• creativesoul
    11.9k
    My approach to a recent debate hinged upon the notion of existential contingency. The other participant claimed that s/he wasn't sure what that was. This post is meant to offer a detailed account of that, and hopefully attract the right kind of participants to make for a thoughtful, provocative, and rational discussion. The aim involves delving into considerations that much, if not most, of philosophy has left sorely neglected, by virtue of applying the notion of existential contingency. So, lets get started...


    When something consists of a plurality of simpler things, and those simpler things exist prior to the complex, then that something is a complex thing(similar to a composite). As such it is existentially contingent upon the simple. Water is an easy example to understand. It is existentially contingent upon hydrogen and oxygen. There are all sorts of things like this. Apple pies are existentially contingent upon ingredients; moral codes of conduct are existentially contingent upon language; spatio-temporal distinction is existentially contingent upon a plurality; and so on and so forth. The interesting thing to note here is that while the complex is existentially contingent upon the simple, the simple does not require the complex for the same, for the simple does not consist in/of the complex. So, moving on to the aforementioned considerations that philosophy has neglected...


    There exists a clear and sharp contrast, a difference in/of basic elemental constitution, between thinking about thought/belief and thought/belief itself. That is the difference between cognition and metacognition. The astounding failure of philosophy is that this has not been taken into proper account. The neglect has led to a plethora of philosophical issues that span the breadth of the discipline itself. Grasping the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief is crucial to understanding thought/belief itself. I cannot stress that enough. If we get the very basics of thought/belief wrong, then in some way or another, we get everything that is existentially contingent upon thought/belief wrong as well. The scope of application here is daunting, as it couldn't be any broader than everything ever spoken and/or written throughout human history.

    Thinking about thought/belief is metacognition. Metacognition requires both pre-existing thought/belief, and the ability to identify and isolate that so that it can be the focus of consideration. Only written language allows that kind of focus. Thus, metacognition is existentially contingent upon both pre-existing thought/belief and written language. All written language consists, in part, of symbolic meaning(symbolism). Thus, metacognition is existentially contingent upon symbolism. Symbolism, in order for it to even be able to emerge onto the world stage, requires something to become the symbol, something to become the symbolized, and an agent capable of drawing mental correlations between the two. Drawing a correlation between them is attributing meaning. The moment the correlation is drawn, meaning emerges onto the world stage via attribution, albeit in it's most rudimentary form. This is the origen of meaning, and it does not require language anymore than an apple requires an apple pie. All written language is existentially contingent upon meaning, but not all meaning is existentially contingent upon written language. Furthermore since rudimentary meaning is not existentially contingent upon written language, and metacognition is, then it only follows that rudimentary meaning is not existentially contingent upon metacognition.

    All thought/belief consists entirely of mental correlation(s) drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own mental state. All such correlation constitutes being thought/belief. In light of the above, this brings us to a curious place in consideration. If all thought/belief consists in/of mental correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's mental state, and meaning is attributed by virtue of drawing correlations between symbol and symbolized, then the emergence of rudimentary meaning is existentially contingent upon pre-linguistic thought/belief formation for the attribution of meaning happens within thought/belief formation itself. Meaning is a specific kind of mental correlation.

    Seeing how all thought/belief and statements thereof consist of mental correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the thinking/believing agent's own 'mental state', and correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, it also becomes clear that thought/belief, even in it's most rudimentary form, presupposes it's own correspondence to fact/reality. That is to say that the correlations themselves constitute being thought/belief, and that the act of drawing correlation constitutes thought/belief formation, and within thought/belief formation, correspondence with/to fact/reality is presupposed by virtue of correlation presupposing the existence of it's own content.

    So, here we have the emergence of rudimentary thought/belief, meaning, and the presupposition of correspondence all prior to and quite necessary for language itself, for language is existentially contingent upon them all.
  • creativesoul
    11.9k
    Due to the sheer unusualness of what's been set out thus far - for clarity alone - there's a need to further develop the notion of pre-linguistic thought/belief. In particular, there needs to be some clarification regarding what non-linguistic thought/belief consists in/of as well as it's content, if it can be determined that it makes any sense at all to talk about non-linguistic thought/belief in terms of it's content. Coherency alone demands that the content of non-linguistic thought/belief exclude all that is existentially contingent upon language.

    Here, we find ourselves at a place in consideration where we must be able to distinguish between that which is existentially contingent upon language, and that which is not. That sort of endeavor has very close connections to a host of philosophical conundrums. Namely, any and all positions that are inherently incapable of properly accounting for the difference between talk and what we're talking about, including but not limited to positions neglecting the difference(s) between metacognition and cognition. All this can seem rather daunting, so perhaps it be best if we begin with some obvious examples of what non-linguistic thought/belief cannot possibly include, and take it from there.

    Pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief cannot consist of the same 'structure' that logic and/or natural language has. The most prevalent example is talk of belief that and/or belief in. The opening sentence in this paragraph seems to go against the heart of the commonly held notion that all belief is statable, but I do not think that it actually does. While I would agree wholeheartedly with that claim as it pertains to justification, and/or setting out the ground for one's thought/belief(particularly when it pertains to talking about the unknown realm, Noumena, and/or any other notion that purportedly cannot be put into words and/or otherwise known), that consideration simply doesn't apply to the current endeavor. Let me be clear, all thought/belief can be taken proper account of by statements, but our doing so with regard to the non-linguistic variety must not require that our candidate be put into the form of a statement/proposition/assertion. The trouble with this logical demand is that it leaves us at a loss - or at least seems to - for how to accurately represent non-linguistic thought/belief.

    I am of the very strong opinion that natural language affects non-linguistic thought/belief in that it structures them; not the other way around. Thus, if my position is correct, then any and all attempts to represent non-linguistic thought/belief by attempting to force them to adhere to the underlying structure of statements/propositions/assertions puts the cart ahead of the horse, so to speak. It is a conflation of cognition and metacognition, akin to attributing the features of an apple pie that have nothing to do with apples to the apples themselves. It simply doesn't follow from the fact that apple pies consist of crust, that apples must as well. That is likewise the case with linguistic thought/belief and non-linguistic thought/belief. The former consists in/of things(structures in this case) that the latter does not. The structure of the latter cannot be the same as the former, if it makes sense to say that non-linguistic thought/belief has structure at all. I find no reason at all to say that it can and/or does.

    Rather, I find that the only place to look for clues regarding what non-linguistic thought/belief consists in/of, is what is readily available to us:Statements of thought/belief. All statements of thought/belief have certain things in common. If we can become aware of and therefore establish what all statements of thought/belief have in common, regardless of the cultural, familial, historical, and/or individual particulars, then we're well on our way to being able to separate thought/belief that is existentially contingent upon language, from that which is not. Some of these commonalities are not existentially contingent upon language, and yet they still constitute being thought/belief. In short, all thought/belief boils down to mental correlation(s) drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own mental state.

    All statements/assertions of thought/belief consist of predication. All predication is existentially contingent upon mental correlation(s). Not all mental correlation is existentially contingent upon predication. Pavlov's dog, the bell, getting fed/eating. My cat, the sound of certain plastic bags, getting fed/eating a specific kind of food. The guppies in the pond, the visible/'auditory' presence of a person, getting fed/eating. These are all very simple - rudimentary - examples of cases where an agent is drawing correlation(s) between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own mental state(hunger influenced in all these examples). Re-cognition.
  • creativesoul
    11.9k
    There is another burden at hand. It seems that stimulus/response needs to be somehow 'factored' into this position; taken account of, I suppose. I mean, is there some 'line' which lays between stimulus/response and rudimentary thought/belief formation, which when 'crossed over' stimulus/response becomes thought/belief? Nah. I don't think that that makes much sense.

    It seems to me that the stimulus/response mechanism is satisfied by autonomous reflexivity. While I wouldn't have any issue at all with saying that thought/belief begins in autonomous fashion, it seems to me that the difference between thought/belief and stimulus/response is one of kind not degree.
  • Wayfarer
    22.3k
    Thinking about thought/belief is metacognition. Metacognition requires both pre-existing thought/belief, and the ability to identify and isolate that so that it can be the focus of consideration. Only written language allows that kind of focus. Thus, metacognition is existentially contingent upon both pre-existing thought/belief and written language. All written language consists, in part, of symbolic meaning(symbolism). Thus, metacognition is existentially contingent upon symbolism.creativesoul

    I will leap in here, Creative, with the caveat that I only read the first post, and also that I'm stealing bits of time between working on a drudgerous contract.

    I think it is very perceptive to notice the role of meta-cognition, 'thinking about thinking', and that it's also true that this is not something that many people are aware of, or comment about. So in that regard, in agreement so far.

    However, I think there's an element of confusion in respect of what is called 'correspondence theory'. That is, you're basically assuming a correlation. or correspondence, between thought and language, and objects of sensory perception, within which thought and language operate essentially as a kind of representation.

    So I think, overall, you're operating within the general paradigm of representative realism; that thought and language represents the objects of sensory perception. Then you begin to question the sense in which thought and language can be 'objectified', so to speak. But you seem to be arguing that representative cognition exists on a continuum, from that exhibited by animal cognition, but becoming increasingly refined in the case of humans.

    I won't say anything more at this point, before checking that I'm on the right track, other than to suggest that the problem you're wrestling with is a form of 'foundationalism'. The other point is that I think you're in the general ballpark with Chomsky in some respects. Which prompts me to say, have a peruse of this review, of a book about the evolution of language, by Chomsky (et al).
  • Wayfarer
    22.3k
    '
    I mean, is there some 'line' which lays between stimulus/response and rudimentary thought/belief formation, which when 'crossed over' stimulus/response becomes thought/belief? Nah. I don't think that that makes much sense.creativesoul

    From the above review:

    human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. A more interesting example given in the book is the sentence “Birds that fly instinctively swim.” The adverb “instinctively” can modify either “fly” or “swim.” But there is no ambiguity in the sentence “Instinctively birds that fly swim.” Here “instinctively” must modify “swim,” despite its greater linear distance.

    Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.
  • WISDOMfromPO-MO
    753
    It seems to me like quantities may be non-linguistic thoughts. I have read that some traditional cultures only had words for what in English are "one", "two" and "many". But the sight/sense of a tree and another tree is not a quantity. A concept had to be created in the mind and then a symbol (2, two, II, etc.) created to signify it.

    Did the symbol come before the concept, or did the concept--something not sensed through vision, hearing, touch, etc.--come before the symbol?
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    You wrote:

    I will leap in here, Creative, with the caveat that I only read the first post, and also that I'm stealing bits of time between working on a drudgerous contract.

    Hey Jeep! Nice of you to join in.


    I think it is very perceptive to notice the role of meta-cognition, 'thinking about thinking', and that it's also true that this is not something that many people are aware of, or comment about. So in that regard, in agreement so far.

    Ok. Thanks for kind words.



    However... ...you're basically assuming a correlation. or correspondence, between thought and language, and objects of sensory perception, within which thought and language operate essentially as a kind of representation.

    I would not use those terms like that.

    The relationship between thought and language is similar to the relationship between apples and apple pies. It is one of basic elemental constitution. Apple pies aren't represented by apples.



    So I think, overall, you're operating within the general paradigm of representative realism; that thought and language represents the objects of sensory perception.

    Nah Jeep. This one's a bit off target as well. I'm a direct realist. Our thought/belief aren't representing reality. They connect the agent to the universe(reality). The connection is the direct result of the presupposition inherent to all rudimentary thought/belief formation. If that makes me anything, it would make me a Connectivist...




    Then you begin to question the sense in which thought and language can be 'objectified', so to speak. But you seem to be arguing that representative cognition exists on a continuum, from that exhibited by animal cognition, but becoming increasingly refined in the case of humans.

    I won't say anything more at this point, before checking that I'm on the right track, other than to suggest that the problem you're wrestling with is a form of 'foundationalism'.

    It doesn't make sense on my view to talk about thought/belief being objectified. I wouldn't call myself a foundationalist. Although I do work from the presupposition that at conception the agent is completely void of all thought/belief.



    The other point is that I think you're in the general ballpark with Chomsky in some respects. Which prompts me to say, have a peruse of this review, of a book about the evolution of language, by Chomsky (et al).

    Cool. I'll check it out at my earliest convenience.

    8-)
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    Greetings wis...

    You wrote:

    It seems to me like quantities may be non-linguistic thoughts...

    Not on my view.


    I have read that some traditional cultures only had words for what in English are "one", "two" and "many".

    Yup.



    But the sight/sense of a tree and another tree is not a quantity.

    Nor need it be.

    There is no sight/sense of a tree and another tree when there is no plurality.



    Did the symbol come before the concept, or did the concept--something not sensed through vision, hearing, touch, etc.--come before the symbol?

    I can't make heads nor tails of this...

    On my view, concepts are existentially contingent upon language.
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    You offered the following excerpt:

    human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. A more interesting example given in the book is the sentence “Birds that fly instinctively swim.” The adverb “instinctively” can modify either “fly” or “swim.” But there is no ambiguity in the sentence “Instinctively birds that fly swim.” Here “instinctively” must modify “swim,” despite its greater linear distance.

    Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.

    Interesting. Is this in line with what I've written, by your lights?
  • Cavacava
    2.4k


    So then Existential Contingency is an ontological concept, the existence of something is constructed out of other things, which are by implication simpler in construction. Does this process ever end...your example of water, being comprised of Oxygen & Hydrogen can be extended almost indefinitely, as we have seen in physics. The same question has to do with the meta-cognition concept, thinking about thinking, about thinking...the circle of correlation. How do you differentiate meta-cognition from recursion or do you think they are the same.

    You indicated that you are a direct realist, so what is.. is perceived, no unknowable or unthinkable reality lurking in the background, behind the apparent. Yet your only access to the apparent is though thought. I think there's kind of a "transparent cage" made out of language and thought, from which neither realist nor idealist can escape.

    You mention the meta function of written language and from the way you describe it, it almost sounds like written language is an abstraction from spoken language, which is itself our best shot at communication of our experiences with others. Why Plato wrote dialogues.

    Just a few thoughts. I like the idea of non-cognitive pre-linguistic perception, and I agree with the general outline you provided on this.
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    Greetings Cava!

    So then Existential Contingency is an ontological concept, the existence of something is constructed out of other things, which are by implication simpler in construction. Does this process ever end...your example of water, being comprised of Oxygen & Hydrogen can be extended almost indefinitely, as we have seen in physics.

    Yes. It is fair to say that existential contingency is an ontological concept. However, I find that it's better regarded as a method which has it's limits. I'm ok with those limits.




    The same question has to do with the meta-cognition concept, thinking about thinking, about thinking...the circle of correlation. How do you differentiate meta-cognition from recursion or do you think they are the same.

    I do not know enough about recursion to answer, but I am more than willing to grant whatever you say about it as a means for comparison if it is relevant.




    You indicated that you are a direct realist, so what is.. is perceived, no unknowable or unthinkable reality lurking in the background, behind the apparent.

    If being a direct realist requires denial of the unknown realm, or assuming that we perceive everything, then I am not a direct realist, and I mistakenly categorized myself as such. I find no need to take it that far.

    We directly perceive and that begins autonomously.




    Yet your only access to the apparent is though thought.

    I would disagree. Our access to that which appears is physiological sensory perception.



    I think there's kind of a "transparent cage" made out of language and thought, from which neither realist nor idealist can escape.

    Well, it is most certainly the case that language will (de)limit what we can say... sensibly at least.



    You mention the meta function of written language and from the way you describe it, it almost sounds like written language is an abstraction from spoken language, which is itself our best shot communication of our experiences with others. Why Plato wrote dialogues.

    Indeed. I think that there's much to be gleaned by taking note of how written language expands the spoken. Likewise, how spoken thought/belief expands the non-linguistic.



    Just a few thoughts. I like the idea of non-cognitive pre-linguistic perception, and I agree with the general outline you provided on this.

    Nice.

    I often find myself needing and/or wanting to invent new language to better set out my own position, because the conventional terminology carries too much baggage. Hence, the earlier bit about being a direct realist.
  • Cavacava
    2.4k
    I would disagree. Our access to that which appears is physiological sensory perception.

    OK Creative but

    That is likewise the case with linguistic thought/belief and non-linguistic thought/belief. The former consists in/of things(structures in this case) that the latter does not. The structure of the latter cannot be the same as the former, if it makes sense to say that non-linguistic thought/belief has structure at all. I find no reason at all to say that it can and/or does.

    Yes, our access is physiological sensory perception, but I think it's two processes, which is kinda what I thought you were on about in what I quoted above. Sensing which is non- linguistic and mostly automatic, is an never ending process of maintaining coherence, and the processing of that information into recognizable concepts is an incredibly fast process. Initial sense datum recognized in 200 milliseconds (+/-} and processed in say 400 milliseconds, compare to animation speed at say 60 frames per second.

    So when I said our only access to the 'great outdoors' is though thought, what I mean't was that our input into what we sense only occurs at the conceptual/linguistic level. Preexisting concepts and thoughts must affect the processing of incoming information, however that might be physically accomplished. Given the brains processing speed and its ability to handle multiple sense, it has plenty of time to shade additional information to match context, emotional mood, and so on.
  • Wayfarer
    22.3k
    Is this in line with what I've written, by your lights?creativesoul

    It was in response to this:

    is there some 'line' which lays between stimulus/response and rudimentary thought/belief formation, which when 'crossed over' stimulus/response becomes thought/belief?creativesoul

    My view is, there is a leap or discontinuity when h. sapiens becomes able to use language and reason, and to tell stories - when s/he becomes human, in effect. Then we cross a threshold which is no longer explicable in purely biological, hence evolutionary, terms.
  • creativesoul
    11.9k
    I see nothing there that I would disagree with Cava.

    Regarding the comment about two processes...

    Physiological sensory perception on my view is akin to innate 'equipment'(for lack of a better word), whereas 'perception' - as historically defined - amounts to thought/belief about that which is being perceived.

    Suffice it to say that our worldview 'filters' out and fills in the blanks of our physiological sensory perception.
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    My view is, there is a leap or discontinuity when h. sapiens becomes able to use language and reason, and to tell stories - when s/he becomes human, in effect. Then we cross a threshold which is no longer explicable in purely biological, hence evolutionary, terms.

    There's all sorts of things that purely scientific jargon cannot possibly take account of. Not everything that counts can be counted.

    ;)
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    So when I said our only access to the 'great outdoors' is though thought, what I mean't was that our input into what we sense only occurs at the conceptual/linguistic level.

    I'm not sure if I understand. Could you help me a bit by clarifying what you mean by "our input into what we sense"?

    Perhaps a pair of examples will help build a bridge of common understanding.

    Let's imagine two children, one who has no language and one who does, touching fire and getting burned as a result.

    What would the language-less child's input into what he sensed be, if anything at all?

    And the child who has language?
  • Cavacava
    2.4k


    I think either child would scream holler and cry.

    Perhaps if we use your existential contingency process here.

    I am mad a Jane, and something I would normally pass by and think nothing of, suddenly upsets me and sets me off on a tirade. The existential contingency of my getting overly upset by someone having knocked my hat off the rack where I put it is my anger with Jane.

    Psychologists have done experiments that suggest that our overall state of being affects what and how we sort out what we experience, We only perceive a selection from of what we sense, apparently what we are concerned about at the time, which is contingent on our over state of being at the time, which is contingent on our thoughts

    X-)
  • creativesoul
    11.9k
    X-)

    That(screaming hollering and crying) looks like output to me.

    Indeed regarding the last bit. Thought/belief has efficacy.
  • Wayfarer
    22.3k
    There's all sorts of things that purely scientific jargon cannot possibly take account of. Not everything that counts can be counted.creativesoul

    True, but not the point. I was responding to your statement about 'the line between stimulus/response and thought/belief' - I'm arguing there is one, which is germane to your OP.
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    On my view they are different Jeep...
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    My view is, there is a leap or discontinuity when h. sapiens becomes able to use language and reason, and to tell stories - when s/he becomes human, in effect.

    I think that I understand what you're saying here Jeep. There is no doubt that language use reason and such makes humans quite different from other creatures capable of thought/belief formation. I'm not sure if I would put it the same way as you though. I mean, I find no reason to posit a line between stimulus/response and thought/belief. That would be to place both on a linear continuum. If I held such a linear view, I would be inclined to agree with you that there must be a line, or some sort of clear distinction between the two that is marked by something that thought/belief has but stimulus/response does not. That said...

    There are both differences and similarities between stimulus/response and thought/belief. Both are existentially contingent upon physiological sensory perception. The key consideration, on my view, involves the difference between the criterion(necessary and sufficient conditions) for them. Here, it seems we agree as well as far as holding that they are indeed different from one another. The only difference, it seems to me, between our views on this matter is how we respectively take account of it.

    In order for there to be a leap or discontinuity between two things, they must be placed on a strictly linear continuum. I reject that due to the way that thought/belief gains complexity.

    Follow me?
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    Alright Cava, let's see if we can elucidate upon some things...

    You wrote:

    Perhaps if we use your existential contingency process here.

    I am mad a Jane, and something I would normally pass by and think nothing of, suddenly upsets me and sets me off on a tirade. The existential contingency of my getting overly upset by someone having knocked my hat off the rack where I put it is my anger with Jane.

    Psychologists have done experiments that suggest that our overall state of being affects what and how we sort out what we experience, We only perceive a selection from of what we sense, apparently what we are concerned about at the time, which is contingent on our over state of being at the time, which is contingent on our thoughts.

    Your example is clearly steeped in very complex thought/belief. That sequence of events is existentially contingent upon language. I can't make much sense of the following...

    The existential contingency of my getting overly upset by someone having knocked my hat off the rack where I put it is my anger with Jane.

    I wouldn't use the notion of existential contingency in that manner. Your getting overly upset is existentially contingent, amongst other things, upon the ability to be upset, and a standard of what it takes to be overly upset. That requires moral belief. Your report of the events shows this. If the report is accurate, then the events themselves instantiate these things.

    On the bit about the experiments...

    As I've already said, I agree with the conclusion. However, when held under scrutiny...

    The explanation of the conclusion implicitly draws a distinction between sense and perception. As mentioned earlier, this is a perfectly acceptable use of the notion of perception. Historically, it seems to be the most popular way to talk about mental ongoings, particularly when discussing the archaic philosophical issues that arose from the likes of Hume, Locke, Kant, and others. I'm putting it to anyone who cares to think about it, that those issues are the product of using the framework. Lot's of folk hold that perception is reality, because it's affects/effects are real. Here, perception amounts to how one views and/or interprets the world. All that aside...

    I want only to note here that such a framework cannot be used as a valid means to critique and/or asess my claims here. Applying it in an attempt to garner understanding of what I'm putting forth is futile. One cannot grasp what I putting forth if s/he doesn't draw and maintain the distinction between physiological sensory perception and thought/belief. So...

    While I can understand what the conclusion is saying, and I agree with it's findings, I find that the way it is being explained is unnecessarily complex and actually adds confusion to the mix. Here it is again...

    We only perceive a selection from of what we sense, apparently what we are concerned about at the time, which is contingent on our over state of being at the time, which is contingent on our thoughts.

    My summation would be more like this...

    Our thought/belief system has efficacy. Pre-existing thought/belief not only largely determines how we take account of the world and/or ourselves, but it also produces mental states that largely determine our behaviours at any given time.
  • Cavacava
    2.4k
    I agree, forget Jane.

    Still trying to sort out your position regarding perception versus judgement/belief. How is the construction, the existentialist contingency developed, top down or bottom up, or...

    The following from summary of a paper from Neuroscience News, written by Dr, A Newen, doctor of Philosophy.

    The aim of the paper is to defend the claim that the content of our perceptual experience can include emotions and also person impressions. Using these examples, an argument is developed to defend a liberal-content view for core examples of social cognition. This view is developed and contrasted with accounts which claim that in the case of registering another person’s emotion while seeing them, we have to describe the relevant content not as the content of a perceptual experience, but of a perceptual belief. The paper defends the view that perceptual experiences can have a rich content yet remain separable from beliefs formed on the basis of the experience. How liberal and enriched the content of a perceptual experience is will depend upon the expertise a person has developed in the field. This is supported by the argument that perceptual experiences can be systematically enriched by perceiving affordances of objects, by pattern recognition or by top-down processes, as analyzed by processes of cognitive penetration or predictive coding.

    It's a funny situation, forgetting for a moment sense datum, just thinking about perception as a totality. If he is right then what we know, our skills, our empathy affect what we perceive ("cognitive penetration") but these are fundamental and automatically involved in our perception. Perhaps like typing without looking or realizing that someone is sad, mad, or whatever. These perceptions don't require any additional cognition.

    This is not that far off your summary, at least as I read it.
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    You wrote:

    Still trying to sort out your position regarding perception versus judgement/belief.

    You've invoked judgment.

    It is worth noting here that, on my view, judgment and belief are not one in the same thing. Judgment is existentially contingent upon pre-existing thought/belief. Judgment is deliberately assessing whether or not some claim is true, whereas thought/belief can be as rudimentary as the mental correlation required for initially attributing meaning to objects within experience.

    So...

    Judgment is thought/belief based. That is, judgment rests it's haunches upon pre-existing thought/belief. Thought/belief presupposes it's own truth, whereas judgment presupposes the truth of it's ground.

    When comparing perception with thought/belief...

    Physiological sensory perception is a basic elemental constituent of thought/belief. It is an 'ingredient' so to speak. All thought/belief either stems directly from and/or directly involves physiological sensory perception and/or is a more complex composition consisting - in part at least - of pre-existing thought/belief that has/does.

    The relationship between physiological sensory perception and thought/belief is akin to apples and apple pies. As mentioned heretofore but bears repeating, the relationship between them is one of basic elemental constitution.


    How is the construction, the existentialist contingency developed, top down or bottom up, or...

    The notion(s) of top/down and/or bottom/up are prevalent in today's discourse and they seem to underwrite what Wayfarer was thinking about earlier regarding foundationalism and it's shortcomings. Suffice it to say that I find that that framework cannot possibly account for that which requires both and thus... is neither.

    Short answer: Thought/belief does not accrue in any specific direction whatsoever.

    I do not find that a strictly linear explanation is adequate when it concerns how thought/belief gains complexity, particularly after language acquisition begins in earnest. However, if we work from the premiss that at conception we are void of all thought/belief, the formation thereof must begin simply and gain in it's complexity. Thought/belief systems like our own aren't built in purely linear fashion, nor do they work that way.

    Our awareness of our own mental ongoings begins top down, as it must. I mean, by the time we are capable of metacognition, our mental ongoings are heavily steeped in all sorts of historical, cultural, and familial particulars. Then there's all of the philosophical baggage that goes along with talking about our mental ongoings. So, any and all knowledge that is acquired about them must begin with a top down approach, as there is no alternative.

    So, we look for the universally extant common denominators within all known examples of thought/belief by virtue of removing the individual, historical, familial, and cultural particulars. What's left and yet remains sufficient for thought/belief is precisely what I'm calling rudimentary, i.e; non and/or prelinguistic thought/belief. That top-down pursuit provides nice support for the aforementioned premiss.

    All thought/belief consists entirely in/of mental correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's mental state(of mind when applicable).
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    I'll attend to the last portion next time around...

    X-)

    Looks promising...
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    After having read the article, of course I'm going to object about how the word "perceive" is being used. On my view, it's unnecessarily confusing. I'll try showing how/why that is the case while parsing out the substantive content within the article.

    It seems that they're trying to determine the complexity within the content of what they're calling 'perception'. Namely, one question is/was whether we 'perceive' a laptop or a flat rectangular shaped object that has bumps on one side but is smooth on the other(words to that effect/affect)? This question is meant to elucidate upon the richness of our 'perception'. I take that to be determined by it's complexity.

    Below I've quoted the beginning of the article for accurate reference...

    Does our brain perceive objects initially as a conglomeration of shapes, colours, and patterns or does it instantly recognise the entire structure?

    A laptop or a cluster of shapes?

    There is a thing on the desk. It is open, grey on the outside and black on the inside, has many small square bumps on its horizontal side, and on its vertical side a smooth, reflecting surface. A laptop. But do we really see that thing as a laptop? Or do we see shapes, colours, edges etc., while our brain completes our perception by making use of rational inferences to reach the conclusion that the thing is a laptop? In other words: how intelligent are our perception processes?

    It seems to me that the mystery itself is the inevitable consequence of language use; a bewitchment stemming from ill-conceived notions of perception and perception processes.

    While objects of physiological sensory perception have features that distinguish them from other objects, and we often identify and talk about these features, when it comes to talking about what we see, or what we perceive as it pertains to these objects, the limits of our language determine the complexity of our 'perception'. That is, the more complex the language used in past as a means of taking account of 'objects', the more complex the recognition of the object.

    So... to answer the question of whether or not we 'perceive' a laptop or a cluster of shapes, it may be one, the other, both and/or neither, depending of course upon how any particular agent has learned to talk about the object. The limits of our language is the limit of our worldview. Some agent may have no awareness of laptops, and thus the 'object' on the table would be 'seen' as s/he has learned to talk about similar 'objects', situations, or perhaps it would not arrest the agent's attention at all.
  • Cavacava
    2.4k
    I do not find that a strictly linear explanation is adequate when it concerns how thought/belief gains complexity, particularly after language acquisition begins in earnest. However, if we work from the premiss that at conception we are void of all thought/belief, the formation thereof must begin simply and gain in it's complexity. Thought/belief systems like our own aren't built in purely linear fashion, nor do they work that way.

    I agree with what you said but this blank tablet, is biologically constructed such that language acquisition comes built-in, a la Chomsky, The structure of language, is complex yet a baby learns the complicated rules will seemly little effort. Chomsky thinks that this innate ability was due to a biological mutation that occurred between 60-100,000 years ago. He thinks this ability was acquired suddenly and it was passed on quickly because of the evolutionary, and revolutionary advantages it gave humans.
  • Cavacava
    2.4k


    What interested me about this article is the implication that habituation in perception enables the brain to skip its constructive thought/belief function as part of its normal ongoing processes. We see a laptop sitting on the table, we immediately understand what it is, there is no thought/belief construction, it is a laptop. Our perceptions are habituated to most ordinary experience, we don't have to think much, because we have already done the work, things generally fall into slots that we have already constructed.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.1k
    Judgment is deliberately assessing whether or not some claim is true, whereas thought/belief can be as rudimentary as the mental correlation required for initially attributing meaning to objects within experience.creativesoul

    Isn't belief existentially contingent on judgement? I mean, in order to believe something, don't you have to do some sort of deliberate assessment as to whether or not it is true? Without that judgement, how can it be a belief, which means to accept something, and acceptance implies deliberate judgement?

    Thinking, on the other hand, is the process whereby we pass such judgements, and form beliefs. Thinking is not existentially contingent on belief, because we can think with a content of images and memories, which are not per se beliefs, because they are not created through deliberate acceptance.

    So don't you think that we need a separation between thought and belief, to represent this situation where belief is existentially contingent on thought, but thought is not existentially contingent on belief?
  • creativesoul
    11.9k


    I agree with what you said but this blank tablet, is biologically constructed such that language acquisition comes built-in, a la Chomsky, The structure of language, is complex yet a baby learns the complicated rules will seemly little effort. Chomsky thinks that this innate ability was due to a biological mutation that occurred between 60-100,000 years ago. He thinks this ability was acquired suddenly and it was passed on quickly because of the evolutionary, and revolutionary advantages it gave humans.

    While there's much overlap of agreement, it seems, between Chomsky's position and my own...

    The notion of tabula rasa doesn't quite fit into the position I'm arguing for. I mean, a zygote is not equivalent to a blank slate, although it is void of all thought/belief. That's a technicality worth mention.

    If learning the rules of language requires only using language correctly, then there is no issue with Chomsky's claim that children learn the rules with seemingly little effort. I'm not so sure that correct use equals learning the rules. As a matter of fact, that equivalency is highly suspect, on my view.
  • creativesoul
    11.9k



    What interested me about this article is the implication that habituation in perception enables the brain to skip its constructive thought/belief function as part of its normal ongoing processes. We see a laptop sitting on the table, we immediately understand what it is, there is no thought/belief construction, it is a laptop. Our perceptions are habituated to most ordinary experience, we don't have to think much, because we have already done the work, things generally fall into slots that we have already constructed.

    You and I share an interest here:The everyday facts as they transpire time and time again with regard to how humans use physiological sensory perception to take an account of experience.

    Despite the way that neuroscience takes account of things, it is utterly impossible for the brain to skip drawing mental correlations as part of it's normal ongoing processes. That notion is a consequence of an inherently inadequate framework. 'Seeing a laptop' is equivalent to drawing mental correlations between an 'object' in/of physiological sensory perception and all of the ways one has learned to talk about the 'object'. In short, 'seeing' a laptop is recognition of an object as 'a laptop'. That does not 'skip' drawing mental correlations. Rather, it is doing just that.

    I'm struggling here Cava between identifying and elucidating upon agreement and critically assessing the inherent inadequacy within the framework underwriting the example themselves. The article, and neuroscience itself for that matter, uses a conceptual(linguistic) framework firmly based upon a brush(the notion of perception) that has much too broad a stroke, which is precisely why using it paints a picture full of either/or questions, when the answers are one, the other, neither, and both - depending upon the level of complexity within the agent's worldview(thought/belief system).

    Habituation in 'perception', as in the laptop example, requires initial cognition and re-cognition, only the latter of which counts as 'perception' in the sense being used.
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