And yet you accuse me of mistakenly holding this "independence" from the distinction, as if "independence" meant something other than language and things talked about being their own states of existence.

How am I preaching to the choir when the choir is singing the exact opposite of my position?

I edited out that comment about preaching to the choir, and have clarified.

We don't completely disagree. We're both realists. But I think that your parts of your argument are fallacious.

An anti-realist can claim, without contradiction, that X is distinct from "X", and that X is dependent (or not independent) on (or of) "X".

There is a logical distinction between my pain and "my pain". The former is an intolerable sensation and the latter is a phrase. To accept this logical distinction does not make me a realist. The anti-realist can accept this distinction, too.

Indeed, but the question here is not merely whether you make such a distinction, but whether the dependence claim of anti-realism is tenable.

To make the distinction between a thing and language which talks about it, on its own, does not identify a commitment to whether or not things exist independently of experience. One certainly draw that distinction without proclaiming themselves to be a realist. Such lack of comment can even be thought of as enough to make anti-realism consistent with the distinction. If one just says: "Well, I am an anti-realist" and then points to their act of distinguishing language form what language talks about, then it does appear the two positions are compatible. One can certainly think of themselves as an anti-relaist while still making the distinction in question.

But I'm not interested in whether one can believe this. I concerned about whether it makes sense. And it doesn't. In the drawing of the distinction between lounge and the things it talks about, each state is defined on its own terms, not whether it is thought or spoken about. Nothing is depedent on being thought of spoken about.

Anti-realism is incoherent given this position. Not because, somehow, it is impossible for someone to make the discintion between language and what it talks about, while also holding themselves to be an anti-realist. Rather it is because there is a contradiction between the claim of anti-realism (the existence of meaningful things defined by experience) and a world where language is distinct from what it talks about.

Indeed, but the question here is not merely whether you make such a distinction, but whether the dependence claim of anti-realism is tenable.

To make the distinction between a thing and language which talks about it, on its own, does not identify a commitment to whether or not things exist independently of experience. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, I know. That's what I've been trying to explain to you.

In the drawing of the distinction between lounge and the things it talks about, each state is defined on its own terms, not whether it is thought or spoken about. Nothing is depedent on being thought of spoken about.

That a thing is defined "on its own terms" rather than in terms of "whether it is thought or spoken about" does not entail realist metaphysics. This is just semantics. To be a realist is to say that the truth of "X exists" is not dependent on experiences, concepts, or linguistic conventions.

That a thing is defined on its own terms, rather than whether it is spoken or thought about, IS realist metaphysics. It is not semantics at all. What is at stake is a logical point about how states are defined, not some meaning quibble over what to call something.

To be a realist is to say that the existence of state X is defined on its own terms, rather than if it is thought or spoken about. The "truth of X" being defined "independent of experiences, concepts, and linguistic conventions" only extends to the fact that, for any state, the world which is needed for a true statement isn't required for the state to exist.

A chair can exist (what is required for someone to be able to make a true statement about a chair) whether or not anyone thinks or speaks about it. What we talk about when we make statements of truth (e.g. "X is true" ) doesn't need to be though or spoken about to exist. This is what "independence" means here. There isn't something extra, something outside the reach of language, required to define what's true. That's only the meaning (which may stated in language) of the state in question.

That a thing is defined on its own terms, rather than whether it is spoken or thought about, IS realist metaphysics. It is not semantics at all. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Of course it's semantics. You're talking about how things are defined.

A chair can exist (what is required for someone to be able to make a true statement about a chair) whether or not anyone thinks or speaks about it.

Yes, that's what I said. To be a realist about chairs is to argue that the truth of "the chair exists" is independent of experience and conception and language. But that's not the same as arguing that chairs and "chairs" are logically distinct. The anti-realist can accept the latter whilst rejecting the former, and it's in rejecting the former that marks one as an anti-realist (and it's in accepting the former that marks one as a realist).

If it is about definitions, then there is more than language going on. If definitions are involve, then there is a question of logic. Someone doesn't understand a meaning or a relevant distinction.

You are still confusing realism (things are defined in themselves) with empirical claims ( a "squiloople exists" ). They are different claims. No-one is "a realist about X." Realism is a metaphysical position (i.e. logic) not a position on empirical states.

To "be realist about X" doesn't make because, for any state of the world, it is the same regardless of one metaphysical stance. The tree in front of you is the same regardless of whether you hold a realist position or an anti-realist position. There is no discintion make in an empirical state to define someone as "a realist about X" or an "anti-realist about X."

Of course one can be a realist about one thing and an anti-realist about another. There are plenty who are realists about trees but anti-realists about morality or universals or mathematics or fictions, for example.

Realism is a metaphysical position (i.e. logic).

This is the fundamental issue with your position. Metaphysics and logic are different things. Logic is concerned with the proper relationship between sentences and valid reasoning. Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental nature of being and the world. And semantics is concerned with meaning and definitions (in fact, when you talking about "logical distinction" it seems you're really talking about "semantic distinction").

But that makes no sense because, if we are talking about an existing tree, there is no "anti-realist" or "realist" option. An existing tree is the same, a state of the world, regardless of whether we think it is dependent of experience or not. To be realist or anti-realist about an existing tree is incoherent.

No doubt people use the "realist" and "anti-realist" distinction, in some cases, as a shorthand for the distinction between "existing state (e.g. a tree)" and "logic and fictions (e.g. morality)," but this distinction no longer makes sense if we are talking about an existing tree. How could an existing tree possibly be anything other than a state of the world? It can't be. It is incoherent to apply the question: "Is it an existing state (realism) or a point of logic (anti-realism)?" in that situation.

But that makes no sense because, if we are talking about an existing tree, there is no "anti-realist" or "realist" option. An existing tree is the same, a state of the world, regardless of whether we think it is dependent of experience or not. To be realist or anti-realist about an existing tree is incoherent. — TheWillowOfDarkness

To be a realist about an existing tree is to argue that the truth of "the tree exists" is independent of experience, conception, and language. To be an anti-realist about an existing tree is to argue that the truth of "the tree exists" is dependent on experience, conception, and language.

One can accept that a tree is defined as a member of the category that excludes experience, conception, and language whilst also accepting that the statement "the tree exists" is dependent on experience, conception, and language (e.g. if one adopts the coherence theory of truth). That's why one can be an anti-realist whilst maintaining a logical (or, rather, semantic) distinction between trees and "trees".

That makes no sense. The "realist"position is incoherent because the truth of "the tree exists" is both defined independently of language (what is required for the true statement "the tree exists" may be regardless of whether it is spoken about) and only within it (as a true statement cannot be made in the absence of language).

Similarly, the "anti-realist" position is incoherent because the true of "the tree exists" is both defined only with language (as language is required for a statement to be made) and without it (as the tree may exist regardless of whether it is spoken about).

One can accept that a tree is defined as a member of the category that excludes experience, conception, and language whilst also accepting that the statement "the tree exists" is dependent on experience, conception, and language (e.g. if one adopts the coherence theory of truth). That's why one can be an anti-realist whilst maintaining a logical (or, rather, semantic) distinction between trees and "trees". — Michael

Here you've switched subjects. You are no longer discussing whether or not states of existence are dependent on language and the relationship of this to true statements. Nor do you make any comment on the distinction between states of the world and language which talks about them.

Now you are talking about merely the existence of the statement "the tree exists," as opposed to the truth "the tree exists." The realist completely agrees the statement "the tree exists" is of experience, conception, and language. One cannot have statement without language.

Now you are talking about merely the existence of the statement "the tree exists," as opposed to the truth "the tree exists." — TheWillowOfDarkness

No I'm not. I'm discussing the truth of "the tree exists". The anti-realist argues that the statement is only true if certain experiential, conceptual, or linguistic criteria are met, and the realist argues that the statement is only true if certain non-experiential, non-conceptual, and non-linguistic criteria are met.

Nor do you make any comment on the distinction between states of the world and language which talks about them.

I've made the distinction plenty of times. It's a matter of definition. The anti-realist is quite capable of accepting a semantic distinction between objects and the words which name them. As an example, the anti-realist will say that trees are plants and that "trees" is a word. He doesn't say that trees are words or that "trees" is a plant.

As an aside, I have a real problem with the 'Frodo' example being used as it refers to a fictional being and character. It adds layers of psycho dynamics to the discussion, rather than focusing on the ontology (or deontology) of the language.

What I mean to say is, when I read your screen name 'Michael' I, by default, associate it with two ideas; namely a person I know and the Arch angel. What if someone knows an actual, real life Frodo? You might then confuse two entirely different entities when refering to them 'by name'.

Now, when we refer to an object; let's say the 'chair', we - similarly - could conjure up many different types of chairs, however, we haven't ascribed psychological set values or given it that level of emotional context.