Really? This seems to me one of hte most potent and obvious oddities of humanity. There are plenty of people whos lifestyles I think are damaging (to themselves/those around them or society at large) and I think it s perverse that they defend their life style (funnily enough, plenty of gender theory types run along these lines - I don't suggest that being interested in gender causes one to be immoral, but I do think immoral people tend to be drawn to the more liberal communities abouts). That says absolutely nothing, whatsoever, about how i feel about them as a human. — AmadeusD

I can kind of see your point. But I guess I would hold that if someone is gay, this is a more significant part of their identity, and of a quite differnt nature, than the drug consumption of someone who uses. And I would consider neither of them a perversion. I don't think I would compare the two things. Denying someone’s drug use doesn’t seem to me to be the same thing as denying their homosexuality. Is homosexuality damaging to themselves or society at large? I wouldn't have thought so. Drug use? Not always, but often.

In other words, is this discussion necessarily just a fight rather than a shared quest for truth? — Jamal

I think that is the danger that MacIntyre was forced to take more seriously in his later work. Also, the fact that MacIntyre was not always sufficiently attentive to that danger is one reason I'm not his biggest fan.

Traditionally, going back to Socrates, you're either seeking truth or trying to win. But why not both? In the case of this discussion I think I can produce an argument with a dual function: (a) to be read by those who share my premises (e.g., that homosexuality is not immoral, degenerate, or mentally or otherwise defective), it strengthens our shared understanding or explores how we can understand these moral positions better; and (b) to be read by wavering opponents and fence-sitters, it is simultaneously a public demonstration of our moral framework's superiority to that of the Christian conservatives. — Jamal

Assuming that MacIntyre's diagnosis is about right and that engaging Bob on his own terms would be yet another of those interminable debates, we're each free to engage in metacritique, examining the opponent's ideas in terms of their genesis, while ignoring their validity — Jamal

I think Socrates' approach was straightforward: try to convince your interlocutor. The rest will follow. If one begins with the presupposition that they cannot properly engage their interlocutor's arguments, but must instead play to their own side or to some "neutral" party, then I think Socratic dialogue has been abandoned. In other words, it's hard to see how one can accept MacIntyre's diagnosis while avoiding eristic. For example, if @Bob Ross does not himself accept the criteria and validity of "genesis argumentation," then what is occurring is simply eristic. If a metacritique is to be legitimate, it must work within the bounds of mutual dialogue. If a "metacritique" involves turning away from Bob in order to start talking to other people about Bob (which is something we have seen often within this thread), then eristic has emerged.

Socrates would do something like this: "I think that if one can show that the genesis of an idea is faulty, then the idea itself must be rejected. Would you agree with me on this?" Namely, he would bring his interlocutor along with him so that the dialogue is not abandoned.

But remember that @Bob Ross is attempting to offer arguments that are sound and not merely valid. If one honestly does not see the force of one of Bob's premises, they must simply say so. Validity is not of much interest in any philosophical debate. Invalid argumentation should be rare among principled philosophers. Philosophical objections should almost always pertain to soundness rather than mere validity.

I mean, we could critique the position immanently by pushing its concepts to breaking point. For example, if all non-procreative sex acts are degenerate and morally corrupt, then heterosexual anal sex, oral sex, and even kissing and touching, are degenerate and morally corrupt. That diverges sufficiently from human experience that it strikes one as preposterous... — Jamal

This is a perfectly legitimate form of argument that remains within dialogue and does not move into eristic. Is it also the sort of argument that is most likely to convince an interlocutor, given that it retains the lion's share of their premises.

But ultimately there's little benefit in hashing out the telos of the rectum. — Jamal

But you are being glib, and also inaccurate. The argument you just offered was not about "the telos of the rectum," but rather about whether sex acts require a procreative condition. It would cash out in the idea that the non-procreative nature of the rectum is irrelevant to an analysis of sex acts.

Bob's arguments constitute a textbook case of this identity thinking: he must reduce the whole person to the act he finds disgusting to justify a coercive impulse to force everyone into his chosen norm of being. No attempt is made to understand the lived experience of gay or transgender people, to listen to their voices, to appreciate their diverse experiences of love and intimacy. That's all pre-emptively obliterated under the force of the categories of degenerate, defective, violation of nature, and so on, and the total person is reduced to the function of sex organs, the context of the act ignored in the act of imposing the category of non-procreative act. — Jamal

The irony is that this is exactly what conservatives tend to accuse progressives of. Progressives are said to reduce someone's entire personhood to their sexual orientation, such that their core identity must be equated to their sexual desires. Similarly, "No attempt is made to understand the lived experience of gay or transgender people," given that there are not a few such people who agree with Ross and disagree with Jamal. It is simply assumed, a priori, that one is speaking for all such people.

Still, this sort of argument remains at a properly dialogical level insofar as it relies upon reasoning that is shared by one's interlocutor, at least in part. Presumably it does achieve that, and I think this is a sign that the notion of incommensurable worldviews that MacIntyre flirts with is actually mistaken. Instead of seeing an opaque speech, the conservative can say, "I actually agree with a good portion of that, and I think it gets at a problem with the way the LGBT movement reduces persons to their sexual orientation. I would want to see personhood and human life in a much broader and more spacious context." At the same time, if one wants the conservative to be open to Adorno, then they must be open to conservative parallels.

(The Christian community has received this objection with a fair amount of sympathy, as can be seen in the work of someone like Karol Wojtyla.)

As it happens, even the categories of trans person, gay man, etc., are examples of identity thinking and therefore have this coercive potential, if we forget that individuals are more than that. — Jamal

That's right, but I worry that the word "coercion" is being stretched too far in sentences like these. It would require a fair bit of argumentation to conclude that an act of categorization is a coercive act, or is pregnant with coercive potential. The problem folds on itself, given that if an accusation of coercion is found to be credible, then what is justified in response is precisely coercion. This is why, I think, that remaining on the dialogical level remains so imperative.

The censorious impulse on display in Bob's more careless comments... — Jamal

I haven't seen a "censorious impulse" from Bob. I actually think a lot of people within this thread are desirous to see Bob himself censored.

But I don't want to reduce this to psychology: in its reliance on pathologization and its anachronistic demand for public priority... — Jamal

I think this is one of the many double standards at play. Does the LGBT lobby not use coercive means? Does it not rely on pathologization, for example by literally dubbing their opponents "homophobes"? Does it not demand public priority?

It is clearest in his least philosophical comments. Note the language: "disorder," "defect," "degeneracy," and "privation". — Jamal

Those are actually philosophical terms with the exception of "degenerate."

This allows the argument to present itself as compassionate (always the protestation "I don't hate them, I just want to help them") while its function is to negate the legitimacy of certain ways of being. — Jamal

Every moral and political position will end up negating the legitimacy of certain ways of being.

I admit that this was immoderate, in the personal nature of the attack. But I want it to be understood as a description of the ideological function of Bob's comments, rather than a personal accusation. In more detail, this function is the anachronistic use of Thomist Aristotelianism as the respectable-looking outward appearance for an attack on pluralism, an attempt to use the language of timeless nature to delegitimize a rival social vision and re-establish a lost cultural dominance---and along the way, to exclude, stigmatize, and pathologize people on the basis of aspects of their identity and of the private, consensual relationships in which they find human connection, and which produce no demonstrable public harm. — Jamal

By this point your charitable reading looks to have dried up. You are simply imputing malicious motives to Bob by focusing on certain parts of his posts and ignoring others.

The kicker for me is that I know lots of gay people who agree with Bob, and we have had great conversations about these topics. I realize it is very hard for the activist to reckon with such a fact, and of course when the fact is spied out coercion from the LGBT activist follows almost immediately. It would be hard to overemphasize the extent of bullying and coercion such people feel at the hands of LGBT activists, even to the point of falsely speaking for them and refusing to grant them any voice at all. They are subject to some of the most vicious attacks if they fail to fall into line with the cultural orthodoxy. Two of the people I have in mind are afraid to "come out" publicly because they fear the LGBT community. Their support meetings have been pushed underground after the meetings were infiltrated by reporters who doxed certain members, destroying their careers and lives.

Odd that Bob managed to misgender Philippa Foot. :razz: — Jamal

:lol:

Coming back to this:

The proponents of Thomist natural law no doubt have many elegant and logically consistent responses to all of the objections above, and we get another instance of interminable moral debate that doesn't touch what I think is interesting and important, namely the genesis and the social meaning of the ideas. — Jamal

This seems to amount to, "The whole tradition in question will rationalize endlessly, and what is therefore needed is a form of ad hominem (where one tries to show that the 'genesis' of the ideas in question is 'prejudicial feeling' and evil motives)." I didn't understand what you meant by "the genesis of the ideas," until finishing your post, but it looks to be a form of eristic. I don't think there are such short cuts to be had, especially if Socrates is our model.

I would suggest that if one wants to offer a tradition such as Adorno, then they must be open to the traditions that others bring to the table, especially when they are strongly represented. I think the avoiding of eristic is the correct criterion, but I think the "genesis approach" fails to avoid eristic (and it is worth noting that one can question another's motives dialogically, without moving into eristic - Bob himself surely wishes to avoid engaging in bad faith argumentation). Finally, Bob is someone who is still finding his philosophical bearings. I think it is unfair to criticize him for an eclectic approach. That's how everyone begins.

I'm still not sure why Christianity was convincing to you — Tom Storm

I am allergic to proselytism (I didn't much appreciate it when it was attempted upon me) but I will try to briefly respond in this way:

Either the guy was the messianic King or he wasn't.

As C.S. Lewis famously put it:

A man who was merely a man and said the sort of things Jesus said would not be a great moral teacher.
He would either be a lunatic — on the level with the man who says he is a poached egg — or else he would be the Devil of Hell.
You must make your choice.
Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman or something worse.
Mere Christianity, Book II, ch. 3

For example no-one even reasonably sane could say "before Abraham was, I AM" - if they were merely some great ethical teacher.

Now if that is true, I'm not sure that whether the claim that he was the messianic King can be "convincing" in exactly the way you're putting it in your question. I am not "convinced" that I have clearly "seen", for example that Jesus is the Son of God.

Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.
Hebrews 11:1

So I am not "convinced" in the same way that I am "convinced" that 2+2=4.

But I do have faith, hope and charity - at least in a very limited way.

Some say that faith can only ever be anti-rational. I don't think that. I prefer to just ask:

"But what if it is true?"

If it is true then certain things follow - but I'll leave it there.

A man who was merely a man and said the sort of things Jesus said would not be a great moral teacher.
He would either be a lunatic — on the level with the man who says he is a poached egg — or else he would be the Devil of Hell.
You must make your choice.
Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman or something worse. — Colo Millz

My response to Lewis was always that he missed the 4th option: myth.

But I appreciate your response. Maybe we can talk about other things some time.

:up:

Hence, the notion that the primary purpose of marriage is, or has historically been, to reproduce is a bit of joke in light of the surplus of evidence that presents itself. — javra


I'm not really sure what you mean here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I gave my justifications for it in the respective post. One can theorize something to be X and so maintain, but if it in practice is Y, then it is Y and not X. As much as the dictum goes that the #1 telos of marriage is that of having children, it isn't currently and has never been. To add to what i previously stated: People can and often enough do conceive and birth children just fine without marriage. The notion of "illegitimate child" is by no means modern. The issue is not that of having children but, instead, that of raising children to their desired purposes as adults. And for this, and only this, monogamous nuclear families are paramount.

Also, most people were peasant serfs (and earlier, many were slaves) and so not particularly focused on alliances and amassing generational wealth and prestige. — Count Timothy von Icarus

For the greatest portion of Western history post common era, marriages have been non-consensual, such as is the case in prearranged marriages. Serfs too had their economic necessities for survival. One quick reference to this generality:

The beginnings of consensual marriage

About 1140, Gratian established that according to canon law the bonds of marriage should be determined by mutual consent and not consummation, voicing opinions similar to Isaac's opinion of forced marriages; marriages were made by God and the blessing of a priest should only be made after the fact. Therefore, a man and a woman could agree to marry each other at even the minimum age of consent- fourteen years for men, twelve years for women- and bring the priest after the fact. But this doctrine led to the problem of clandestine marriage, performed without witness or connection to public institution.[54] The opinion of the parents was still important, although the final decision was not the decision to be made by the parents,[55] for this new consent by both parties meant that a contract between equals was drawn rather than a coerced consensus.[56] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_European_marriage_pattern#The_beginnings_of_consensual_marriage

Hence, till about 1140 consensual marriages did not occur. Nor did they predominate afterward. If you've ever read Queen Marguerite de Navarre's Heptaméron published in the mid-1600s, you'll find romance almost always being an extra-marital luxury (in the best of cases, as per a knight that devotes his life and eternal love for a perfectly married loved one while never having intercourse with her, though there's plenty of infidelity stories as well).

[edit: to try make this clearer: And all prearranged marriages are done for socio-economic reasons. Be it among nobility or among serfs. As long as one in not infertile, one can reproduce with anyone out there (and the act, regrettably, need not be consensual). But the formalization of marriage unites and unifies two households together. Reproduction here takes second place to which other household one as parent(s) ends up unifying with.]

I'd imagine that many people who view homosexuality as a sort of imperfection could agree with this though, no? My extremely Catholic grandmothers were fine with civil unions, back when that was a thing. It's not like those who see gluttony as defect want to ban fancy food (and here "gluttony" traditionally referred not only to over consumption, but any undue focus on food).

The issue of "condemnation" is interesting though. Leaving aside homosexuality for a moment, there is the whole idea that any notion of gluttony is "fat shaming" or perhaps "consumption shaming." To speak of licentiousness is "slut shaming," etc. There are all "personal choices," and all personal choices are relative to the individual, so long as they do not transgress the limits of liberal autonomy and infringe on others, or so the reasoning seems to go.

I do wonder if the shift in moral language is part of the difficulty here. To say something is "bad" becomes to describe it as possessing a sort of specific "moral evil." But this is hardly what was traditionally meant by gluttony being "evil." It was a misordering of desire, although towards something that is truly desirable, and didn't denote anything "horrific." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm in general agreement with this. But here's the important caveat for me: No one, none of us, period, is or will ever be anywhere near to perfect in any sense of the word while we live, at the very least, this lifetime. Hence, heterosexuality too is a form if imperfection, this by entailment of the just stated. And, while we can of course agree that imperfections are bad, it yet remains the case that likewise is none of us perfectly good; ergo, we are all in our own difference ways and degrees bad. Some will then take this as entailing a condemnation. Some have taken this state of mind to the point of mortification of the flesh via self-flagellation and the like. I don't view it this way. I take it that the one way to incrementally purge our impure being is to do what we all know to be right, this most of the time, while on occasion splurging a bit in the kinks we all have (be it a love of sweets, a sexual fetish consensually engaged in, etc.) while nevertheless never overly deviating from what is optimally righteous / virtuous - all this so as to better iron out our kinks, and all this without condemning ourselves but by both acknowledging our relative imperfections and being forgiving of them both in ourselves as well as in others (of course, sans any significant deviations).

In parallel, all this bit like intelligence or wisdom: we all fail to reach our perfect potential in this department and so we're all stupid by this standard of perfection. But, while the self-righteous will deny being in any way stupid, their very self-righteousness will in due measure prevent them from becoming more intelligent and wise then they currently are. Can't learn anything when one already knows everything. And so one cease to develop and improve. Much like is said of common beasts.

Don't mean to be preaching here, but to me it directly addresses the issue of condemnation for the badness of being imperfect. In closer relation to this thread, this be one heterosexual, homosexual, or else bisexual. Or course, implicit in all this is the question of what the heck then is the ultimate telos of life, aka the meaning or purpose of life. A different topic of potential argument. But I don't find this telos - which does go hand in hand with teleology and which can be the only "is" that justifies our "oughts" - has anything to do with heterosexuality, to not bring reproduction into the very same issue.

So, to ↪Colo Millz's point, this is perhaps more an issue with liberalism. Liberalism has a strong sense of the "morally bad" as distinct, because everything else is personal choice, and so to say anything is bad, that it "ought not be done" or that it is "not ideal" become a sort of "condemnation." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I very much disagree. None of us, progressives, conservatives, independents, or whatnot, are perfect angels. And each forest has its own crocked trees. It's a bit of scapegoat to claim otherwise. Besides, folks such as Girolamo Savonarola, who's renowned for his mortification of the flesh among other things, thereby condemning his own imperfections, were/are anything but liberal/progressive.

This seems to me to touch on my questioning of the veracity of Bob's Neo-Aristotelianism . My vague recollections of Aristotle do not much cohere with the reactionary and authoritarian direction that our Aristotelian friends hereabouts seem to share. — Banno

True. Aristotle's exclusion of barbarians and slaves, and partial exclusion of women, from the moral and political community was a presupposition rather than an active reactionary position.

But I'm sceptical as to teleological accounts that link what it supposedly is to be human to what we ought do - although I might be convinced - grounding "ought" in teleology appears to be a category mistake. And the turn to "traditional" values is just too convenient.

The core of my disparagement of Aristotelian essentialism is the hollowness of "that which makes a thing what it is, and not another thing". It doesn't appear to do any work, and to presuppose a referential approach to language that I hold to be demonstrably false. — Banno

Fair. I am undecided on it myself.

There is indeed an unresolved tension in my thinking, in an admiration for both Anscombe and Foot (to whom Macintyre owes a great debt) together with a more progressive attitude than either. I do not accept the authoritarianism of Anscombe, nor the emphasis on tradition in Foot. I'll add Rawls and Nussbaum to the mix, and I think we might translate Aristotelian ethics into a modern, inclusive agenda. I'd hope that we might proceed without a "thick" ethics of tradition or evolutionary constraint, and proceed instead with a "thin" ethics of autonomy, dignity, and realised capabilities. Small steps over grand themes.

Excellent post, Jamal. I hope you succeed in shaking up the conversation here. — Banno

:up:

You don't think parents who see gender dysphoria as an illness are capable of truly or fully loving their children? Would this apply to something like autism or Down's syndrome too (which are surely even more relevant to personal identity)?

Anyhow, if seeing gender dysphoria as a pathology amounts to "denying someone's identity," wouldn't this mean that sex actually is deeply essential to identity in precisely the way essentialist claim? I suppose this would go along with the sentiment that even if a treatment for gender dysphoria existed it would not be desirable, or that it should be removed from the DSM.

You don't think parents who see gender dysphoria as a mental illness as being capable of truly or fully loving their children? Would this apply to something like autism too? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, many of them do. Maybe I could tweak my wording.

But the proposition was that a stranger like Bob Ross would deny the identity of people he’s never met on the basis that they have a 'perversion' he doesn't understand. That's not parenting and I don’t think that counts as loving.

Note also that abuse is frequently perpetrated by people who say things like, “I’m doing this because I love you.” Having worked in the area of domestic violence I've heard this many times.

Anyhow, if seeing gender dysphoria as a pathology amounts to "denying someone's identity," wouldn't this mean that sex actually is deeply essential to identity in precisely the way essentialist claim? I suppose this would go along with the sentiment that even if a treatment for gender dysphoria existed it would not be desirable, or that it should be removed from the DSM. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not a gender theorist. Here’s my formulation (and I’ll let you have the last word, since this isn’t a productive conversation, much as I’ve enjoyed it). Trans people exist and seem to have existed across cultures and throughout history. Empirical evidence consistently shows that their mental health deteriorates when they are forced to live contrary to their gender identity. And they are more likely to thrive if they are able to transition. The most ethical and pragmatic response, then, is to accept people as they identify. In most cases doing so doesn't undermine society and it greatly improves individual wellbeing and social inclusion.

The solution, arguably, is not to discard neo-Aristotelian ideas of essence, but to show how it can be used well, setting out a more humane, and more inclusive teleology—like one that shows how the telos of a human being is fulfilled in relationships of love and mutual flourishing, which can take many forms. I want to say that abandoning the concept of human nature and purpose because it's open to misuse is to surrender the very ground on which we can build a progressive vision of the good life. — Jamal

So, does this make you a foundationalist? Do you think, for instance, Rorty’s neopragmatic view of morality is limited because it doesn’t rely on objective moral truths or universal principles? If all things are socially constructed, contingent conversations, then why do anything in particular? — Tom Storm

Good questions, although I balk at the suggestion that I'm a foundationalist. Otherwise ... it's complicated.

The qualification "arguably" is there because I am undecided, so one answer I can give to you is that I just don't know. But even if I fully endorsed the neo-Aristotelianism, I don't think that would entail foundationalism, if that is meant in a strong metaphysical sense, i.e., the belief in a fixed nature and purpose that provides normative justification for moral judgements.

My position right now is maybe something like a negatively teleological virtue ethics. I'm here to criticize ideas that seek to frustrate the telos of human flourishing, as I believe Bob's do, even if I don't have my own settled conception of what that human flourishing is. And settling on a conception of human flourishing is something I suspect is impossible in what I regard as a fragmented and chaotic human world. In other words, MacIntyre is right that modernity has produced people who, when they talk about ethics, don't know what they're talking about---and since I don't exclude myself from that, I have to be careful---and Adorno is right that while we might be able to see the sources of our norms and values, we cannot in our present circumstances find rational justification for them, such is the lack of access to a coherent socially embedded tradition.

So if there's any foundation to my moral thought, right now it's along the lines of Adorno:

The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth.

As for Rorty, I'm not very familiar with him, but on the face of it yes, his view is limited without objective moral truths or universal principles, just as every other moral philosophy is. This standard is impossible to meet in the post-Enlightenment world, and the question is if Rorty's response navigates a good path between the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of relativism-nihilism. As far as I can see he sails too close to the latter.

My position right now is maybe something like a negatively teleological virtue ethics. I'm here to criticize ideas that seek to frustrate the telos of human flourishing, as I believe Bob's do, even if I don't have my own settled conception of what that human flourishing is. — Jamal

This would seem to be a tricky place to occupy, and I sympathise.

And settling on a conception of human flourishing is something I suspect is impossible in what I regard as a broken and chaotic human world. — Jamal

:fire:

And one might argue that they matter all the more in broken and chaotic circumstances. How else do we wrest some control or peace?

MacIntyre is right that modernity has produced people who, when they talk about ethics, don't know what they're talking about---and since I don't exclude myself from that, I have to be careful---and Adorno is right that while we might be able to see the sources of our norms and values, we cannot in our present circumstances find rational justification for them, such is the lack of access to a coherent socially embedded tradition. — Jamal

Interesting. Does anyone know how to talk about ethics? Might not a redeemable form of post-modernism be the answer? I often think we are in a transition period. In our thinking, we seem done with modernity. There are powerful nostalgia projects everywhere, seeking to get us back to a golden era before things went astray. It’s why we now have folk as diverse as Jordan Peterson and John Vervaeke flogging retro solutions to our problems, generally talking about the need to re-enchant the world. And every second new philosopher seems to be a Thomist.

The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth. — Jamal

I watched an Australian interview with Nick Cave yesterday; he said that to be human is to suffer. Not an original take, sure, but one can't disagree (or help qualifying with "some suffer much more than others". Antinatalism lacks ambition. The most obvious antidote to this would be to blow up the world, destroy all life, and prevent all future suffering. Why is this not postulated as a heroic solution to all our problems?

In lieu of this, might it not be that we need a pragmatic approach to morality, given we are unable to get to truth or even agree upon axioms? Why let the perfect be the enemy of the good? I would take it as a given that anything human is going to be limited, imperfect, tentative, regardless of the era. Could we not build an ethical system acknowledging this, and put aside notions of perfection and flawless reasoning, focusing instead on what works to reduce harm? Just don't ask me how. :wink:

It’s why we now have folk as diverse as Jordan Peterson and John Vervaeke flogging retro solutions to our problems, generally talking about the need to re-enchant the world. And every second new philosopher seems to be a Thomist. — Tom Storm

If only Peterson really strove to re-enchant the world. Most of the times I've heard him he was striving to re-lobster the (young male) human condition.

This standard is impossible to meet in the post-Enlightenment world, and the question is if Rorty's response navigates a good path between the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of relativism-nihilism. As far as I can see he sails too close to the latter. — Jamal

You might find interest in his quarrel with Putnam who was competing with him about the proper way to re-appropriate the American pragmatist tradition of Peirce, Dewey and James. While Rorty's idea of replacing ideals of truth and objectivity with ideals of solidarity didn't lack merit as a way to oppose what Putnam also rejected under the label of "metaphysical realism," Putman's own idea of a "Realism With a Human Face" sails at a safer distance from the Charybdis of relativism. (Rorty had a good rejoinder against charges of relativism, though.)

In lieu of this, might it not be that we need a pragmatic approach to morality, given we are unable to get to truth or even agree upon axioms? Why let the perfect be the enemy of the good? I would take it as a given that anything human is going to be limited, imperfect, tentative, regardless of the era. Could we not build an ethical system acknowledging this, and put aside notions of perfection and flawless reasoning, focusing instead on what works to reduce harm? Just don't ask me how. — Tom Storm

Good stuff. I mostly agree. Where I think this runs into difficulty is in how to uncover and decide on the causes of harm/suffering. The tools I favour are the critique of ideology, which I've tried to do here, and the analysis of social relations to reveal systemic domination. These can show the way harm gets baked into life and appear as normal. Liberal pragmatism doesn't really have this toolkit, since it doesn't have a robust scepticism towards social structures, so it can inadvertently end up preserving them and the harms they cause.

For example, both I and a liberal pragmatist might want to do something about the problem of widespread depression, agreeing that this is a significant harm or suffering. But while the liberal might want to solve the problem with better access to drugs and therapy, I and my quasi-Marxian critical theory buddies will question the diagnosis, saying that depression is a rational response to conditions of alienation and atomization, made to seem normal by ideologies like the work ethic, the performance society, and so on---and then link all that back to social and economic relations.

I and my quasi-Marxian critical theory buddies will question the diagnosis, saying that depression is a rational response to conditions of alienation and atomisation, made to seem normal by ideologies like the work ethic, the performance society, and so on---and then link all that back to social and economic relations. — Jamal

I’d probably agree with this too. Of course, given that we can’t change society short of a revolution (and then there’s the question of what to do the morning after, as Žižek might ask), you're right that we probably can’t do much more than offer people pills and talk therapy: the pragmatic responses (but not solutions) to being stuck in a traumatic world we can’t alter. I guess it's a harm reduction approach. Perhaps theism is just the other side of the pills and talk therapy coin.

If only Peterson really strove to re-enchant the world. — Pierre-Normand

Who knows what he's been trying to do? I think he might be a misunderstood atheist with a poor capcity to explain himself.

While Rorty's idea of replacing ideals of truth and objectivity with ideals of solidarity didn't lack merit — Pierre-Normand

I quite like it.

(Rorty had a good rejoinder against charges of relativism, though.) — Pierre-Normand

Indeed and it's easy to get him wrong, I suspect. As I understand him, Rorty argued that he was never sayign that “anything goes.” He accepts that we lack absolute, universal foundations, but he insisted we can still distinguish better from worse beliefs within our communities and conversations.

As I understand him, Rorty argued that he was never sayign that “anything goes.” He accepts that we lack absolute, universal foundations, but he insisted we can still distinguish better from worse beliefs within our communities and conversations. — Tom Storm

Exactly. I seem to remember he also argued that if one were truly a relativist, then each community would have their own norms/truths and there would be no warrant for widening the circle of solidarity (for including transgender persons, for instance!)

I haven't seen a "censorious impulse" from Bob. I actually think a lot of people within this thread are desirous to see Bob himself censored. — Leontiskos

Just a quick note to say that the word means severely critical of the behaviour of others, like someone who polices public morality (like the Roman censor). It's not about wanting to silence people.

Otherwise, I may respond to some of your interesting criticisms in the coming days.

Just a quick note to say that the word means severely critical of the behaviour of others, like someone who polices public morality (like the Roman censor). It's not about wanting to silence people. — Jamal

That's fair. I actually think we could get a lot of mileage out of ' point about Aquinas' view on prostitution. I think a lot of fast assumptions are being made about Bob's views. Part of that is simply because @Bob Ross misunderstood the Overton window of TPF and did not anticipate the manner in which his posts would be received. If he were to go back in time he would probably understand his audience differently and write somewhat different posts. For example, going back in time, he might have anticipated the objection from some that what he really wants is coercive conversion therapy for all homosexuals.

Otherwise, I may respond to some of your interesting criticisms in the coming days. — Jamal

Sounds good. I am going to pile yet another (short) post on your head, given that I will be out for a number of days after tomorrow. :wink:

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Assuming that MacIntyre's diagnosis is about right and that engaging Bob on his own terms would be yet another of those interminable debates, we're each free to engage in metacritique, examining the opponent's ideas in terms of their genesis, while ignoring their validity... — Jamal

I see these meta-questions about eristic and the like as extremely important, and I'm happy you began your post with that sort of consideration.

I think this move of yours is a case of the following: <Arguing dialogically is going to take too much time, therefore I will abandon dialogical argument and leverage some other means to my end>.

On the one hand, time management is important and because of this I favor strictures that help equalize differences of time-availability (e.g. #6 here). On the other hand, I think the pain of time-taking is part and parcel of philosophy.

It could of course be objected that I have misrepresented the argument. It could be said that the point is not that the debate will take a long time, but rather that it is literally interminable. First, I don't think the debate is interminable. When someone like MacIntyre says that a debate is interminable, what they usually mean is that it may take decades or centuries for the debate to be settled within a society, and I would suggest that the needle is always being moved towards a terminus even if one can't settle the entrenched debate in a week. Second, the notion of "interminable debates" is a prelude to misology. To say that a debate is interminable is either to justify some course of action outside debate, or else to justify doing nothing. Either way, it ends rational discussion.

Beyond that, I think there are three operative principles at play. Eristic is one of them. Another is ad hominem. A third is the notion of being "Beyond the Pale." A key point here is that there are certain cases where ad hominem is not fallacious, and I think those exceptional cases have everything to do with the notion of being "beyond the pale." The simplest explanation is to say that ad hominem is acceptable when someone is engaging in bad faith. Yet it needs to be emphasized that the ontology of "bad faith" and especially the epistemology of recognizing "bad faith" must be grasped. This is because it is extremely common to use ad hominem appeals to shut down legitimate debate (and this is itself a form of bad faith engagement). Similarly, all fallacious ad hominem is a form of eristic. It is only the exceptional form of ad hominem that is not fallacious and is not necessarily eristic. When that exceptional form remains in earnest dialogue with one's interlocutor, it is not eristic. When that exceptional form of ad hominem abandons earnest dialogue with one's interlocutor, then it is either eristic or it is a form of moderation/policing (i.e. an authoritative move by a kind of referee or someone acting in that capacity). That form of moderation/policing is coercive, but not objectionably so as long as the bad faith has been properly assessed and understood.

I realize that's a lot, but the crucial point is that claims of "bad faith" (or bad acting, or bigotry, etc.) must be taken seriously, particularly by those who utter them. Bad faith engagement is something that is contrary to the spirit of philosophy, but a proper understanding of what it is and what it isn't is crucial given the potential for manipulation.