Michael has used a bit of rhetoric to put those opposed to indirect perception on the back foot. They feel obliged to defend "direct" realism.

What one sees is the apple with a ten-second delay. What one does not see is some mental representation of the apple as it was ten seconds ago. — Banno

As I said to NOS4A2 there are (at least) three distinct claims:

1. We have direct visual perception of apples
2. We have direct visual perception of light
3. We have direct visual perception of mental phenomena/qualia/sense data

Even if (3) is false it does not follow that (1) is true.

The argument with the slow light is merely to show that (1) is false; not to show that (3) is true. It is true that the sense-datum theorist must also defend (3), but it's also true that the direct realist must still defend (1). The more minimal indirect realist (with respect to sight) need only defend the rejection of (1).

Not with our eyes. — NOS4A2

Either way, what you mean by "direct perception" isn't what most other direct realists mean by it. They will say that we do have direct visual perception of apples even though our sense organs are not in direct physical contact with the apples.

So we have the following proposition:

1. "I directly perceive X" means "my sense organs are in direct physical contact with X"

You seem to be saying that (1) is true, whereas both traditional direct realists and indirect realists will say that (1) is false.

In other words, you are talking past everyone by meaning something very different by "direct perception" and so your arguments are red herrings and your interpretations of indirect realism are strawmen.

Given what both traditional direct realists and indirect realists mean by "direct perception", both of these are non sequiturs:

2. My sense organs are in direct physical contact with X, therefore I have direct perception of X
3. My sense organs are not in direct physical contact with X, therefore I do not have direct perception of X

I don't think there's any such thing as direct perception. The only perception there is is indirect.

I don't think there's any such thing as direct perception. The only perception there is is indirect. — frank

I'd say I directly perceive pain, colours, smells, tastes, etc.

I'd say I directly perceive pain, colours, smells, tastes, etc. — Michael

The experience of pain is generated the same way the experience of seeing an apple is.

What experiment would prove the validity of direct realism as you define direct realism? — Hanover

I have no idea. Science primarily relies on falsification, not verification. If direct realism claims that ordinary objects are "constituents" of experience (see here), and if science has falsified this claim — as I believe it has — then science has refuted direct realism.

You are conflating "self standing object" with "self standing object of perception". The chiming is the latter but not the former. It indicates something else. Yet it can be discussed, contemplated, appreciated on its own, independent of object. — hypericin

That doesn't sound right to me. I don't deny that the chiming can become the focus of reflective attention in its own right; I deny only that it is the object of perception in the first instance. I would argue that this reflective stance is second-order and derivative upon the original perceptual episode. To insist otherwise is, I think, to get the phenomenology backwards.

When the chiming is first heard, it is not given as a self-standing auditory object, but as a mode of appearance of something else. The experience is not "I hear a sound and infer a cause", it is "something is chiming—what is it?". The sound is already presented as the manifestation of a thing in the world, even though which thing has not yet been determined. That is to say, the object-that-is-chiming is presented as determinate in existence, but indeterminate in sense or meaning. It is precisely this structure that gives rise to the question “what is it?”

. That is to say, the object-that-is-chiming is presented as determinate in existence, but indeterminate in sense or meaning. — Esse Quam Videri

When we hear environmental sounds we have an impicit, hard-wired understanding that these sounds represent something. Our interest as organisms is in what the sound is of. But you seem to be elevating this biological and contextual feature to a philosophical importance it does not have.

The world-directedness of perception is a stance. It is a default, but it is not exclusive. One can take a meditative stance, and focus on the phenomenology, not the object. Or, in other contexts the phenomenology itself is what is important, and what we are attuned to by default. I already mentioned music as an example of this.

The point is that the phenomenology and the object are distinct. The fact that we, organisms in a threatening world, are object-oriented does not obviate this.

It's not the indirect realist conclusion. It's the meaning of the term "direct perception" as used by both indirect realists and their direct (naive) realist opponents. — Michael

Yes, and if both sides accept that usage, then both sides are already confused in the same way.

Again, you clearly just mean something else by "direct perception" and "direct object of perception", and other than the use of the label "direct" it's not clear how the substance of your position is incompatible with the substance of indirect realism. — Michael

Yes—I mean something else, because the traditional usage is theoretically confused. We must sometimes revise or discard inherited meanings when those meanings collapse distinct cognitive operations, smuggle metaphysical conclusions into definitions, or block the intelligibility of error and inquiry.

Using this account, the naive realist must accept that the apple is not a "constituent" of the experiential episode during the second 10 seconds — because no such apple exists — and so is not the direct object of perception. My claim is that if it's not a "constituent" of the experiential episode during the second 10 seconds then it's not a "constituent" of the experiential episode during the first 10 seconds. It existed and was causally responsible for the experiential episode, but even the naive realist acknowledges above that this alone is insufficient. — Michael

I would likewise reject the claim that the apple is a "constituent" of the experiential episode during either interval, but for a different reason. To talk of "constituents" of experience is already to reify experience in a way that smuggles in the representationlist picture that IR depends on because it already assumes that intentional contents are contained within— or internal to— experience as reified.

I reject that picture. In my view, experience is not an inner entity and phenomenology underdetermines objecthood. So in the apple scenario the phenomenology continues but the perceptual intention is no longer fulfilled by anything in the world. Strictly speaking, insofar as the apple has disintegrated, there is no direct object of perception during the second interval. So while the intentional content persists, the perceptual act goes unfulfilled. Nothing in this requires denying phenomenal continuity; it only denies that phenomenal continuity fixes perceptual ontology.

But the intentional content that persists throughout the scenario does not, in my view, meet the qualifications of ontological objecthood. And it seems to me that this is, perhaps, where we diverge most deeply. You seem to want to deflate objecthood to the fulfillment of a grammatical schema, whereas I think that is insufficient to explain the normatively of perception as a public act.

I don’t think I’ve elevated anything here. I’ve simply tried to describe the phenomenology of the event as accurately as I can.

Furthermore, I don’t deny that we can take a reflective or “meditative” stance toward experience—I explicitly conceded that in my previous post. What I deny is that this shows phenomenology to be the object of perception in the first instance. World-directed perception is the base; epoché is a withdrawal or bracketing of the world-directedness intrinsic to that base. In that sense, it is epistemologically derivative, not fundamental. I would argue that meditation and music don’t undermine this structure; they presuppose it.

Then what you mean by "direct perception" isn't what most other direct realists mean by it.

1. I don’t really care
2. That’s not entirely true.

According to everyone’s favorite, the SEP:

A.D. Smith claims that what most authors have in mind in talking about the Problem of Perception is the “question of whether we can ever directly perceive the physical world”, where “the physical world” is understood in a realist way: as having “an existence that is not in any way dependent upon its being... perceived or thought about” (2002: 1). The arguments at the heart of the Problem of Perception challenge this direct realist perspective on perceptual experience.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem

So I understand the problem similar to “most authors”, according to AD Smith. If I take a different approach to solving that problem that shouldn’t be an issue, at least for someone who doesn’t require other people’s arguments to pad their own.

So my solution is something like this. We directly perceive light. Light is a member/instance/object of the mind-independent world. Therefore, we directly perceive the mind-independent world.

I say the “directness” of perception is simple contact because it leaves zero space for mediation. As you show with your false analogies, once you allow space between objects there is a necessary mediation because light has to travel through that space and is at the mercy of anything in there (air, water). Contact is the only situation where there is nothing standing in the way of, or in between, the perceiver and the perceived. This relationship is “unmediated”, by which I mean there is no intervening thing or object. If you can come up with a better account of “directness”, by all means, I’d love to hear it.

On the other hand, you say you directly perceive sensations, or “images”, or “characters of experience”and a whole host of objects that no one else could ever perceive but you promise are there nonetheless. But that, to me, just means you consider yourself perceiver and the object of perception at the same time, a relationship that contradicts any realist position, and one that looks silly given the simple fact that the senses point outward, away from the mind-dependent world towards the mind-independent world.

We can phrase the dispute without using the words "direct" or "indirect".

Group A believes that a) mind-independent objects and their properties are "phenomenally present" constituents of first-person experience.

Group B believes that b) mind-independent objects and their properties are not "phenomenally present" constituents of first-person experience and that c) the "phenomenally present" constituents of first-person experience that Group A believes to be mind-independent objects and their properties are in fact sense-data (sense datum theory) or mental representations (representational theory) or qualia or other mental phenomena.

Your position seems to be that "perception is direct" and "perception is indirect" mean something else, above-and-beyond (a), (b), and (c), such that perception can be direct even if (a) is false and (b) is true. This is where I disagree. I think that in the context of the dispute between traditional direct and indirect realism, "perception is direct" just means that (a) is true and that (b) and (c) are false, and that "perception is indirect" just means that (a) is false and that (b) is true, and that "we directly perceive sense-data/mental representations/qualia/other mental phenomena" just means that (c) is true.

So I understand the problem similar to “most authors”, according to AD Smith. If I take a different approach to solving that problem that shouldn’t be an issue, at least for someone who doesn’t require other people’s arguments to pad their own. — NOS4A2

You don't solve the problem because "most authors" (who are direct realists) also say that we have direct visual perception of apples. You appear to accept that we don't have direct visual perception of apples, and so you must accept either that a) we only have indirect visual perception of apples (mediated by light) or that b) we do not have visual perception of apples.

So even if you disagree with the positive thesis that we have direct visual perception of mental phenomena (sense datum theory or representational theory) you appear to agree with the negative thesis that we do not have direct visual perception of distal objects (minimal indirect realism).

Is light not a “distal object”?

We directly perceive light. Light is a member/instance/object of the mind-independent world. Therefore, we directly perceive the mind-independent world.

Is light not a “distal object”? — NOS4A2

No, it's a proximal stimulus. Distal objects are things like apples that reflect the light.

We directly perceive light. Light is a member/instance/object of the mind-independent world. Therefore, we directly perceive the mind-independent world. — NOS4A2

When the traditional direct realist says "we directly see the mind-independent world" they mean more than just "we directly see mind-independent light"; they also mean "we directly see mind-independent apples and trees and people, etc.".

If you accept that we don't directly see mind-independent apples and trees then you accept either that a) we only indirectly see mind-independent apples and trees or b) we do not see mind-independent apples and trees.

No, it's a proximal stimulus. Distal objects are things like apples that reflect the light.

Light is not a “distal object”. So beyond the “proximal stimulus” there is no light? You’re repeating phrases, that’s it, making distinctions where there are none. It’s pure nounism.

Light is not a “distal object”. So beyond the “proximal stimulus” there is no light? — NOS4A2

Of course there's light beyond the proximal stimulus, but according to your theory it isn't directly perceived because it isn't in physical contact with our sense organs. According to your theory something is directly perceived only when it's in physical contact with our sense organs, in which case it is no longer a distal object but a proximal stimulus.

But you seem to be deflecting. According to your theory you do not have direct visual perception of apples or trees or people. Therefore, according your theory either a) you only have indirect visual perception of apples and trees and people or b) you do not have visual perception of apples or trees or people. It's a bizarre brand of direct realism, very different to what is ordinarily meant, with (a) being consistent with the negative thesis of indirect realism.

. I would argue that meditation and music don’t undermine this structure; they presuppose it. — Esse Quam Videri

How does meditation and music presuppose this? When I listen to music, or meditate, I lose awareness of the object, and focus on the phenomenology. The phenomenology becomes the first-order subject of perception, the object secondary, if it is present at all. And so your idea of object-first perceptual structure must explain this. It certainly receives no support from it.

We are able to flexibly attend to phenomenology, or to object. But our attentional stance does not speak to the epistemological relationship between phenomenology and object.

Of course there's light beyond the proximal stimulus, but according to your theory it isn't directly perceived because it isn't in physical contact with our sense organs.

It will be in physical contact with our senses, just as the apple will be when we pick it up and eat it.

But you can’t know any of this because you can only directly perceive yourself.

According to your theory something is directly perceived only when it's in physical contact with our sense organs, in which case it is no longer a distal object but a proximal stimulus.

Objects don’t turn from one thing to another according to its proximity of the body. It’s a distinction without a difference.

But you can’t know any of this because you can only directly perceive yourself. — NOS4A2

That doesn't follow. You claim that we only have direct visual perception of light, and yet presumably you think that this allows us to know about the distal object that reflected the light, even though it is not directly seen. So you accept that we can know about things even if we do not have direct perception of them. This doesn't change under indirect realism.

Objects don’t turn from one thing to another according to its proximity of the body. It’s a distinction without a difference. — NOS4A2

What are you talking about? I am simply using the proper terminology, e.g. from here:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

Obviously you disagree with all the talk about "mental re-creations" and "images" and "percepts", but there's nothing objectionable about the use of "distal object" to refer to the object that reflects the light and "proximal stimulus" to refer to the light absorbed by the photoreceptors in the eye.

But, once again, you are deflecting. You accept that we don't have direct visual perception of apples, and so you must accept either that a) we only have indirect visual perception of apples (mediated by light) or that b) we do not have visual perception of apples. Even if you disagree with the positive thesis of something like the sense datum theory you agree with the negative thesis of minimal indirect realism, and your so-called "direct realism" is nothing like what is ordinarily meant by the term.

You’re right that in meditation or music one can lose awareness of the object and focus entirely on phenomenology. I don’t dispute that phenomenological salience can shift. What I deny is that this shift in attention alters the intentional structure of perception itself.

Losing awareness of the object is not the same thing as phenomenology becoming the object of perception. It shows only that object-directedness can be bracketed or backgrounded, not that it was absent or secondary to begin with. A withdrawal of awareness presupposes something withdrawn from. That’s precisely why I say these cases are derivative rather than foundational.

Put differently: changes in attentional stance show flexibility in what we attend to, not a symmetry in the epistemological roles of phenomenology and object. The fact that phenomenology can become focal does not entail that it is what perception is of in the first instance—any more than the fact that I can attend to my visual field entails that my visual field was the original object of sight.

The argument with the slow light is merely to show that (1) is false — Michael

If you include the assumption that direct perception requires temporal coincidence between perceiver and perceived. There is no need to do so.

What one does not see is some mental representation of the apple as it was ten seconds ago.

But even to entertain that scenario is a step too far. Temporal lag does not introduce a new object of perception. We see the apple as it was, and not a memory, a sense datum, a representation, an image,
or anything “in the mind”.

Your position seems to be that "perception is direct" and "perception is indirect" mean something else, above-and-beyond (a), (b), and (c), such that perception can be direct even if (a) is false and (b) is true. This is where I disagree. I think that in the context of the dispute between traditional direct and indirect realism, "perception is direct" just means that (a) is true and that (b) and (c) are false, and that "perception is indirect" just means that (a) is false and that (b) is true, and that "we directly perceive sense-data/mental representations/qualia/other mental phenomena" just means that (c) is true. — Michael

I think we agree that indirect realism means that (a) is false and that (b) and (c) are true. This is why I don't consider myself an indirect realist; I reject both (a) and (c) outright, and my acceptance of (b) is qualified by my rejection of the reification of consciousness implicit within its framing.

So yes, my understanding of "direct" means something different than what naive realists traditionally meant by the term (as I have admitted from the very beginning), but I still reject indirect realism insofar as it entails commitment to (c) and also to the reified conception of consciousness implicit therein.

We see the apple as it was — Banno

What does it mean to see the apple as it was?

Given the scenario as described, both of these are true:

1. At 10:00:25 I see an intact red apple 10m in front of me
2. At 10:00:25 there is not an intact red apple 10m in front of me

Given that (2) is true, an intact red apple is not the direct object of perception at 10:00:25. At 10:00:25 there is just first-person phenomenal experience, with "I see an intact red apple 10m in front of me" describing the subjective character of this first-person phenomenal experience. This is all there is to the positive thesis of indirect realism (e.g. the sense datum theory).

What does it mean to see the apple as it was? — Michael

Just that.

Again, what we see is the apple, and not a memory, a sense datum, a representation, an image,
or anything “in the mind”. Sure, the causal chain that is seeing the apple includes a delay, but so what.

Your argument is merely rhetorical, a play on the word "direct". What one sees is the apple with a ten-second delay. What one does not see is some mental representation of the apple as it was ten seconds ago.

Your argument is merely rhetorical, a play on the word "direct". What one sees is the apple with a ten-second delay. What one does not see is some mental representation of the apple as it was ten seconds ago. — Banno

Yours is the rhetorical argument. You are misrepresenting the grammar of "seeing a mental representation". Once again, the grammar is to be understood in the same way as "the schizophrenic hears voices" and "synesthetes see colours when listening to music".

At 10:00:25 there is no apple, only first-person phenomenal experience with subjective character — described as "seeing a red apple" — and this first-person phenomenal experience with subjective character is a mental representation of an apple that no longer exists.

You are misrepresenting the grammar of "seeing a mental representation". — Michael

Seeing an apple is constructing a mental representation, if you like - it depends where one places the Markov Blanket. But one does not see a mental representation. One sees an apple.

I think we agree that indirect realism means that (a) is false and that (b) and (c) are true. — Esse Quam Videri

Indirect realism means that (a) is false and (b) is true. The sense datum and representational theories say that (c) is true.

As before, there are two distinct claims:

1. We do not have direct perception of distal objects
2. We have direct perception of mental phenomena

It is entirely possible that (1) is true and (2) is false.

If (1) is true — i.e. (a) is false and (b) is true — then either our perception of distal objects is indirect or we do not have perception of distal objects.

At 10:00:25 there is no apple, only first-person phenomenal experience with subjective character — described as "seeing a red apple" — and this first-person phenomenal experience with subjective character is a mental representation of an apple that no longer exists. — Michael

Notice that the conclusion, that we see "only first-person phenomenal experience with subjective character", is not argued for but merely asserted? You are repeatedly presuming that what we see is a "first-person phenomenal experience with subjective character", and not an apple.

That's not how language works. We can talk about the first-person phenomenal experience, but that does not mean that we cannot talk about the apple, including seeing the apple.

Your example continues to confuse the causal chain with the epistemic outcome.

The representation is the machinery, not the seen object.