hope that we can have a productive and respectful conversation. Let’s dive in.

I am going to address the main points, as I see it, that you made; and feel free to let me know if I missed anything crucial.

Eristic vs. Rational Discourse

You provided an interesting, brief treatise on dialectics that aim at sophistry (eristic) vs. truth (rational knowledge) and analogized it to our dispute in ethics and metaphysics. You seem to think, and correct me if I am wrong, that two completely antithetical or exclusive theories cannot be rationally resolved; and, consequently, we must rely on ‘metacritique’—viz., critique of the ‘genesis’ beyond the ‘validity—to decipher which one a person should hold as true. To me, this is false for the following reasons:

1. The genesis of an idea is historical and, consequently, (inter-)subjective and, consequently, cannot provide any influence on the truth or falsity of a proposition (or theory). A genesis, including yours of mine (which I will get to later), at best, exposes the (social or individual) psychology at play in developing the idea—it uncovers the motives...not the truth...of the idea.

2. The kinds of theories you are describing are just ones that are logically consistent and internally coherent; but epistemically we evaluate theories on much more than that. The main two you seemed to have missed is external coherence and parsimony.

I submit to you, that we use internal coherence and logical consistency to determine if the given theory meets the prerequisites to be sound; and then we move forward comparing how well it (1) fits the relevant data needing to be explained, (2) how parsimonious it is at explaining it, and (3) how well it coheres with the prioritized (external) knowledge we have of the rest of the world.

With all due respect, what your ‘genesis’ exposition did was collapse ethics into psychology—a fatal Nietzschien mistake IMHO.

Question-Begging

Your criteria for evaluating ethical frameworks used to demonstrate that your ethical framework is better was circular:

a moral framework is better if it is more comprehensive, coherent, and leads to a more humane society

(emphasis added)

The word ‘humane’ is a morally-loaded term; and as we see at the end, you end up presupposing the truth of your ethical theory to prove it:

3. It leads to a more humane society: no loving couples are told by authorities that what they're doing is a privation of goodness or that they are sick in the head.

What makes a humane society? You are presupposing here, in effect, that, in conclusion, your theory is better, liberalism, because it makes a better society. You then, and throughout the entirety of your thinking, assumed the concepts at play in liberal thought to convey your point. E.g., you used ‘love’ in a hyper-individualistic, non-traditional way; and you assumed that it is better for society to have the ‘authorities’ ‘butt-out’ of people’s lives as much as possible—both of which are tenants of classical liberalism.

More importantly, though, I want to be clear that I have not advocated for an authoritarian regime, like big brother, that forces people not to do sexual evils. Not once have I said that. In fact, I think Christianity entails that people need the ability, the leeway, so long as it is not gravely bad for them, to do evil to themselves. E.g., gluttony is evil but I actually think it is evil to force someone not to be a glutton. I just think there is a point where it may be too detrimental to their own good (e.g., Cindy should not have the option to do heroine even if we knew she won't harm anyone else by doing it, being 'objectively suicidal' should not be honored with suicide assistance, people castrating themselves to try to be the other gender should not be affirmed, etc.). The grave issue with liberalism is that it presupposes freedom of indifference and not freedom for excellence; and this is why we see it pushing for what is good as merely what coincides with what a person wants. True liberalism should support furries, medical affirmation care for transgenders, suicide assistance, euthanasia, providing people with hard drugs if they want it, helping people maim themselves if they want to, letting people sell their bodies for money, let people enter sex indentured servitude if its their kink, etc. Liberalism is hyper-libertarianism.

So, to be clear, you are partially arguing against a straw man of my position here. Nothing about the Aristotelian thought I gave necessitates that Chinese-style authoritarianism is the best political structure; or that we should force homosexuals not to have sex. In fact, I think that would be immoral to do.

Natural Law Theory: Based or Absurd?

Kissing, holding-hands, and the like are not sexual acts—they are intimate acts (with sometimes sexual undertones); and are a part of the natural ends of the human body. We use lips for many things—not just one. What your argument here suggests is that any intimacy outside of sex must be contrary to the natural ends of non-sex organs; and I don’t see how that is true. Which leads me to:

But if only some of those acts are bad, why?

In order for an act with a natural faculty to be immoral, it has to be contrary to the ends of that faculty such that it inhibits the said faculty from fulfilling them. Consequently, singing, kissing, cutting one’s hair, cutting one’s fingernails, getting an ear piercing, etc. are not immoral because they are not contrary to the ends of the respective faculties in this way.

Anal sex, for example, on the other hand, inhibits the anus from fulfilling its ends of (1) holding in poop and (2) excreting it. Anal sex does, in fact, although the organ can repair itself to some extent, loosen up the anus organ. Even liberal studies usually admit this to the extent that they suggest to people to do exercises to strengthen the pelvis area to help keep the anus healthy (to counter-act the anal sex they are having). Which leads me to:

The mention of "an organ designed to defecate" pretends to be a scientific or common-sense observation but is really a public performance of disgust, an attempt to bypass rationality by invoking a visceral reaction to justify exclusion.

This seems like an attempt to ignore the obvious fact that the anus is designed to defecate by ad hominem attacking me: you are essentially saying “hey, guys, let’s ignore the fact he’s right about this one part because he really is just prejudiced and trying to give a bad-faithed public performance”. This is the kind of rhetoric on this forum that saddens me; because I am out here trying to have good faith conversations with people.

Likewise, you are absolutely right that heterosexual anal, oral, and touching (such as masturbatory) sex is immoral—I only see this as a bullet to bite from the perspective of liberal thought.

identity thinking

Am I correct in thinking that your ‘identity thinking’ critique is that all concepts and ontological identities are forms of coercion? Do you accept that there are real identities (like a triangle really as opposed to only conceptually being a three sided shape)? Are they all coercive and immoral in your view?

he must reduce the whole person to the act he finds disgusting to justify a coercive impulse to force everyone into his chosen norm of being. No attempt is made to understand the lived experience of gay or transgender people, to listen to their voices, to appreciate their diverse experiences of love and intimacy. That's all pre-emptively obliterated under the force of the categories of degenerate, defective, violation of nature, and so on, and the total person is reduced to the function of sex organs, the context of the act ignored in the act of imposing the category of non-procreative act.
…
And it's in comments like those that Bob is most forceful and genuine, which again indicates that the genesis of Bob's arguments is not in reason, but in prejudicial feeling, an aspect of a certain kind of ideology.

To demonstrate good faith in my desire to have a productive conversation with you, I am going to overlook the fact that you reduced my entire metaphysics to a baseless ad hominem attack on my character and psychology; but I do need to clear my name. I am not ad hoc rationalizing a feeling of disgust for homosexuals; I am not prejudiced towards homosexuals; and I am not trying to use the terms like ‘defective’, ‘violation of nature’, etc. to pre-emptively obliterate anything (although I grant that the term 'degeneracy', although it truly does apply to what I was saying, is a provocative term that I would not use when talking to a member of the LGBTQ+ community). You know nothing about my personal life…..nothing, Jamal.

One last thing I wanted to cover:

Despite the Aristotelian clothing, Bob doesn't properly engage or inhabit any tradition at all, if we understand a tradition along with MacIntyre as a "historically extended, socially embodied argument".

MacIntyre accepts the vast majority of my view. He’s an Aristotelian too and a Christian; so I don’t understand why you would think that he would think I am not following a tradition when I am using Aristo-Thomism. Aristo-thomism is a long-standing tradition in the Latin, Dominican Scholastics.

Small steps, not grand schemes — Banno

Yes, I think that’s the way ahead in so many avenues. We still have to live and get on, even in imperfect circumstances.

I’m acutely weary of theory and theorists - seems to me it’s a great place to hide. But at some point useful ideas do become elongated strategic programs and it’s easy to get caught up.

In order for an act with a natural faculty to be immoral, it has to be contrary to the ends of that faculty such that it inhibits the said faculty from fulfilling them. — Bob Ross

For those who are interested, in the philosophical literature this form of argument is called a "perverted faculty argument." A contemporary philosopher who has written about this topic both informally and academically is Edward Feser (<link to his related blog posts>).

I don't see how these comments help forward the conversation.

To be honest, this thread is revealing itself as liberals being incapable of discussing an alternative gender theory. Virtually no one has even quoted or tried to contend with the OP so far: instead, they are trying to cancel me. — Bob Ross

Well, again, that's because you are not discussing an alternative to gender studies, but foreclosing on it. Your claim that gender is just biological sex has been thoroughly debunked.

Banno, why do you straw man me? — Bob Ross

If you think that my interpretations of your claims is a straw man, one possibility worth considering is that your account is not as coherent as you suppose.

Here's my critique in outline.

1. Aristotelian essences are hollow.
2. There is a usable and interesting distinction to be made between biological sex and socially inaugurated gender.
3. You account of Aristotelian ethics is shallow. Other Aristotelian theorists, such as Nussbaum, do not reach the conservative conclusions of your account.
4. In claiming that certain gender traits are biologically determined, you move form an is to an ought, a logical error.
5. I hold that the stance you take concerning issues such as sexuality and abortion to be immoral.

@hypericin, I find that you are digging in ten toes deep on a hill that no one wants you to die on. Your justification for my views on transgenderism for being bigoted are internally incoherent in your own beliefs. Perhaps, would you care to re-word your claim in a way that is internally coherent?

Likewise, you still, hypericin, have not attempted to critique the OP. What are your thoughts on the contents of the OP itself?

Of the very same post:

↪Banno - A substantive post. :up: — Leontiskos

I don't see how these comments help forward the conversation. — Bob Ross

So it was a substantive post that did not help forward the conversation.

Perhaps the problem is not with my post?

How do I tell the difference between natural and non-natural?

By determining if it is in accord or disaccord with the nature of the being in question. It is contrary to the nature of a lion for it eat plants; it is in its nature to eat meat.

Is the sex act a joyful act or a painful duty?

When properly done, sex is a beautiful act of love and pleasure; so this is a false dilemma.

 Is the sex I have with my 25 year post-menopausal wife degenerate, sinful, inferior, because she is not going to get pregnant?

No, it is not.

 And if not, then why is the sex of a homosexual so different?

Homosexuality as a sexual orientation is not itself degenerate: I am not sure why you are assuming I believe that. Homosexuality as an act or behavior is because it wills in accord with what is bad for a human. You having sex with your wife is an attempt at realizing your and her nature—irregardless if your nature’s are defective or inhibited in some sort of way. Think of it this way: is a kid who is born without the ability to feel pain thereby immoral? Of course not! Is it a defect? Absolutely. If we could cure it, would we? Absolutely. Is the kid doing anything wrong by willing in ways that are not contrary to their natural ends in an effort to realize their nature even though they are incapable of realizing the aspect of their nature that is sensible [in relation to their lack of feeling of pain]? Of course not. Would the kid be doing something wrong if they tried to maim themselves? Of course: that’s contrary to their natural ends.

What distinguishes real nature from fake/ersatz/inferior/degenerate/perverse/ nature?

A real nature is innate in the being of the being in question: it is intrinsic. A fake nature could refer to many different things; like someone understanding the nature of a being incorrectly or a nature that is merely conceptual (in the case of nominalism).

I didn't make any argument like that. I am not sure where you got this from: many people, including myself, have outlined clearly what you said and why it leads to absurd conclusions that you wouldn't accept.

Again, this is not a gotcha moment. I think this is a rather meaningless topic to debate right now.

The vast majority of the people responding to me have been trying to get the thread censored. Some reported it to the moderators to get removed; some notified the moderators without formally reporting to incentivize them to remove it; and some outright, like @Banno, said that they wish this was getting censored.

The fact of the matter is that no one from the opposition, expect perhaps @Jamal, has even tried to contend with the OP; instead, they tried to get it banned and then, when that failed, tried to trip me up with labels to try and get me to cancel myself. No, e.g., I am not a supporter of Nazism.

Do you think an eristic is a legitimate way to discover truth? I don't see how that isn't just an attempted psychoanalysis of the one forwarding the argument as opposed to contending with the argument itself.

The fact of the matter is that no one from the opposition, expect perhaps Jamal, has even tried to contend with the OP — Bob Ross

That's an extraordinary claim.

Taking on the role of the victim in the face of overwhelming critique is a cheap, purely rhetorical move.

Part of that is simply because Bob Ross misunderstood the Overton window of TPF and did not anticipate the manner in which his posts would be received. If he were to go back in time he would probably understand his audience differently and write somewhat different posts. For example, going back in time, he might have anticipated the objection from some that what he really wants is coercive conversion therapy for all homosexuals. — Leontiskos

Definitely agree. I was genuinely interested to converse about modern gender theory contrasted to mine; and no one even attempted to do that.

The fact of the matter is that no one from the opposition, expect perhaps Jamal, has even tried to contend with the OP; instead, they tried to get it banned and then, when that failed, tried to trip me up with labels to try and get me to cancel myself. No, e.g., I am not a supporter of Nazism. — Bob Ross

I'd put our conversation differently than you have here.

I didn't try to get your OP banned or trip you up with labels.

If it needs to be said I believe you're a good faith interlocutor -- I didn't think it needed to be said.

Now, I have voiced opposition to your position, and in stricter terms than I normally do. But my opposition is directed at your position, and not your character. Were you of ill character I'd be tempted to ban the OP.

Do you think an eristic is a legitimate way to discover truth? — Bob Ross

Eristic is something like fighting because one likes to fight, or arguing because one likes to argue. It usually connotes a desire to win for the sake of winning, without any regard for whether what one says is true or false, sound or unsound.

So no, I don't think it is a proper philosophical approach. My first thread was related to the topic. Actually, I think everyone generally agrees that eristic is problematic. @Jamal's post seemed to begin with that premise.

In all the back and forth, I forgot that you and Leontiskos never did answer my question about abortion and the pregnant 12 year old who was raped by her father.

Sorry, I am queued up with all the responses. I thought I already answered this; but to answer: it is immoral. Again, directly intentionally killing an innocent person is always murder and murder is always wrong. However, in your consequentialistic view none of this would be true. This is why I asked you (I think?) what equation, as a consequentialist, you are deploying to evaluate what the best outcome is.

Obviously, she should not be forced to carry the rapist's baby to term, right?

I understand the emotional-intuition we tend to have that she should be allowed to have an abortion; and I don’t think it is entirely misplaced: it arises out of good empathy for the tragic situation the poor girl is in. However, the ends do not justify the means; and, of course, I am saying that knowing you reject that as a consequentialist.

This is the part I'm disagreeing with. Not Nazi-ism, but rather that homosexuality is on par with schizophrenia. They are not the same or even analogous.

I do this on the basis of hedonism. The happiness of the person is what's important.

Even if hedonism is true—viz., a person’s hedonic happiness is all that matters—it does not follow that homosexuality as a sexual orientation is not a defect of the human species. I understand it could increase hedonic happiness for a person by engaging in their sexual desires; but this says nothing about whether it is a defect.

For example, not having my legs since birth might, in hindsight, bring me a lot of hedonic happiness through the tribulations I overcame with the condition: does that mean that me being born without my legs is not a defect?

I think you are conflating how a defect can influence our (hedonic) happiness or, more generally, psychology with the defect itself.

None of the acts listed are degenerate acts. They have not "lost the physical, mental, or moral qualities considered normal and desirable; showing evidence of decline"

I am not saying you are quoting me out of context for disagreeing with that; I’m saying that the original comment being leveraged here by everyone didn’t even claim that homosexuality from degenerate and my comment later that did did not claim that homosexuality simpliciter is degenerate. Degeneracy is about moral decline; and badness is not identical to immorality.

I agree with you that under your view you shouldn’t see anything wrong with homosexuality and, consequently, it can’t be degenerate even though it is still a defect at best or a mental illness at worst. Defectiveness is not the same as degeneracy.

 For the OP, though, my simple counter-argument is you set up a false dichotomy because we can think of gender and sex in neither the Aristotelian nor as a psychological construct.

Fair enough: what do you believe sex and gender are? Let’s start there and see if we can make some headway.

But if there is some other position between Essence realism and nominalism, perhaps one that doesn't even try to find the essence of things...

Yes, but that’s just logically impossible for it to succeed as a third position. That’s like saying “there is some other position to take about this block being yellow or not yellow, perhaps one that doesn’t even try to figure out if it is yellow to begin with…”. That’s not a valid third option to topic.

 The Kinsey report shows that there's a lot more to human sexuality than your normative conception based on heterosexuality suggests. I don't think people having sex differently violates any sort of grand norm that a person should be striving towards because of the gender of their soul. Rather the reports of self-satisfaction are far more persuasive to me than comparisons to a big picture ethic on the nature of man and what men ought to be to be truly eudemon.

This doesn’t demonstrate that it is morally permissible; all that demonstrates is that people have sex in many different ways and enjoy it (superficially).

 Not of a personality expressing its subjectivity, but of an event that effects the person telling the story and the person listening to the story in order to elucidate who we are in the world given what's happened.

If it is their expressions throughout time that they are describing, then it is a history of their personality unfolding.

but surely you can see that there's more to our possible ways of thinking about sex than as a psychological theory of personality archetypes or immortal souls?

I understand that; but what I was saying is that IF gender is just a social construct then it is just about personality types. History about people’s sexuality would just be, as a social expression, an expression of their personality.

The reality I deny is of essences, but not because that dissolves the world around us into inchoate unrelated bits without meaning or even knowledge as much as the philosopher's knowledge on such things.

I think nominalism is an untenable theory IMHO.

It's my intent to point out hedonism is as a kind of difference whereby we'd reach the same conclusion: i.e. if your metaphysic leads to thinking about men and women like a medieval priest then I'm afraid I think that you're wrong factually and ethically, as you do of I.

Where to go from there?

Let’s start with what you mean by sex and gender; and then we can get into hedonism vs. aristotelianism afterwards.

Polyphonic. It's erotic, friendly, filial, and small. We can do anything we want with love. The particularities of a love will depend upon the lovers.

What’s its definition though: you just used the word to describe it. I need to know what you mean by it; because you mean it totally differently than the traditional usage. Is it to will the good of something for its own sake where the good of that something is just what it desires (or gives it pleasure)?

Fair enough, and I appreciate that Moliere :heart:

I hope we can have a fruitful dialogue. I think we need to start with what each other means by 'sex' and 'gender'. You said it isn't just a social construct, so I am curious to see how you use them then.

Oh, then maybe I misunderstood @Jamal; or perhaps I misunderstood the term. I thought they were giving an psychological account of why I am coming up with the Aristotelian account of gender because they wanted to provide a metacritique of the genesis of my views.

To be fair, I do think you tried in good faith to contend with my view a little bit there; but then it stopped for some reason.

I don't think it is unreasonable to note that virtually no one contended with the OP; and still haven't. You still haven't contended with the revised version I asked you to.

Here's my critique in outline.

1. Aristotelian essences are hollow.
2. There is a usable and interesting distinction to be made between biological sex and socially inaugurated gender.
3. You account of Aristotelian ethics is shallow. Other Aristotelian theorists, such as Nussbaum, do not reach the conservative conclusions of your account.
4. In claiming that certain gender traits are biologically determined, you move form an is to an ought, a logical error.
5. I hold that the stance you take concerning issues such as sexuality and abortion to be immoral.

1. We never had a discussion substantively about nominalism vs. essence realism.
2. You never gave an account of what that is; and did not contend with my outlining of it in your terms that I gave to try to forward the conversation.
3. I've never heard of Nussbaum, and you've never provided any reasons that we could discuss of why it is shallow.
4. We did discuss this a bit: that's fair. However, you seem to think that you are contending immanently with the OP when you noting Hume's Guillotine; but I don't see how it does. Like I said, we can discuss this in detail and I already asked you (to of no answer) what grounds the objectivity of ethics for you as a non-naturalist. Non-naturalism can't account for moral objectivism: it only accounts for moral cognitivism.
5. Well this isn't directly relevant to the OP and begs the question. We can discuss this though.

I am more than happy to continue our discussion if you want to discuss any of these.

You quoted us as if we are the same person. I didn't say it was a substantive post, and I am pretty sure Leontiskos was being sarcastic (although I could be wrong).

Yes, I did:

You still haven't contended with the revised version I asked you to. — Bob Ross

Yes, I did:

What a terrible argument. A woman wearing a dress is not like a triangle's having three sides. There are no triangles that do not have three sides, but there are women in trousers. — Banno

And so on. I'm sorry you haven't been able to follow these connections. This is how threads of this sort become echo chambers, one party repeatedly demanding accounts the other has already given because they do not match the expected response.

I responded to this:

What a terrible argument. A woman wearing a dress is not like a triangle's having three sides. There are no triangles that do not have three sides, but there are women in trousers.

With:

I don’t think you are appreciate fully what I said. When a woman wears a dress it isn’t itself a part of their gender: it is the symbol which represents their expression of their sex (i.e., the symbol that represents their gender). You can separate the dress-wearing from femaleness, but you can’t separate the feminine expression of femaleness that it represents from the sex (femaleness) that it represents. That’s the part that is virtually distinct.

You responded with:

Muddled. You are here confusing the biological category with its social expression. Here's an idea: lets' seperate the biological category from its social expression - to make this clear, we cpoudl call the former "sex", and the latter "gender"... that will avoid the circularity of “Feminine expression is inseparable from femaleness → therefore feminine expression must reflect biological sex.”

I responded with:

CC: @RogueAI, @hypericin, @unenlightened, @Tom Storm, @Leontiskos, @Moliere

Let’s go with your semantics to demonstrate my point, because semantics here doesn’t matter (philosophically). The social expression, the gender, of sex is not itself ontologically tied to sex: it is an epistemic symbolism of society’s understanding of the ontological reality of sex and its tendencies. Gender, in this sense, is just society’s beliefs about sex and its tendencies.

A natural tendency of the particular sex that has a procreative nature (like male and female as opposed to an asexual being) would not be identical to the social expressions: it would be the ontologically upshot of the sex. Society could get its symbols completely wrong about those tendencies and natural behaviors of the given sex and this would have no affect on the reality of those tendencies and would just mean that this particular society got it all wrong. These tendencies, grounded in sex, are what would be called masculinity for males and femininity for females for humans. Someone can mimick each to their liking, but they have a real basis in sex and its natural tendencies.

The sex, as you call it, and the tendencies due to that sex are virtually but not really distinct. If you have a being, no matter how imperfectly instantiated, that is of sex M then they will have tendencies T<M> which will naturally flow, no matter how inhibited or malnourished, from that type of being M. You cannot have a man, in nature, in form, who doesn’t have masculinity flowing from that nature (no matter how imperfectly: yes, this includes super-feminine men!); just as trilaterality and triangularity cannot be found in existence separate from one another.

Can we agree on this (notwithstanding the semantic disputes)???

To which you killed the conversation with:

No. You just moved your goal post. You still want gender to be "an epistemic symbolism of society’s understanding of the ontological reality of sex and its tendencies", and so grounded in your "ontological reality" and not in social reality. You still want trousers to be like the three sides of a triangle, the "symbol of an ontological reality".

I tried to reformulate it to your schema to further the convo and you never contended with it in any substantial sense. The above is the track record: these are the facts of our discourse on the actual OP. The rest is loosely related.

- A misunderstanding on that score would be understandable. A subtle argument was being offered wherein one attempts to justify an approach that looks a lot like eristic but is supposedly different from eristic. Such things are bound up with what goes by the name of "the paradox of tolerance," as well as the question of when non-retaliatory coercion is admissible.

If this is opaque to you I wouldn't worry too much about it. There's a suspicion that you are not engaging in good faith, but I think such a suspicion is mistaken. You strike me as one of very best posters on TPF as far as "good faith" is concerned. I could cite numerous instances where you change your mind after rethinking an issue, and that's part of why I treat you as a serious interlocutor even on issues where we have significant disagreements (example 1, example 2, example 3). Heck, your first threads on TPF favored a form of moral subjectivism and argued against moral realism. That's where I met you.

So your overall point is that those five interactions didn't "contend with (your) view"?

I don't follow that at all. They might not be what you were expecting, but they form a neat dialogue on your claim.

Again, your "epistemic symbolism of society’s understanding of the ontological reality of sex" just seeks to collapse gender into biology, which is again no more than your failure to recognise the distinction between sex and gender.

It's bang on.

Why doesn't it fly? — Leontiskos

Since we are being pedantic, let's amend the supposition:

Supposition: It is bigotry to substantively call an entire class of people mentally ill.

"Schizophrenics are mentally ill" is not a substantive claim, it proceeds from the definition of "schizophrenic". To know the word is to know that "mental illness" and "schizophrenia" stand in a genus - species relationship. It offers nothing new to the competent language user.

This is not at all the case with "Ali Chinese are mentally disabled" or "all trans people are mentally ill".

For example, if bigotry is defined as "obstinate attachment to a belief," then the holding of a material position can never be sufficient for bigotry. — Leontiskos

I do not accept this definition. I can make any number of claims that are clearly identifiable as bigoted, without requiring a personalized, subjective assessment of just how obstinate I am in my beliefs.


This is really just basic decency. If I were trans, or had loved ones who were, I wouldn't want to come here and have to deal with threads claiming that I or my loved ones were immoral and mentally ill based merely on group identification. And context matters deeply: Bob's claims are made within a historical context where the government of the predominant English speaking country came to power on a platform of naked bigotry, primarily against trans and immigrants. As others here have pointed out, this post takes part in the ignoble philosophical tradition of providing intellectual scaffolding for state-sponsored bigotry.


Actually I take all that back. I have an idea for a new op: "Conservative Christians are immoral and mentally ill". I'm positive I can make a better case than @Bob Ross, without appealing to a questionable reading of Aristotle.

The fact of the matter is that no one from the opposition, expect perhaps Jamal, has even tried to contend with the OP — Bob Ross

That's false though: i read it and tried sympathizing with your logic, and i still don't agree with it.

If you don't like being treated like this, then don't try and ban drag shows like you said you wanted to...and don't complain about people trying to cancel you when your thread and arguments stay intact.

It's hard for me to obey the moderation rules on websites in general when there's so much dumb and spammy crap; so you are not alone if you feel misunderstood. People trying to cancel your thread is not the same as people trying to kill you, which is another form of "canceling".

Since we are being pedantic, let's amend the supposition: — hypericin

By all means feel free to amend the argument if you think it can be improved. I was simply using your own language as a starting point.

Supposition: It is bigotry to substantively call an entire class of people mentally ill.

"Schizophrenics are mentally ill" is not a substantive claim, it proceeds from the definition of "schizophrenic". To know the word is to know that "mental illness" and "schizophrenia" stand in a genus - species relationship. It offers nothing new to the competent language user.

This is not at all the case with "Ali Chinese are mentally disabled" or "all trans people are mentally ill". — hypericin

Let's look at how you hope your new supposition changes the conclusion:

1a. Supposition: It is bigotry to substantively call an entire class of people mentally ill
2a. Mental illnesses non-substantively call an entire class of people mentally ill
3a. Therefore, it does not follow that anyone who believes in mental illness is a bigot

I see what you are trying to do, but I don't think your distinction between substantive and non-substantive holds up. Here's why:

To know the word is to know that "mental illness" and "schizophrenia" stand in a genus - species relationship. It offers nothing new to the competent language user. — hypericin

"Schizophrenia is a mental illness," is not a tautology. Things such as schizophrenia are added and removed from the list of mental illnesses, and therefore such predication cannot be tautologous. For example, one of the newest mental illnesses in the DSM-5-TR is prolonged grief disorder. It was added in 2022. In 2021 it was not considered a mental illness. This is one sure reason why we know that, "X is a mental illness," is not a tautological ("non-substantive") claim.

I do not accept this definition. I can make any number of claims that are clearly identifiable as bigoted, without requiring a personalized, subjective assessment of just how obstinate I am in my beliefs. — hypericin

Then feel free to provide your own definition. I was just taking a common one. My points will hold with any genuine definition of "bigotry."

As others here have pointed out, this post takes part in the ignoble philosophical tradition of providing intellectual scaffolding for state-sponsored bigotry. — hypericin

But this begs the question at hand, namely the question of whether it is bigotry. That's the very thing you've been failing to demonstrate, and three people have now pointed out the fallacious quality of your arguments for that conclusion.

The crux here is that you want to maintain that it is correct for you to call "bigotry" anything you think is really bad. The problem is that that's not what "bigotry" means. Not everything that you think is really bad is bigotry. "This is really bad, therefore it is bigotry," is an invalid inference.

I hope we can have a fruitful dialogue. — Bob Ross

We've always managed to do so so far. I hope and suspect that we will.

I think we need to start with what each other means by 'sex' and 'gender'. You said it isn't just a social construct, so I am curious to see how you use them then.

Would you mind if I suggested another starting point?

Eristic is something like fighting because one likes to fight, or arguing because one likes to argue. It usually connotes a desire to win for the sake of winning, without any regard for whether what one says is true or false, sound or unsound.

So no, I don't think it is a proper philosophical approach. My first thread was related to the topic. Actually, I think everyone generally agrees that eristic is problematic. Jamal's post seemed to begin with that premise. — Leontiskos

Oh, then maybe I misunderstood Jamal; or perhaps I misunderstood the term. I thought they were giving an psychological account of why I am coming up with the Aristotelian account of gender because they wanted to provide a metacritique of the genesis of my views. — Bob Ross

Yes, I think we all agree that eristic is not good in a philosophical context. My claim was that engaging directly would result in eristic, and that I had another option, which was metacritique.

It isn't a psychological account. At least, it's not meant to be. If my account veered into psychology---meaning that I imputed dishonesty and hateful feelings to you and explained your attraction to Thomist Aristotelianism in those (or other psychological) terms---that's a risk which is always tempting when I'm discussing things I care about with someone whose views I find morally objectionable. But one can examine someone's personal motivations from a sociological, rather than psychological, viewpoint---as representative of an ideology's operation in society. The problem is that since the focus is in some sense on the person, it can look a lot like ad hominem. But there is a difference, which is that the ideology critique aims to explore the social function of certain beliefs expressed or implied by your interlocutor, rather than simply discrediting that interlocutor.

This is actually a pretty common confusion in philosophy. Rather than directly confront the validity (or soundness) of a Christian's moral precepts, Nietzsche tried to expose their genesis, namely in the hatred and resentment of the slave. Rather than arguing that the plans of 19th and 20th century penal reformers were inhumane or resulted in recidivism, Foucault traced the genesis of these reforms to developing technologies of power, a result of more thorough social control even while being less brutal.

I think both these philosophers have been accused of committing ad hominem or the more general genetic fallacy. Imagine Foucault saying to a penal reformer, "your view represents the internalization of a new, more insidious form of power". To which the penal reformer might say "Ad hominem!" But of course, that's not what Foucault is doing. Genetic reasoning is not always fallacious.

I'm not saying all this to get myself off the hook. I'm saying that there is a central argument which remains to be dealt with after you remove all personal attacks and instances of ad hominem.

However, I am thinking of revising my original argument to show that engaging directly (what I called "immanently") can, e.g., by exposing contradicitons, serve as a basis for metacritique (which I think it effectively did in my big post).