Is there a meaningful difference between relativism and anti-foundationalism, or is the latter simply a sophisticated version which ultimately fails to avoid the former's traps? — Tom Storm

One difference is that almost all major philosophers who are accused of moral or epistemic relativism explicitly reject the label. What they reject is the following formulation:
truth or moral validity is relative to a framework, such as a culture, language, historical epoch, or conceptual scheme, and there is no non-relative standpoint from which competing frameworks can be judged. Many critics of relativism understand this as entailing either equal validity of all moral claims or an inability to criticize other moral systems. It is this package that thinkers like Rorty, Heidegger, and Derrida reject.

For instance, Rorty abandons the idea of objective, ahistorical foundations for morality and knowledge, which is why he is constantly labeled a relativist. But he insists that his view is not relativist but ethnocentric: we always reason from within our own inherited practices, vocabularies, and moral sentiments. For Rorty, the key point is not that “anything goes,” but that justification is always to someone, to a community with shared norms, without implying that all communities are equally good or beyond criticism.

Heidegger rejects relativism because he doesn’t think the disclosure of Being is a matter of subjective or cultural “points of view.” Historical “worlds” are not interchangeable frameworks chosen by agents; they are ontological conditions that shape what can count as intelligible at all. The difference between epochs is not a difference between equally valid beliefs, but a transformation in how being itself is revealed. From Heidegger’s perspective, calling this “relativism” already presupposes the modern subject–object scheme he is trying to overcome.

Derrida likewise rejects relativism. Deconstruction does not say that meaning or value is merely relative to perspectives, nor that interpretations are equally valid. Derrida insists instead on undecidability under conditions of responsibility. Ethical and interpretive decisions must be made without final, grounding guarantees, but this lack of foundations does not mean arbitrariness. On the contrary, responsibility becomes more demanding when one cannot appeal to absolute rules. Derrida consistently distances himself from relativism by arguing that justice, unlike law, is not relative, even though it cannot be fully present or codified.

What unites these figures is that they reject foundationalism, the idea that morality needs an ahistorical, metaphysically secure ground, while also rejecting the relativist conclusion that norms are therefore merely subjective or interchangeable. The label “relativism” is typically applied by critics who assume that if universal foundations are unavailable, then only relativism remains. But these thinkers reject that forced choice. They are trying to articulate forms of normativity that are historical, situated, and contingent without collapsing into “anything goes.”

Leontiskos (one of our more rigorous and philosophically sophisticated members and, perhaps, a classicist) seems to argue that anti-foundationalism is a variation of relativism... — Tom Storm

Just as a preliminary point, I don't think I've ever said anything like that. I don't even know what "foundationalism" or "anti-foundationalism" are supposed to be. On TPF "foundationalism" is often used as a kind of vague slur. It is one of those words that is applied to one's opponents but is never adopted by anyone themselves.

Here's one way to put the argument I've made: If nothing is right or wrong, then it is not logically coherent to place blame. Or else, if moral realism is false, then there is no ground for basic moral claims. So:

Is slavery wrong? I can definitely see how it would be wrong from a human values perspective. If you essentially accept the Western tradition, that life should be about values like flourishing and freedom and well-being and the minimisation of suffering, then slavery is not an ideal way to go about it. — Tom Storm

On this view if you see a slaveholder you could rationally engage them by saying, "If you agree that freedom is an ultimate value then it is wrong for you to hold slaves," but it would not be rational to simply say, "It is wrong for you to hold slaves." On such a view there can be hypothetical imperatives but not non-hypothetical imperatives.

What I am interested in here is whether it is possible to make moral claims from either position. I can certainly see how simple relativism makes it a performative contradiction. Hence the relativist fallacy. — Tom Storm

So then the question remains: Is it possible to make moral claims from the position of "anti-foundationalism"? That depends on what you mean by "anti-foundationalism," but in a general sense I am more interested in what you yourself believe than what so-called "anti-foundationalists" believe.

But I will try to revisit this when I have a bit more time.

Just as a preliminary point, I don't think I've ever said anything like that. I don't even know what "foundationalism" or "anti-foundationalism" are supposed to be. On TPF "foundationalism" is often used as a kind of vague slur. It is one of those words that is applied to one's opponents but is never adopted by anyone themselves. — Leontiskos

Good to know and apologies if I have made some assumptions. I've tended to view myself as sympathetic to anti-foundationalism.

So then the question remains: Is it possible to make moral claims from the position of "anti-foundationalism"? That depends on what you mean by "anti-foundationalism," but in a general sense I am more interested in what you yourself believe than what so-called "anti-foundationalists" believe.

But I will try to revisit this when I have a bit more time. — Leontiskos

Fair points. If you get a chance, yes please. I think your perspective on this will be useful.

But he insists that his view is not relativist but ethnocentric: we always reason from within our own inherited practices, vocabularies, and moral sentiments. For Rorty, the key point is not that “anything goes,” but that justification is always to someone, to a community with shared norms, without implying that all communities are equally good or beyond criticism. — Joshs

For me this view just seems inherently common sensical. But I'm always somewhat fearful when something seems like common sense.

Heidegger rejects relativism because he doesn’t think the disclosure of Being is a matter of subjective or cultural “points of view.” Historical “worlds” are not interchangeable frameworks chosen by agents; they are ontological conditions that shape what can count as intelligible at all. The difference between epochs is not a difference between equally valid beliefs, but a transformation in how being itself is revealed. — Joshs

There's a lot in this to unpack but I see where it's headed. Sounds promising.

What unites these figures is that they reject foundationalism, the idea that morality needs an ahistorical, metaphysically secure ground, while also rejecting the relativist conclusion that norms are therefore merely subjective or interchangeable. The label “relativism” is typically applied by critics who assume that if universal foundations are unavailable, then only relativism remains. But these thinkers reject that forced choice. They are trying to articulate forms of normativity that are historical, situated, and contingent without collapsing into “anything goes.” — Joshs

That's a helpful summary and pretty much what I've been attempting to describe. Appreciate your reply.

Good to know and apologies if I have made some assumptions. — Tom Storm

No worries. My point about hypothetical vs. non-hypothetical imperatives or ought-judgments could also be revised in relation to this:

Anti-foundationalists, by contrast, hold that we can still justify our views through shared practices, shared goals and reasoning, even if there’s no single universal truth to ground them. — Tom Storm

So, as above, you could rationally say, "If you share my premises then it is wrong for you to hold slaves," but it would be irrational for you to simply say, "It is wrong for you to hold slaves." If there is no reason for anyone else to share your premises, then we have the same problem I pointed out in my first post. In other words, I would want to ask why anyone should share your values in the first place. That is the key question, and your claim that you can justify the conclusion of an argument to those who agree with (or share) the premises is not at all controversial. (Incidentally, this is what Rawls eventually admitted about his work, namely that it is not capable of reaching out beyond his own cultural context).

So, as above, you could rationally say, "If you share my premises then it is wrong for you to hold slaves," but it would be irrational for you to simply say, "It is wrong for you to hold slaves." If there is no reason for anyone else to share your premises, then we have the same problem I pointed out in my first post. In other words, I would want to ask why anyone should share your values in the first place. That is the key question, and your claim that you can justify the conclusion of an argument to those who agree with (or share) the premises is not at all controversial. (Incidentally, this is what Rawls eventually admitted about his work, namely that it is not capable of reaching out beyond his own cultural context — Leontiskos

Good. Exactly. I think this is the key issue we should explore. I'd need to think though how to answer thsi without making a mess of the reasoning. I'm not ideally placed to do this. :wink: We really need an experienced anti-foundationalist.

Best I can do is this; and I'm going the long way around. An anti-foundationalist might argue that in a society caring about solidarity ("inclusion" to use the trendy woke term) is not about metaphysical necessity, it’s about practical consequences and shared aims. Cultures that reject solidarity tend to produce fear, domination, and instability. They undermine trust and cooperation, which woudl seem essential for any functioning society. So even without universal moral facts, there are strong pragmatic reasons for solidarity: it helps communities flourish, reduces harm, and supports mutual security.

Now you can respond, “So what?” And I woudl say such a quesion is morality in action. Do we want to find ways of working together or not? Sure, we don’t have to. We could create a culture of death, pain, and suffering if we wanted. But who would really support that? Human beings are social animals who cooperate to attain goals and thrive. That's morality right there, pragmatic and unfounded on anything beyond human experince.

Seems to me that without moral facts I can still argue that slavery is wrong if I believe it is not an effective way to achieve the goal of overall flourishing. If you ask me why we should care about overall flourishing, I would say: because flourishing reflects the kinds of lives and communities we have reason to value. Lives with less suffering, more security, and greater opportunities for cooperation and mutual respect. These reasons don’t depend on eternal truths; they grow out of human experience and the practical need to live together.

I think that's the best I can do with this for now.

I think you did pretty well, and I agree with the general argument you've presented. Another tack, in my view, would be to point out to anyone who cares that their moral views be supported by "pure" rationality, that there is no purely rational reason why anyone deserves less moral consideration than anyone else.

This is the basis of the idea that we are all equal before the law. no one would want to live in a society wherein murder, rape, theft, slavery, exploitation and so on are condoned or even advocated.

There may be no moral facts, but there are facts about people's moral attitudes. I doubt you could find anyone who advocates the above -mentioned acts. There can be honor even among thieves.

Nice. I think this is a rich source for further discussion. The matter of pure reason is interesting. I understand reasoning, I’m not sure what “pure” adds to it. I guess Kant meant by this an entirely a priori understanding. Like you, I tend to think the role of affect and experience has a significant role in reasoning but I’m no expert. Many seem to think a sound morality is a form of rationalism.

Any concept, be it relativism, anti-fundamentalism, or postpositivism, is a conceptual framework or analytical tool—a "lens" through which to describe a phenomenon, defining the boundaries of what is and isn't included within that concept. Roughly speaking, it's an idea to see the world or phenomena in a certain way, and for the sake of economy (to avoid describing the full content each time), an appropriate term—a construct—is selected. This construct is tested and accepted or rejected by intersubjective consensus.

If you approach the topic you've outlined from this perspective, the content of the idea itself, rather than its specific name, comes to the fore.

As for the content of these ideas, they have much in common—they are tools for describing the different views of contemporary people on the world order. Both terms, to varying degrees and with varying nuances, express the different understandings of contemporary people about the foundations of the world. You can create your own construct.

For me, the idea (content) itself is always more important. Perhaps philologists value a more precise demarcation of terminology.

The question of whether anti-foundationalism allows moral assertions depends on whether we believe morality requires a metaphysical foundation. If we adopt a pragmatic perspective, moral norms can be justified not through eternal truths, but through intersubjective practices, the goals of shared life, and the ability of norms to work cooperatively. Anti-foundationalism then doesn't boil down to relativism—because norms may not be "absolute," but still rational, critiqued, and improveable. In this understanding, a "position" arises not from metaphysics, but from the practice of reasoning.

One possible terminological consideration would be to cast the debate in terms of the contrast between 'contingent' with 'unconditional' rather than between 'relative' and 'absolute' (or 'foundational'.) The terms 'absolute' and 'foundation' have the unfortunate connotation of being fixed, solid, unmoveable, and, so, inflexible and indifferent to negotiation.

An expression I've heard in relation to this apparent dilemma is the 'Cartesian anxiety' - that either knowledge has an indubitable foundation, or else certainty falls away and we're left with mere conjecture. I think that's also a consequence of Christian monotheism and the 'jealous God'. And talk of 'the absolute' or a 'philosophical absolute' invariably sounds both ponderous and covertly theistic.

Interestingly, the 'cartesian anxiety' is a theme taken up in The Embodied Mind, where it is proposed that this anxiety is a strong motivating force in current culture. But they see it as a false dilemma which needs to be overcome. Very much an 'all or nothing' kind of mindset. Their analysis is too lengthy to summarise here, but it's one of the source texts for enactivism, a key theme of which is the transcending of the subject/object, self/world division.

Nevertheless I think there's a real gap in philosophical discourse where the unconditioned should be. If everything is contingent, then the best that can be hoped for is a kind of social consensus or inter-subjective agreement. But then, if we're part of a flawed culture, there's no reason that either will provide us with a proper moral foundation. We might still be subject to Descartes' 'evil daemon', meaning that what we've gone through life thinking is real and substantial might in the end be illusory. I think that's a legitimate cause of angst.

The matter of pure reason is interesting. I understand reasoning, I’m not sure what “pure” adds to it. — Tom Storm

What I had in mind was simply reasoning based on unbiased premises. Take, for example, the dialogue between Thrasymachus and Socrates about the nature of justice. Thrasymachus argues that justice consists in the "advantage of the stronger". That can be challenged on the basis that such an opinion is based on a bias in the favour of power. Of course the powerful can force a situation where their wishes carry the day and are purported to be just, but it doesn't stand up to rational scrutiny. So, there is no purely rational (i.e. unbiased) justification for equating the wishes of the powerful with justice.

We might still be subject to Descartes' 'evil daemon', meaning that what we've gone through life thinking is real and substantial might in the end be illusory. I think that's a legitimate cause of angst. — Wayfarer

There is no escape from the downward spiral of such absurd thinking, except to reject it for what it is.

Four stellar paragraphs. Thanks.

One possible terminological consideration would be to cast the debate in terms of the contrast between 'contingent' with 'unconditional' rather than between 'relative' and 'absolute' (or 'foundational'.) — Wayfarer

Indeed, I was actually going to raise this but thought I had done enough damage already. :up:

nterestingly, the 'cartesian anxiety' is a theme taken up in The Embodied Mind, where it is proposed that this anxiety is a strong motivating force in current culture. But they see it as a false dilemma which needs to be overcome. — Wayfarer

That resonates with me.

Their analysis is too lengthy to summarise here, but it's one of the source texts for enactivism, a key theme of which is the transcending of the subject/object, self/world division. — Wayfarer

If I were of a more scholarly cast I think this is precisely where I would go looking for a coherant model of thought in this space.

Nevertheless I think there's a real gap in philosophical discourse where the unconditioned should be. If everything is contingent, then the best that can be hoped for is a kind of social consensus or inter-subjective agreement. But then, if we're part of a flawed culture, there's no reason that either will provide us with a proper moral foundation. — Wayfarer

Wow! The sting in the tail is the last sentence. I think this can be the problem, and perhaps ultimately why anti-foundationalism is often resisted. By "proper" I am assuming one that allows for flourishing, solidarity - you might also include higher contemplation?

We might still be subject to Descartes' 'evil daemon', meaning that what we've gone through life thinking is real and substantial might in the end be illusory. I think that's a legitimate cause of angst. — Wayfarer

Hmm, I've been pondering this since I was 7 or 8.

The question of whether anti-foundationalism allows moral assertions depends on whether we believe morality requires a metaphysical foundation. — Astorre

Yes, and that's the quesion I am posing.

moral norms can be justified not through eternal truths, but through intersubjective practices, the goals of shared life, and the ability of norms to work cooperatively. Anti-foundationalism then doesn't boil down to relativism—because norms may not be "absolute," but still rational, critiqued, and improveable. In this understanding, a "position" arises not from metaphysics, but from the practice of reasoning. — Astorre

I think we are in agreement about the possibility of this lens.

But there are likely to be good arguments against it too.

By "proper" I am assuming one that allows for flourishing, solidarity - you might also include higher contemplation? — Tom Storm

Indeed. But one has to ‘see it to be it’, so to speak. No use holding forth on it otherwise.

If I were of a more scholarly cast I think this is precisely where I would go looking for a coherant model of thought in this space. — Tom Storm

Considering your number of forum posts, as well as the fact that you read almost every thread on this forum, I imagine you're already more than well-educated. Perhaps there's no document? But for me, a fan of content over form, that means nothing.

Hmm, I've been pondering this since I was 7 or 8. — Tom Storm

I would have thought you are too level-headed to take such thinking seriously, even at an early age.