IS that the only choice, certainty nothing?

What irks me about Gettier is that he appears to be assaulting a straw man. Who is it that believes knowledge is exactly justified true belief?

What irks me about Gettier is that he appears to be assaulting a straw man. Who is it that believes knowledge is exactly justified true belief? — Banno

Well, it was over fifty years ago. A simpler time.

Plus, it's a theory with some pedigree.

Plus, "justification" is a pretty flexible word. Informally, I think of JTB just as getting the right answer for the right reasons. That sounds plausible doesn't it?

IS that the only choice, certainty nothing? — Banno

I don't know. But you can arbitrarily strengthen the justification and still be vulnerable to Gettier. At least it seems that way. I think the impulse to say that if a belief were really justified, you know, really, properly justified, the way God intended and no cheating, then it would have to be true -- I think this impulse is mistaken.

The time I've spent in this thread (time I will never get back) has led me me to think that the point of Gettier is this: justification can point away from truth instead of toward it. I find that pretty interesting.

it's a theory with some pedigree. — Srap Tasmaner

Is that so? Who, before Gettier, took it seriously?

If we understand the arrow above to be justifies or some cognate...

Then if the consequent is true, it is justified by any antecedent, true or false.

So anything justifies a truth.

Just sayin'.

Is that so? Who, before Gettier, took it seriously? — Banno

Gettier cites the Theaetetus, Chisholm, and Ayer, for starters. Obviously the stars of Chisholm and Ayer have dimmed somewhat since then. Besides explicit support, I think the thrust of foundationalism, of empiricism in general, is toward such a position: a true belief grounded in experience, in the testimony of your senses, is the foundation of knowledge, that sort of thing.

Also, I think Gettier spurred many to consider defending the theory, because it feels like his argument is a parlor trick in some way.

If we understand the arrow above to be justifies or some cognate...

Then if the consequent is true, it is justified by any antecedent, true or false.

So anything justifies a truth.

Just sayin'. — Banno

The problem here is that you're switching in the middle from talking about justification to talking about truth. We expect both of these to hold, given that p→q:

(1) If p is true, then q is true;
(2) If I am justified in asserting (or believing) that p, then I am justified in asserting (or believing) that q.

But we cannot expect to freely mix and match:

(1*) If p is true, then I am justified in asserting q;
(2*) If I am justified in asserting that p, then q is true.

(1*) fails because I may have no idea that p; (2*) fails because I may be justified in asserting p though p and q both be false.

Inference does not confer either truth or justification; it only preserves whatever truth or justification is to be found in the premises.

Gettier cites the Theaetetus — Srap Tasmaner

But that's not right. The Theaetetus is famously inconclusive as to a definition of knowledge, and instead is perhaps best seen as arguing against empiricism, showing that the logos) must be taken as granted, in a neat parallel with Wittgenstein.

If we understand the arrow above to be justifies or some cognate... — Banno

The problem here is that you're switching in the middle from talking about justification to talking about truth. — Srap Tasmaner

"If..."

I really have no idea what you're up to.

I'me just filling in time by sharing a few thoughts more or less on the topic. In doing so I found an interesting link between the Theaetetus and Wittgenstein, in the contemplation and then rejection of logical atomism.

I'm thinking that knowledge is not as useful a term in epistemology as perhaps truth and certainty and belief. And that justification is near useless.

All just musings.

I wrote:

The astute reader will note that Michael just conceded, perhaps unwittingly, that there are two parts of Smith's belief that:Mary will pay him because Jones owns a Ford.

Michael wants to eliminate one part. Doing so renders an incomplete account of Smith's belief. This is clear for all to see. "Mary will pay me" does not mean the same thing as "Mary will pay me because Jones owns a Ford".

Michael replied:

I'm not saying they do, so this is a straw man.

The irony...

This coming from one who's position rests upon knowingly and admittedly changing the meaning of Smith's belief...

I'm saying that if he believes that Mary will pay me because Jones owns a Ford then he believes that Mary will pay me..

I believe that:Mary will pay me because Jones owns a Ford is not equivalent to I believe that:Mary will pay me.

The former is an adequate account of Smith's belief. The latter is an oversimplification that leads to the very problems we're discussing.

Mary says she'll pay Smith if either this or that is the case. Smith understands this, and believes Mary will pay him because this is the case. You want to remove the understanding from Smith's thought/belief, and by doing so create a problem that is otherwise not there.

Smith's belief includes his considering the conditions under which Mary will pay him and believing that those conditions have been met. Leaving that part out of Smith's belief eliminates Smith's consideration of the truth conditions that are specific to believing a disjunction. That not only changes the meaning of Smith's belief, but it also changes whether or not it is true.

You admit that much, but then insist upon continuing to simplify it to the point of changing the meaning anyway.

To answer your earlier question Banno.

Regarding JTB, I have no skin in the game either way. What's important to me is getting thought/belief right...

I'm charging Gettier with inadequately accounting for Smith's thought/belief by virtue of not taking account of the process that is necessary for believing a disjunction. The oversimplification that Gettier is guilty of results in the Gettier problem. It's not a problem for believing a disjunction. It's a problem with how that's being accounted for. It's a pseudo-problem:The self-induced bewitchment of inadequate language use.

A proper account of believing a disjunction has been offered. There are no problems with it, and no disjunction is immune. None. Here it is again...

p1. ((p) is true)
p2. ((p v q) follows from (p))
p3. ((p v q) is true if...(insert belief statement(s) regarding what makes this particular disjunction true))
C1. ((p v q) is true because... (insert belief statement(s) corresponding to the prior 'if'))

That is what believing a disjunction takes. That is what it consists in/of. I've invited anyone to imagine a disjunction arrived at by a rational agent on the basis of believing P that is not completely exhausted by the above solution. There are no problems. Fill it out.

The added beauty, of course, is that this eliminates any and all confusion about senses of 'or' as well as the fact that an insincere purveyor of disjunction cannot get through it, for it puts his/her actual belief on display for everyone to see. It also stops Gettier and anyone else from just mentioning - in passing - that Smith recognizes the entailment. The solution above spells out exactly what that means by virtue of showing what it requires.

Hm.

How does knowledge sit with thought?

There's something to be said about Michael's earlier reply...

Smith is claimed to believe a disjunction.

The appropriate question for Smith is not "Do you believe that Mary will pay you?", for that is not asking about a disjunction. "Mary will pay you" is not a disjunction. Smith believes a disjunction.

Do you believe that Mary will pay you because Jones owns a Ford or because Brown is in Barcelona?

How does knowledge sit with thought?

Solely by virtue of drawing and maintaining a meaningful distinction between knowledge and thought.

interesting. So is it important to have a tight definition of knowledge in order to maintain that distinction?

Well, I wouldn't put it like that. The quality of the definitions has no bearing upon the existence of the distinction. Knowledge cannot be adequately understood in terms of "how it sits with thought" unless the agent is capable of drawing and maintaining the aforementioned distinction and has long since done so.

I've no issue with JTB counting as some knowledge. Although, I do tend to cast a critical eye upon a notion of justification pointing towards and setting aside something that requires language.

It's the belief part that matter most. If we get thought/belief wrong, then we'll have something or other wrong about everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or recorded.

Hey, not to get deep into this threads topics. And it seems out of context regarding Gettier. I’m reading along every now and then.

I'm thinking that knowledge is not as useful a term in epistemology as perhaps truth and certainty and belief. And that justification is near useless.

All just musings. — Banno

A different vantage: Justification is useful in discerning mistakes of reasoning (self-deceptions and the like) in that it follows the principle of noncontradiction. Where a falsehood is denoted as a self-deception (or some other kind of deception), a falsehood will contradict both that which is true (i.e., a non-deception) as well as any other deception that is of a different ilk. Assuming any form of realism, there will always be something true. So justification, by means of remaining noncontradictory, serves to ensure that one’s beliefs remains accordant to what is real - i.e., from the vantage of correspondence to what is real, true. Even the most elaborate coherency between willfully given deceptions, in light of their being something true, will eventually be evidenced non-justifiable given its contradiction to that which is true - this, at least, given a sufficiently long enough chain of justifications. It may not always pinpoint what is true, but a contradiction will always pinpoint that there is a falsity somewhere.

If anyone cares to comment, I’m interested in how this sits with others?

Hey, not to get deep into this threads topics. And it seems out of context regarding Gettier. I’m reading along every now and then.

If you're interested, page 40 is a good starting point...

If you're interested, page 40 is a good starting point... — creativesoul

thanks

I asked:

"Jones owns a Ford" is true. "Jones owns a Ford" entails "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona". Therefore, "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true.

Is that an accurate rendition of what you're claiming Smith's 'argument' is?

Michael answered:

Yes. Except I wouldn't use the "either ... or ..." terminology as that implies an exclusive or, which isn't actually entailed by Jones owning a Ford. Gettier clearly meant for it to be an inclusive or, and so "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is the better wording. Charitable readings and all.

I countered:

One of the two statements is believed. To state that one or the other is true is to believe that they both could be...

Michael objected:

No it isn't....

<snip the smokescreen>

...Smith likely does believe that "Brown is in Barcelona" could be true. So your counter-argument isn't actually a counter-argument at all.

Am I the only one who finds this unacceptable?

Michael wrote:

I wouldn't use the "either ... or ..." terminology as that implies an exclusive or, which isn't actually entailed by Jones owning a Ford. Gettier clearly meant for it to be an inclusive or, and so "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is the better wording. Charitable readings and all.

And yet Gettier used the "either ... or ..." terminology.

I'm charging Gettier with inadequately accounting for Smith's thought/belief by virtue of not taking account of the process that is necessary for believing a disjunction. The oversimplification that Gettier is guilty of results in the Gettier problem. It's not a problem for believing a disjunction. It's a problem with how that's being accounted for. It's a pseudo-problem:The self-induced bewitchment of inadequate language use.

A proper account of believing a disjunction has been offered. There are no problems with it, and no disjunction is immune. None. Here it is again...

p1. ((p) is true)
p2. ((p v q) follows from (p))
p3. ((p v q) is true if...(insert belief statement(s) regarding what makes this particular disjunction true))
C1. ((p v q) is true because... (insert belief statement(s) corresponding to the prior 'if'))

That is what believing a disjunction takes. That is what it consists in/of. I've invited anyone to imagine a disjunction arrived at by a rational agent on the basis of believing P that is not completely exhausted by the above solution. There are no problems. Fill it out.

The added beauty, of course, is that this eliminates any and all confusion about senses of 'or' as well as the fact that an insincere purveyor of disjunction cannot get through it, for it puts his/her actual belief on display for everyone to see. It also stops Gettier and anyone else from just mentioning - in passing - that Smith recognizes the entailment. The solution above spells out exactly what that means by virtue of showing what it requires.

<snip the smokescreen>

You mean <snip the bit that proves creativesoul wrong>?

I believe that:Mary will pay me because Jones owns a Ford is not equivalent to I believe that:Mary will pay me.

I haven't said they are, so again this is a straw man.

I'm not going to continue discussing with you if you're going to resort to such dishonesty.

If justified true belief does not amount to knowledge, then what the eff is knowledge and what does amount to it? — unenlightened

So far as I can see, Gettier problems don't give us reason to reject the conception of knowledge as justified true belief, they only present eccentric breakdown cases that push us to clarify. I've suggested we might respond to the issue by clearing up the relevant conception of belief, which seems to be creativesoul's approach, or by clearing up the relevant conception of justification, or both.

Where I'm at with this at the moment is that Smith does not arrive at his belief 'p' by formal logic, but by informal induction, and therefore he is not entitled (by logic) to treat his belief as a certainty, which is required to form the disjunction with a random 'q'. — unenlightened

I'm not sure I follow.

Knowledge is not the same thing as certainty. I can know the way from here to the grocery store, even while doubting that I know the way. Belief and knowledge are compatible with doubt.

In Case I, Smith is not certain that Jones will get the job, nor certain that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. He only has "strong evidence" to support those claims.

In Case II, he has "strong evidence" that Jones owns a Ford. It's not made explicit how Gettier makes sense of the warrant for "Brown is not in Boston, Barcelona, or Brest-Litovsk". Say: Smith has a good idea of the history of Brown's whereabouts and Brown's plans for the next few weeks, thus believes accordingly it's extremely unlikely that Brown's at any of those three places, so has good reason to assume Brown's not in any of those three places.

In each case, there's no question of certainty, but only strong evidence that provides defeasible warrant for premises that ground the inference leading to the proposition in question.

So far as I can see, the problem is not that Smith is certain when he shouldn't be, but rather that Smith makes valid inferences based on false premises, and still winds up latching onto true conclusions. The lack of fit is so severe that we're forced to deny that Smith knows what he's talking about when he affirms the true propositions in question.

This problem remains whether or not Smith's beliefs account for the possibility of error.

p1. ((p) is true)
p2. ((p v q) follows from (p))
p3. ((p v q) is true if...(insert belief statement(s) regarding what makes this particular disjunction true))
C1. ((p v q) is true because... (insert belief statement(s) corresponding to the prior 'if'))

That is what believing a disjunction takes. That is what it consists in/of. I've invited anyone to imagine a disjunction arrived at by a rational agent on the basis of believing P that is not completely exhausted by the above solution. There are no problems. Fill it out. — creativesoul

The first problem that comes to mind is that (p2) can fill in the blank at (p3), which makes (p3) redundant.

(p V q) is true if p.

All that remains is to provide warrant for p.

Seems that Gettier does as well as many many others including yourself. I mean, you say so immediately after saying that (p v q) is not an adequate representation of Smith's belief. — creativesoul

I'm not aware of having said that.

I do say that "(p V q)" can and should have a place in an adequate representation of Smith's belief. That's not the same as doing the job all by itself.

So far as I can see, we need to add the premise that supports the inference to (p V q), and also the warrant for that premise.


Does it help if we adjust to reflect the exclusive disjunction in Gettier's paper:

1. p [for reasons assumed in the scenario]
2. ~q [for reasons assumed in the scenario]
3. if (p and ~q) then (either p or q) [empty formalism]
4. either p or q [by inference from 1, 2, 3]

1. I am claiming that believing a disjunction is necessary for knowing one — creativesoul

Agreed, at least for the sake of argument.

2. Believing a disjunction is not being taken proper account of — creativesoul

Agreed, in that Smith's belief is not an isolated "belief in a disjunction", but has an epistemic structure. I've sketched my take on that structure, and I'm not sure I understand your take.

3. Belief that:((p v q) is true) is an utterly inadequate account of what believing a disjunction consists in/of — creativesoul

Agreed, same as (2).

4. An adequate account of believing a disjunction clearly shows that Smith's belief is false — creativesoul

Every account on the table clearly shows that the premise p is false and that the premise ~q is false. That's the problem. The justification is flawed because it's based on false premises, but it still reaches a true conclusion by way of valid inferences.

Is there something else you show to be false, some other proposition relevant to the problem?

5. False belief is not a problem for JTB, no matter how it is arrived at — creativesoul

Agreed.

But valid inferences from false premises to true conclusions arguably pose a problem worth addressing, at least given the peculiar character of the Gettier cases.

6. The underlying problem in Case II is a grossly inadequate (mis)understanding of what believing a disjunction consists in/of — creativesoul

I'm still not clear on what your view of "believing a disjunction" amounts to.

I agree that clarifying the "representation" of the relevant belief is a promising approach to the problem, and that the complete picture should include more than "Smith believes that (p V q)" [or more than "Smith believes that (either p V q)", to follow Gettier's example more closely].

I've suggested that clarifying the relevant sense of "justification" is another promising approach.

I'm not sure I follow. — Cabbage Farmer

You're not alone, and I wish I could make clearer to others what is very clear to me.

In Case II, he has "strong evidence" that Jones owns a Ford. It's not made explicit how Gettier makes sense of the warrant for "Brown is not in Boston, Barcelona, or Brest-Litovsk". Say: Smith has a good idea of the history of Brown's whereabouts and Brown's plans for the next few weeks, thus believes accordingly it's extremely unlikely that Brown's at any of those three places, so has good reason to assume Brown's not in any of those three places. — Cabbage Farmer

The argument is that if S has a justified belief p, then by pure logic he has a justified belief (p v q), where q is any proposition whatsoever. I don't think he can justify the second belief because it relies entirely on the truth of p, and not at all on the justification or the belief of p. Now to believe p is to believe the truth of p, but this belief is still not the truth of p, but only the belief of p.

Everyone seems to agree with Gettier that we can have justified false beliefs, but this is not reflected or accounted for in the proposition S makes his argument from. He believes p with good reason, but he is not thereby entitled to argue formally from p, but only from (p v I am mistaken about p). And from that premise, he cannot logically move to (p v q), but only to ((p v I am mistaken about p) v q) which is harmless.

If S knows p, then by force of logic, he knows (p v q). This works, because if he knows p, then p is true, by the definition of knowledge. But he doesn't know p and cannot possibly know p, because p is not true, and it is because beliefs are not always true that the truth preserving logic does not work for beliefs.

He believes p with good reason, but he is not thereby entitled to argue formally from p, but only from (p v I am mistaken about p). — unenlightened

@Cabbage Farmer describes Smith somewhere as having a defeasible warrant to assert that p, and that's all he needs.

Think about how reductio works: assume that p, and then show that p leads to a contradiction or a known falsehood. And then plain old modus tollens.

It's the same thing here: Smith has strong evidence that Jones owns a Ford, but his belief is defeasible. If Jones walked in the office one day and said, "I don't know why I bought Fords all these years, this Chevy I just bought is fantastic!" Then poof, there goes Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford. Why? Because Smith can immediately see that his theory would predict Jones not saying this. (The switch from material to subjunctive conditionals has a little wiggle room.)

There is all the reason in the world to reason from premises not known to be true, precisely so you can test them, expose them to possible defeaters. You can reason from premises you believe false as if they were true, precisely in order to show that they are false. (Again there may be a switch to counterfactual conditionals.)

In short, I think you're always entitled to inference. Inference is innocent. The credence you give your premises is usually the issue. If you hold certain what you shouldn't, then you block the modus tollens that would revise your belief. If you never infer, you block the modus tollens that would revise your belief.