So no, the chess analogy isn’t claiming rational discourse is literally a game. It’s forcing a distinction you keep trying to blur, viz. that clarifying the conditions of intelligibility isn't the same thing as arguing for a claim within those conditions or parameters. You can have meta-level norms without turning bedrock conditions into ordinary premises. And pretending otherwise is exactly how the issue of global doubt and endless “improvement” talk becomes performative rather than really answerable. — Sam26

While I can't speak for @J, I can say that it hasn't been my intention to collapse everything into one level. I take it that the distinction between levels has been explicitly granted, and that we're now disputing whether the meta-level is inside or outside of rational normativity as such. For me, it's not about arguing for system-closure, or for some Archimedean stand-point outside of inquiry. It's about acknowledging that reason can come to understand the conditions of its own operation, and that to do so is itself a rational achievement.

For me, it's not about arguing for system-closure, or for some Archimedean stand-point outside of inquiry. It's about acknowledging that reason can come to understand the conditions of its own operation, and that to do so is itself a rational achievement. — Esse Quam Videri

I suspect that what’s at stake here is, at least in relation to Wittgenstein, is to what extent we treat understanding and reason in terms of adequation and conformity vs creation, enaction and becoming.

Thanks for all of the replies. I'm trying to think of another subject for a thread. My philosophical focus tends to be very narrow, but hopefully I'll think of something that's interesting.

I suspect that what’s at stake here is, at least in relation to Wittgenstein, is to what extent we treat understanding and reason in terms of adequation and conformity vs creation, enaction and becoming. — Joshs

Yes, I agree it’s probably the underlying axis. For my part I would tend to side more with . I wouldn't want to deny creation, enaction, or becoming, but my worry is that if we say “normativity is creatively re-established in each use,” we risk collapsing into “norms are whatever we now make them,” which would seem to undercut the possibility of error and the authority of correction.

I'm changing my paper from a conservative defense of JTB into something more innovative. Instead of "I'm clarifying what was always implicit," it now says "I'm developing the guardrails framework, three criteria for evaluating epistemology." I've also changed the title and cut the paper by 20%. The following is the new opening:

Knowledge as Practice-Standing: The Guardrails Framework
By Samuel L. Naccarato

Abstract
Sixty years after Gettier, epistemology remains stuck. The "JTB + X" industry keeps proposing new conditions, but the counterexamples keep coming. I argue the problem is not that justified true belief needs additional conditions, but that we've misunderstood what justification is.

Justification is standing within a practice, not merely having supporting reasons. Drawing on Wittgenstein's later philosophy, I develop a framework that makes this explicit. Three guardrails discipline epistemic standing (no false grounds, practice safety, and defeater screening), and five routes describe how justification proceeds (testimony, inference, perception, linguistic training, and logic's boundary-setting role). Standing requires conceptual competence and rests on bedrock certainties that make justification possible without themselves being justified.

This framework dissolves Gettier cases, which mistake the appearance of support for genuine standing. It also explains why artificial systems lack knowledge. They produce true statements but lack practice-standing. The result preserves JTB's core insight while articulating its grammatical structure.

Introduction
The classical account of knowledge as justified true belief captured something essential. To know is to hold a true belief that meets the criteria our practices of justification require. But something has gone wrong. Fifty years of post-Gettier epistemology has produced an industry of "JTB + X" proposals (adding causal connections, reliability conditions, defeasibility clauses), each attempting to patch the model against counterexamples. The proliferation of patches suggests we've been looking for solutions in the wrong place.

Gettier cases are not counterexamples to justified true belief. They reveal a confusion about what justification is. When we treat justification as merely having supporting reasons, we mistake the appearance of support for genuine justification. The "ten coins" case fails not because JTB is incomplete, but because the belief doesn't satisfy our epistemic criteria. It rests on false grounds, succeeds only by luck, and collapses under scrutiny. These are not missing conditions we need to add. They describe what justification requires.

Justification is standing within a practice, a status conferred when a belief meets the criteria that govern knowledge-attribution in a language-game. This status requires conceptual competence (knowing how to use concepts within a form of life, recognizing what supports what, and responding to challenges). Understanding is not added to justification from outside. It is internal to justification itself.

Moreover, justification operates against bedrock certainties that stand fast without themselves being justified. These Wittgensteinian hinges are not items of knowledge. They make knowledge possible. Doubt presupposes something not in doubt. To question everything is not to extend inquiry but to lose the standpoint from which inquiry proceeds.

I develop three guardrails that discipline epistemic assessment. No False Grounds means support cannot rest on falsehoods that undermine the inference. Practice Safety means the belief must not be true merely by luck. Defeater Screening means the belief must survive relevant challenges. I also distinguish five routes (testimony, inference, perception, linguistic training, and logic's boundary-setting role).

This framework dissolves Gettier cases and explains why AI systems lack knowledge. It provides clear criteria for epistemic assessment in an age of artificial intelligence and information overload. The result is not a new theory but the articulation of a grammar at work in our practices.

[I'm trying to make the paper shorter and more concise.]