Thanks for the additional clarification. Your additional comments do a great job of hammering in the logic behind your argument. — Esse Quam Videri

Thank you for the polite and well written inquiry! It is rare to not get angry pushback. Not that you have to agree with me as this continues, it is just nice to have a pleasant discussion.

Another way of framing the worry is that explaining each individual item within a contingent series by reference to its predecessor does not explain why there is a contingent series at all. The relations within the series can't be used to explain the existence of the series itself. The response "it just is" seems to arbitrarily terminate inquiry rather than satisfy it. I wouldn't argue that this is incoherent, but I might argue that it is unprincipled. — Esse Quam Videri

A very good approach. Lets imagine for a second that the logic is correct and it is the case that ultimately there is no cause for existence, and thus contingency itself. Does that shut down inquiry, or open new avenues for us to explore?

First, understanding this ultimate end result does not diminish our need to understand as much about the causal universe as possible. Understanding the universe allows us to make wiser choices, and potentially control outcomes favorable to the human race.

Second, proving, "This is the thing that has no causality for its existence," is nigh impossible from a practical standpoint. There is always the question whether we have arrived at 'the end' or simply the end of our capability to understand either through the limitations of knowledge, observation, or instrumentation.

So I do not see it as a discouragement to inquiry and exploration of understanding our universe as much as possible. If it is true that ultimately there is no cause for contingency itself, this would be a discovery of the truth, and therefore a further understanding of the universe. This allows us to push our exploration into realms we had not yet thought possible.

For example, if it is the case that there is no underlying reason for why existence is, besides the fact that it is, we can put forth new ideas that might help us as we continue to explore causal interactions. If there was no reason for existence to be, then there is no reason for any existence not to be. Meaning in the next second, something could appear in reality that wasn't there before. Or something that was there could disappear.

Further it seems that if something could appear in reality, it could be anything. After all, if there is no reason for existence, de facto there are no limitations as to what can exist. There would have to be something which would cause there to be a limitation.

Thus while the conclusion might appear limiting at first, it is actually one of the most freeing to give credence to infinite possibilities. Knowing this can let us look at the universe in a new light. Could we math out what 'anything being possible' would logically entail? I've done a few approaches myself as proposals.

For example, imagine that the universe is an infinite plane and anything could happen at any moment on that plane. We can break the plane down into a theoretical x/y/z. Then we can do a bit of cardinality comparison. If 1, is the smallest space and 'smallest' particle (of course smallest is a limitation, but just go with this for a second) then we have the highest growing infinite series.

First, we must assume that if anything is possible, everything has an equal chance of appearing, disappearing, or being as anything else. In one time unit, every x,y,z portion of the grid could have something happen, or not happen. What's the chance of there being something that is the same from piece to piece? Infintismaly small. But given infinite x,y,z, it will happen. But its likely not going to happen anywhere near another cluster of sameness. Further, even if something happens on this level, if it does affect something around it larger, its going to be imperceptible and nearly negligible. Essentially a random dice roll in the universe that introduces the concept that at a particular level of measurement there is a principle of uncertainty.

Let me stop here. I could continue on with more questions that this raises, but I want to give you a chance to think about this first and potentially come to them yourself.

Is there anything that exists contingently?

I challenge the assumption that we should assume contingency unless proven necessary. I believe there are laws of nature, and that laws entail a necessitation: given a cause, the effect will necessarily follow.

The exception is quantum indeterminacy (most interpretations) but this still entails a necessary probability distribution. Still, it accounts for a restricted source of contingency: any specific quantum collapse could have come out differently. A specific instance of Quantum Collapse causes result X1, but it could have resulted in X2, X3....Xn.

Quantum collapse demonstrates how contingency works: X is contingent iff there is a C such that C accounts for X, but C could have accounted for Y. I.e. C contingently accounts for X. There is no other obvious source of contingency.

So suppose the past is finite. This implies an uncauses initial state (S0): that initial state was not caused and therefore there is no C that contingently accounts for S0. This would justify a claim that God exists necessarily, but it's more general - it doesn't entail a God. Whatever it may be,it exists necessarily.

The question of the OP invites a kind of view from nowhere, unconditioned by any framing or assumptions. Is there anything necessary tout court?

My contention is that such a question is meaningless. There is no view from nowhere. All meaningful questions about possibility and necessity are "small" questions, as puts it. In other words, they are asked within the context of a particular framing and grounding assumptions. A first-person account implies the existence of the first person. Newtonian physics unfolds against the background of an immutable Euclidean space and an independent time dimension. In these examples, as in all meaningful examples, necessity is contingent, as it were, on how the question is framed.

Is there one ultimate, unconditional, necessary frame that would ground all inquiry? Only in the most general, Kantian sense in which our cognitive faculties are constituted in a certain way, and the way they are constituted conditions how we see and reason about the world. But there is a curious circularity here: we are embedded in and are shaped by that same world, which in turn conditions how we see and reason about it. We are not entirely free to choose our frame of reasoning, because we have always already been framed by the very subject of our inquiry.

I would tentatively answer "yes", and argue that contingency means dependency on conditions. Dependency implies ordered explanatory relations. A structure of ordered explanatory relations ultimately requires an unconditioned (ungrounded) ground. — Esse Quam Videri

I agree with this, with the proviso that the ground is implicit in and contingent on the explanatory structure.

But I think the subsequent discussion of "intelligibility" goes astray, perhaps confusing the map with the territory. I don't know what it would mean for the reality to be intelligible (or necessary, or contingent, for that matter), except in the obvious sense that making the reality intelligible to us is what we as intelligent creatures do. This framing already implies that a world in which intelligent creatures thrive exists, and is perforce intelligible to those creatures. Fair enough. But if we go on to ask whether it is necessary that such a world exists, the question loses its meaning. Necessary in relation to what? What is the framing theory and whence it came from?

I take the OP as asking if there are any necessary individuals - things. Not "are there necessary propositions?" or "Are there necessary truths?".

So set aside "Meillassoux's "Absolute" and look at

every existing thing... can be conceived of as not existing... without contradiction (i.e. negating a "necessary thing").
— 180 Proof

...which can be seen as an informal version of my more formal argument. — Banno

Exactly. :up:

... metaphysical necessity. The very act of conceiving ~X presupposes a stable intelligible order — Esse Quam Videri

Btw, this (implicit) reification fallacy – ergo, substance duality – is merely reminiscent of Plato's question-begging (thereby unparsimonious and proto-Gnostic) "Theory of Forms" that as a consequence is imho more mythical than metaphysical.

Would you say that absent a necessary being, the universe is a result of either an infinite series of causes or a series terminating in an uncaused cause?

Only contingency is necessary (Q. Meillassoux's "Absolute") insofar as, without exception, every existing thing / fact (X) can be conceived of as not existing, or not being the case, (~X) without contradiction (i.e. negating a "necessary thing"). — 180 Proof

This only esrablishes conceptual possibility, not metaphysical possibility.

This only establishes conceptual possibility, not metaphysical possibility. — Relativist

Please clarify the difference between "conceptual" and "metaphysical" in this context.

Also consider @Banno's comment here ...

.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/dec/29/new-orleans-brothers-priest-killing-child-sexual-abuse

↪Philosophim Would you say that absent a necessary being, the universe is a result of either an infinite series of causes or a series terminating in an uncaused cause? — RogueAI

Its impossible to know with our current understanding. What I can claim with 100% confidence is that logically, either way, there is no cause which explains why the universe exists at all.

Meillasoux would resist framing his argument in terms of modal semantics — Esse Quam Videri

A pity, since his argument, and the the question of the OP, have model theoretical answers. We have in possible world semantics a clear and coherent grammar for modal issues. Ignoring it would be folly.

Your account seems to presume "logical necessity" concerns only entailment. Modal logic is not just concerned with mere entailment. It differentiates between and provides tools for considering nomological and metaphysical modality. There is, after all, an explicit distinction between ☐ and ⊢. And to that we can add model theory, including accessibility relations.

While we might agree that truth is not fixed by stipulation, the arguments of metaphysics should be coherent, and so constrained by a framework of logic.

Modal logic does not generate metaphysical necessity, but any claim to metaphysical necessity is accountable to modal logic.

So as I said,

Requiring an individual to exist in all worlds is a stipulated metaphysical condition, not a logical or semantic necessity. — Banno

Thank you, this helps clarify your position a great deal. You've covered a lot of ground and introduced some interesting and unexpected (in a good way) considerations. I still have a lingering concern, and it turns on one specific inference you’re making.

First, I agree with your first two points: (1) Accepting a metaphysical limit does not shut down scientific inquiry, and (2) we may never know whether we’ve reached the ultimate explanatory limit.

Where I think the argument possibly breaks down, is here:

If there was no reason for existence to be, then there is no reason for any existence not to be. — Philosophim

The absence of a reason for why anything exists at all does not entail the absence of intelligible constraints within existence. You are moving from “no ultimate explanation” to “no internal intelligibility,” but I'm not sure that follows.

In fact, the model you propose depends on there being constraints. You introduced theoretical constructs such as an infinite plane, spatial dimensions, time units, probability distributions, etc. But these aren't neutral, they already presuppose a highly structured and law-governed reality.

My worry is that if existence were genuinely unconstrained in the way you suggest, then there would literally be no reason for persistency over time, stable entities, probabilistic regularities rather than total chaos, or even the continued existence of the probability space you are modeling.

Furthermore, saying "anything could happen" immediately raises a new question: why in fact does almost nothing happen that could happen? Appealing to brute contingency does not answer these questions, it intensifies them. The stability of reality that we manifestly experience becomes radically inexplicable.

This is why I’ve been insisting on the difference between exhausting causal explanations and providing a metaphysical one. Reaching “the limit of causality” only tells us that a certain kind of explanation has ended. It does not show that what remains is self-explanatory or unconstrained. An infinite regress of contingent explanations, or a probabilistic model of unconstrained possibility, does not explain why there is an intelligible order rather than none. It simply assumes that order while denying any ground for it.

So the issue isn’t whether inquiry continues, I agree that it does. The issue is whether intelligibility itself is ultimately grounded or ultimately accidental. And if intelligibility is accidental, then the success of explanation becomes a coincidence — which undermines the very probabilistic and mathematical reasoning your proposal relies on (and on which science itself is based).

To state my worry more cleanly: can we ground the intelligibility of being in a radically unintelligible foundation without undermining intelligibility itself?

Another way to look at it is is, "What is the definition of necessary?" Necessary implies some law that if this does not exist, then something which relies on that thing cannot exist. — Philosophim

Necessity is not causation.

I wasn't explicit enough yesterday, so I'll bold it, just to be clear.

Aristotle made the distinction. A triangle necessarily has internal angles summing to two right angles—but the triangle is not caused to have them.

The Scholastics blurred the distinction, wanting to suppose that if God wills X, then X necessarily occurs. Necessity started to look like something imposed by a prior condition.

Descartes and Spinoza made it worse, treating necessity as divine decree. Hume and Kant went along with them. The logical positivists more or less agreed, and concluded that necessity was trivial.

Kripke restored metaphysical necessity using the structure of possible worlds. Something is necessary if it occurs in every possible world, possible if it occurs in at least one world, impossible if it occurs in none, and contingent if it occurs in some but not all.

This is far and away the best account we have.

Necessity does not imply some casual law.

Again, I'm not challenging accountability. I'm challenging reducibility. Metaphysical conclusions as to the existence of necessary beings (if there be such) are reached by inquiry and argument, not by stipulation.

I’m not reifying intelligibility or invoking Platonic Forms. The point is transcendental: conceivability presupposes intelligibility as a condition of judgment, not as a metaphysical entity. That X can be conceived as ~X shows only a lack of logical necessity, not metaphysical contingency. “Only contingency is necessary,” when asserted universally, already relies on the unconditioned intelligibility it claims to exclude.

Metaphysical conclusions as to the existence of necessary beings (if there be such) are reached by inquiry and argument, not by stipulation. — Esse Quam Videri

Far too broad. Every metaphysical inquiry stipulates a framework (language, identity conditions, modality), argues within that framework, and is answerable to coherence conditions expressible in logic.

“Only contingency is necessary,” when asserted universally, already relies on the unconditioned intelligibility it claims to exclude. — Esse Quam Videri

In other words, whatever is "asserted ... relies on" grammar (Ludwig W., Freddy N.).

That X can be conceived as ~X shows only a lack of logical necessity, not metaphysical contingency. — Esse Quam Videri

That word, "conceived".

What work is it doing here?

I’m not denying that metaphysics requires a framework; I’m denying that metaphysical necessity is itself a framework stipulation (language, logic, modality) rather than an explanatory conclusion.

I’m not denying that metaphysics requires a framework; I’m denying that metaphysical necessity is itself a framework stipulation (language, logic, modality) rather than an explanatory conclusion. — Esse Quam Videri

So... we agree that metaphysics requires a framework; but you don't see language and logic as a part of that framework but as the conclusion? I must be misunderstanding you.