The deeper question is: in what sense would time exist absent any awareness of it? The difficulty is that as soon as you begin to think about that question, you are already bringing time into awareness, or rather, bringing your mind to bear on the question. So time is always already part of the consideration. — Wayfarer

OK, fair enough on that. But it doesn't say anything about why and how time is intuition, and nothing about the nature of time itself. Remember time is not a new topic. It has been one of the hot topic since ancient Greek era. We could like to try to figure out what the nature of time could be in more understandable and realistic manner from our own material world we live in.

Idealist's account of time would be meaningless and groundless, if it just says that time is something unknowable, and hard to understand, but it makes our perception possible and is a precondition of perception. Anything can appear in our intuition, and time is intuition. It does not really say much about the nature of time itself.

We still have to search, explore and aim to demonstrate in more concrete manner where in our material world time might be existing hidden in the form of different level or type of existence.

….the statement that Time is intuition, said by Kant. — Corvus

“… In this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles of a priori cognition, namely space and time…” (A22/B36)

I did say they were intuitions, when I should have said they were the pure forms of intuitions, and of sensibility in general.

“…. We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, (…). What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, (…). We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition….” (A42/B60)

All intuition is representation of appearance, space and time are not representations of any appearances, therefore not any intuition. Kant would not have said time is intuition, or time is an intuition.

“…. Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us. Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities? Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet ones that would pertain to them even if they were not intuited, or are they relations that only attach to the form of intuition alone, and thus to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to any thing at all?…”

What they are, covers 15 A paginations and 16 B.
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If time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited internally, can that be extended to mean time can be intuited internally and space can be intuited externally? In which case, space and time can indeed be intuitions, even if Kant didn’t actually say they were?

But if space and time, in and of themselves alone, are said to represent conceptions the transcendental expositions of which are idealities, must it then be possible to intuit idealities in the same regard as appearances? No, for to cognize transcendentally is to reason, from which follows in the cognition of a ideal representation, we in effect represent to ourselves purely a priori nothing more than the ground of a principle, in this case for the use of sensibility in general insofar as by it the representation of appearances in intuition, re: phenomena, becomes possible.

Which is why everybody hates speculative metaphysics: in most cases, the greater the explanation the less the comprehension.

But if space and time, in and of themselves alone, are said to represent conceptions the transcendental expositions of which are idealities, must it then be possible to intuit idealities in the same regard as appearances? No, for to cognize transcendentally is to reason, from which follows in the cognition of a ideal representation, we in effect represent to ourselves purely a priori nothing more than the ground of a principle, in this case for the use of sensibility in general insofar as by it the representation of appearances in intuition, re: phenomena, becomes possible. — Mww

:up: Yes, agreed.

Capital ‘S’ Self. Which is the entire aim of the path. There’s nothing really corresponding with that in Western culture save as a kind of import from Indian sources. Which is not to imply disrespect but mindfulness of context.

Yes, very much the undifferentiated self, but seen, or known from a personal perspective.
As for a Western equivalent, it seems like it was lost in the mists of time. Maybe never was here, I don’t know.