Thinking about thought/belief is metacognition. Metacognition requires both pre-existing thought/belief, and the ability to identify and isolate that so that it can be the focus of consideration. Only written language allows that kind of focus. Thus, metacognition is existentially contingent upon both pre-existing thought/belief and written language. All written language consists, in part, of symbolic meaning(symbolism). Thus, metacognition is existentially contingent upon symbolism. — creativesoul

I mean, is there some 'line' which lays between stimulus/response and rudimentary thought/belief formation, which when 'crossed over' stimulus/response becomes thought/belief? Nah. I don't think that that makes much sense. — creativesoul

human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. A more interesting example given in the book is the sentence “Birds that fly instinctively swim.” The adverb “instinctively” can modify either “fly” or “swim.” But there is no ambiguity in the sentence “Instinctively birds that fly swim.” Here “instinctively” must modify “swim,” despite its greater linear distance.

Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.

You wrote:

I will leap in here, Creative, with the caveat that I only read the first post, and also that I'm stealing bits of time between working on a drudgerous contract.

I think it is very perceptive to notice the role of meta-cognition, 'thinking about thinking', and that it's also true that this is not something that many people are aware of, or comment about. So in that regard, in agreement so far.

However... ...you're basically assuming a correlation. or correspondence, between thought and language, and objects of sensory perception, within which thought and language operate essentially as a kind of representation.

So I think, overall, you're operating within the general paradigm of representative realism; that thought and language represents the objects of sensory perception.

Then you begin to question the sense in which thought and language can be 'objectified', so to speak. But you seem to be arguing that representative cognition exists on a continuum, from that exhibited by animal cognition, but becoming increasingly refined in the case of humans.

I won't say anything more at this point, before checking that I'm on the right track, other than to suggest that the problem you're wrestling with is a form of 'foundationalism'.

The other point is that I think you're in the general ballpark with Chomsky in some respects. Which prompts me to say, have a peruse of this review, of a book about the evolution of language, by Chomsky (et al).

You wrote:

It seems to me like quantities may be non-linguistic thoughts...

I have read that some traditional cultures only had words for what in English are "one", "two" and "many".

But the sight/sense of a tree and another tree is not a quantity.

Did the symbol come before the concept, or did the concept--something not sensed through vision, hearing, touch, etc.--come before the symbol?

You offered the following excerpt:

human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. A more interesting example given in the book is the sentence “Birds that fly instinctively swim.” The adverb “instinctively” can modify either “fly” or “swim.” But there is no ambiguity in the sentence “Instinctively birds that fly swim.” Here “instinctively” must modify “swim,” despite its greater linear distance.

Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.

So then Existential Contingency is an ontological concept, the existence of something is constructed out of other things, which are by implication simpler in construction. Does this process ever end...your example of water, being comprised of Oxygen & Hydrogen can be extended almost indefinitely, as we have seen in physics.

The same question has to do with the meta-cognition concept, thinking about thinking, about thinking...the circle of correlation. How do you differentiate meta-cognition from recursion or do you think they are the same.

You indicated that you are a direct realist, so what is.. is perceived, no unknowable or unthinkable reality lurking in the background, behind the apparent.

Yet your only access to the apparent is though thought.

I think there's kind of a "transparent cage" made out of language and thought, from which neither realist nor idealist can escape.

You mention the meta function of written language and from the way you describe it, it almost sounds like written language is an abstraction from spoken language, which is itself our best shot communication of our experiences with others. Why Plato wrote dialogues.

Just a few thoughts. I like the idea of non-cognitive pre-linguistic perception, and I agree with the general outline you provided on this.

I would disagree. Our access to that which appears is physiological sensory perception.

That is likewise the case with linguistic thought/belief and non-linguistic thought/belief. The former consists in/of things(structures in this case) that the latter does not. The structure of the latter cannot be the same as the former, if it makes sense to say that non-linguistic thought/belief has structure at all. I find no reason at all to say that it can and/or does.

Is this in line with what I've written, by your lights? — creativesoul

is there some 'line' which lays between stimulus/response and rudimentary thought/belief formation, which when 'crossed over' stimulus/response becomes thought/belief? — creativesoul

My view is, there is a leap or discontinuity when h. sapiens becomes able to use language and reason, and to tell stories - when s/he becomes human, in effect. Then we cross a threshold which is no longer explicable in purely biological, hence evolutionary, terms.

So when I said our only access to the 'great outdoors' is though thought, what I mean't was that our input into what we sense only occurs at the conceptual/linguistic level.

There's all sorts of things that purely scientific jargon cannot possibly take account of. Not everything that counts can be counted. — creativesoul

My view is, there is a leap or discontinuity when h. sapiens becomes able to use language and reason, and to tell stories - when s/he becomes human, in effect.

You wrote:

Perhaps if we use your existential contingency process here.

I am mad a Jane, and something I would normally pass by and think nothing of, suddenly upsets me and sets me off on a tirade. The existential contingency of my getting overly upset by someone having knocked my hat off the rack where I put it is my anger with Jane.

Psychologists have done experiments that suggest that our overall state of being affects what and how we sort out what we experience, We only perceive a selection from of what we sense, apparently what we are concerned about at the time, which is contingent on our over state of being at the time, which is contingent on our thoughts.

The existential contingency of my getting overly upset by someone having knocked my hat off the rack where I put it is my anger with Jane.

We only perceive a selection from of what we sense, apparently what we are concerned about at the time, which is contingent on our over state of being at the time, which is contingent on our thoughts.

The aim of the paper is to defend the claim that the content of our perceptual experience can include emotions and also person impressions. Using these examples, an argument is developed to defend a liberal-content view for core examples of social cognition. This view is developed and contrasted with accounts which claim that in the case of registering another person’s emotion while seeing them, we have to describe the relevant content not as the content of a perceptual experience, but of a perceptual belief. The paper defends the view that perceptual experiences can have a rich content yet remain separable from beliefs formed on the basis of the experience. How liberal and enriched the content of a perceptual experience is will depend upon the expertise a person has developed in the field. This is supported by the argument that perceptual experiences can be systematically enriched by perceiving affordances of objects, by pattern recognition or by top-down processes, as analyzed by processes of cognitive penetration or predictive coding.

You wrote:

Still trying to sort out your position regarding perception versus judgement/belief.

How is the construction, the existentialist contingency developed, top down or bottom up, or...

Does our brain perceive objects initially as a conglomeration of shapes, colours, and patterns or does it instantly recognise the entire structure?

A laptop or a cluster of shapes?

There is a thing on the desk. It is open, grey on the outside and black on the inside, has many small square bumps on its horizontal side, and on its vertical side a smooth, reflecting surface. A laptop. But do we really see that thing as a laptop? Or do we see shapes, colours, edges etc., while our brain completes our perception by making use of rational inferences to reach the conclusion that the thing is a laptop? In other words: how intelligent are our perception processes?

I do not find that a strictly linear explanation is adequate when it concerns how thought/belief gains complexity, particularly after language acquisition begins in earnest. However, if we work from the premiss that at conception we are void of all thought/belief, the formation thereof must begin simply and gain in it's complexity. Thought/belief systems like our own aren't built in purely linear fashion, nor do they work that way.

Judgment is deliberately assessing whether or not some claim is true, whereas thought/belief can be as rudimentary as the mental correlation required for initially attributing meaning to objects within experience. — creativesoul

I agree with what you said but this blank tablet, is biologically constructed such that language acquisition comes built-in, a la Chomsky, The structure of language, is complex yet a baby learns the complicated rules will seemly little effort. Chomsky thinks that this innate ability was due to a biological mutation that occurred between 60-100,000 years ago. He thinks this ability was acquired suddenly and it was passed on quickly because of the evolutionary, and revolutionary advantages it gave humans.

What interested me about this article is the implication that habituation in perception enables the brain to skip its constructive thought/belief function as part of its normal ongoing processes. We see a laptop sitting on the table, we immediately understand what it is, there is no thought/belief construction, it is a laptop. Our perceptions are habituated to most ordinary experience, we don't have to think much, because we have already done the work, things generally fall into slots that we have already constructed.