Part of the problem about asking after the 'fasifiability' of free will is that it's not even entirely clear that the very concept itself is intelligible - let alone falsifiable. One might ask, for instance, who or what exactly is the subject of free will - that is, what exactly is the 'thing' or 'person' that is excercising free will? Even phrasing it in terms of things or persons is already to bias the inquiry. What theory of subjectivity is involved here? Further, one might ask what kind of freedom is involved in free will? It is commonly understood to be a matter of choice ('freedom of choice', or the liberum arbitrium), but this is not the only way to understand it (indeed, this understanding of freedom was only introduced relatively late into philosophy, and was done so on theological grounds - credit to Augustine), and there are rich, alternative traditions of thought for which freedom is something else entirely (Arendt, Foucault, Merleau-Ponty to name but a few). Until the very conceptual cogency of 'free will' is clarified (and it is not at all obvious that it can be), falsifiability remains, at best, a derivitive or secondary issue.

Until the very conceptual cogency of 'free will' is clarified (and it is not at all obvious that it can be), falsifiability remains, at best, a derivitive or secondary issue. — StreetlightX

Yet, we have people stating unequivocally that "Free will is an illusion".

If somebody says "Vanilla bean cupcakes are an illusion" then it is clear how that statement can be falsified: show everybody a vanilla bean cupcake.

How can the statement "Free will is an illusion" be falsified?

But one presumably knows what a vanilla cupcake is. What kind of thing is free will?

One might ask, for instance, who or what exactly is the subject of free will - that is, what exactly is the 'thing' or 'person' that is excercising free will? — StreetlightX

Clearly you and I.

Further, one might ask what kind of freedom is involved in free will? It is commonly understood to be a matter of choice ('freedom of choice', or the liberum arbitrium), — StreetlightX

Yes, this is definitely the crux of the problem; or rather, not what kind of freedom (kinds of freedom seems fallacious), but instead, the question of how to define freedom. This question seems ultimately unanswerable, just given the multiplicity of nuances of answers.

(indeed, this understanding of freedom was only introduced relatively late into philosophy, and was done so on theological grounds - credit to Augustine), and there are rich, alternative traditions of thought for which freedom is something else entirely (Arendt, Foucault, Merleau-Ponty to name but a few). — StreetlightX

I'm not sure what you mean, since Augustine pre-dates all the other people you mention.

What kind of thing is free will? — StreetlightX

It seems to always be presented as one part of a binary: free will vs. determinism. And determinism seems to always be presented as saying, "You thought that you had a choice between chocolate or vanilla bean, but you did not have a choice".

Therefore, free will is apparently the freedom to choose between alternatives.

I would say no, it isn't falsifiable. In my opinion we can treat the past deterministically and deduce a certain amount of constraints which will, partially, determine the future. Though the universe might be fully deterministic we do not have the full knowledge of all the constraints which will govern the future. The current state of affairs is one wherein we gain more functional knowledge due to discovering more and more constraints which decrease uncertainty.

The difficulty in making an empirical statement on free will resides in our awareness being akin to a frontier of knowledge, as soon as we are able to make a sure statement that statement can be used as information which governs our current behaviour.

So you get experiments which indicate that we have no free will because the actual decision shows up in an fMRI machine before we are aware of that decision ourselves, to which we can say: "Don't play games while hooked up to an fMRI machine". Similarly, I am able to use common knowledge about unconscious biases as information to observe my own behaviour and negate the effect of such a bias to a degree.

In the present, free will is false in the past but it's true in the future, every time we notice we didn't have a choice in the matter we use that information to evolve towards a state where a similar observation might be made (and I feel the mind / body schism and the objective vs subjective issue tie into this also). To be certain that free will is false now would be to refrain from acting upon that information and negate our human capacities. Denying such agency takes effort though and I would be inclined to accuse those who do so of having a future oriented goal in mind. Just the observation that someone is able to conjure up the concept of free will and deny it's existence would indicate to me that this specific part of the universe is more predictable for me if I consider it as a social peer with moral agency then something which I might be able to describe objectively with empirical science.

the question of how to define freedom — Noble Dust

The absence of constraints.

It seems to always be presented as one part of a binary: free will vs. determinism. And determinism seems to always be presented as saying, "You thought that you had a choice between chocolate or vanilla bean, but you did not have a choice".

Therefore, free will is apparently the freedom to choose between alternatives. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

But here you're just basing your conception of free will on how it's colloquially presented. There's no philosophical grounds (or there might be, but there are definitely opposing other grounds) to assume this colloquial assumption. The binary that you describe might in fact be the problem. What if free will wasn't a choice between alternatives, but an ability to create reality? Choosing "between alternatives", after all, involves set choices; if the choices are set, is it really free will? If free will is truly free, then nothing can be extant with regards to freedom.

See my reply above.

we have people stating unequivocally that "Free will is an illusion". — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Harris apparently argues this is so on the basis that every decision is determined by neurology and evolutionary biology - the standard materialist tripe trope. My meta-analysis of the motivation behind it all is that its aim is to avoid facing the fact that we are really responsible. This is something similar to what Eric Fromm argues in his Escape from Freedom - that we are oppressed by the boundless possibilities that life presents and have a gnawing anxiety that we're somehow missing the point of it all. So one sure defense against that is - there is no point! You're a biologically-programmed robot, get over it!

Clearly you and I. — Noble Dust

This means nothing though. Or at least, one cannot draw anything philosophically useful from this answer.

Yes, this is definitely the crux of the problem; or rather, not what kind of freedom (kinds of freedom seems fallacious), but instead, the question of how to define freedom. This question seems ultimately unanswerable, just given the multiplicity of nuances of answers. — Noble Dust

But there certainly are different kinds of freedoms; or rather, freedoms understood in various, not-necessarily-compatible ways.

I'm not sure what you mean, since Augustine pre-dates all the other people you mention. — Noble Dust

True, and my list is comprised of modern representatives of that tradition. Which has no bearing on the fact that free will qua choice is a relatively recent invention in the history of philosophy.

The concept of freedom coincides the concept of slavery, freedom is to not have a lord, to be sovereign. This is what we negotiate in the real world, with others, the state, our bank accounts, most of the time functioning vehicles, colon, etc. The more one attempts to pin point the abstract form of it, the looser their grip will become.

This means nothing though. Or at least, one cannot draw anything philosophically useful from this answer. — StreetlightX

You'd need to explain why you think that.

But there certainly are different kinds of freedoms; or rather, freedoms understood in various, not-necessarily-compatible ways. — StreetlightX

Hmm, I can entertain that idea, but, on the contrary, I tend to come to the realization that, rather than different kinds of actual freedoms existing, it's rather that I'm able to imagine different kinds of freedoms existing, but this doesn't mean that they actually exist. This is just on a philosophical level. Now, if you just mean levels of freedom, then sure, that's a different matter, because I would consider that to be more practical and less philosophical. I'm assuming you still disagree, so can you explain in detail why?

Which has no bearing on the fact that free will qua choice is a relatively recent invention in the history of philosophy. — StreetlightX

Ok, fair enough, as I'm not educated enough to have a good response to this. So are you saying free will was a concept that didn't include the idea of "choice" until recently?

Free will is apparently the freedom to choose between alternatives — WISDOMfromPO-MO

By what kind of subject? Organized by what field of constraints? (And constraint must figure into it; after all, that I cannot turn into a unicorn at will would presumably not be an argument against free will; so what makes an alternative 'count', and why?).

But here you're just basing your conception of free will on how it's colloquially presented. There's no philosophical grounds (or there might be, but there are definitely opposing other grounds) to assume this colloquial assumption. — Noble Dust

I don't have a conception of free will.

I am reporting, as requested, what I think people who say "Free will is an illusion" have in mind.

Notice that I used words like "apparently".

For all I know, free will could be some metaphysical novelty like triangular circles.

What if free will wasn't a choice between alternatives, but an ability to create reality? — Noble Dust

That would seem to go against every Enlightenment/modernist assumption about there being objective reality that we observe, inductively or deductively model with theories, etc.

It would seem to play right into the hands of postmodern theorists who say that reality/truth is culturally constructed.

Choosing "between alternatives", after all, involves set choices; if the choices are set, is it really free will? If free will is truly free, then nothing can be extant with regards to freedom. — Noble Dust

I thought that free will simply implies having freedom within the parameters one is working within. We do not hold people accountable for things that they could not have done--we hold them accountable for the choices they made out of everything they could have done.

Even an omnipotent being can't create a rock so heavy that he/she can't lift it, right?

I'll have you know that my fursona is a unikitty. The technology is just around the corner!

You'd need to explain why you think that. — Noble Dust

But the onus is on you here: if you say 'you and I' are the subjects of free will, presumably you want to say something like 'you and I, and not this other kind of thing'. But what is the difference that this difference makes? What is 'special' about You and I?

I tend to come to the realization that, rather than different kinds of actual freedoms existing, it's rather that I'm able to imagine different kinds of freedoms existing, but this doesn't mean that they actually exist. — Noble Dust

I agree! One can imagine a range of freedoms: the question is why one, rather than another, ought to be of any relavence at all. This is why it's important to specify the kind of thing, person, or subject that would have this freedom. One cannot intelligibly talk about free will without at the same time considering the kind of subject that would excercise it.

Ok, fair enough, as I'm not educated enough to have a good response to this. So are you saying free will was a concept that didn't include the idea of "choice" until recently? — Noble Dust

Consider, to keep this short, that the ancient Greeks had no concept of 'will' or it's equivalent - let alone free will. Incidentally, I think was an excellent state of affairs. Note also, as Wosert has, that freedom was traditionally contrasted with slavery, and not 'determinism' - it was a political, practical issue, and not a 'metaphysical' one. Another excellent state of affairs, sadly neglected in much discussion about it today.

That would seem to go against every Enlightenment/modernist assumption about there being objective reality that we observe, inductively or deductively model with theories, etc. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Yup...

It would seem to play right into the hands of postmodern theorists who say that reality/truth is cultural constructed. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Why would it have to play specifically into their hands?

I thought that free will simply implies having freedom within the parameters one is working within. We do not people accountable for things that they could not have done--we hold them accountable for the choices they made out of everything they could have done. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Yes, this is a problem I wrestle with constantly. Ironically, I think you're bringing up one of the core problems with the free will debate here. How much of one's individual actions are your own "free" choices, and how much of them are determined by environment? Is it something that's correlative to age? To "maturity"? Or something like "consciousness" or "awareness"? Perhaps this is why free will is such an unanswerable question for philosophy? It really deals with spiritual questions, not strictly philosophical questions, at least in the analytical sense. This means that, by definition, free will is actually something out of bounds for much of philosophical thought, as much as that philosophical thought is determined by classical analytic thought.

presumably you want to say something like 'you and I, and not this other kind of thing'. — StreetlightX

No I don't; I want to say "You and I". Is it unclear to you what I mean when I say "You and I"?

the question is why one, rather than another, ought to be of any relavence at all. — StreetlightX

No, I disagree; take a step back with me: It's rather that the problem is abstract thought (the method of thought that lead to the imagined states of freedom) is not the proper method to apprehend the concept; experience is what we should use to apprehend the concept. Think about it: free will would be a state of action. Free will would mean acting on some inner state that predicated total freedom. Now, for you to think abstractly, as you've been doing, about this concept, you would need to first have experienced the thing that the concept derives from in order to make valid statements about it. Otherwise you're just creating thought experiments, which are useless because they don't pertain to the reality of experience. So, by saying you agree with me here, you're simply stating that you agree that we can imagine different states of freedom, but that doesn't mean they exist. Now, I was not the one imagining these states, that was you. I was, rather, asking for a definition (provisional is fine) of "freedom", or of "free will".

No I don't; I want to say "You and I". Is it unclear to you what I mean when I say "You and I"? — Noble Dust

Incredibly unclear.

I was not the one imagining these states, that was you. I was, rather, asking for a definition (provisional is fine) of "freedom", or of "free will". — Noble Dust

I guess I'm not sure what we disgree about. This is just the question I've been asking all along.

Apparently "Free will is an illusion" means "The belief that you are anything more than a collection of matter and energy behaving according to universal physical laws is a false belief".

But as far as I know there are no known universal physical laws that predict human behavior.

Isn't that the heart of the matter? Isn't the big implication of determinism that we could have the ability to accurately predict every thought and action of every human person, and that people could therefore be controlled/manipulated like matter and energy are controlled/manipulated to design and make buildings, cars, communications networks, etc.?

It seems to me that until we discover the universal laws that govern human behavior--if they exist--and are therefore able to accurately predict all human behavior like we are able to accurately predict the weather, we can't say if the aforementioned belief is false or not.

Incredibly unclear. — StreetlightX

Why?

I guess I'm not sure what we disgree about. This is just the question I've been asking all along. — StreetlightX

As far as I can tell, it's that you were asking about "levels of freedom", but I was asking for a "definition". But now you seem to be saying otherwise? Maybe I misread?

I completely agree. But, re: your last paragraph: can we discover "universal laws" (scientific terminology), or is the process something different? Wouldn't universal laws preclude free will?

Why? — Noble Dust

Because the kind of thing that you or I 'am' is not at all clear. And without knowing that, you might as well have said anything at all. Moreover, the kind of subject that is claimed to have freedom is among the most contentious topics in this debate, historically. Kant's subject is not Rousseau's subject is not Augustine's subject is not Locke's subject; and the kind of subject involved in each countours the kind of freedom is each is said to have. And this is before we can even consider, let alone intelligibly discuss, questions of falsifiability.

My point is simply that if one wants to talk about the falsifiability of free will, one really ought to specify, from a wide field of contenders, which notion of free will is in play.

As far as I can tell, it's that you were asking about "levels of freedom", but I was asking for a "definition". But now you seem to be saying otherwise? Maybe I misread? — Noble Dust

I think so. I don't believe I've once used the word 'levels' in our discussion, nor have I intended to discuss anything like it - not that I would know what it means to talk about levels of freedom in the first place.

I'd agree that's what's at the heart of the matter.

Harris simply bites the bullet and acknowledges that he can't claim any responsibility for his own intellectual achievements. He is even handed about that. If people can't be held morally responsible for their bad deeds -- since they're mere puppets being moved around by the impersonal forces of the universe -- then they can't either be given any real credit for their positive accomplishments. — Pierre-Normand

Sorry, I wasn't talking about any acheivement (that's a separate discussion). I was speaking specifically about the (meta)physical ability for something that is without effects to be the corner stone of his entire philosophy. The very ability to do such a thing would suggest it is not epiphenomenal but in communion.
See this Dennett interview to see what I meant: https://youtu.be/oj858Vujb6g?t=57s

In a way it's like saying cigarettes have no psychological effects on you and then purchasing them everyday.

What the realization of no self is, is that the "self" you once thought you were basically isn't there at all. So people just call it "no self", when in actuality there is still an experience there which you could aptly call a self or more appropriately "higher self". — intrapersona

Okay, thanks, sure I see that. It fits a lot with my own meditation experiences. The thoughts do appear autonomous after a time and you can passively receive them.
My pet theory is that it may be due to evolution and needing to have a lot of it be automatic. I find when I'm out walking the thoughts come more freely and are specific to what I'm doing. The meditation thing is sort of like an artificial state so the thoughts are often random and give an illusion of being out of control.
The newer stuff like complex mathematics can't be completed in the same way. Answers don't just come to you, you have to (consciously) work them out.

But, re: your last paragraph: can we discover "universal laws" (scientific terminology), or is the process something different? Wouldn't universal laws preclude free will? — Noble Dust

We can accurately predict the behavior of sub-atomic particles, the atmosphere, trees, etc., right?
Maybe if determinism is true such predicting is itself an illusion.

But, no matter if it is an illusion or not, we do not have that same ability to make accurate predictions with respect to the behavior of humans. If we did we would know in advance exactly when, where and by who every bank robbery will be done. If we did we would know in advance who will win every U.S. presidential election.

If we did have the ability to predict and construct accurate models / laws of human behavior like we do with the weather, ecosystems, solar systems, etc. then that would be the end of anybody being able to rationally believe that we have free will, it seems.

However, we may never have those universal laws and predictive power in the realm of human behavior because we consider it unethical to treat humans like lab rats.

However, we may never have those universal laws and predictive power in the realm of human behavior because we consider it unethical to treat humans like lab rats. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Ironic how it seems to be free will keeping us from disproving it ;)
(Don't think that has to do with us never becoming able to model human behaviour, by the time we 'do' manage that we might have become an advanced race or something.)

how could we falsify "Free will is an illusion"? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Of course you can, if you so choose. X-)