I support the idea of social welfare, free education and medical services and, most importantly, taxing the rich to a much greater degree than is presently happening. But no government seems to have the balls to do it — Janus

Agree.

OK, then we disagree on that. I think their attitude is simplistically self-serving and sociopathic. For me sociopathy is not an "all or nothing" proposition, but is on a spectrum. — Janus

One of the problems for me is that each side in this discourse seems to think the other is sociopathic. Today’s discourse is polarized and antagonistic. I’d like to see more civil conversations between people with different worldviews. I’m reluctant to call individuals sociopathic.

One of the problems for me is that each side in this discourse seems to think the other is sociopathic. Today’s discourse is polarized and antagonistic. I’d like to see more civil conversations between people with different worldviews. I’m reluctant to call individuals sociopathic. — Tom Storm

It's not that I'd say the individuals are necessarily sociopaths, but that their attitude of "let them sink or swim" is sociopathic. I don't believe this attitude is good for the individuals in need or for society as a whole (or even for the individuals holding such attitudes). In my view such attitudes and the policies that reflect them contribute to social ill-being in more ways than just their impact on the individuals in need, and in that sense I would class such attitudes and policies as sociopathic.

Firstly, great post.

The contemporary thinker I personally follow most closely is Peter L. P. Simpson, who defends what he calls "ethical naturalism," but it's hard to specify the contours of such a thing without getting into his book. Also, I don't think that level of detail is necessary in order to avoid the problem I've pointed to with regards to relativism. I think 180's approach does a fine job avoiding the problem I've raised in this thread. — Leontiskos

Cool. I'll have a look. That's helpful.

I think so. I admit that I didn't follow your conversation with Fire Ologist very closely, but I myself think well-being is a perfectly reasonable and defensible moral standard. When people want to argue for a more "transcendent" standard they are usually concerned with specific, rarefied moral truths or norms (e.g. "You should be willing to sacrifice your life for the good of your family if push comes to shove"). — Leontiskos

Nice. I need to refine my understanding of this.

Note, though, that the person who seeks money will have a harder time rationally justifying their position than the person who seeks well-being. This is because—as Aristotle points out—money is a means of exchange without intrinsic worth. If one does not seek money for the sake of the things that money can buy, but rather seeks money and the accumulation of money as an end in itself, then they would seem to be acting in an intrinsically irrational way. Put differently, you should be able to give someone everything money can buy and at that point they should have no real desire for money. If they still desire money at that point then they desire a means without an end, and are therefore irrational. — Leontiskos

That's a great point well put.

I would suggest that no one can opt-out entirely, except perhaps the hermit who abandons all civilization and lives self-sufficiently in the wilderness. Aristotle calls such a person a 'god' given that this is basically impossible to do. If we interact with other human beings then we must also decide how to interact with other humans beings, and anyone who does that already has moral positions, whether they understand them or not. — Leontiskos

Yes, I have often thought this too. For me, as a non-philosopher with finite time and years left, there is an issue around what I can legitimately acquire in terms of knowledge and perhaps more importantly understanding and wisdom. It's clear to me that most of the significant debates in philosophy, including moral philosophy, require some significant reading and study. Most of the recurring questions of philosophy have not been conclusively answered, and some of those answers are more complex than the average person can ever hope to understand. It's hard to know what to do. Sometimes a little bit of knowledge can be a dangerous thing, as we sometimes see on this forum.

What is a person's mandate to figure all this out? It often feels that as public discourse grows increasingly coarse and belligerent, and good philosophy becomes harder to acquire, it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely.

Firstly, great post. — Tom Storm

Thanks. There is one thing I want to come back to:

My understanding is that [moral naturalism is] the view that moral facts, if they exist, are grounded in natural facts about the world rather than in anything supernatural or non-natural. — Tom Storm

This specific understanding of moral naturalism is also something I am okay with, especially as pertains to the OP. There is a notion in the Anglophone world that moral realism goes hand in hand with divine command theory, and my guess is that this stems from Anscombe. I'd say it is really hard to overestimate how faulty such a thesis is. Divine command theory is a latecomer to the theological scene, especially in Christianity, and it doesn't really solve any meta-ethical questions. Connotatively, moral (or ethical) "naturalism" more often refers to the alternative to the ethical non-naturalism of the 20th century. But that's why I asked what you meant by the term. I am fine with it on either reading, but if you mean something like "non-religious," then it is much easier to agree that it is a reasonable view.

Yes, I have often thought this too. For me, as a non-philosopher with finite time and years left, there is an issue around what I can legitimately acquire in terms of knowledge and perhaps more importantly understanding and wisdom. It's clear to me that most of the significant debates in philosophy, including moral philosophy, require some significant reading and study. Most of the recurring questions of philosophy have not been conclusively answered, and some of those answers are more complex than the average person can ever hope to understand. It's hard to know what to do. Sometimes a little bit of knowledge can be a dangerous thing, as we sometimes see on this forum. — Tom Storm

I understand what you are saying.

What is a person's mandate to figure all this out? It often feels that as public discourse grows increasingly coarse and belligerent, and good philosophy becomes harder to acquire, it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely. — Tom Storm

I don't think of you as a non-philosopher. I don't think academic philosophy has a monopoly on philosophy. In fact I think academic philosophy is oftentimes positively unhelpful, unphilosophical, and ivory tower-ish. For example, in I argued that my four year-old nephew engages in philosophy, and I did this in response to some TPFers who seem to think that if you're not rearranging existential quantifiers then you must not be doing philosophy. I don't mean that as hyperbolic. That exchange with my nephew was philosophical. It was more philosophical than many of my exchanges on TPF.

So whether or not you are reading through the academic philosophical positions on meta-ethics, I think you are doing philosophy. In all honesty, I think the best moral philosophers are probably not academics (and that some of the worst moral philosophers are academics). Judges, school teachers, counselors, pastors, business managers, sports coaches - these are the people who are actually competent moral philosophers. The best objection to this claim of mine would be, "Well they are morally skillful individuals insofar as they routinely navigate and adjudicate deeply complex human interactions, but they may not be able to explain any of that on a theoretical level." That would be a fair objection, and I might amend my claim by saying, "Okay, but some of them really can explain the theory behind it, and those people tend to understand the theory better than the academics. They engage the theory on a day-to-day basis with real stakes and real consequences."

For example, the person who tries to think through the problem of their estrangement from their adult child is doing moral philosophy in a pre-eminent way.

What is a person's mandate to figure all this out? It often feels that as public discourse grows increasingly coarse and belligerent, and good philosophy becomes harder to acquire, it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely. — Tom Storm

Yeah, I get that. Aquinas says that we should enter the ocean through small streams, not all at once. So you start where you are, and build out from what you already have. Maybe you think twice about your wife's perspective in the last argument you had. Maybe you step back from an unfortunate decision that your boss made and try to understand the way he sees the world, and then compare it to the way you see the world (and try to deeply understand and even justify why you would not have made the decision he made).

If you're thinking about literature then Plato comes to mind. He is remarkable insofar as he exercises everyone, from beginner to advanced, with the exact same texts. Beyond that, good fiction literature is extremely fruitful in a moral sense, because it provides insight into the complexities of human life and human persons.

If you really want to do the academic thing then you probably want to start with handbooks or overviews.

it is sometimes tempting to just say, "Fuck it, I know what I like and I can’t really do much better than that," or even to opt out entirely. — Tom Storm

The more general question here has to do with the tension between improvement and contentment. "Have I devoted sufficient energy to improvement? Is it okay to be content with where I am? Is my contentment really complacency?" It's always a balance, and it changes with age, duties, the availability of leisure, etc.

For my part I try to devote more attention to the perspectives and moralities in my immediate vicinity (e.g. family, friends, local community, my own country...). It might be fun to read about Confucian morality from 2500 years ago, but if you're talking about a "mandate" then it's not to the point. For example, I am currently trying to understand Nick Fuentes and the movement that he represents, because he is relevant to my country, to the region where I live, to my conservative political sensibilities, to the young men who I interact with, etc. To illustrate, someone like Fuentes says, "I live in Chicago where there is rampant gang violence committed largely by blacks. Therefore for my own safety and the safety of my family I must be racist towards black people, avoiding the neighborhoods where they live and taking extreme caution when interacting with them." The moral philosopher is the person who takes that perspective seriously and tries to interact with it in a fruitful way instead of just writing it off as malicious and irrational racism. The attempt to respond rationally and effectively to those racist perspectives is currently a topic of interest in the U.S.

This specific understanding of moral naturalism is also something I am okay with, especially as pertains to the OP. There is a notion in the Anglophone world that moral realism goes hand in hand with divine command theory, and my guess is that this stems from Anscombe. I'd say it is really hard to overestimate how faulty such a thesis is. — Leontiskos

Gotya. That's a useful insight to me. Cheers.

I think the best moral philosophers are probably not academics (and that some of the worst moral philosophers are academics). Judges, school teachers, counselors, pastors, business managers, sports coaches - these are the people who are actually competent moral philosophers. — Leontiskos

I wouldn’t have expected this, but I can see the merit in the view, precisely because, as you say, …

They engage the theory on a day-to-day basis with real stakes and real consequences." — Leontiskos

Maybe you step back from an unfortunate decision that your boss made and try to understand the way he sees the world, and then compare it to the way you see the world (and try to deeply understand and even justify why you would not have made the decision he made). — Leontiskos

I think this is important. I’m interested in people who think differently from me (part of the reason I joined) and in understanding why they think that way. I also think we’re in a terrible place, even in Australia, where conservatives and progressives (for want of a better term) talk past each other and tend to regard the other side as insane or deficient. We need to listen. Having said that, I’m not especially fond of activism on either side.

The more general question here has to do with the tension between improvement and contentment. "Have I devoted sufficient energy to improvement? Is it okay to be content with where I am? Is my contentment really complacency?" It's always a balance, and it changes with age, duties, the availability of leisure, etc. — Leontiskos

Yes, I think it does come down to this.

The moral philosopher is the person who takes that perspective seriously and tries to interact with it in a fruitful way instead of just writing it off as malicious and irrational racism. The attempt to respond rationally and effectively to those racist perspectives is currently a topic of interest in the U.S. — Leontiskos

I hear you. I'm probably on the progressive side compared to you but I have conservative intuitions such as wanting to preserve certain institutions and traditions.

For example, I am currently trying to understand Nick Fuentes — Leontiskos

I’d be interested in what you find. He’s a contentious figure.

I’m intrigued by our own anti-immigration and populist politician, Pauline Hanson. A fascinating long essay was written about her party and its membership, which was useful in helping me get my bearings.

I was intrigued for a while by Roger Scruton and his understanding of the conservative tradition. What are your thoughts? I wasn't on board with all I've heard him say but I appreciated his rigour and he had a generosity that is sometimes missing from public intellectuals who focus so clearly on values.

A well-known Australian conservative commentator once described conservatism as a disposition rather than an elaborate philosophy. I wonder whether you think that’s right.

This may not belong here, but since I started this thread, I’ll ask it anyway. It seems to me that we tend to bundle together terms like conservative, right-wing, and reactionary, even though they represent quite different traditions and approaches. If you were to parse the conservative tradition and the right more broadly, how would you go about it?

I apologise that I didn't respond to your very thoughtful contribution. I must have missed it. — Tom Storm

I must admit I've not been reading this thread lately. Work's been very taxing and I couldn't muster the concentration. I've yet to catch up with this thread; I'm fairly sure I will when things have quited down.

As far as I read, though, your discussion with Leontiskos was very interesting to read.

Yes, that’s true. The anti-foundationalist would probably say that things can still count as better or worse relative to shared cultural goals and values, without being grounded in anything transcendent or universal beyond that. We want safe traffic, so we create road rules. Many of these rules are partly arbitrary; we can drive on different sides of the road or adopt different turning conventions, but there are clearly practices that work better or worse for safety. None of this makes road rules objectively true independent of contingent human purposes and conditions. How different is morality to this? — Tom Storm

Pretty much my take.

Unfortunately, I think a required clarification, will defeat this in a significant way: — AmadeusD

Sorry for not being clear. I didn't spot the ambiguity when writing my post: "to shut them up" was supposed to indicate intent not effect. I'm a relativist myself, and if that sort of thing shuts me up, it does so in a "not-that-again" way.

I understand this to be true, given that those people are not Western. It is wrong to us. — AmadeusD

Yes, pretty much.

My form of relativism goes outward in concentric circles, with decisions often involving conflict:

- interior conflict (and individual wondering what to do)
- conflict between people
- conflict between groups
- conflict between bigger groups

So:

accept as moral the idea that some foreign culture has a scripture which commands that ever third child is purposefully blinded in service of the faith — AmadeusD

This just focuses on consensus over conflict. If I think that's wrong I can find and support elements in that culture that also thinks this is wrong.

Then: given that I'm an atheist (and so is Harris), faith isn't going to carry legitimising weight with me. But whether I can outright say this depends on who I'm talking to - how much I'll get into trouble saying this.

And that can cause problems, too, if I wish to support people who are against that sort of blinding, but they're against it from a position of minority faith, and thus - by banding together - we need to settle other moral conflicts, or agree to set them aside for the time being as much as possible.

But before that: should I even get involved? Is it any of my business? In how far can I make my moral disgust the problem of unrelated others? Am I going to have the mental and emotional fortitude to pull through? What if I change my mind but can't stop the avalanche I've started?

I consider morality an ongoing iterative process like that.

I don't really want to say much more until I've caught up with the thread, as I don't know what's already been said.

I think this is important. I’m interested in people who think differently from me (part of the reason I joined) and in understanding why they think that way. I also think we’re in a terrible place, even in Australia, where conservatives and progressives (for want of a better term) talk past each other and tend to regard the other side as insane or deficient. We need to listen. Having said that, I’m not especially fond of activism on either side. — Tom Storm

That makes sense to me.

I hear you. I'm probably on the progressive side compared to you but I have conservative intuitions such as wanting to preserve certain institutions and traditions. — Tom Storm

Yeah, I think conservation of at least some things is something most people are interested in.

I’d be interested in what you find. He’s a contentious figure.

I’m intrigued by our own anti-immigration and populist politician, Pauline Hanson. A fascinating long essay was written about her party and its membership, which was useful in helping me get my bearings. — Tom Storm

Interesting. In some ways I think Fuentes is a red-pilled young man with an all-or-nothing attitude. He feels as though if he stops short of 100% he will not have the effect he wants to have. This leads to an iconoclastic attitude towards cultural shibboleths. In some ways it's fairly simple. For example, on race Fuentes has grown up in the midst of an ever-growing problem of black crime in Chicago, and because speaking up about the problem leads to gaslighting in the form of "racist" accusations, Fuentes ends up embracing or at least disregarding the label ("I'd rather be a 'racist' than be murdered"). I had a hard time understanding his anti-Semitism until I watched a video from a British guy (Connor Tomlinson) explaining Fuentes' position in the midst of the recent fallout of a Piers Morgan interview (link). Tomlinson seems to be representing Fuentes' ideas in a much more rational and polite way, and at the same time explaining the phenomenon of Fuentes and his followers. You spoke of the way the two sides, "talk past each other and tend to regard the other side as insane or deficient," and Fuentes is an example of how that approach can blow up in our faces.

The moral question for American conservatives is something like this: is Fuentes an anti-immigrationist who happens to be anti-Semitic? Or is he an anti-Semite who happens to be an anti-immigrationist? Or does it not matter?

The moral principle that few understand is that all immoral acts come down to a form of neglect (i.e. neglecting what one knows they are supposed to observe). Fuentes might say, "When I say 'Hitler is cool,' I am referring to a lot of the things he did apart from genocide, such as rising a nation out of the ashes, or his military prowess, or his style and skill at public speaking." The problem is that if it is impermissible to obliquely affirm genocide, then none of these reasons work as justifications. Or to give a simpler example, if one is not allowed to kill people, then one must also take pains to avoid being neglectful in ways that could cause someone's death. "It wasn't my intention for him to die," is not a sufficient justification if the person was doing something they knew could reasonably cause others to die. But if you back a young man far enough into a corner, he simply won't care about these nuanced moral distinctions, and that's sort of understandable.