How would this world differ from one without objective/inherent/intrinsic/absolute/universal morality (henceforth simply referred to as "morality")? — Yahadreas
[...W]ould you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make? — Yahadreas
In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make? — Yahadreas
If one found, as a matter of fact, that it's moral, then is it not the case that the fact, and it's finding, are also of significance? Because presumably one could demonstrate that it's a fact, and thereby convince a reasonable person that it's moral, even if they had previously believed otherwise. — Sapientia
Beliefs are truth-apt. My belief is true IFF it is the fact of the matter. Could there be a world in which the statement "killing babies is moral" is true? Not if it's necessarily true that killing babies is immoral.
How do you find out if a statement is necessarily true? — Mongrel
How would this be any different to thinking (incorrectly) that one had found a moral fact, and successfully convincing others of this falsehood? — Yahadreas
Whether or not it is true is beside the point. I want to know what difference the truth makes.
The truth of things like "e = mc^2" and "there's a kettle in the next room" have a causal affect in the world, irrespective of belief. But does the truth (or falsity) of "X is immoral" have a causal affect? — Yahadreas
Sure, if we believe that we ought not do X then we might not do X, but then it wouldn't really matter if our beliefs were true; only that we have them.
I agree. My basis is a Witty-type one: we find the language contains 'should', and other people say it, and I find myself saying it too. As pattern-seeking animals, it makes sense for us to try to systematise these uses.I think the question assumes we have a choice in being moral or not. Morality as a term just cordons off a certain sphere of human activity for study, which is real enough, but concerning which we might not and probably do not have any control over. I tend to side with Plato, that the good attracts the good. We cannot help but be moral once in contact with it, so there is no "choice" to be so or not. — Thorongil
In most cases, the fact of the matter makes quite a difference. Belief that you can fly can get you injured or killed, if you, in fact cannot fly, Being wrong about the facts entails misjudgments, which may be benign, or beneficial, but usually are neither, I would think. — Wosret
I'm not sure about your criteria here. It seems to me that behavior is obviously influenced by belief more than truth -- but that does not then mean that even regular, as opposed to moral, statements are not true or false.
Similarly, our behavior will be influenced by beliefs about morality. But this does not then entail that our beliefs are or are not truth-apt. — Moliere
Let us imagine that the concept of categorical/unconditional imperatives/obligations was sensible. Let us also imagine that these are true. What then? How would this world differ from one without objective/inherent/intrinsic/absolute/universal morality (henceforth simply referred to as "morality")? — Michael
I'm not questioning the truth-aptness of moral beliefs. I'm questioning the relevance of moral facts, both as motivating factors and consequences. Is there any empirical difference between a world in which killing babies is moral and a world in which killing babies is immoral? If you found out that killing babies is moral then would you kill babies, or would you act immorally and not kill babies? — Michael
Sure, but are moral facts the sort of facts that can lead to measurable consequences if we act in light of false moral beliefs? For example, if I falsely believe that killing babies is (im)moral then what sort of outcome could I expect? — Michael
But what if what is right is what we find reprehensible? What if we ought to kill babies for fun? Would we then wish to be good? Or would we deny morality -- not in the sense that we don't accept its validity; in the sense that we don't act in accordance to it? — Michael
To make it simple. Explain to me the difference between these possible worlds:
1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies. — Michael
To make it simple. Explain to me the difference between these possible worlds:
1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies. — Michael
Personally the answer I prefer is self-evident: to ask the question "why be moral?" is to forget that morality is what we ought to do. — darthbarracuda
Yes. "Why ought I to do what I ought to do?" is a confused question. — The Great Whatever
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