If I understand you correctly, your position is that our concepts are not completely true, but are consistent among all humans, and this indicates that we are close to truth. I see a few flaws with this view.If you use "true" or "truth" in a less strict sense, then we can say that if human beings agree, that this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
(1) There is a self-contradiction in the assertion that "the complete truth cannot be obtained but truth in the lesser sense, of pointing to reality, is implied by human agreement". If complete truth can never be obtained, then this statement can never be validated to be completely true. — Samuel Lacrampe
2) It fails the principle of parsimony: If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. Thus if everyone perceives the same concept, it is reasonable to assume the concept is pointing to the real thing; until it is invalidated. But it cannot be invalidated, for the same reason that your position cannot be validated, as shown in (1). — Samuel Lacrampe
3) You wish to escape the absurdity that no judgement can ever be determined as true or false, by arguing that we can have mutual agreements among everyone, and claim "this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality". I agree that we can have mutual agreement among everyone, but why is this an indication that we are pointing toward reality? If the concept of a single individual is not true, then why would the whole group, which is nothing but the sum of all individuals, be any more true? — Samuel Lacrampe
You are correct that there is no self-contradiction in the sense that the statement "the complete truth cannot be obtained but truth in the lesser sense, of pointing toward reality, is implied by human agreement" must be necessarily false. However, there is a self-contradiction in the assertion of the statement, as in "it is completely true that we cannot obtain complete truths". To escape the contradiction, the statement must remain in the state of hypothesis. Now on the other hand, there is also a flaw in saying "it is completely true that we can obtain some truths completely", because it creates circular reasoning. Indeed, the very nature of the topic is such that we will forever remain in the state of hypotheses regardless what position we take, and never be able to rise to a higher level of certainty. And this brings me to the point on the principle of parsimony.I don't see any problem with this, no self-contradiction. It's like the statement "any statement may be doubted". That statement may be doubted too. But there is no self-contradiction unless I state that it is undoubtable that any statement may be doubted. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree, but given the nature of the topic as shown in the previous paragraph, this principle is unfortunately the best method we have left. As such, if I perceive some thing, it is more reasonable to assume that the thing perceived is the real thing, than not, until a flaw is found in the hypothesis. And you claim to have found one, as follows:The principle of parsimony is very weak as a proof. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover
This depends on the degree of difference. Let's take a common-sense example: You and I both observe the same duck, and we describe it to a third person. I say "it has a beak, two wings and is brown". If you say "it has a trunk, leaves, and is green", then I agree that this type of difference is significant enough to debunk the 'sameness' conclusion, and by extension refute the 'complete truth' hypothesis. But if you say "it has wings, a beak, and is beige", then even though there are differences in the description (different words in different order), this type of difference is not significant enough to debunk the conclusion that we are describing the same thing, by common sense. As such, your demand for complete sameness is unreasonable. Then I claim the differences are for the most part insignificant, as demonstrated in the example of 'triangle' way back then, where I described it as "a flat surface with 3 straight sides", and you described it as "a plane with 3 sides and 3 angles". Surely you understand that I don't disagree with your description, and that the differences can simply be attributed to differences in expressions.I say that the differences, the peculiarities, which we each have, "point to" the lack of a real universal form. I support my claim by pointing to differences, and saying that there are no examples of human concepts which are "the same" between individuals. So the assumption of "the same" is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover
That does not sound right. You and I surely agree that the sum of 2 and 2 is 4 and nothing else. Here is an example of agreement with no difference. Are you perhaps mixing the concept of 'agreement' with 'tolerance' or 'compromise'? Regardless, I think the first two points above are more decisive to the topic.Agreement is necessitated by differences. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, there is a self-contradiction in the assertion of the statement, as in "it is completely true that we cannot obtain complete truths". — Samuel Lacrampe
Indeed, the very nature of the topic is such that we will forever remain in the state of hypotheses regardless what position we take, and never be able to rise to a higher level of certainty. And this brings me to the point on the principle of parsimony. — Samuel Lacrampe
I agree, but given the nature of the topic as shown in the previous paragraph, this principle is unfortunately the best method we have left. As such, if I perceive some thing, it is more reasonable to assume that the thing perceived is the real thing, than not, until a flaw is found in the hypothesis. And you claim to have found one, as follows: — Samuel Lacrampe
This depends on the degree of difference. Let's take a common-sense example: You and I both observe the same duck, and we describe it to a third person. I say "it has a beak, two wings and is brown". If you say "it has a trunk, leaves, and is green", then I agree that this type of difference is significant enough to debunk the 'sameness' conclusion, and by extension refute the 'complete truth' hypothesis. But if you say "it has wings, a beak, and is beige", then even though there are differences in the description (different words in different order), this type of difference is not significant enough to debunk the conclusion that we are describing the same thing, by common sense. As such, your demand for complete sameness is unreasonable. Then I claim the differences are for the most part insignificant, as demonstrated in the example of 'triangle' way back then, where I described it as "a flat surface with 3 straight sides", and you described it as "a plane with 3 sides and 3 angles". Surely you understand that I don't disagree with your description, and that the differences can simply be attributed to differences in expressions. — Samuel Lacrampe
Surely you understand that I don't disagree with your description, and that the differences can simply be attributed to differences in expressions. — Samuel Lacrampe
That does not sound right. You and I surely agree that the sum of 2 and 2 is 4 and nothing else. Here is an example of agreement with no difference. Are you perhaps mixing the concept of 'agreement' with 'tolerance' or 'compromise'? Regardless, I think the first two points above are more decisive to the topic. — Samuel Lacrampe
My point was that even when we are describing the same thing like a duck (and we know this by pointing to the same object), then it still happens that we can give different descriptions.In your example, we both have different descriptions, and you are assuming that we are describing the same thing. That assumption is not sufficient. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover
I am not sure what you mean by "pointing to the idea in my mind". Concepts or ideas are like signs that point to something else. If I have the idea of a specific chair in mind, I would not "point to the idea in my mind", but point to the specific chair in reality, which the idea is about.In the case of the concept, I point to the idea in my mind, and you point to the idea in your mind, and we are pointing to different things. — Metaphysician Undercover
You are making an error. Yes, you are correct that it is impossible for similar things to be one and the same thing. However, it is possible for similar descriptions of a thing to be about one and the same thing. And as shown previously, it is very probable that our description of the same duck will have insignificant differences in words and order of words.However, the whole point of my argument is that there is a distinction to be made, between "similar" and "same". If you agree that there is a distinction between similar and same, then in making this distinction there can be no such thing as a difference which does not make a difference, because this would allow that two similar things are the same. And that would negate the distinction between similar and same which we would have agreed to uphold. — Metaphysician Undercover
My point was that even when we are describing the same thing like a duck (and we know this by pointing to the same object), then it still happens that we can give different descriptions. — Samuel Lacrampe
I am not sure what you mean by "pointing to the idea in my mind". Concepts or ideas are like signs that point to something else. If I have the idea of a specific chair in mind, I would not "point to the idea in my mind", but point to the specific chair in reality, which the idea is about. — Samuel Lacrampe
You are making an error. Yes, you are correct that it is impossible for similar things to be one and the same thing. However, it is possible for similar descriptions of a thing to be about one and the same thing. And as shown previously, it is very probable that our description of the same duck will have insignificant differences in words and order of words. — Samuel Lacrampe
Indeed, it does not make it necessary but possible; and this possibility is sufficient to refute your argument that, since we give different descriptions of concepts, then the concepts must be different. We are therefore back to the starting point obtained from the principle of parsimony, namely that concepts coincide with real things, because it is the simplest hypothesis.So your argument is that we each describe the same thing with different words. But this does not necessitate that the thing we are each describing with different words is the same thing. So your argument just creates a possibility, it doesn't produce anything conclusive. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that for particular physical beings, we can validate that we are talking about the same thing by pointing to its spatial-temporal properties. Also, this cannot be done for universal concepts because I argue that they are not physical beings. However, we can get close to certainty by testing numerous particular physical beings that have the universal concept as its genus. For example, we can test if my judgement of the shapes here, here, and here match with your judgement that they have 'triangle' as their genus. Since our judgement is based on our respective concept, then the more objects we test, the closer we get to certainty that our concept is the same. Another way is to see if we agree with each other's description, despite their minor differences. I personally believe this way is also legit, but I know you don't because you demand complete sameness in descriptions. So on to the next section below.Now, in the case of a concept, how are we going to point to it to determine whether it's the same thing which we are each talking about? — Metaphysician Undercover
I find that position surprising. Recall that if the concept is not connected a being in reality, then the consequence is that no proposition ever spoken can be true, that is, reflect reality. Up to now, I thought your position was that our concepts are connected to real beings, and although they may fail to accurately match the real beings, they nevertheless come close to it. I was willing to take that position seriously. But now, it seems your new position is that a concept is nothing but the description itself, not referring to another thing, thereby completely severing its connection to any real being. Consequently, no truth can ever be spoken. I hope I am misunderstanding something, because as it stands, your new position leads to absurdity. It forces you to give up on metaphysics (which is ironic given your name), and by extension, truth, and by extension, philosophy, which is the search for truth.I do not believe that different description can refer to the same concept because I believe that the concept is the description itself. [...] If you want to support your position, in which the concept is something other than the description, something referred to by the description, or described, you need to point to the concept, show it to me. — Metaphysician Undercover
Indeed, it does not make it necessary but possible; and this possibility is sufficient to refute your argument that, since we give different descriptions of concepts, then the concepts must be different. We are therefore back to the starting point obtained from the principle of parsimony, namely that concepts coincide with real things, because it is the simplest hypothesis. — Samuel Lacrampe
Since our judgement is based on our respective concept, then the more objects we test, the closer we get to certainty that our concept is the same. — Samuel Lacrampe
I find that position surprising. Recall that if the concept is not connected a being in reality, then the consequence is that no proposition ever spoken can be true, that is, reflect reality. Up to now, I thought your position was that our concepts are connected to real beings, and although they may fail to accurately match the real beings, they nevertheless come close to it. I was willing to take that position seriously. But now, it seems your new position is that a concept is nothing but the description itself, not referring to another thing, thereby completely severing its connection to any real being. Consequently, no truth can ever be spoken. I hope I am misunderstanding something, because as it stands, your new position leads to absurdity. It forces you to give up on metaphysics (which is ironic given your name), and by extension, truth, and by extension, philosophy, which is the search for truth. — Samuel Lacrampe
You presuppose that all beings are particulars. Why is that necessary? I would agree that all physical beings are particulars, due to having particular spacial-temporal properties. But this would not apply to non-physical beings.[...] If they coincide with real things, then they are particulars. That is what I was arguing, if we want to give concepts real existence, we must reduce them to particulars, either as the form of a particular thing, or as an ideal universal. — Metaphysician Undercover
It can also mean that we judge these things in the same way. I thought we previously agreed that different descriptions can still refer to the same thing.All this demonstrates is that we judge these few things in a similar way. It doesn't demonstrate that we have the same concept. However, the fact that we each described our concept of "triangle" in a different way does demonstrate that we each have a different concept of "triangle". — Metaphysician Undercover
I understand that it has been a while. It is unfortunate, but it's reality. Yes, we can leave it at that. This was fun. I think I will post a new discussion at some point, to start fresh with the things I have learned here. I have still answered below your questions for completeness, but I don't expect a response afterwards.I think we've been away from this discussion for too long, and we've both lost track of what each other has been arguing. perhaps we ought to give it up. Why must a concept be connected to a "real being"? A concept may be completely artificial. An architect designs a building. The concept is completely in the architect's mind, then on the paper. it is not connected to a "real being". Or do I misunderstand you? — Metaphysician Undercover
You presuppose that all beings are particulars. Why is that necessary? I would agree that all physical beings are particulars, due to having particular spacial-temporal properties. But this would not apply to non-physical beings. — Samuel Lacrampe
It can also mean that we judge these things in the same way. I thought we previously agreed that different descriptions can still refer to the same thing. — Samuel Lacrampe
Do I think wave is matter? No so much. Rather, it seems best described as a pattern of matter (although I defer to the quantum mechanics amongst us). — Kym
Moderators close this thread! — Kym
I am questioning whether information, generally speaking, is physical. — Wayfarer
The question I want to explore is: in such a case, what stays the same, and what changes? — Wayfarer
As a nominalist, I'd say nothing literally stays the same — numberjohnny5
The information could be transmitted wrongly, or correctly. If it’s transmitted correctly, then it stays the same. The rest is not germane. — Wayfarer
Still not the point. The particular piece of information in question - about the ship - can be described exactly, by any one of a number of media and even systems of representation. The same can be said for all manner of information. If I write out a formula or a recipe or an equation, I can employ a wide range of systems or languages to encode it. Yet, one digit wrong, and the chemical won’t form, or the cake won’t bake, and so on. So the information in each case is the same, even if the representation is completely different. — Wayfarer
I would think that there is no room for meaning in such an ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover
Ideas are reduced to mental states and mental states are reduced physical brain states. — Metaphysician Undercover
Where's meaning? — Metaphysician Undercover
That's mainly becuase I think there's often a stigma when employing "reduction" in these debates (probably from those who aren't identity theorists and dualists, which makes sense), at least in my experience, and I think that can sometimes be a red-herring about views like mine. — numberjohnny5
Located in minds/brains — numberjohnny5
Or, do you think that meaning is completely subjective, entirely within each brain? — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you think that any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants, and each way would be an equally valid interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover
I'd say that "any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants," (there's no objective rule saying everyone must interpret anything in any particular way whatsoever); and that those interpretations that the brain is trying to match (by speculation) with what they believe the intention of the writer was/is can be relatively similar or dissimilar to the writer's intentions. — numberjohnny5
If any brain can interpret a piece of writing in any way that it wants, then on what basis would you say that there is any "information" in any writing? If there is nothing objective, and any mind can determine the meaning as whatever it wants, then we cannot say that the writing gives us any information because any meaning derived is completely fabricated by the interpreting mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
But to say that the interpreter must try to match the intention of the writer, is to contradict this (any way that the brain wants). So which is it, that you believe? Can the writing be interpreted in any way that one wants, or do we assume that there is a correct way, the way intended by the writer? If we assume that there is a correct way, then don't we have to turn to conventions and such to support an interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover
That means that there is no objective meaning, if that's what you mean. — numberjohnny5
I'm not saying the interpreter must try to do anything, btw. I'm saying the interpreter has a choice to match the writer's intention through the writing. They don't have to choose that though. They can choose to interpret the writing any way they want. That's what I meant by these earlier statements: — numberjohnny5
OK, so what you are saying is that anything written can have absolutely any meaning whatsoever, depending entirely on the interpretation. What the written thing means is whatever any individual who interprets it thinks it means. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you recognize that this means that the written material cannot communicate any information from one individual to another? The interpreting individual gives the written material any meaning whatsoever. — Metaphysician Undercover
This thread was opened over 6 months ago, and all of these issues have been canvassed in depth. — Wayfarer
However, and I'm not going to argue the point beyond this post, if there was 'no objective meaning', then nobody could ever be correct, or incorrect, about anything. — Wayfarer
You couldn't write down instructions for how to build a computer, or specify how TCP/IP works, or how information is routed across the internet. All of these things work, because there are successful ways of making them work, which can be communicated via specifications and instructions, which are accurate. — Wayfarer
And if they were not accurate, and the technological solutions they refer to did not actually exist, then there would be no computers nor an internet. So the fact that you're able to participate in a debate, on the internet, using a computer, contradicts the point you're making - which, incidentally, is not a point at all, but simply a very long-winded way of saying that 'meaning is whatever you want it to be'. Or, in short - whatever. — Wayfarer
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