What irks me about Gettier is that he appears to be assaulting a straw man. Who is it that believes knowledge is exactly justified true belief? — Banno
IS that the only choice, certainty nothing? — Banno
it's a theory with some pedigree. — Srap Tasmaner
Is that so? Who, before Gettier, took it seriously? — Banno
If we understand the arrow above to be justifies or some cognate...
Then if the consequent is true, it is justified by any antecedent, true or false.
So anything justifies a truth.
Just sayin'. — Banno
Gettier cites the Theaetetus — Srap Tasmaner
I wrote:
The astute reader will note that Michael just conceded, perhaps unwittingly, that there are two parts of Smith's belief that:Mary will pay him because Jones owns a Ford.
Michael wants to eliminate one part. Doing so renders an incomplete account of Smith's belief. This is clear for all to see. "Mary will pay me" does not mean the same thing as "Mary will pay me because Jones owns a Ford".
Michael replied:
I'm not saying they do, so this is a straw man.
I'm saying that if he believes that Mary will pay me because Jones owns a Ford then he believes that Mary will pay me..
How does knowledge sit with thought?
I'm thinking that knowledge is not as useful a term in epistemology as perhaps truth and certainty and belief. And that justification is near useless.
All just musings. — Banno
Hey, not to get deep into this threads topics. And it seems out of context regarding Gettier. I’m reading along every now and then.
I asked:
"Jones owns a Ford" is true. "Jones owns a Ford" entails "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona". Therefore, "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true.
Is that an accurate rendition of what you're claiming Smith's 'argument' is?
Michael answered:
Yes. Except I wouldn't use the "either ... or ..." terminology as that implies an exclusive or, which isn't actually entailed by Jones owning a Ford. Gettier clearly meant for it to be an inclusive or, and so "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is the better wording. Charitable readings and all.
I countered:
One of the two statements is believed. To state that one or the other is true is to believe that they both could be...
Michael objected:
No it isn't....
<snip the smokescreen>
...Smith likely does believe that "Brown is in Barcelona" could be true. So your counter-argument isn't actually a counter-argument at all.
Michael wrote:
I wouldn't use the "either ... or ..." terminology as that implies an exclusive or, which isn't actually entailed by Jones owning a Ford. Gettier clearly meant for it to be an inclusive or, and so "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is the better wording. Charitable readings and all.
<snip the smokescreen>
I believe that:Mary will pay me because Jones owns a Ford is not equivalent to I believe that:Mary will pay me.
So far as I can see, Gettier problems don't give us reason to reject the conception of knowledge as justified true belief, they only present eccentric breakdown cases that push us to clarify. I've suggested we might respond to the issue by clearing up the relevant conception of belief, which seems to be creativesoul's approach, or by clearing up the relevant conception of justification, or both.If justified true belief does not amount to knowledge, then what the eff is knowledge and what does amount to it? — unenlightened
I'm not sure I follow.Where I'm at with this at the moment is that Smith does not arrive at his belief 'p' by formal logic, but by informal induction, and therefore he is not entitled (by logic) to treat his belief as a certainty, which is required to form the disjunction with a random 'q'. — unenlightened
p1. ((p) is true)
p2. ((p v q) follows from (p))
p3. ((p v q) is true if...(insert belief statement(s) regarding what makes this particular disjunction true))
C1. ((p v q) is true because... (insert belief statement(s) corresponding to the prior 'if'))
That is what believing a disjunction takes. That is what it consists in/of. I've invited anyone to imagine a disjunction arrived at by a rational agent on the basis of believing P that is not completely exhausted by the above solution. There are no problems. Fill it out. — creativesoul
Seems that Gettier does as well as many many others including yourself. I mean, you say so immediately after saying that (p v q) is not an adequate representation of Smith's belief. — creativesoul
Agreed, at least for the sake of argument.1. I am claiming that believing a disjunction is necessary for knowing one — creativesoul
Agreed, in that Smith's belief is not an isolated "belief in a disjunction", but has an epistemic structure. I've sketched my take on that structure, and I'm not sure I understand your take.2. Believing a disjunction is not being taken proper account of — creativesoul
Agreed, same as (2).3. Belief that:((p v q) is true) is an utterly inadequate account of what believing a disjunction consists in/of — creativesoul
Every account on the table clearly shows that the premise p is false and that the premise ~q is false. That's the problem. The justification is flawed because it's based on false premises, but it still reaches a true conclusion by way of valid inferences.4. An adequate account of believing a disjunction clearly shows that Smith's belief is false — creativesoul
Agreed.5. False belief is not a problem for JTB, no matter how it is arrived at — creativesoul
I'm still not clear on what your view of "believing a disjunction" amounts to.6. The underlying problem in Case II is a grossly inadequate (mis)understanding of what believing a disjunction consists in/of — creativesoul
I'm not sure I follow. — Cabbage Farmer
In Case II, he has "strong evidence" that Jones owns a Ford. It's not made explicit how Gettier makes sense of the warrant for "Brown is not in Boston, Barcelona, or Brest-Litovsk". Say: Smith has a good idea of the history of Brown's whereabouts and Brown's plans for the next few weeks, thus believes accordingly it's extremely unlikely that Brown's at any of those three places, so has good reason to assume Brown's not in any of those three places. — Cabbage Farmer
He believes p with good reason, but he is not thereby entitled to argue formally from p, but only from (p v I am mistaken about p). — unenlightened
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.