That's because it's the same information, represented differently. — Wayfarer
This is what the whole thread is about from the word dot, you've been too busy wanting to argue to actually notice it. This is definitely my last response to you in this thread. — Wayfarer
Notice that the in that Wiki article, it says 'whether universals or particulars'. As far as I'm concerned, this thread is about universals, and in that case, any 'A' is equal to, the same is, any other 'A'. There's not 'my A', and 'your A', which are subtly different, because you and I think of them in slightly different ways. — Wayfarer
There is absolute sameness, it's described by the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This refers to the thing in relation to itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point though, as I've argued, is that it is not the same information, in the strict sense of the word "same" it is similar information which we call "the same" for practical purposes. That's why there is ambiguity and we can never be absolutely certain that we got the interpretation absolutely correct, because the information is not "the same", it is similar. — Metaphysician Undercover
But your argument is that information is not the physical 'A' itself, it is what is represented by the 'A'. And what 'A' represents to me is not the same as what 'A' represents to you. — Metaphysician Undercover
Information is the relationship between cause and effect. — Harry Hindu
Identity consists in the fact that a thing is; from that it follows tautologously that a thing is itself, and is the same as itself. — Janus
This is the same nonsense. If you write a technical specification for a particular model of machine and then turn it out according to those specifications, you get the same machine each time. — Wayfarer
You’ve wasted thousands of words arguing about the meaning of the word ‘the same’. — Wayfarer
Perfect. So the object's coordinates in space-time can be just as important or even more important than it's other properties depending on the arbitrary usefulness of some person at some moment.It depends on how you define the concept of object. You can define it any way you want. It depends on your needs. Sometimes, we define it to include the coordinates; sometimes, we define it to exclude the coordinates. When we say that two balls are equal, more likely than being wrong, we are defining the concept of ball to exclude the coordinates that someone else would include in the definition of the concept of ball. You can stretch concepts any way you like. You can stretch the concept of ball to include not only the coordinates that you want to include in the concept but also portions of the environment that surrounds objects under your consideration such as for example other objects of the same kind (so that instead of speaking of single balls we are now talking about pairs of balls.) By stretching the definition of concepts, you can prove anything you want.
An object is nothing but a portion of reality. If you want to have a meaningful conversation, then parties must focus their attention on the same portion of reality. This is why definitions are important. We want to make sure we are talking about the same portion of reality. — Magnus Anderson
I've never seen a problem with inductive reasoning. Just as we have to account for and explain a different effect occurring than what we predicted will happen based on previous experience (why did the sun rise in the west today?), we also need to account for and explain why it was the case for so long prior to this new effect (why did the sun rise in the east for so long prior to today?).How do you think that relates to Hume’s criticism of inductive reasoning? — Wayfarer
And don't go whining that I'm going to deep. 100% means 100%. Can any two objects ever be 100% the same? — Harry Hindu
This is not true, because there is a difference between "what a thing is", and "that a thing is"; this is the difference between essence and existence. Identity is concerned with what a thing is, it's essence. What you have stated is that a thing's identity, its essence, is that it exists, and that's not true at all, because that a thing exists is common to all things, and this is completely different from what a thing is, which is specific to each thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
The law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, indicates that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is nothing other than the thing's essence. It is not vacuous because it prevents sophistic arguments which begin with the assumption that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is some abstracted form, in the human mind, which doesn't include the accidentals of the thing.
The law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, indicates that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is nothing other than the thing's essence. It is not vacuous because it prevents sophistic arguments which begin with the assumption that a thing's essence (what the thing is), is some abstracted form, in the human mind, which doesn't include the accidentals of the thing.
the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.
No, I haven't equated essence with existence at all; what I have said is merely that a thing cannot have an essence if it does not exist, because without existence (of some kind; i.e real or imaginary) there would be no thing that could be said to possess an essence. — Janus
A thing must first be ("that it is") before it can be something ("what it is"). To say that is something before it is; would be to speak nonsense. — Janus
So, if a thing's essence includes its "accidentals", by which I presume you mean all its relations with other things; you would seem to be contradicting yourself, because a thing's relations constitute its particular existence, and in formulating it this way to you seem to be making its essence dependent on its existence; which is the assertion you are supposed to be arguing against. — Janus
In any case for me essence and existence are inseparable and co dependent. The problem I have with the formulation " a thing is the same as itself" is that is unnecessary because it necessarily follows from " a thing is"; and also because it is misleading insofar as it suggests that a thing bears a relation to itself. There can be relations in a robust sense (as opposed to a vacuous tautologous sense) only between different things. — Janus
The Law of Identity is very simple: A = A. — Wayfarer
To me, this is actually a relatively straightforward philosophical idea - agree with it or not, and nowadays the majority of people probably would not. But Metaphysician Undiscovered is in a muddle about this salient point, and I would discourage anyone who has persisted with this meandering thread not to keep flogging this horse, because it’s dead. — Wayfarer
The problem with wistfully harking back to ancient, Eastern and medieval thinkers is that they were not aware of many things about the world which we moderns take for granted, and cannot, if we wish to be intellectually honest, ignore. — Janus
The examples I was referring to are these: "This is not a triangle", and "this is a triangle". I assume you agree that these statements are true, as well as virtually everyone else. Now, this knowledge, that these statements are true, must be explained. I explain it by our knowledge of the concept of triangle-ness. In other words, our knowledge of the concept enables us to make true statements of particulars, as above, which in turn enables to come up with its definition, through a socratic dialogue. It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around.Now you have lost me. I cannot follow what you are arguing here. You speak about "examples used to falsify the definitions". I assume that these examples are drawings on a paper or some other medium, or in some cases a verbal description. These examples are constructs, created by the person drawing, doing the demonstration. So when an understanding is produced in this way, why do you conclude that it comes from a concept already within? — Metaphysician Undercover
If I understand, you claim that the concept of triangle-ness is subjective, and that we all have similar ones by coincidence. Can you back-up this hypothesis of "inter-subjectivity"? It seems to me that if we all observe an object with extremely similar properties, then it is reasonable to assume that we all observe the one and same object, until proven otherwise. As such, the onus of proof is on you to defend a more complicated hypothesis.[...] Concepts do not exist in any "objective sense". They are property of subjects and so are subjective. The "more correct" doesn't exist in an objective sense, it is something agreed upon by the various subjects. Some call this inter-subjectivity, but inter-subjectivity doesn't create a true objectivity. But "correctness" is created by inter-subjective agreement, so "three angles" is more correct than "four angles" because it is what is agreed upon by convention. This is what constitutes "correctness", what is agreed upon by convention, not some "objective" concept. — Metaphysician Undercover
You are committing the fallacy of moving the goal post. My point is that reaching the ideal is a logical possibility. As such, you have once again the onus to prove that reaching an ideal definition of triangle-ness is impossible.Your example is of one particular math exam. Just because you got 100% on one exam, this does not mean that you have the ideal understanding of mathematics. You have a lot more to learn. — Metaphysician Undercover
Some people in this discussion claim that not all properties coincide. Some, including myself, claim they do; — Samuel Lacrampe
Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. This is, of course, denied by many philosophers, either for Berkeley's reasons or for Kant's. But we have already considered these reasons, and decided that they are inadequate. We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.
This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.
This exercise also applies to concepts. Thus if the properties of a concept described by several subjects coincide, then the concept described is one and the same for all. Some people in this discussion claim that not all properties coincide. Some, including myself, claim they do; and the minor differences in description is explained by a minor difference in expression, not by a difference in the properties observed. E.g. I may describe the dog as brown, and you may describe it as beige. — Samuel Lacrampe
It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around. — Samuel Lacrampe
If I understand, you claim that the concept of triangle-ness is subjective, and that we all have similar ones by coincidence. — Samuel Lacrampe
Can you back-up this hypothesis of "inter-subjectivity"? It seems to me that if we all observe an object with extremely similar properties, then it is reasonable to assume that we all observe the one and same object, until proven otherwise. As such, the onus of proof is on you to defend a more complicated hypothesis. — Samuel Lacrampe
You are committing the fallacy of moving the goal post. My point is that reaching the ideal is a logical possibility. As such, you have once again the onus to prove that reaching an ideal definition of triangle-ness is impossible. — Samuel Lacrampe
I posted it because you consistently seem to blur the differences between Aristotle, Plato or "the ancients" (not to mention Kant), while, at the same time, you speak of others (for example, MU or Janus) as not getting the basics of Platonism, platonic epistemology, Aristotle or whatever. — Πετροκότσυφας
But it's clear that the essence of a thing precedes the thing's material existence. This is the case when we make a plan for something, in advance. So an essence can be independent of the thing which it is the essence of. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore what the thing will be is necessarily prior to the material existence of thing, to necessitate that the thing when it comes into being, is what it is, and not something else. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, a complete description of me, my complete essence, what I am, would include what is in my stomach. — Metaphysician Undercover
As for your responses to my posts - I have found quite a few of them quite unfriendly, not to mention badly informed, to be blunt. If you really do understand what the arguments are, and then can criticize them constructively, then I'm more than willing to take it on, but I'm not hearing it. — Wayfarer
I posted it because you consistently seem to blur the differences between Aristotle, Plato or "the ancients" (not to mention Kant), while, at the same time, you speak of others (for example, MU or Janus) as not getting the basics of Platonism, platonic epistemology, Aristotle or whatever. — Πετροκότσυφας
So, in your case, what happens, it seems to me, is a mishmash which distorts all three. Even if you could (ultimately) mix them (at least parts of their systems), the way you understand them, those who have read the texts, can bring forth passages that contradict the way you understand them, while you can't point to such passages. — Πετροκότσυφας
if you have been taking my critiques of your arguments personally then that explains your failure to address what I have actually said. — Janus
otherwise it would be best to leave it — Janus
Although, I rather miss Dawson and his donkey. — Wayfarer
I haven't been able to discern a claim for any alternative standpoint in your claim that information cannot be physical. — Janus
I can't see what being could be (apart from being merely our idea) over and above the totality of beings. Being is comprised of beings I would say, just as beings are manifestations of being; I can't think of any other way to make sense of it.
Why do we keep quoting philosophers from 1000s of years ago, when it is likely that they wouldn't say the same things today given the knowledge we have today. — Harry Hindu
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