I'd have to make some assumptions about what Harris thinks. I was never a fan of his, but here's one take on it.

If the statement is meant to imply a negative hypothesis, there is no non-illursory thing that corresponds to "free will", then it isn't falsifiable. We all know that ypu can't prove a negative. If what he means is that those things that suggest to us that we have free will can be explained by other, deterministic and empirical elements, then it could be falsified by showing that those elements either aren't the things that suggest free will to us, or that such elements don't exist.

But how could we falsify "Free will is an illusion"? — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Short from showing that free will isn't an illusion, you can show that Harris's argument are unsound, inconsistent, and also that his conception of free will is some sort of a strawman. Daniel Dennett has written a devastating review of Harris's Free Will. (And Harris has replied here.) Although I don't endorse fully Dennett's own brand of compatibilism, myself, I think his view is much more sensible and sophisticated than Harris's. And also, he is fairly successful in pointing out the most glaring flaws in Harris's arguments.

From when I read Sam Harris' book Free Will it seemed that the only way free will could be proven is for the owner of the choices to account for why he made them (of which he can never do), mostly because a large majority of our decisions are made by the unconscious mind, in fact so much that experiments have found decisions made 0.4 milliseconds before we become aware of them and can be predicted up and over 7 seconds before we can make them. Also, proving whether the universe (and therefore human brains) are deterministic is problematic in physics, down at the quantum level things are probabilistic but how things behave at that level is also different to process in the macro world in that one event can cause another etc. and likewise in the brain, one thought pattern can cascade in to another (as seen in most anxiety disorders). But just because the universe isn't deterministic doesn't mean our brain aren't dictated by the unconscious mind of which we have the compelling experience that those decisions are made by us and that somehow we control or ARE our unconscious mind, when the reality is far that at all.

Short from showing that free will isn't an illusion, you can show that Harris's argument are unsound, inconsistent, and also that his conception of free will is some sort of a strawman. Daniel Dennett has written a devastating review of Harris's Free Will. Although I don't endorse fully Dennett's own brand of compatibilism, myself, I think his view is much more sensible and sophisticate than Harris's. And also, he is fairly successful in pointing out the most glaring flaws in Harris's arguments. — Pierre-Normand

Yeah, of which Harris' has replied and showed how Dennett has misunderstood and misconstrued his statements by equivocation. This is a great one:

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Yeah, of which Harris' has replied and showed how Dennett has misunderstood and misconstrued his statements. This is a great one: — intrapersona

Harris is painting himself into a corner here. In his analogy, Atlantis stands for the crudest from of "contra-causal" libertarianism, which very few philosophers endorse; while Sicily stands for compatibilism, which a majority of philosophers endorse in one form of another. Harris then complains that it's as if Dennett were accusing him of denying the existence of Sicily. But arguing that compatibilism is incoherent and not worthy of any serious consideration also is something that Harris attempts to do in his book. So, in the analogy, it's as if Harris was arguing that there really isn't any such place as Sicily and that it is a mythical place as well. Dennett complaint therefore is on target.

In his review of Harris's book, Dennett also argues convincingly that a view akin to compatibilist free will can ground our reactive attitudes (praise and blame) just as well as the crude form of libertarianism that Harris ascribes to ordinary people. There is a debate regarding whether ordinary people's intuitions about free will are more in line with libertarian or compatibilist theories. There is inconclusive evidence in the "experimental philosophy" literature on this topic. But Dennett also argues successfully, in my view, that it is of little significance how ordinary people *theorize* about the source of free will when pressed to do so. So long as they ascribe to each other abilities to freely chose among ranges of options in a manner that reflects well or badly on their characters there is no reason to charge them with irrationality just because they may have a tendency to come up with bad theories regarding the way human beings make choices. In fact, Harris himself is guiltier than most in producing flawed theories about the source of our sense of freedom and responsibility.

Incidentally, we had a discussion 10 months ago about this topic and Harris's view also was brought up.

Also worth noting, a couple years after Harris replied to Dennett's review of his book, Harris and Dennett had another conversation about free will in a podcast. This the the most recent episode of their dispute that I know of.

In fact, Harris himself is guiltier than most in producing flawed theories about the source of our sense of freedom and responsibility. — Pierre-Normand

I found this a good one: https://youtu.be/pCofmZlC72g?t=42m19s

"Clearly there's a difference between voluntary and involuntary action, yet we don't need free will to make sense of these difference... ...these are just differences that relate to the global properties of individual minds and what's reasonable to expect from these minds in the future"

I am unaware how positions on libertarian vs compatibilist free will turn out in keeping some form of morality but I'd take Dennet's quote by saying what matters is the: "free will worth having".

If we (globally) agree to make a value judgement and decide that morality is worth keeping, we expect people to be able to discern between right and wrong to a degree, very clear guidelines are set in judicial systems across the world and things become more cloudy in social interactions yet we have peer pressure, culture, valuing the opinion of those we relate to, etc. The main thing most would agree on is that humans have the right of self-determination to a degree we don't let that right detract upon that same right we grant others.

To falsify "Free will is an illusion" you'd have to set up a practical exam for moral competence. We tend to go by the concept of innocent until proven guilty and I guess / hope most of us raise our children to be competent to engage the world socially (among other things), the proof expected here is in the pudding and I would feel it violates our right of self-determination to expect more in an empirical sense. Again we have judicial systems to impose the outer limits.

This is not to say that the incentives to behave better in the future should never be subject to criticism, just that anyone who claims free will doesn't exist yet still desires to keep some form of morality could easily start to suffer from trust issues ...unless they arrogantly rationalize their way out of it.

Harris is painting himself into a corner here. In his analogy, Atlantis stands for the crudest from of "contra-causal" libertarianism, which very few philosophers endorse; while Sicily stands for compatibilism, which a majority of philosophers endorse in one form of another. Harris then complains that it's as if Dennett were accusing him of denying the existence of Sicily. But arguing that compatibilism is incoherent and not worthy of any serious consideration also is something that Harris attempts to do in his book. So, in the analogy, it's as if Harris was arguing that there really isn't any such place as Sicily and that it is a mythical place as well. Dennett complaint therefore is on target. — Pierre-Normand

Ok cool thanks for breaking down that analogy further. So, what does Dennett have to say about unconscious choices dominating our free-will? Harris' has come from a background in buddhist meditation where it is observed through meditative practices that your sense of identity is basically an illusion. Tie this in with the neurological findings of unconscious decision making and it looks pretty solid, so how is Dennet refuting these findings with compatibilism?

Well, from my perspective it seems that the only way would be to say that you ARE your unconscious mind which makes decisions. Which, correct me if I am wrong, Dennett does. Well if you ARE your unconscious mind then why can't you account for why you chose one decision over another? Or why can't you just fall asleep at anytime in one second as you wish? This does not mean to say that people's actions shouldn't go unpunished or that they are not to blame, just that the observer is not to blame. Because the observer and the actor are somewhat segregated.

If we (globally) agree to make a value judgement and decide that morality is worth keeping, we expect people to be able to discern between right and wrong to a degree, very clear guidelines are set in judicial systems across the world and things become more cloudy in social interactions yet we have peer pressure, culture, valuing the opinion of those we relate to, etc. The main thing most would agree on is that humans have the right of self-determination to a degree we don't let that right detract upon that same right we grant others.

To falsify "Free will is an illusion" you'd have to set up a practical exam for moral competence. We tend to go by the concept of innocent until proven guilty and I guess / hope most of us raise our children to be competent to engage the world socially (among other things), the proof expected here is in the pudding and I would feel it violates our right of self-determination to expect more in an empirical sense. Again we have judicial systems to impose the outer limits.

This is not to say that the incentives to behave better in the future should never be subject to criticism, just that anyone who claims free will doesn't exist yet still desires to keep some form of morality could easily start to suffer from trust issues ...unless they arrogantly rationalize their way out of it. — Gooseone

I don't see how knowledge of right/wrong is going to disprove free will. Think about a counter-example of a determined robot who doesn't want to harm anyone... they sure would pass your practical moral competence exam wouldn't they? Yet they are still a robot.

Yep, morality still exists even without free-will.

Who determined the robot didn't want to harm anyone? does the robot has a sense of self preservation? Is it future goal oriented and if so, how does it moderate between achieving it's goals and not bothering people with it.

You make a caricature out of what morality actually comes down to.

Harris' has come from a background in buddhist meditation where it is observed through meditative practices that your sense of identity is basically an illusion. — intrapersona

And these testaments are derived through introspection and a direct 1st person experience.
See the contradiciton? How you can recall an experience of "no self" without a self to reflect back on to?

I posted this recently in another discussion about free will:

Did you create yourself? No, you only exist because of some fluke of nature, or the design of some higher power. Did you choose your mother and father? Did you choose your country of birth? Does someone choose to be neglected? Does someone choose to be abused? Does someone choose the beliefs of the society they are born into? No, no, and no.

The very first choice a person makes is a product of their biological make-up, and the sensory experiences they've encountered up to that point, none of which were controlled by that person. Every decision thereafter is based on a combination of instinct, and the perceived results of previous choices. Even your choice to believe or not believe what you are currently reading is based on the experiences you've had and the choices you've made up until now. At the root of that series of choices are inputs over which you had no control. — CasKev

For me, this indicates that free will is illusory, despite the fact that we are able to make choices, for whatever reasons. Is there a way to make the above argument unsound?

The main thing most would agree on is that humans have the right of self-determination to a degree we don't let that right detract upon that same right we grant others. — Gooseone

According to Harris the very foundation of this right -- the possibility of self-determination -- is illusory. This is why he also is pushing an utilitarian theory that has as its sole foundation the imperative to increase human "well being" regardless of the values people may endorse.

Ok cool thanks for breaking down that analogy further. So, what does Dennett have to say about unconscious choices dominating our free-will? Harris' has come from a background in buddhist meditation where it is observed through meditative practices that your sense of identity is basically an illusion. Tie this in with the neurological findings of unconscious decision making and it looks pretty solid, so how is Dennet refuting these findings with compatibilism?

Well, from my perspective it seems that the only way would be to say that you ARE your unconscious mind which makes decisions. Which, correct me if I am wrong, Dennett does. Well if you ARE your unconscious mind then why can't you account for why you chose one decision over another? Or why can't you just fall asleep at anytime in one second as you wish? This does not mean to say that people's actions shouldn't go unpunished or that they are not to blame, just that the observer is not to blame. Because the observer and the actor are somewhat segregated. — intrapersona

Your unconscious mind is a part of who you are, for sure. This includes most of your cognitive habits and abilities as well as the source of most of your "raw" motivations. Harris indeed has been, as you note, influenced by his Buddhist meditation practice in viewing the "self" from the stance of a passive observer who introspects her own states of mind and ponders over the origins of her random "thoughts". This is just about the worst possible stance for inquiring about free agency (or about knowledge, for that matter), which involves active involvement of an agent in the world (including the social world) and not a voluntary retreat from it.

Freedom is not to be found in the passive contemplation of one's own navel. The observer and the actor aren't two different entities. They are two different stances taken up alternatively (and oftentimes simultaneously within the normal flow of life) by the very same embodied human being. Also, the observer no more than the actor can be absolved from responsibility for what she comes to believe since she can reflect critically about the deliveries of her senses and memory. Harris often seems to think that the role of the epistemic "observer" (which he equates with the "self") is limited to her passively witnessing random thoughts popping up in her conscious mind as a result of automatic "free" association.

This is why he also is pushing an utilitarian theory that has as its sole foundation the imperative to increase human "well being" regardless of the values people may endorse. — Pierre-Normand

Yep. But wouldn't this require a person/self to suffer to be correct? If the self is an illusion that vanishes on close analysis how can there be any suffering? I watched Dennett and Harris podcast when it was linked on the old forum here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vFa7vFkVy4g
I'm not sure what Dennett's current ontological stance is on self (a center of gravity, but I think it's not relevant to this discussion) but his response to Harris' thought experiment to plausibly remove Ayn Rand ideals from a human brain, was "why?" As in what is the point, the final end. Dennett is consistent. It seems it's Harris who posits theology by adding telelogy to the debate.

Yep. But wouldn't this require a person/self to suffer to be correct? — JupiterJess

That's right, but Harris isn't arguing that the self is an illusion. It's rather the self's sense of her own freedom that is an illusion according to Harris. He believes that the mental phenomena that are being experienced by the self (including the sense of one's own power of free agency) are epiphenomena. They are not unreal but they don't have any causal efficacy according to him.

So, Harris's ethics (as expounded in The Moral Landscape) boils down to the affirmation of the intuition -- which he believes to be a self-evident a priori truth -- that it would be ethically good if all of the epiphenomenal "selves" being generated by biological brains in the universe were somehow being caused to have happy thoughts and pleasurable feelings. This is quite sophomoric, really.

So, Harris's ethics (as expounded in The Moral Landscape) boils down to the affirmation of the intuition -- which he believes to be a self-evident a priori truth -- that it would be ethically good if all of the epiphenomenal "selves" being generated by biological brains in the universe were somehow being caused to have happy thoughts and pleasurable feelings. This is quite sophomoric, really. — Pierre-Normand

Thanks, so has anyone ever asked him how something can be epiphenomenal and yet cause him to still generate an entire philosophy based around it? I'm sure he must have considered it at least once.

Thanks, so has anyone ever asked him how something can be epiphenomenal and yet cause him to still generate an entire philosophy based around it? I'm sure he must have considered it at least once. — JupiterJess

Harris simply bites the bullet and acknowledges that he can't claim any responsibility for his own intellectual achievements. He is even handed about that. If people can't be held morally responsible for their bad deeds -- since they're mere puppets being moved around by the impersonal forces of the universe -- then they can't either be given any real credit for their positive accomplishments.

Of course, Harris's philosophy of powerlessness and irresponsibility is unstable and he attempts to patch it up with the caveat that although people are powerless to make choice among real alternatives, and although they can't be given any real credit for their actions, it still is useful to pretend that they are responsible, and praise and reward them accordingly, in order to manipulate them. People are powerless puppets but you can still use praise and blame (and rewards and punishment) as mere psychological tools for pulling on their strings. Harris is quick to add, though, that blaming or punishing someone who has intentionally done a very bad deed (a murderer, say) is terribly unfair to the criminal since he isn't responsible at all. Blaming or punishing the criminal can justifiably be done only if that's the only means for controlling him, but it would be much better, if possible, to tie him up and hack into his brain in order to remove the source of the criminal impulse.

For me, this indicates that free will is illusory, despite the fact that we are able to make choices, for whatever reasons. Is there a way to make the above argument unsound? — CasKev

Though we might not have the willpower to consciously grow our own nails or beat our own hearts we've grown into very peculiar beings which are capable of acting upon information which we gain through a very specific way of interpreting our environment.

To me this all seems like an issue between people who take that as a given and trust others to act somewhat like they themselves would and those who aren't satisfied until they can look inside someone's head in manner they know more about what's going on inside the investigated subject then the subject itself or want to set up an empirical behaviourist framework which could easily turn into a form of totalitarianism.

I would really like mankind as a whole to gain more insight into their automatic behaviours so that we are able to use that information to learn from as a species. Creating dichotomies where something we've only just become able to contemplate rationally is expected to be either true or false in the present moment with our current state of knowledge only makes me feel like we haven't learned enough from our unconscious biases atm.

So, this does not make your argument unsound, it's more like a plea to wonder about what constitutes the "information" we can claim to act upon willingly and if there's a better method to figure that out then we currently do ...somewhat automatically.

And these testaments are derived through introspection and a direct 1st person experience.
See the contradiciton? How you can recall an experience of "no self" without a self to reflect back on to? — JupiterJess

I guess that's really just a problem with semantics. What the realization of no self is, is that the "self" you once thought you were basically isn't there at all. So people just call it "no self", when in actuality there is still an experience there which you could aptly call a self or more appropriately "higher self".

In simpler terms, the parameters of which you once defined yourself have been shown to you to be illusory but yet you still exist and are still aware of life (not you but SOMETHING is still aware of life, call it the observer).

So there is no contradiction, just the same term being thrown around twice to make it looks so.

Your unconscious mind is a part of who you are, for sure. This includes most of your cognitive habits and abilities as well as the source of most of your "raw" motivations. Harris indeed has been, as you note, influenced by his Buddhist meditation practice in viewing the "self" from the stance of a passive observer who introspects her own states of mind and ponders over the origins of her random "thoughts". This is just about the worst possible stance for inquiring about free agency (or about knowledge, for that matter), which involves active involvement of an agent in the world (including the social world) and not a voluntary retreat from it.

Freedom is not to be found in the passive contemplation of one's own navel. The observer and the actor aren't two different entities. They are two different stances taken up alternatively (and oftentimes simultaneously within the normal flow of life) by the very same embodied human being. Also, the observer no more than the actor can be absolved from responsibility for what she comes to believe since she can reflect critically about the deliveries of her senses and memory. Harris often seems to think that the role of the epistemic "observer" (which he equates with the "self") is limited to her passively witnessing random thoughts popping up in her conscious mind as a result of automatic "free" association. — Pierre-Normand

Incase you haven't missed it, it can't be claimed to be who you are because YOU have no OWNERSHIP over it. I mean, sure you can influence it's decisions but you can influence your girlfriend/boyfriends decisions too, does that mean that they are part of who you are? I think not, just a part of your life.

And so by definition, anything that you are unaware of and can not control is therefore not you. Like your heart, or your cells, they form part of your body but they are not you. All YOU are is an awareness, an observer riding around in a body that you so naively and arrogantly call your own. The driver of the car is not the car, remember that.

P.S. Meditation is perhaps the clearest sense of attaining insight on the matter as self-observation is primary. You can't claim physical activity anymore valuable in determining free will over self-observation. Self-observation is primary and comes before decision making, that's why babies need to learn to understand consciousness before they can make decisions. In anycase, it has already been observed by neurological studies that the unconscious mind makes the decisions.

Who determined the robot didn't want to harm anyone? does the robot has a sense of self preservation? Is it future goal oriented and if so, how does it moderate between achieving it's goals and not bothering people with it.

You make a caricature out of what morality actually comes down to. — Gooseone

Whether the robot wants to harm or has self preservation is irrelevant, because not wanting to cause harm and seeking self preservation IS NOT dependant on free-will. IT IS dependant on KNOWLEDGE. Like we are taught the golden rule in schools, it does not become our choice not to harm someone but rather fear conditioning from being punished AND combined with (later in life) the rational understanding of the value of not harming others. It has absolutely nothing to do with free will, just fear conditioning and good judgement. That is all morality is. That is why you can't train dogs to act morally and not poop inside, who by the way are apparently all instinct.

Free-will is about desire for outcomes, states of affairs, experience etc. some of which are in the face of morality (which once again is based on learnt paradigms via fear conditioning as well as sound judgement and understanding of knowledge).

Incase you haven't missed it, it can't be claimed to be who you are because YOU have no OWNERSHIP over it. I mean, sure you can influence it's decisions but you can influence your girlfriend/boyfriends decisions too, does that mean that they are part of who you are? I think not, just a part of your life.

And so by definition, anything that you are unaware of and can not control is therefore not you. Like your heart, or your cells, they form part of your body but they are not you. All YOU are is an awareness, an observer riding around in a body that you so naively and arrogantly call your own. The driver of the car is not the car, remember that. — intrapersona

I'm not sure why it should be regarded as arrogance to claim your body as your own. (Who else would more rightfully claim ownership over it?) In any case, the body and the brain that you allegedly are "riding in" are causally involved in the exercise of your capacities to perceive the world, to gain knowledge about it, and to act. The proper way to characterize those involvements, in my view, is as enabling conditions for the possession of your mental powers and their exercises. Likewise, your eyes enable you to see but they are not doing the seeing for you, your legs enable you to walk but aren't doing the walking for you, and your brain enables you to think but isn't doing the thinking for you.

P.S. Meditation is perhaps the clearest sense of attaining insight on the matter is it is primary. You can't claim physical activity anymore valuable in determining free will over self-observation. Self-observation is primary and comes before decision making. In anycase, it has already been observed by neurological studies that the unconscious mind makes the decisions.

I think you alluded to Libet's experiment earlier. The interpretation of this experiment has been widely criticized, and even Libet himself later came to temper his own conclusions. I commented on it just a few days ago.

Harris' has come from a background in buddhist meditation where it is observed through meditative practices that your sense of identity is basically an illusion. — intrapersona

That, I think, is dubious. True, Harris has engaged with a Buddhist tradition, namely Dzogchen, but many contemporary Buddhists are highly dubious about Harris' interpretations, motivations and credentials. If you look into his degree in neurosciences, it comprises a thesis on the alleged 'neural correlates' of religious belief. It's also noteworthy that Harris has never lectured in neuroscience, nor has ever practiced it apart from this thesis. Furthermore, his PhD was in part published by 'The Reason Project' which was 'a 501(c) (3) nonprofit foundation whose mission includes conducting original scientific research related to human values, cognition, and reasoning.” The thesis forms a large part of his later book, The Moral Landscape, which in my view is basically 'utilitarianism with an fMRI scanner'. For a critical (if not scathing) look at this kind of fMRI-powered neurobabble, have a look at this recent NY Times review, Do You Believe in God, or Is That a Software Glitch? So all in all, I think Harris mainly presents himself as 'a neuroscientist' as part of the overall 'Religion vs Science' polemics, of which he is a prominent spokesman. He gives Buddhism and other eastern practices credit for being more like what he would consider an 'inner science', and indeed there is a lot of truth in that, but scratch the surface with Harris, and it's not hard to find militant atheism, which I think many Buddhists are uncomfortable with.

Harris indeed has been, as you note, influenced by his Buddhist meditation practice in viewing the "self" from the stance of a passive observer who introspects her own states of mind and ponders over the origins of her random "thoughts". This is just about the worst possible stance for inquiring about free agency (or about knowledge, for that matter), which involves active involvement of an agent in the world (including the social world) and not a voluntary retreat from it. — Pierre-Normand

As one who has at least studied the subject at postgraduate level, if not through a traditional monastic education, I think a considerable amount of misinformation sorrounds the interpretation of the Buddhist 'no-self'. It's noteworthy that at the very outset, that, when directly asked if the self exists or not, the response from the Buddha is to maintain a 'noble silence'. The question of the nature of the self - and indeed everything! - is inextricably bound up with 'dependent origination', a very deep philosophy which takes years of study to understand. But suffice to say that I don't think the Buddha ever denied that 'the self exists' tout courte, and that this misunderstanding constitutes one of the popular misconceptions about Buddhism generally.

Incidentally I did participate in a debate on the topic of Free Will on the Dharmawheel forum not long back, and I maintained the view that Buddhism basically supports the idea of free will - it has to, because it defines 'karma' in terms of 'intentional action', so I can't see how it could possibly not. But, interestingly, there was quite a bit of dissent from other contributors.

(...) Incidentally I did participate in a debate on the topic of Free Will on the Dharmawheel forum not long back, and I maintained the view that Buddhism basically supports the idea of free will - it has to, because it defines 'karma' in terms of 'intentional action', so I can't see how it could possibly not. But, interestingly, there was quite a bit of dissent from other contributors. — Wayfarer

Thanks for those useful explanations. So, Harris's Buddhism really amounts to Pop Buddhism sprinkled with a fair amount of Cartesian prejudice.

I have read some of what he's had to say on Buddhist philosophy and it's not completely uninformed but overall his approach to the subject is tendentious in my opinion. So - yes, that would be a fair summary.

Is it falsifiable or not?

I doubt that Sam Harris is the only person saying it. Alex Rosenberg, among others, has probably said it.

Let's not make this a thread about Sam Harris. Let's address the thread topic, please.

Free-will is about desire for outcomes, states of affairs, experience etc. some of which are in the face of morality (which once again is based on learnt paradigms via fear conditioning as well as sound judgement and understanding of knowledge). — intrapersona

Glad you cleared that up. What you're talking about here seems a lot like the free will worth having.
I see that as a form of moral competence, which requires being able to interpret and act upon (for now subjective) information.

You say things like "the rational understanding of the value", "the understanding of knowledge", this indicates you agree that we have a capacity to understand our unconscious behaviours to a degree and can act according to that knowledge. It's up to your sound judgement what you do with that.

The fact that we can choose whatever aspect of the topic we wish to, is pretty convincing demonstration of free will, I would have thought.

As for whether it's 'falsifiable' - recall that the very idea of 'falsifiability' was the brainchild of Karl Popper, in respect of a very specific type of question: namely, to ascertain whether a given proposition could be invalidated by any observation. The point was to draw a demarcation between scientific propositions, which ought to be falsifiable, and metaphysics, which in principle may never be.

So the existence, or otherwise, of 'free will' is not the kind of statement to which the criterion of 'falsifiability' ought to be applied.

(Y) (was hoping for an applause emoticon)