That's because it's the same information, represented differently. — Wayfarer

The point though, as I've argued, is that it is not the same information, in the strict sense of the word "same" it is similar information which we call "the same" for practical purposes. That's why there is ambiguity and we can never be absolutely certain that we got the interpretation absolutely correct, because the information is not "the same", it is similar. We can only say that the information is "the same" by discounting the accidentals, and claiming that it is essentially the same. The accidentals are differences which are ignored because they are unimportant. So your use of "same" here is a form of "similar", it is not "same" according to the law of identity.

Now the conclusion of the argument doesn't follow unless "same" here is meant in an absolute sense. Any slight difference, accidental differences, between the representation in one medium and another, such as the fact that different media pose different limitations on the transmission of information, invalidates your conclusion that the information is separate from the physical medium, non-physical. Your conclusion is not valid it is based in an equivocation between two senses of "same". Now we are forced to consider these accidental differences, and the possibility that differences in the information are due to differences in the physical medium, as well as the possibility that information is actually physical.

This is what the whole thread is about from the word dot, you've been too busy wanting to argue to actually notice it. This is definitely my last response to you in this thread. — Wayfarer

I'm the only one whose stayed true to what the thread is about, and you are refusing to talk to me. That's because I've proven your argument to be wrong, and you're to stubborn to change your mind.

Notice that the in that Wiki article, it says 'whether universals or particulars'. As far as I'm concerned, this thread is about universals, and in that case, any 'A' is equal to, the same is, any other 'A'. There's not 'my A', and 'your A', which are subtly different, because you and I think of them in slightly different ways. — Wayfarer

But your argument is that information is not the physical 'A' itself, it is what is represented by the 'A'. And what 'A' represents to me is not the same as what 'A' represents to you. What it represents to me is similar to, but not the same as, what it represents to you. Therefore it is not the same information, it is similar information.

There is absolute sameness, it's described by the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This refers to the thing in relation to itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

To say that a thing is the same as itself is to utter a vacuous tautology. Conceiving of identity merely in this way does not grant identity any metaphysical robustness.

Identity consists in the fact that a thing is; from that it follows tautologously that a thing is itself, and is the same as itself.

The point though, as I've argued, is that it is not the same information, in the strict sense of the word "same" it is similar information which we call "the same" for practical purposes. That's why there is ambiguity and we can never be absolutely certain that we got the interpretation absolutely correct, because the information is not "the same", it is similar. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the same nonsense. If you write a technical specification for a particular model of machine and then turn it out according to those specifications, you get the same machine each time. Same goes for instructions, formulae, recipes, and any number of other things. But you can’t agree that two of the same kind are the same. The same, not similar. Two Fords of the same model are the same model, by definition. (I make a good living as a technical writer, by the way, so my understanding of the matter is not simply a matter of philosophy.)

You haven’t ‘proven my argument to be wrong’, you’ve simply obfuscated for thousands of words.

But your argument is that information is not the physical 'A' itself, it is what is represented by the 'A'. And what 'A' represents to me is not the same as what 'A' represents to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

More of the same nonsense. Really you ought to desist here, you’re simply embarrassing yourself.

If I tell two people to open the door marked ‘A’, out of all the doors over there, they will both open the same door. They won’t turn around and ask, ‘oh which door did you mean by that?’ You’ve wasted thousands of words arguing about the meaning of the word ‘the same’.

Everyone who has continued this thread for so long should be embarrassed. I already showed long ago that information is related to causation. Information is the relationship between cause and effect. Effects carry information about their cause. The fact that no one has yet agreed or come to any conclusion other than this, is embarrassing. Just because you ignored my questions and points doesn't make it any less so.

Causal relationships exist between both - as the mental is affected by the physical and vice versa. Information is both "physical" and "mental", as a causal relationships exists between both. This itself should show that there should be no distinction between either the physical or mental. Dualism is pointless.

Information is the relationship between cause and effect. — Harry Hindu

How do you think that relates to Hume’s criticism of inductive reasoning?

*****

Man: “Hey Im looking to buy a new car, can you show me what you’ve got?’

MU: “Certainly sir. Over here, we have a Ford Meteor, and on the left hand side, we have a Ford Meteor.’

Pause.

Man: ‘But they’re the same car’.

MU: ‘Oh most assuredly not, sir. They’re similar cars, that’s all. But, as you can see, that one is over there, and this one is over here. That makes them different.’

Man: ‘That doesn’t make sense. A Ford Meteor is a Ford Meteor. If you had a Ford Mustang on display, then that wouldn’t be the same car, but it would be similar, being at least a Ford. And if you had a Cadillac, then it would be a completely different car. But these two cars are the same. I don’t understand what you’re saying’.

MU: ‘As you wish, sir. I will let your amateur grasp of Aristotle’s Law of Identity pass. Which of these two cars do you wish to look at? The red one, or the red one?’

Identity consists in the fact that a thing is; from that it follows tautologously that a thing is itself, and is the same as itself. — Janus

This is not true, because there is a difference between "what a thing is", and "that a thing is"; this is the difference between essence and existence. Identity is concerned with what a thing is, it's essence. What you have stated is that a thing's identity, its essence, is that it exists, and that's not true at all, because that a thing exists is common to all things, and this is completely different from what a thing is, which is specific to each thing.

The law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, indicates that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is nothing other than the thing's essence. It is not vacuous because it prevents sophistic arguments which begin with the assumption that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is some abstracted form, in the human mind, which doesn't include the accidentals of the thing.

This is the same nonsense. If you write a technical specification for a particular model of machine and then turn it out according to those specifications, you get the same machine each time. — Wayfarer

I'm sure that you recognize that two cars, the same model, same year, the same colour, are not the same car? This is the use of "same" that I am referring to. I do not deny that you can use "same" in your way, and call them the same car, that is not the point. Clearly there are two very distinct ways of using "same" here. By what you've stated above, the cars are the "same" car. But if you bought one of them, you would know that they are not the same car, one is yours, the others are not yours.

The point is that the law of identity indicates that they are not the same car. It provides the premise to assume that your car is different from other cars, despite the fact that it is one of a number. turned out from the same specifications, and is therefore the "same" according to your description above. So, your use of "same" here is contrary to how "same" is defined by the law of identity. In your usage, all the cars are the same, according to the law of identity they are not the same. My argument is that you only produce the conclusion of your argument in the op, by equivocating between these two, very distinct ways of using "same".

You’ve wasted thousands of words arguing about the meaning of the word ‘the same’. — Wayfarer

If I never demonstrate to you these very distinct ways of using "same", then my words are wasted. But if you accept the difference between these ways, and proceed to analyze the op argument, maintaining this distinction, then the words are not wasted.

It depends on how you define the concept of object. You can define it any way you want. It depends on your needs. Sometimes, we define it to include the coordinates; sometimes, we define it to exclude the coordinates. When we say that two balls are equal, more likely than being wrong, we are defining the concept of ball to exclude the coordinates that someone else would include in the definition of the concept of ball. You can stretch concepts any way you like. You can stretch the concept of ball to include not only the coordinates that you want to include in the concept but also portions of the environment that surrounds objects under your consideration such as for example other objects of the same kind (so that instead of speaking of single balls we are now talking about pairs of balls.) By stretching the definition of concepts, you can prove anything you want.

An object is nothing but a portion of reality. If you want to have a meaningful conversation, then parties must focus their attention on the same portion of reality. This is why definitions are important. We want to make sure we are talking about the same portion of reality. — Magnus Anderson

Perfect. So the object's coordinates in space-time can be just as important or even more important than it's other properties depending on the arbitrary usefulness of some person at some moment.

How can you even say that two balls are the same (by your definition) when not every stitch in the ball will be the same. Also, this ball is mine, and that one is yours. Each ball has a different history and future.

Using Wayfarer's example of cars, not every car of the same model is the same either. This car will break down at 100,000 miles, while that one will break down at 120,000 miles.

Even the balls and cars histories aren't the same. They probably weren't produced at the same time (have the same birth date), or produced in the same factory, or by the same robots or people. I would challenge you to find any two objects that are 100% the same. And don't go whining that I'm going to deep. 100% means 100%. Can any two objects ever be 100% the same?

How do you think that relates to Hume’s criticism of inductive reasoning? — Wayfarer

I've never seen a problem with inductive reasoning. Just as we have to account for and explain a different effect occurring than what we predicted will happen based on previous experience (why did the sun rise in the west today?), we also need to account for and explain why it was the case for so long prior to this new effect (why did the sun rise in the east for so long prior to today?).

Different effects are the result of different causes. The fact that something different happened than has always happened before simply means that there was a different causal relationship being made. The cause of the sun rising in the west today probably indicates that the sun and/or the earth changed it's movement. If the sun disappeared and didn't rise at all, then that would be the result of a completely different cause (it was sucked into a black hole).

Karl Popper says that science doesn't even use induction. Science is always looking to criticize existing knowledge. You can only arrive at the right answer after making all possible mistakes.

And don't go whining that I'm going to deep. 100% means 100%. Can any two objects ever be 100% the same? — Harry Hindu

Let's just say you're a retard.

Name-calling isn't an argument against anything I said. The fact that you resort to name-calling just shows that you don't have an argument. Thanks.

This is not true, because there is a difference between "what a thing is", and "that a thing is"; this is the difference between essence and existence. Identity is concerned with what a thing is, it's essence. What you have stated is that a thing's identity, its essence, is that it exists, and that's not true at all, because that a thing exists is common to all things, and this is completely different from what a thing is, which is specific to each thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I haven't equated essence with existence at all; what I have said is merely that a thing cannot have an essence if it does not exist, because without existence (of some kind; i.e real or imaginary) there would be no thing that could be said to possess an essence.

So, I agree that there is a logical distinction between "what a thing is " and "that a thing is"; but this distinction is not relevant to the argument. A thing must first be ("that it is") before it can be something ("what it is"). To say that is something before it is; would be to speak nonsense. Conversely it cannot be without being something; so strictly speaking there is no priority between being and being something; each entails the other.

I have not stated that a thing's identity, its essence, is that it exists, and what I have said does not entail that either. The identity of an imagined entity, for example, consists in its being imagined (that it is imagined); and its being imagined consists in its being imagined as a particular thing (what it is imagined as).

So, to summarize (in case you still don't get it) a thing cannot be the same as itself, without being itself, and it cannot be itself without being. This applies to both real and imagined entities.

The law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, indicates that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is nothing other than the thing's essence. It is not vacuous because it prevents sophistic arguments which begin with the assumption that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is some abstracted form, in the human mind, which doesn't include the accidentals of the thing.

So, if a thing's essence includes its "accidentals", by which I presume you mean all its relations with other things; you would seem to be contradicting yourself, because a thing's relations constitute its particular existence, and in formulating it this way to you seem to be making its essence dependent on its existence; which is the assertion you are supposed to be arguing against.

In any case for me essence and existence are inseparable and co dependent. The problem I have with the formulation " a thing is the same as itself" is that is unnecessary because it necessarily follows from " a thing is"; and also because it is misleading insofar as it suggests that a thing bears a relation to itself. There can be relations in a robust sense (as opposed to a vacuous tautologous sense) only between different things.

The law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, indicates that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is nothing other than the thing's essence. It is not vacuous because it prevents sophistic arguments which begin with the assumption that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is some abstracted form, in the human mind, which doesn't include the accidentals of the thing.

I think that if this was submitted in a University assignment on the basics of philosophy, it would fail. The Law of Identity is very simple: A = A. It is one of the basic logical laws elaborated in Aristotelian logic, alongside the law of the excluded middle etc. The fact that something ‘is identical with itself’ is at best a tautology; the efficacy of the law relies on the fact that it applies to abstract judgements, that is, universals, and so has universal applicability. If it applied only to individuals then we wouldn’t even be able to form words.

The highly condensed version of A-T (Aristotelian-Thomist) epistemology was given in this post, (30 days ago), being an excerpt from a textbook called ‘Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man’ by Robert E. Brennan, O.P.; Macmillan Co., 1941.

At risk of labouring the point that has already been thoroughly beaten to death, the key sentence in that excerpt is this:

the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.

Here, the Platonist provenance of ‘forms’ is clearly visible, namely, that they are ‘perceived directly by the Intellect’, in the same way that logical principles are grasped, i.e. immediately and intuitively and without recourse to material facts, and that they are universal in that apply to all instances of the perceived particular. That is why logic works, in this philosophy.

To me, this is actually a relatively straightforward philosophical idea - agree with it or not, and nowadays the majority of people probably would not. But Metaphysician Undiscovered is in a muddle about this salient point, and I would discourage anyone who has persisted with this meandering thread not to keep flogging this horse, because it’s dead.

[delete]

No, I haven't equated essence with existence at all; what I have said is merely that a thing cannot have an essence if it does not exist, because without existence (of some kind; i.e real or imaginary) there would be no thing that could be said to possess an essence. — Janus

But it's clear that the essence of a thing precedes the thing's material existence. This is the case when we make a plan for something, in advance. So an essence can be independent of the thing which it is the essence of.

A thing must first be ("that it is") before it can be something ("what it is"). To say that is something before it is; would be to speak nonsense. — Janus

No, this is not nonsense at all. Aristotle demonstrated logically that "what a thing is", its essence, is necessarily prior to its material existence. The demonstration goes something like this. Material things come into existence, they are not eternal. When a thing comes into existence, it is impossible that it is a thing other than the thing which it is. When the thing comes into existence it is necessarily the thing which it is, and not something else. Therefore what the thing will be is necessarily prior to the material existence of thing, to necessitate that the thing when it comes into being, is what it is, and not something else.

So, if a thing's essence includes its "accidentals", by which I presume you mean all its relations with other things; you would seem to be contradicting yourself, because a thing's relations constitute its particular existence, and in formulating it this way to you seem to be making its essence dependent on its existence; which is the assertion you are supposed to be arguing against. — Janus

What I mean by "accidentals" is properties which are not essential for calling the thing by the name that it is called. So for instance, I am still MU whether I had eggs for breakfast, or cereal for breakfast. What is in my stomach is accidental, so I am still called MU despite these differences, they are accidentals. However, a complete description of me, my complete essence, what I am, would include what is in my stomach.

The description of a thing's relations with other things is not part of the description of the thing itself, it is the description of a larger thing, of which the first thing is a part. To describe a thing, the thing's essence (what the thing is), is to describe everything inherent to the thing, and this includes accidentals which are inherent.

If a thing's relations with other, external, things constitutes a thing's existence, then we must keep this separate from the thing's essence. In defining "existence" this way, a thing having an essence, what it is, does not require that it has existence, relations with other things.

In any case for me essence and existence are inseparable and co dependent. The problem I have with the formulation " a thing is the same as itself" is that is unnecessary because it necessarily follows from " a thing is"; and also because it is misleading insofar as it suggests that a thing bears a relation to itself. There can be relations in a robust sense (as opposed to a vacuous tautologous sense) only between different things. — Janus

When you realize that the thing's essence (what it is) is prior to the thing's material existence, then this objection is seen as unfounded.

The Law of Identity is very simple: A = A. — Wayfarer

You obviously do not know the law of identity. This appears to be some logician's symbolic representation. Do some research, I know you're good at it.

To me, this is actually a relatively straightforward philosophical idea - agree with it or not, and nowadays the majority of people probably would not. But Metaphysician Undiscovered is in a muddle about this salient point, and I would discourage anyone who has persisted with this meandering thread not to keep flogging this horse, because it’s dead. — Wayfarer

Still not ready to analyze your argument to see whether you equivocate those two meanings of "same", I see.

Dead. Horse.

I should add, the reason why the ancients so esteemed mathematical certainty, is because when we say X + Y = Z, then Z is, in a way that mere material objects can never be said to be. Because the ‘form of the answer’ is perceived directly, the mind is, as it were, at one with the answer, in a way that it can never be in respect of judgements about material particulars. And that goes back to the Platonic epistemology, in which dianoia is of an intrinsically higher order than pistis or doxa. (This is also the point of the Lloyd Gerson quotation on Aristotle that I mentioned earlier in this thread.)

The reason this is alien to us, is that we have been brought up in a culture which assumes a naturalist viewpoint. It doesn’t occur to us to question the testimony of sense, and it’s not something we know how to do. The idea that there is some level or domain of reality that is superior to the domain of what we regard as common-sense experience is simply incomprehensible, such is our culturally-instilled understanding of nature. What this is not appreciating, is the ascetic or world-denying characteristic of early philosophy. Its practitioners were much more like religious renunciates than today’s academicians (which is subject of the books of Pierre Hadot, e.g. ‘Philosophy as a Way of Life’.) This provided the means to really question the sense in which the common-sense understanding of the world was radically mistaken. (I suppose this has been preserved in some sense in modern science, but at the expense of eliminating any metaphysic of value.)

The problem with wistfully harking back to ancient, Eastern and medieval thinkers is that they were not aware of many things about the world which we moderns take for granted, and cannot, if we wish to be intellectually honest, ignore. — Janus

I am not harking back to ancient and Eastern philosophy out of nostalgia or misplaced idealism. That is not the motive at all. Modern Western liberalism, whilst it has many obvious benefits, also suffers from some major flaws, in my view; it takes for granted many plain falsehoods, which, as they're so familiar to us, we often can't see; we look through them, rather than at them. Basically one of the consequences of living in the modern West, is that normative judgement concerning ethical and metaphysical questions is to all intents subjectivised. I notice you take others to task for ‘scientism’, and yet when challenged on what an alternative to ‘scientism’ means, you’re unable to articulate anything beyond a ‘subjective feeling’ which is apparently so self-evidently true that nothing can or should be said about it (e.g. here, here, here, and here).

What I’m actually doing is attempting to articulate what is scientism, and analyse its origins and causes, partially historically, partially philosophically. An aspect of that is, I believe, retrieving the 'forgotten wisdom' of the Western philosophical tradition. The whole point of Platonist philosophy was articulating a metaphysic of value, identifying what is truly good, independently of anyone's opinion of it. That, I believe, has been lost and forgotten, and that's not 'nostalgia' or 'wistfulness' - it's a hard historical fact, as far as I'm concerned. I am trying to retrieve that insight, without having had the benefit of a education 'in the Classics', as they are described, and without getting too bogged down in meaningless obscurantism and nonsense (of which this thread has suffered an unfortunate surfeit.)

The same quest for a domain of real values is also true of Buddhism albeit via a radically different conception of the Good. But being able to look at such questions from diverse perspectives is, I would have thought, one of the unqualified goods of modern liberal democracies. (And I might add, I went to the lengths of doing an MA in Buddhist Studies at the cost of $20k, for no professional or material end, simply to understand.)

As for your responses to my posts - I have found quite a few of them quite unfriendly, not to mention badly informed, to be blunt. If you really do understand what the arguments are, and then can criticize them constructively, then I'm more than willing to take it on, but I'm not hearing it.

The law of identity does not suggest that if two separate things change to have all properties coincide, then they become one and the same thing. This is impossible, because 1+1=1 is mathematically impossible. Rather, it says that if two subjects could describe all the properties of an object that they observed, and that all the properties were to coincide, then it follows that they observed the same object. E.g. If I saw a brown dog at time t and position x, y, z; and you saw a brown dog at time t and position x, y, z, then it follows that we saw the same dog (assuming no false perceptions).

This exercise also applies to concepts. Thus if the properties of a concept described by several subjects coincide, then the concept described is one and the same for all. Some people in this discussion claim that not all properties coincide. Some, including myself, claim they do; and the minor differences in description is explained by a minor difference in expression, not by a difference in the properties observed. E.g. I may describe the dog as brown, and you may describe it as beige.

Note: the statement "Since all concepts are located in different minds, it follows that the concepts must be separate things in all minds" is invalid, because this "location in the mind" is not a property of the object observed, but of the subject. It would be similarly invalid to say "Since the perception of the dog is from different subjects, then it follows that we did not observe the same dog".

Now you have lost me. I cannot follow what you are arguing here. You speak about "examples used to falsify the definitions". I assume that these examples are drawings on a paper or some other medium, or in some cases a verbal description. These examples are constructs, created by the person drawing, doing the demonstration. So when an understanding is produced in this way, why do you conclude that it comes from a concept already within? — Metaphysician Undercover

The examples I was referring to are these: "This is not a triangle", and "this is a triangle". I assume you agree that these statements are true, as well as virtually everyone else. Now, this knowledge, that these statements are true, must be explained. I explain it by our knowledge of the concept of triangle-ness. In other words, our knowledge of the concept enables us to make true statements of particulars, as above, which in turn enables to come up with its definition, through a socratic dialogue. It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around.

[...] Concepts do not exist in any "objective sense". They are property of subjects and so are subjective. The "more correct" doesn't exist in an objective sense, it is something agreed upon by the various subjects. Some call this inter-subjectivity, but inter-subjectivity doesn't create a true objectivity. But "correctness" is created by inter-subjective agreement, so "three angles" is more correct than "four angles" because it is what is agreed upon by convention. This is what constitutes "correctness", what is agreed upon by convention, not some "objective" concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I understand, you claim that the concept of triangle-ness is subjective, and that we all have similar ones by coincidence. Can you back-up this hypothesis of "inter-subjectivity"? It seems to me that if we all observe an object with extremely similar properties, then it is reasonable to assume that we all observe the one and same object, until proven otherwise. As such, the onus of proof is on you to defend a more complicated hypothesis.

Your example is of one particular math exam. Just because you got 100% on one exam, this does not mean that you have the ideal understanding of mathematics. You have a lot more to learn. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are committing the fallacy of moving the goal post. My point is that reaching the ideal is a logical possibility. As such, you have once again the onus to prove that reaching an ideal definition of triangle-ness is impossible.

it should be clear from your exchanges here that your opponent is arguing for a version of nominalism or subjectivism. However he doesn’t understand the issue well enough to see this, which simply results in further circular argument and shifting of goal posts. This will go on indefinitely.

Some people in this discussion claim that not all properties coincide. Some, including myself, claim they do; — Samuel Lacrampe

And I agree, although, again, it’s important to distinguish a ‘form’ from a ‘mental image’. That is a hard distinction to draw but it’s important.

Thanks, that is a key passage. (I’m really not that well-educated in all this stuff, I’m flying by the seat of my pants.) I *think* I see that as a statement of Aristotle’s incomprehension of a fundamental aspect of the ‘doctrine of Ideas’*. My reading is that the ideas or forms don’t exist. They belong to a prior ontological level, that being ‘the way that things can exist’ (which is suggested by the phrase ‘prior to formula’).

So in this interpretation, ‘whiteness’ is not an existing thing, but it is a real attribute or quality which is realised (made real, instantiated) by any white thing. I think the problem in the quoted passage is that ‘whiteness’ and ‘things’ are being conceptualised on the same level i.e. both as existing things. So ‘whiteness’ is being reified as a kind of object or entity. But it is not something that exists in the absence of white things (or beings), but anything has the potential to be white (or round or whatever) - which is why it’s a universal.

Note also that the original of the word translated as ‘substance’ is ‘ousia’, which is nearer in meaning to ‘being’; so the phrase ‘kind of being’ might be nearer to the intended meaning than the word ‘substance’. So ‘whiteness’ is a real attribute which is instantiated by white things, but whiteness doesn’t depend on there being white things; whiteness would still be real in the absence of any white things.

Anyway, I also think there’s a recognition of this problem in Russell’s Problems of Philosophy, in the chapter on Universals, where he says:

Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. This is, of course, denied by many philosophers, either for Berkeley's reasons or for Kant's. But we have already considered these reasons, and decided that they are inadequate. We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.

This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.

emphasis added. Note the use of the term ‘subsist’ at the top. That is how I think of universals - they’re not existent things, they’re at a level prior to ‘existence’; hence Russell’s use of ‘subsists’. But universals ‘hem the possibilities’, so to speak; they are the way things must be in order to exist. Think of a wing, for instance: whether it’s a bat, bird, insect, or pterosaur wing, the evolutionary route to the wing being vastly different in each case, the upshot has to be wing-like, ‘something light and flat that can be flapped’ Otherwise, you can’t fly, no matter what. So that is the ‘eidos’ of ‘wing’ - or even of ‘flight’, for that matter. (After all, even aeroplanes have wings).

That is all completely off-the-cuff, and I welcome any objections, but again, thanks for bringing that in, I think it is central to Aristotle’s criticism of the Ideas.

———-

* I am reading through a well-regarded 1920’s British text, J A Stewart, Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas, and although I haven’t made much headway, I do note that straight up he says Aristotle didn’t understand the Ideas at all well, which I find encouraging.

This exercise also applies to concepts. Thus if the properties of a concept described by several subjects coincide, then the concept described is one and the same for all. Some people in this discussion claim that not all properties coincide. Some, including myself, claim they do; and the minor differences in description is explained by a minor difference in expression, not by a difference in the properties observed. E.g. I may describe the dog as brown, and you may describe it as beige. — Samuel Lacrampe

There are faults in this statement. Just like in the case of describing an object, likewise in describing a concept, two people having exact descriptions does not necessitate that we are talking about the same thing. If I say "big and green", and you say "big and green", this does not mean that we are talking about the same thing. It is true, that if all properties coincide, then it is the same thing, (as per the Leibniz principle), but the human being doesn't have the capacity to identify all properties, so your claim that if two people produce the same description they are talking about the same thing, is unsound.

You need to respect the fact that the properties which a thing actually has, and the properties which a thing is said to have are not necessarily the same.

It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around. — Samuel Lacrampe

There are two sides to this procedure, and you are completely neglecting one side. The perception of the object is one factor which allows us to describe it, but knowing the words, and their meanings is another factor. And, the act of using words to describe things is what gives words their meanings. I describe this process of ostensive definition to you already. So the opposite way around is just as important as the one you describe, describing objects in ostensive demonstrations allows one to learn the words, and this is necessary in order that we can proceed to describe other objects.

If I understand, you claim that the concept of triangle-ness is subjective, and that we all have similar ones by coincidence. — Samuel Lacrampe

It's not coincidence, it comes through effort, and is called learning.

Can you back-up this hypothesis of "inter-subjectivity"? It seems to me that if we all observe an object with extremely similar properties, then it is reasonable to assume that we all observe the one and same object, until proven otherwise. As such, the onus of proof is on you to defend a more complicated hypothesis. — Samuel Lacrampe

Did you not ever go to school in your life? It is quite clear, that in school we learn the concepts, they are taught to us by our teachers. That's why we happen to have similar concepts in our minds, there is a structured education system which ensures that we are all taught these similar things. The defense of my position is not difficult, because the evidence is everywhere within the institutions of our society. The institutions are set up to ensure that we are all taught very similar things.

You are committing the fallacy of moving the goal post. My point is that reaching the ideal is a logical possibility. As such, you have once again the onus to prove that reaching an ideal definition of triangle-ness is impossible. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, I did not "move the goal post", I simply explained that you were working off an incorrect definition of "ideal", which made the ideal into a particular instance of occurrence. If "ideal" is made into a particular instance of occurrence, then any occurrence is the ideal of that particular occurrence, and "ideal" looses all meaningfulness. So I could define the "ideal" as obtaining 40% on my math exam, then if I get 40% on my math exam I have obtained the ideal. But this leaves "ideal" as meaningless. That's what you did, you defined the ideal as obtaining 100% on your exam, and then said that if you get it, you have obtained the ideal. By this procedure we could say that absolutely anything is the ideal, and always be obtaining the ideal. But that leaves "ideal" as meaningless because then the ideal could be anything which you want it to be.

I posted it because you consistently seem to blur the differences between Aristotle, Plato or "the ancients" (not to mention Kant), while, at the same time, you speak of others (for example, MU or Janus) as not getting the basics of Platonism, platonic epistemology, Aristotle or whatever. — Πετροκότσυφας

This is a very good point, to consider the differences between the principles of these great philosophers. A very good example is found in the ontological differences which Neo-Platonism, and Aristotelianism expressed. Neo-Platonism with its immaterial Forms was accepted into Christian religion as fundamental teaching, by people like St. Augustine, and became foundational to their ontology. The Aristotelian principle of unmoved movers, eternal circular motions, provides a more materialist description which doesn't require immaterial Forms to account for material existence, because matter is included within the concept, as that which is moving.

In Aquinas we can see an attempt at the very difficult task of creating consistency between the Neo-Platonist traditions within Christianity, and the more recently introduced texts of Aristotle. As I said, this was an extremely difficult task, which required volumes of text, and despite St Thomas' arduous attempts at explaining the usage of different terms, some inconsistency still remains

Why do we keep quoting philosophers from 1000s of years ago, when it is likely that they wouldn't say the same things today given the knowledge we have today.

But it's clear that the essence of a thing precedes the thing's material existence. This is the case when we make a plan for something, in advance. So an essence can be independent of the thing which it is the essence of. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would call that an imagined existence preceding a material existence. Particular Imagined existences are always part of general material existence though, and the material (in the sense of 'content') of imagined existences is always the material of material existence.

Therefore what the thing will be is necessarily prior to the material existence of thing, to necessitate that the thing when it comes into being, is what it is, and not something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

This argument holds only if determinism is presumed. I don't accept determinism so the argument has no power to persuade.

However, a complete description of me, my complete essence, what I am, would include what is in my stomach. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems to be confused. So, what you think of as essence is something which changes constantly along with the conditions of your existence or is it something prior to your existence?

As for your responses to my posts - I have found quite a few of them quite unfriendly, not to mention badly informed, to be blunt. If you really do understand what the arguments are, and then can criticize them constructively, then I'm more than willing to take it on, but I'm not hearing it. — Wayfarer

OK. if you have been taking my critiques of your arguments personally then that explains your failure to address what I have actually said. And your claim that some of what I have said is "badly informed", sounds just like what someone who is taking what has been said personally would say.

If you back that claim of ill-informedness up with some examples, and show exactly what I have been badly informed about, why I should have been well-informed about it before commenting on your arguments, and how I could become well-informed about it, then perhaps we can continue; otherwise it would be best to leave it, since I don't want to waste my precious time on someone who refuses to freely and openly engage.

Learning not to take things personally on philosophy forums would be a well-learned lesson, and would help you engage more fully with your interlocutors.

I posted it because you consistently seem to blur the differences between Aristotle, Plato or "the ancients" (not to mention Kant), while, at the same time, you speak of others (for example, MU or Janus) as not getting the basics of Platonism, platonic epistemology, Aristotle or whatever. — Πετροκότσυφας

The issue I have with Metaphysician Undiscovered concerns his obfuscation over what it means to say 'two things are the same' or 'two representations have the same meaning'. This lead to the absurd argument that 'A' means something differently for two persons, depending on their interpretation, thus calling into question the law of identity, which then triggered yet more obfuscation. So I think his comments on the question of identity and individuation are muddled. He has consistently argued a nominalist position against Samuel LaCrampe, but when this is pointed out, he doesn't acknowledge it, and instead obfuscates the meaning of 'nominalism'. (I could go back and show numerous examples, but I don't want to waste the time.) As for Janus, I will stand by my earlier reply.

So, in your case, what happens, it seems to me, is a mishmash which distorts all three. Even if you could (ultimately) mix them (at least parts of their systems), the way you understand them, those who have read the texts, can bring forth passages that contradict the way you understand them, while you can't point to such passages. — Πετροκότσυφας

That's a fair criticism. I know I have a lot more work to do if I want to make the case seriously. I had intended to enrol in an external degree in metaphysics towards this end, although I can't enroll until I resolve my income situation. And I will also admit, the prospect of becoming properly acquainted with Plato and Aristotle is quite a daunting one, I often make an attempt to start, but in the absence of a structure program my reading is desultory.

But as for 'blurring the difference' - I am making a very general point about the ontology of ideas. I generally assume that most readers understand ideas to be ultimately within the individual mind (as MU has stated throughout). If pressed, most will say that ideas are, therefore, the product of the brain, which in turn is the product of evolution. This is the general consensus in modern culture. Of course its true that none of the pre-modern philosophers understood evolutionary science, so none could respond to it. But we generally assume that the pre-modern views on such questions are therefore bound to be false, on the basis that they didn't understand the scientific explanation of the nature of the mind - which is predominantly materialistic. So I am arguing the case on the general principle that the nature of reason, and the faculty of the mind that perceives meaning, is not something which has been explained in biological terms, on the basis of Platonic realism about ideas. I am arguing on a general interpretation of Platonic realism.

And please, I don't 'despise' anything or anyone. My philosophical topic of interest is simply that the widespread and commonly-accepted views of scientific materialism are mistaken. My basic position is very simple: ideas are real, and they're not reducible to the physical.

if you have been taking my critiques of your arguments personally then that explains your failure to address what I have actually said. — Janus

As far as I am concerned, I do try and address your criticisms, but you don't understand my replies, you accuse me of 'slipping away' or 'not answering questions', when I have attempted to do so.

otherwise it would be best to leave it — Janus

That would be good, as whilst I admit my knowledge of this subject is patchy, I don't think you have any interest in it. Although, I rather miss Dawson and his donkey.

Although, I rather miss Dawson and his donkey. — Wayfarer

Dawson and his donkey both held views which were identical with mine; and they haven't really changed that much since.

I am interested in this topic, though. I just don't think that asking whether information is physical is a fruitful way to approach it. This is because if we say that information is not physical I can't see what could be intended other than either:

• A trivial claim that says merely that it is not an empirical object

or:

• A claim that it cannot be an operation of physical substance, and that therefore it must be an operation of mental substance.

The first is compatible with any metaphysical standpoint and the second is dualism; which I don't accept as being coherent.

I haven't been able to discern a claim for any alternative standpoint in your claim that information cannot be physical. Also, your argument that it cannot be physical seems to amount to saying that information consists in generalizations, generalizations cannot be physical and therefore information cannot be physical. What you need is an argument that shows why physicality could not have qualities (eg the ability to constitute generalities) beyond its capacity to be observed and quantified.

In short, I think that potentiality as well as actuality are both physical, but obviously they are not both actual. On this view information would be the 'not yet actual'.

I haven't been able to discern a claim for any alternative standpoint in your claim that information cannot be physical. — Janus

I have already admitted, the topic really ought to be about ideas, not about information. But on the other hand, the example in the OP does rely on the ability of the mind to absorb and translate information that is based on ideas.

But recall that Aaron answered a question from you the other day about the traditional philosophical view of God as ‘being itsellf’, to which your response was:

I can't see what being could be (apart from being merely our idea) over and above the totality of beings. Being is comprised of beings I would say, just as beings are manifestations of being; I can't think of any other way to make sense of it.

The fact that ‘you can’t think of any other way to make sense of it’, is not actually an argument against this understanding. It might be something you genuinely don’t understand. Furthermore, as I have said, whilst you acknowledge that there is a reality corresponding to ‘spirit’ - i think we agreed on that? - you say the ‘experience’ of it is essentially subjective, and something about which nothing can be said. Then you take me to task for trying to base arguments on such a reality.

Whereas here I am inexpertly trying to deal with metaphysical arguments that do claim that ‘being as such’ is real, and real in a way that doesn’t require your agreement or buy-in. In other words, there might be something about this school of argument that you’re not seeing. Please don’t take that as a put-down or an ad hominem because it isn’t intended as such, although we have reached this point in previous debates.

As has been said above, my arguments are a mish-mash. Agreed! They’re all over the place. I read bits here, pieces there, snippets from Ed Feser, articles and essays both online and on paper. They all go into the thought processor, get blended up - and you see the results. But, I also think that along the line, I have had a genuine moment of epiphany and that I glimpsed a reality which I have come to think is now lost and forgotten. That is why I have a sense of antagonism towards what a lot of people take for granted. I think it ‘pushes buttons’ because it questions the taken-for-granted nature of reality. That’s how I interpret my own efforts here.

Why do we keep quoting philosophers from 1000s of years ago, when it is likely that they wouldn't say the same things today given the knowledge we have today. — Harry Hindu

Obviously knowledge has progressed immensely since the time of the ancient Greeks. Yet philosophical disputes remain. Those disputes often find their origin in the fundamental differences between the views of Plato and Aristotle. In particular, whether ideas have a reality apart from the natural world or whether they are grounded in the natural world. In general terms, this is the problem of universals.