I entirely agree, although I expect our interpretations will differ somewhat. — Punshhh

:up:

Thoughts? — Esse Quam Videri

That's an interesting way to frame the antinomy. However, I feel like it divorces the 'epistemological' and the 'ontological' aspects in a too radical way. Let me explain why.

The dilemma consists of two 'horns':

1) The analysis of the empirical world (and here I include the inner experience of sentient beings) strongly suggests that the consciousness of individual sentient beings is not fundamental. It even suggests that these individual consciousnesses arose in time via an evolutionary process.
2) However, the above 'insight' assumes that the 'world' is intelligible. Assuming that this intelligibility is not a deception, it makes us wonder why it is there in the first place. Does it make sense to think of 'intelligibility' without any reference to a cognizing consciousness?

So (1) suggests that individual consciousnesses of sentient beings are contingent and perhaps derived from something that isn't conscious. (2) however seems to suggest that this 'not conscious ground' is somehow understandable by consciousness.

So, let's say one wants to take seriously both insights. Sentient beings are not 'fundamental entities' per (1). Ok, but (2) suggests that the 'external world' is intelligible. If it is true, then we have an ontological claim about the 'external world' that is 'outside' the consciousnesses of sentient beings.

If it is true, as I believe, that it can't be that 'intelligibility' makes any sense without reference to a cognizing consciousness, the most reasonable alternative that I believe we have is to posit a 'Consciousness' that is, in fact, fundamental. The apparent intelligibility of the 'external world' isn't a 'happy accident' that is unexplainable and that somehow by pure coincidence gives us the possibility to navigate into the world. Rather, intelligibility would be an essential property of both the 'sentient' and 'insentient' entities.

I am not @Wayfarer and I don't speak for him but as I see Nagarjuna goes beyond phenomenologists. Remember that most Buddhist schools IIRC say that the 'self' is illusion-like, a mere appearance. Various Buddhist schools affirmed that while the 'self' was such a 'mere appearance', there was a set of ultimate, irreducible 'entities' (dharmas) that were either 'conditioned' or 'unconditioned' (like Nirvana).
Nagarjuna went further and claimed, as I understand him, that even these purpoted 'ultimate entities' are in fact illusion-like, just like the self*. So, all conceptual models that we can imagine about 'reality as it is' (i.e. ultimate reality) inevitably fail. And, in fact, by analysing the claims of his both non-Buddhist and Buddhist opponents he concluded that all ontological theories about 'ultimate reality' are inconsistent. For instance, there is no coherent way, according to him, to explain the arising and ceasing of a 'truly existing' entity. This leads to the conclusion that the 'entities' that supposedly arise and cease in fact do not arise at all*. So, Nagarjuna claimed that in order to avoid inconsistencies, one should avoid to have any 'thesis', i.e. any metaphysical theory*.

However, Nagarjuna was also wary to point out that at a provisional level, there is an appearance that entities arise, cease, display regularities (e.g. 'dependent origination')*, there are selves that are subject to 'karmic' laws and so on.

The objection that I would personally give to Nagarjuna is how these two 'truths' can be reconciled. That is, how if there are is no indeed an intelligible ultimate reality we can even make sense of the appearance of an intelligible world of selves, 'dharmas' and so on, especially when we are told by Nagarjuna himself that we should take this 'apparently intelligible world' very, very seriously.

* I quote some citations from a work attributed to Nagarjuna, the 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning':

21

Since there is nothing that arises,

There is nothing that disintegrates;

Yet the paths of arising and disintegration

Were taught [by the Buddha] for a purpose.

22

By understanding arising, disintegration is understood;

By understanding disintegration, impermanence is understood;

By understanding how to engage with impermanence,

The sublime dharma is understood as well.
...

33

Just as the Buddhas have spoken of

“I” and “mine” for a practical purpose;

Likewise they spoke too of “aggregates,”

“Elements” and “sense-fields” for practical reasons.
...
48

“Who understands this?” one might wonder;

It’s those who see dependent origination.

The supreme knower of reality has taught

That dependent arising is unborn.
...
50

Those who are great beings,

They have neither thesis nor contention;

For those who have no thesis,

How can there be opposing thesis? — Nagarjuna, Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning