Michael Dummett has claimed that Wittgenstein's Investigations view of the linguistic sign is incompatible with a recognition-transcendent notion of truth, which in turn rules out realist metaphysics.
In regard to the linguistic sign, Dummett's argument is, in outline, that recognition-transcendent truth-conditions could attach to our statements only if such conditions could play an active role in language use. The key Wittgensteinian thought that drives the argument is the idea that if we did suppose ourselves to be able to grasp a particular meaning for our words that attached to a recognition-transcendent condition then the whole practice of language use would go on the same even if we had got it wrong. But this, the argument goes, is to posit a difference that makes no difference. Consequently, it drops out of consideration as irrelevant (Dummett 1993, pp.312-14).
The principal connection with metaphysics is via the notion of bivalence—the semantic principle that every statement is determinately true or false. If the truth of our statements depended on the obtaining of a worldy state of affairs (as the realist maintains), then our statements would have to be determinately true or false, according to whether or not that state of affairs obtained. However, given that we cannot guarantee that every statement is recognisable as true or recognisable as false, we are only entitled to this principle if our notion of truth is recognition-transcendent. By the above argument, it is not, and hence bivalence must be rejected and metaphysical anti-realism follows (Dummett 1963).
Dummett then goes on to claim that the principle of bivalence – an essential part of realist metaphysics – requires that what happens outside the simulation does have something to do with the meaning of the words inside the simulation. As an example, the statement "there's a cat in the cupboard" is either true or false, even if the inside of the cupboard isn't being simulated. This only works if the world outside the simulation has something to do with the meaning of this phrase when used inside the simulation. But the argument above is that the outside world is irrelevant. As such, the statement cannot be either true or false as nothing in the simulation determines it to be one or the other, and so the principle of bivalence fails, and along with it realism. — Michael
What does it mean that the "external world" is "irrelevant"? If we're talking pragmatic use, then truth claims are valuable only by how they help us accomplish our goals. But something can be useful and yet still be completely wrong. Or we might have purely accidental knowledge, and not even realize it. — darthbarracuda
So if we talk about it raining, our behavior might be identical regardless of how the external world actually is, but it still stands that our belief, that it is raining, is either true or false. True knowledge just becomes epiphenomenal.
Only the things that play a role in how we use the phrase are relevant, which in my analogy is the simulation. — Michael
We shall say that someone knows the meaning of the word 'yellow' just in case his judgements of what is yellow agree, by and large, with those of others. If, then, we call this his 'capacity to recognize the colour', his having that capacity is not a hypothesis which serves to explain the agreement of his judgements with those made by others; the agreement is that in which his having that capacity consists. — LBM, p. 314
Only the things that play a role in how we use the phrase are relevant, which in my analogy is the simulation. — Michael
The key Wittgensteinian thought that drives the argument is the idea that if we did suppose ourselves to be able to grasp a particular meaning for our words that attached to a recognition-transcendent condition then the whole practice of language use would go on the same even if we had got it wrong. But this, the argument goes, is to posit a difference that makes no difference. — Michael
The idea that the use of words has nothing to do with the world is ridiculous on its face. — The Great Whatever
But if you tell me there are invisible yellow unicorns, what am I to do with that? That's not how we use color words. — Srap Tasmaner
However, what's not being taken into consideration, is how meaning is first attributed...
No world... no meaning. — creativesoul
Yeah. I already said it is hard to see that. Dualism is that deeply rooted in the folk view. — apokrisis
You have the word, the thing, and the 'referring' relation between the two. It's triadic. — Janus
In any case, how else could we make sense of our talk about things, other than to accept that our talk is indeed about things? — Janus
I'm not quite sure what's being said, but it seems wrong. The idea that the use of words has nothing to do with the world is ridiculous on its face. Why believe it? — The Great Whatever
This seems to say no more than that we might say things that are false and not realize it. So what?
It doesn't say that the use of words has nothing to do with the world. It says that it has nothing to do with recognition-transcendent things. The recognised world is the world that has something to do with language use as it is that which influences and measures it. — Michael
our language use is identical in the situation that it does and in the situation that it doesn't, and that language use is all there is to meaning, and so nothing to do with their truth. — Michael
to say that the notion of truth involved is potentially recognition-transcendent is to say that (G) may be true (or false) even though there is no guarantee that we will be able, in principle, to recognise that that is so. — Michael
Why should we think that something's truth or falsity should always be recognizable? Surely there are things we get wrong without knowing it? — The Great Whatever
I'm not sure I follow. If the people grow up using the language in the simulation, then indeed the use of their language will result in its truth conditions having to do with things inside the simulation. — The Great Whatever
Perhaps this is your point – but I fail to see how it refutes, or has anything to do with, realism. — The Great Whatever
The people inside the simulation were put inside the simulation late in life. — Michael
Because realism, according to Dummett, requires truth to be bivalent. But truth is only bivalent if truth-conditions are recognition-transcendent, and meaning-as-use doesn't allow for recognition-transcendent truth conditions. — Michael
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