There are beings which exist, and are what they are independent and apart from, anyone's cognition of them. — Zach Johnson

I'm sure that there are many forms of realism, however, "being apart" is a somewhat difficult stance to embrace post-quantum physics. In addition , things are in some quantum state, but it is not clear"what they are", independent of an observing mind, since this is how we know things.

I would say I am a metaphysical realist but not as stated in your description.

Could you point me in the direction of something concise that lays out the problem you suggest?

And well, there is no necessity to have full, or even robust knowledge of what they are - apart from a mind. This would be a move back to a God's Eye perspective on reality, which is impossible, yes.

The issue would be that what we are able to know is generated, or allowed for, metaphysically by that the nature of the thing as it is apart from cognition. Rather than, on the other hand, only knowing products of cognition or our own cognitive processes.

I'm not sure how it would go for post-quantum things, but a way to think about it opposed to perspective-independent views might be: are there aspects of the thing in question that would be salient, were many (non-human) beings able to perceive them - such an aspect, it seems, would not be reducible to cognition yet hint perspective independent.

(I recognize that might not be very clear)

I just so happened to be reading this article which may be a start:

https://phys.org/news/2013-07-quantum-physics-macroscopic.html

Awesome, thanks!

Is anyone active in philosophy and defending metaphysical realism? — Zach Johnson

The Philipapers survey found that 81.6% of professional philosophers accept or lean toward: non-skeptical realism.

Only 4.3% accepted idealism.

Overwhelmingly, idealism has been rejected by those who study philosophy; that it is such a commonplace hereabouts is perhaps a reflection of the undergraduate background of our companions.

There are beings which exist, and are what they are independent and apart from, anyone's cognition of them. — Zach Johnson

Why 'beings'? By beings, are you referring to billiard balls, trees, stars, and mountains? In normal discourse, there is only one type of entity that is referred to as 'a being'.

Only 4.3% accepted idealism. — Banno

It's been bred out of them by materialism, propagated for economic reasons. Besides, only a very small number of persons ever are actual philosophers.

It's been bred out of them by materialism, propagated for economic reasons. Besides, only a very small number of persons ever are actual philosophers. — Wayfarer

4.3%.

Thanks! I didn't know that, that's a high percentage. But I wouldn't limit the opponents to idealism. Anti-realism takes many forms, not limited to, but importantly, the Kantian constructivist view. I see Putnam as an opposition force, too

I can elaborate on this point, from the same paper:

(a) A real being is a being whose existence and nature is independent of its being thought about or, in general, being cognized. Its existence and nature is not dependent upon the fact that it may be an object of awareness. Note carefully, therefore, that mental or psychological activities, since they do not have to be objectified or known in order to exist or be what they are, are not mind-dependent in the sense contrasted with real beings. On the contrary, they are a subset of real beings.
(b) A being of reason is a being whose existence and nature is dependent on its being thought about. It is an object-of-thought, or more exactly, an object-of-awareness. It would be wrong, however, to identify a being of reason with the psychological activities sufficient for its existence. A being of reason is in principle distinct from a real being— regardless of whether it be physical or psychological—for a being of reason only exists in relation to some knower. It is for that reason an objective being. A real being does not exist only in relation to some knower. It does not require a subject to which to be related. It could, then, contrary to what is common in English usage, be termed a "subjective" being, be it physical or psychological.
(c) A physical being is a being whose existence is independent of mental or psychological activities. Sometimes a physical being is also called a "real" being in order to indicate the dependency of the psychological on the physical, but not vice-versa. In other words, mental or psychological activities do not exist apart from physical states, such as neurological conditions of the brain, but physical states can exist apart from mental or psychological activities. This is, of course, not to say the mental or psychological can be reduced without remainder to the physical.
(d) A mental or psychological being is an activity of a particular mind or consciousness. It is important to note that while a mental or psychological being, for example, an act of perceiving or of conceiving, cannot exist apart from a particular knower, a being of reason, for example, the concept of hydrogen or the character Hamlet, is independent of any particular knower. It is, however, not independent of every particular knower, tout court.

The word being, I think, comes from the tradition this particular philosopher comes from. But yes, it would be bad if it was left undefined.

A real being is a being whose existence and nature is independent of its being thought about or, in general, being cognized. — Zach Johnson

Doesn't that mean, by definition, 'a being of which we have no knowledge'?

Why would it? Existing and being thought about are not the very same thing. So why can't something exist, without being thought of?

The Philipapers survey found that 81.6% of professional philosophers accept or lean toward: non-skeptical realism.

Only 4.3% accepted idealism.

Overwhelmingly, idealism has been rejected by those who study philosophy; that it is such a commonplace hereabouts is perhaps a reflection of the undergraduate background of our companions.

A lot of that is due to the bent of Philosophy Academia where most of the professors are non-skeptical realists and very few students can get their idealist dissertations approved or get jobs. Even Rorty, who said he wanted to write on Heidegger and Nietzsche, wrote his dissertation on analytic philosophy because he knew "what side of his bread was buttered." So, it is not, in itself, a foundation supporting non-skeptical realism's superiority. And the Continental schools would likely have a different result.

Idealist apologetics.

If that's the best you've got, that's a terrible example of non-skeptical realist criticism.

Right. This is a typical hang-up, and I think a crucial point. In a sense, yes. It is not possible to have a perspective-free view of something. Nor is that the goal of realism, but those "beings" are foundational. There were things around before there were living things, to be simple. Doesn't mean we can know them before being here, or in all their detail, but we are possible because of them.

When I write, I try to articulate the difference by using the word generativity. A real being has existence and a nature that is independent of cognition, e.g., cognition (nor a particular mind) doesn't generate the existence, or whole nature of the thing. Now, cognition might add to the nature of the thing (and sensory means might be selective) or the way in which the thing exists - something might be colored for us and not for a dog (which brings up a whole different discussion of essentialism of a non-reified/platonic/metaphysical variety - but rather essentialism as a logical tool [neo-Aristotelian, Veatch took this road])
... but the point is that what allows for and, in part, what generates our knowledge of the thing is not reducible to cognition.

So, perhaps not very adequately at times or at all, we can come to know this remainder. This is still not perspective independent knowledge, but that's not the point of realism. We need not know all of reality at once, nor in all it's detail.

The point of realism is that a real being comes prior to cognition, and is what it is, before it is (which is not to say it is as you and I may see it, right now!) in any way determined by cognition - by virtue of this we are not trapped within cognition's bounds, if you will. The first premise of that is against idealism, the second is against Kant and others. Hume and even Russell.
We are always within a perspective, but the nature of things can be known in a way that is not wholly reducible to or generated by that perspective. Think metaphysically passive, but epistemologically active when it comes to cognition.

The path to that nature is difficult, but (I suggest, as a thought experiment, very tentatively and not with foolproof examples) you could consider small cross section of reality that is salient in an inter-perspectival sense (maybe not color, but physicality, or motion, or light, etc.)

Well I will eventually do my dissertation on Nietzsche despite being analytic. I hope the juxtaposition of Nietzsche and idealists was limited to your mentioning Rorty, and not that there's a case to be made there, though!

No, my point was that even as brilliant a philosopher as Rorty was pushed away from his preference of idealist philosophy because he wanted a job and knew the predominance of non-skeptical realists in the field doing the hiring

Good luck on your dissertation, though!

This is a typical hang-up, and I think a crucial point. — Zach Johnson

I'd prefer to think of it as the latter.

There were things around before there were living things, to be simple — Zach Johnson

'Before' is a matter of perspective - which only a mind can bring to bear.

[Kant once remarked] 'If I take away the thinking subject, the whole material world must vanish, as this world is nothing but the phenomenal appearance in the sensibility of our own subject, and is a species of this subject's representations.' … [An] objection would run: 'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to what Kant has just been quoted as saying, that is impossible.'

Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was twofold. First, the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room. The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

Magee on Schopenhauer.

Kant himself:

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding. (CPR, A369)

We are always within a perspective, but the nature of things can be known in a way that is not wholly reducible to or generated by that perspective. — Zach Johnson

I don't say that everything is reducible to perspective but perspective is inextricably part of whatever we know. If something exists altogether outside of any perspective, then what is being discussed? An 'ideal object' or 'real being' which transcends appearances altogether? That appears to be what you're saying.

The point of realism is that a real being comes prior to cognition — Zach Johnson

And again I question your use of the word 'being' in this context. A hundred years ago, you might have argued that the 'fundamental entity' was an atom, but that is no longer tenable, so instead you use the placeholder term, 'real being'. But again, what does it mean? The only beings we know empirically, are human beings. We might colloquially refer to the higher animals as 'beings'. But are inanimate objects 'beings' or 'things'? Is there a difference? It's a difficult question; I believe there is, but that this is a difference which is not generally recognised in modern philosophy.

I'm a metaphysical realist because it's quite obvious that mind is secondary to bodies, to being born, to things in the world, to the effects of foods and drugs we ingest, and so on, and more than anything, that we die. Also because it makes sense of the other being situated bodily in relation to myself. And it makes sense of events happening. Time is real, space is real, things are real.

What I'm not at all sure about is ontology. The world exists regardless of what I think, perceive or know about it. That is almost certainly true. Whether we can truly carve nature at it's joints and describe in terms of one category or another is questionable.

It's also true that the mind plays an important role in how we perceive and understand the world, but the mind itself is shaped by being embodied. We have bodies that move about and change in space and time and communicate with other similar bodies. The mind is part of that, not separate from it.

Wayferer, this is great. Thank you for taking the time to put all that out. Currently I'm out to dinner (pacific time in the U.S) but I will definitely get back to you tonight sometime. These are good points, and while I think some of the issues are a product of conceived use of my language and not what the particular words, e.g., "before" are what I mean to mention.. that's a fault on my part, and clearing that up is a very useful exercise (if possible)

Kant is quite convincing. Shame that he was so wrong.

Can you prove that he is wrong? Johnson refuted it by kicking a rock; Moore by waving his hands around. My favoured method is throwing spitballs.

These, of course, are not proofs. What is happening in each is that the antagonist shows the reality of the stuff of the world that gives meaning to our words.

When kant claims that "Appearances are all representations" he has already assumed his case by speaking about appearances rather than cups, kettles, rocks, hands and spitballs.

There is also quite a distinction to be made between something being true and being known. they are not the same.

Of course it takes a mind to know.

But things can be the case, unbeknownst.

Kant seems (as presented here) not to take that distinction into account.

And Kant's relationship with space and time is fraught. Einstein went to rather a lot of trouble to show that the laws of physics, including space and time, will be the same regardless of the situation of the observer. That is somewhat difficult to reconcile with Kant's view.