If you had learned the conventional uses of the words and phrases in the piece of writing and were also assigning those conventional uses to the writing, then you or others could "accurately" interpret what the writer intended with the writing (assuming the writer wasn't lying, pretending, etc.). If you were using unconventional uses of the words/phrases in the piece of writing and assigning those unconventional uses to the writing, then you or others wouldn't be as "accurate" re the writer's intentions. — numberjohnny5

This is what I was trying to bring to your attention, the existence of conventions. I don't think it's the case that the meaning you derive "wouldn't be as accurate" without the use of conventions in interpreting, I don't thjink you could get any meaning at all without the use of conventions, because the interpretation would be completely random.

In any case, you recognize the importance of such conventions in relation to meaning. What type of existence do you think conventions have? They are not in an individual's brain, because they are shared by many brains. Where are they?

Metaphysician Undercover has pinpointed one of the problems with your position - what you assume about conventions:

On the other hand, if a person is attempting to "understand" what the intention behind a piece of writing was/is, then they might assume the writer/speaker is using language conventions, and then assign language conventions to what the writer/speaker is expressing. In the latter case, though, because meaning is not a non-mental event/thing, there's not any objective (as in, non-mental) thing to try to match.

If your aim is to align with conventional practice, then those practices themselves provide the objective grounds for whether you succeed or not.

I don't think it's the case that the meaning you derive "wouldn't be as accurate" without the use of conventions in interpreting, I don't thjink you could get any meaning at all without the use of conventions, because the interpretation would be completely random. — Metaphysician Undercover

Btw, in my view, what makes something meaningful to a person is that it is a coherent set of beliefs (mental associations) that are assigned/imposed upon things.

I'm considering the cases of "feral children" and how they were able to assign meaning without having any human contact. In these cases, there were no conventions per human communication, and yet, under my definition of "meaning", I believe they were able to assign (non-random) meaning onto things. This is probably because they learned the predictability/consistency of the environment and non-lingual "conventions" of the non-human animals they were interacting with. So I would agree that some kind of "conventionality" is important for coherence re beliefs and meaning.

In any case, you recognize the importance of such conventions in relation to meaning. What type of existence do you think conventions have? They are not in an individual's brain, because they are shared by many brains. Where are they? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd use the entry from Wikipedia as a starting point:

"A convention is a set of agreed, stipulated, or generally accepted standards, norms, social norms, or criteria, often taking the form of a custom."

So conventions are comprised of (a) mental events in the form of agreements, stipulations, standards, etc., (i.e. involving more than one brain) and (b) the manner/method in which those forms of mental events are consistently replicated (i.e. "representational forms", e.g., written language, speech-sounds, non-verbal behaviours, and the organised construction of materials/objects). People learn what these norms are within a community, and then try to imitate these norms. But conventions are a combination of non-mental things (the actual conventional patterns of behaviour and methods of conventional reinforcement) and mental things (conventions are essentially based on intentionality, and how people consistently think about and do/reinforce particular things).

I'm considering the cases of "feral children" and how they were able to assign meaning without having any human contact. — numberjohnny5

There are no case of feral children. The few cases which have sparked the myth are about rejected youth afflicted by developmental and mental problems, which managed to survive on the outskirts of society thanks to scavenging and occasional charity.

But conventions are a combination of non-mental things (the actual conventional patterns of behaviour and methods of conventional reinforcement) and mental things (conventions are essentially based on intentionality, and how people consistently think about and do/reinforce particular things). — numberjohnny5

OK, so to get to the point, I think conventions are essentially non-physical things. As you say, they are based in intentionality. Intentionality is a view toward what is wanted, and what is wanted is a state apprehended which has no physical existence. How do you reconcile this with physicalism?

If your aim is to align with conventional practice, then those practices themselves provide the objective grounds for whether you succeed or not. — ProcastinationTomorrow

My aim wasn't to say that one can't observe behaviours/forms of communicating as objective to try and determine what the intentions of a person are. My aim is to say that one can't observe people's actual intentions (their mental events) to determine what their intentions are. We can only make observations of an individual in the third-person; we cannot have first-person experiences of others' first-person experiences.

There are no case of feral children. The few cases which have sparked the myth are about rejected youth afflicted by developmental and mental problems, which managed to survive on the outskirts of society thanks to scavenging and occasional charity. — Akanthinos

Thanks for clarifying/correcting.

OK, so to get to the point, I think conventions are essentially non-physical things. As you say, they are based in intentionality. Intentionality is a view toward what is wanted, and what is wanted is a state apprehended which has no physical existence. How do you reconcile this with physicalism? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, but I'd also like to know from you how non-physical things exist if they have no properties, and therefore no spatio-temporal location? I can't make sense out of non-physical things having properties and no location.

Intentionality is a mental state in my view, and mental states are brain states. Brain states are physical states. Brain states are comprised of properties and therefore, have location. If that's not enough, obviously ask me for more...

Sure, but I'd also like to know from you how non-physical things exist if they have no properties, and therefore no spatio-temporal location? I can't make sense out of non-physical things having properties and no location. — numberjohnny5

Ask yourself what is a property, and maybe you would realize that a property is itself a non-physical thing.

Intentionality is a mental state in my view, and mental states are brain states. Brain states are physical states. Brain states are comprised of properties and therefore, have location. If that's not enough, obviously ask me for more... — numberjohnny5

Intentionality is a view toward the future, and future things do not have physical existence. So let's consider a simple choice. I am deciding whether or not to shut down my laptop now. How is it that a physical sate, my brain state, can choose to bring about the existence either one of these two possible physical states, my laptop being shut down, or my laptop remaining on? How does a physical state have a choice concerning which physical states will follow from the present physical state?

You seem to be assuming that intentions lie behind the conventions rather than intentions actually being manifested in those conventions. You may be right, you may be wrong, but you would need to address the quasi-behaviourist line of thought that sees intentions as things actually displayed by objective conventional practices, not as things that lie concealed behind those practices and somehow giving rise to them.

You seem to be assuming that intentions lie behind the conventions rather than intentions actually being manifested in those conventions. You may be right, you may be wrong, but you would need to address the quasi-behaviourist line of thought that sees intentions as things actually displayed by objective conventional practices, not as things that lie concealed behind those practices and somehow giving rise to them. — ProcastinationTomorrow

It doesn't make sense to me to suppose that, literally, "intentions lie behind" anything, apart from skulls, since intentions are mental phenomena. Intentions as mental states/events are not the same kind of thing as non-mental states/events, like behaviours, language formalisms, etc. Intentions can't be displayed because mental events are first-person experiences. We can only express intentions via observable methods of communication or action, but those methods are not intentions.

OK, so let me ask you a question: why can't behaviour be mental? Just saying that it cannot be doesn't answer that question. There seems to be a dualistic metaphysics lying behind your position, and if that is the case, then that dualism needs to be brought out clearly and defended, not just stated.

OK, so let me ask you a question: why can't behaviour be mental? Just saying that it cannot be doesn't answer that question. There seems to be a dualistic metaphysics lying behind your position, and if that is the case, then that dualism needs to be brought out clearly and defended, not just stated. — ProcastinationTomorrow

Sure. Behaviour involves the (autonomic and voluntary) motor movements (exhibition/inhibition of muscles via efferent pathways) as processed by nonconscious and conscious phenomena. Mentality refers just specifically to the conscious phenomena. There is a relationship between voluntary motor movements and mentality, of course, but they ain't the same. One major distinction is that motor movements occur in multiple sites in the body e.g. limbs, hands, feet etc., whereas mentality only occurs in the brain.

And I'm strictly a physicalist.

Ask yourself what is a property, and maybe you would realize that a property is itself a non-physical thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Three thoughts came to mind when reading that sentence:

(1) Why you're deflecting the question back to me?
(2) It seems you're implying that I haven't done enough philosophising because if I had, I would share the same conclusions re properties being non-physical as you do.
(3) Why is it that in the handful of times I've asked anyone how to try and explain to me that non-physical existents obtain, they never actually try to accomodate me or give me a straight answer in terms of ontology? (That's rhetorical, but I'd be open to an answer.)

It doesn't make sense to me to suppose that, literally, "intentions lie behind" anything, apart from skulls, since intentions are mental phenomena. Intentions as mental states/events are not the same kind of thing as non-mental states/events, like behaviours, language formalisms, etc. Intentions can't be displayed because mental events are first-person experiences. We can only express intentions via observable methods of communication or action, but those methods are not intentions. — numberjohnny5

It's not clear to me in what capacity you'd like an explanation of a physical brain state making a choice. I'll make a first attempt though. (Btw, when I refer to anything that exists, even when I mention "state", I do not presume they are static things. They are constantly changing/happening.)

The kind of physical state that can make a choice is a mental state that has will and makes choices within particular contexts. For example, the physical state of thinking "I want to shut down my laptop" can (it doesn't have to) result in other conscious processes causing particular motor (efferent) pathways to move (exhibit/inhibit) particular body parts to shut down the laptop.

Sure. Behaviour involves the (autonomic and voluntary) motor movements (exhibition/inhibition of muscles via efferent pathways) as processed by nonconscious and conscious phenomena. Mentality refers just specifically to the conscious phenomena. There is a relationship between voluntary motor movements and mentality, of course, but they ain't the same. One major distinction is that motor movements occur in multiple sites in the body e.g. limbs, hands, feet etc., whereas mentality only occurs in the brain.

And I'm strictly a physicalist.

Perhaps I'm not sure what you mean by physicalist - it's an unclear label for a wide variety of views. Do you mean that mental things simply are physical things, we just don't know it yet? Or do you mean that mental things are caused by physical things, but are distinct kinds of things nevertheless? Or something else? I can only really get to grips with the rest of your response once this is cleared up.

Intangible things exist. My thoughts are in exsistance. Are they a matter of fact? No. They can't be proven but they still exist.

Perhaps I'm not sure what you mean by physicalist - it's an unclear label for a wide variety of views. Do you mean that mental things simply are physical things, we just don't know it yet? Or do you mean that mental things are caused by physical things, but are distinct kinds of things nevertheless? Or something else? I can only really get to grips with the rest of your response once this is cleared up. — ProcastinationTomorrow

I mean that mental things are identical to physical things, namely, "types" of brain states. Physicalism is pretty much the same as materialism for me. Everything that exists is physical or is made of matter.

OK, so do you believe that nominalistic materialism is true? If so, what is it that is true? Could it be merely an occurent state of your brain? Brain states, in and of themselves, are neither true nor false, they simply exist or fail to exist, and truth is not to be identified with the mere existence of a brain state and falsity with its simple non-existence, since some people have false beliefs, which are nevertheless themselves - under nominalistic materialism - just occurent brain states. So in order to account for truth or falsity of beliefs, materialistic nominalism has to make some kind of distinction between types of brain states. And there already we have our non-material things: types. Now, a materialistic nominalist might be tempted to say, "well, types of brain states are really nothing over and above collections of actual brain states" - but the problem (aside from the introduction of these things called "collections") is that any random assemblage of brain states is a collection of brain states, and insofar as truth is concerned the wheat needs to be sorted from the chaff. The simple idea that the true brain states are ones that correspond to reality, where reality is considered as just so many instances of other occurent material states just introduces another non-material thing: therelation of correspondence. But it might be worse than that for the nominalist, since one can have true beliefs about the past, and in those cases the other end of the correspondence relation non longer exists as an occurent material state, so a materialistic nominalist will either have to deny that there are any such things as true historical beliefs, or he or she will have to introduce material but non-existing states in order for the correspondence relation to hold.
So, the big question is how does a nominalistic materialis account for the distinction between truth and falsity without introducing non-material, non-particular things?

Brain states, in and of themselves, are neither true nor false, they simply exist or fail to exist, and truth is not to be identified with the mere existence of a brain state and falsity with its simple non-existence, since some people have false beliefs, which are nevertheless themselves - under nominalistic materialism - just occurent brain states. — ProcastinationTomorrow

You nailed it.

Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Ed Feser

Thanks Wayfarer - I've never heard of Ed Feser, but I note he is being cautious when he says brain processes

seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. — Ed Feser

He's been doing philosophy for too long to be more strident I guess. Clearly he's plugging in to a line of thought we're both sympathetic with, but I think even he'd agree that he's not presenting anything else than a challenge for materialism to come up with some account of meaning. @numberjohnny5 has been trying to meet that challenge, at least I suppose that's what he or she has been trying to do, not only from a materialist perspective, but also a nominalist one. I hope what I've done is pinpoint a problem any such attempt will have with the bare notion of truth and falsity of thoughts. Non-particular, non-material things need to be introduced, but whether those things that need to be introduced have to be thoughts (either conceived directly as information or as information bearers) I don't know. Some extremely clever people (cleverer than I am anyway) have been materialistic nominalists up to a point (I'm thinking here of Quine) and they believed they could get by with just one type of non-material, non-particular thing in their ontology: sets (or classes).

Feser is a neo-Thomist [read: Catholic]. I’m myself am not, but In the spirit of ‘the enemy of the enemy being a friend’, I have found his critiques and polemics against philosophical materialism to be right on the mark; the first book of his I noticed was ‘The Last Superstition’ which was a criticism of Dawkins etc.

Actually earlier in this thread - it’s been a very long thread - we got into long debates about the reality of universals and Platonic reals. Through this, and reading Feser, I’ve discovered what is now called ‘hylomorphic dualism’ - from ‘hyle’ [matter] ‘morphe’[form]. The basic idea of the ‘form’ of a thing is descended from the Platonic ‘eidos’, modified by Aristotelian realism. The ‘form’ is what ‘nous’ [the active intellect] comprehends due to its ability to recognise intelligible ideas. [See this post which contains a succinct summary].

But actually, there’s a straight line from your argument, to the premise of the OP - have another look at the first post, and see if you agree that there’s a connection.

Yes, nominalistic materialism is true, in my view. "Truth" is a property of propositions/claims, and propositions are assertions (made by individuals/minds) about what is the case. Nominalistic materialism (NM) is an ontological claim (being an empirical claim) that asserts that for any thing to exist, that thing is physical/material; and that no two numerically distinct existents/things/occurrences are identical. So yes, propositions feature truth-values (in which minds judge propositions to be true in relation to what they're referring to, in the case of correspondence theory, for example), which occur in brains (specifically, via mental states), which are material things undergoing processes (no thing is static, in my view); and no two numerical brain/mental states are identical. For example, my brain state at T1 is A, and my brain state at T2 is B, and so on.

Propositions are also first-person experiences that refer to things. That is, propositions or truth-claims are always from someone's perspective. It's also important to make a distinction between brain states and mental states, the latter being a "type" (in an anti-realist sense) of the former. That is, mind states are identical to brain states in being a particular "type" of brain state. So it's not that brain states/mind states are in and of themselves true or false, it's rather that brain states/mind states make true or false assertions about stuff.

In lieu of nominalism, then, "types" are ways we organise and classify experience. It's a mental process of abstration. But abstractions are physical processes in the mind/brain. That is, abstractions are thoughts, and thoughts are mental states.

There are (at least) two different "types" of "relations": (i) objective relations as the way materials/properties ontologically interact with other materials/properties (on both the macro or mico scales); and (ii) subjective relations, as the way individuals/minds organise experience and make claims/comments about how objective (and/or subjective) things relate with/to each other. So (ii) is a "type" of mental event/state.

So, the big question is how does a nominalistic materialis account for the distinction between truth and falsity without introducing non-material, non-particular things? — ProcastinationTomorrow

There is no non-material, non-particular thing in my ontology, which I'm hoping you'll recognise in my response.

Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Ed Feser

Two major problems with this argument are:

Firstly, brain processes aren't anything like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, or an electrical current. Different objects are made of different properties in different relations. So to lump all that stuff together and assume it's all the same is a straw-man re physicalist/materialist views.

Secondly, it's false that thought processes aren't brain processes. Thoughts are identical with brain processes, namely, a "type" of mental process. It's important to realise that mental processes are the meaning-makers, not non-conscious processes.

It's also important to remember that meaning-making (i.e. mental associations) is a first-person experience. A lot of externalists don't recognise this fact, and couch their arguments as if meaning is only perceived in the third-person. What I'd love to know is, if meaning was objective, what the hell is meaning ontologically? Is it "ink marks"? What properties of the ink marks makes it have inherent meaning?

I don't know about ProcrastinationTommorow, but for me your reply misses the point.

"Truth" is a property of propositions/claims — numberjohnny5

And then you ramble on about propositions being ultimately brain states or whatever. Fine, ProcrastinationTommorow seems to be ceding the point that it might make sense to equate propositions with brain states, but what he is challenging you with is to come up with an account of truth that doesn't surreptitiously or explicitly imply the existence of non-particular, not-material things. Even your definition of objective relations just introduces another term that looks like a non-particular : i.e. ways of interaction.

what he is challenging you with is to come up with an account of truth that doesn't surreptitiously or explicitly imply the existence of non-particular, not-material things. Even your definition of objective relations just introduces another term that looks like a non-particular : i.e. ways of interaction. — jkg20

You'd have to explain how "particular things interacting in particular ways" looks like a non-particular event. It seems coherent to me, obviously. But I don't know what's preventing you or influencing you to interpret "ways of interaction" as a non-particular.

Because to account for the fact that there is (presumably) more than one thing that is true, you'd have to have different particular things interacting inone and the same (truth-creating) way.

Firstly, brain processes aren't anything like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, or an electrical current. Different objects are made of different properties in different relations. So to lump all that stuff together and assume it's all the same is a straw-man re physicalist/materialist views. — numberjohnny5

But insofar as they're physical processes then they're not different in principle. When you examine brain-scans, you're interpreting graphical images, which are physical in nature - you're examining the trace left by blood-flows in millions of neurons, which is surely a physical process. But it's the nature of interpretation which is at issue - interpreting what the data means is what is at issue in all of this. And you indeed then go on to concede this very point, by saying that 'mental processes are meaning makers' and 'meaning-making is first person'. So your second two paragraphs take back what the first is trying to assert.

What I'd love to know is, if meaning was objective, what the hell is meaning ontologically? Is it "ink marks"? What properties of the ink marks makes it have inherent meaning? — numberjohnny5

That's what this thread is about! What you're giving voice to, is the very widespread view that meaning is wholly in the mind or subjective, or alternatively that it can be understood in physical terms. What this whole thread is arguing, is that it is neither. But in today's worldview, there's no way to accommodate this.

That is why the role of number, logic, and language are significant in this context. Numbers are objectively constant for anyone capable of counting, but at the same time, they're not material objects - they're purely intellectual in nature. The same can be said for logical operators such as 'equals' 'greater than' and so on.

(1) Why you're deflecting the question back to me? — numberjohnny5

I expected that you'd recognize that the question was a rhetorical question. You asked me how do non-physical things exist if they have no properties and my answer (by way of rhetorical question) is that properties are non-physical things. So it doesn't really make sense to ask about the properties of properties.

(2) It seems you're implying that I haven't done enough philosophising because if I had, I would share the same conclusions re properties being non-physical as you do. — numberjohnny5

So, Ill now ask you the question. Do you or do you not apprehend properties as non-physical things? Take the property "large" for example. Many physical things are large, so it is impossible that large is any particular physical thing.

(3) Why is it that in the handful of times I've asked anyone how to try and explain to me that non-physical existents obtain, they never actually try to accomodate me or give me a straight answer in terms of ontology? (That's rhetorical, but I'd be open to an answer.) — numberjohnny5

It appears to me, like you do not adequately understand what "ontology" is. Ontology consists of the assumptions which we make about existence, and we always have our own reasons for the assumptions which we make. So my ontological assumption is that non-physical things have existence no less than physical things.

As to "how" they exist, non-physical things exist as non-physical things, just like physical things exist as physical things. Physical things, are apprehended through the senses, they are called sensible objects, like particular entities, rocks and trees, etc.. Non-physical things are apprehended by the mind, they are called intelligible objects like universal ideas, concepts like "large", "red", etc..

It's not clear to me in what capacity you'd like an explanation of a physical brain state making a choice. I'll make a first attempt though. (Btw, when I refer to anything that exists, even when I mention "state", I do not presume they are static things. They are constantly changing/happening.) — numberjohnny5

How can you say this without contradiction? If a so-called "brain state" is constantly changing, then it is not a state, it is as you say, a "happening", which is a changing. So let's not call it a "brain state" any more, because that's misleading, let's call it brain activity. However, there are ideas which remain unchanged within a person's mind, things like numbers and words. How do you think that the numeral "2" stays the same, as the numeral "2", within my mind, if all there is in my mind is brain activity? How does the numeral "2" stay in my mind as a static object, if my "mind" is only accounted for by brain activity?

The kind of physical state that can make a choice is a mental state that has will and makes choices within particular contexts. For example, the physical state of thinking "I want to shut down my laptop" can (it doesn't have to) result in other conscious processes causing particular motor (efferent) pathways to move (exhibit/inhibit) particular body parts to shut down the laptop. — numberjohnny5

So let's readdress this question. There is brain activity which corresponds to me thinking should I or should I not shut down my computer. Then I make a choice and proceed with the appropriate activity. What, other than the non-physical mind, causes the actual choice? It cannot be the brain activity which is the cause of the decision, because the brain activity is considering the options, weighing the possibilities, and the choice causes the end of this brain activity, to be replaced with a different activity, the movement of the body parts. The brain activity cannot cause the activity of the bodily parts directly, because a choice is required. Nor is it something external, which is the cause, because the choice comes from within me.

"Truth" is a property of propositions/claims, and propositions are assertions (made by individuals/minds) about what is the case. — numberjohnny5

As a physicalist, I assume that a proposition, for you, exists as a bunch of physical. words. In order for those words to be true or false, don't you think that they need to be interpreted?

But actually, there’s a straight line from your argument, to the premise of the OP - have another look at the first post, and see if you agree that there’s a connection. — Wayfarer

As I understand it, the basis of your original argument is that one and same piece of information can be born by numerically distinct material states/processes/events. So, whatever it is that we are counting when we are counting items of information cannot be those material states/processes/events. My argument is, in the nutshell provided by @jkg20, even if particular material things are bearers of truth, since numerically distinct material things can share one and the same feature of being true, whatever we are counting when we count the feature of truth cannot be those material things.
Your argument is a finer grained than mine - but the structure is essentially the same, I agree, and since information and truth are clearly related concepts, there probably is a closer link to be made between them. However, do either of our arguments prove (or can they be used to prove) that information is not material? They might prove that information is not to be identified with any specific material thing, but that's not quite the same thing as proving that information is not material itself. After all, I cannot identify mass with any specific material thing, since it is a feature shared by many (well, let's face it, all) material things, but mass is a material property. So, even if information cannot be identified with any specific material bearer, perhaps there could remain a sense in which it is material insofar as it is something that must be born by material things. I think in order to prove that information is definitively not material you would have to argue that information could exist in the absence of any material bearer, and that strikes me as a pretty tough thing to prove directly.

Because to account for the fact that there is (presumably) more than one thing that is true, you'd have to have different particular things interacting inone and the same (truth-creating) way. — jkg20

It's not entirely clear to me what you mean. Anyway, I'll try to guess and make a stab at it!

Firstly, in my ontology, all existents are constantly changing. There are no "static-instants", for example. That means that both (objective) facts/events/states of affairs and mental events (which are subjective facts/events/states of affairs) are constantly changing/in motion. Any existent at time T1 is non-identical with itself at any other time in the past or future.

So for example, when an individual (X) makes a truth claim (P) about some event (E) at time T1, X, P, and E are constantly changing/in motion. When the "same" X makes a P about E at time T2, the X, P, and E are not identical with what they were at T1. And so on, over time.

So "objective relations," as the ways in which particular things/properties interact with other things/properties, are constantly changing, through time T1, T2, T3, and so on. So an individual can make truth-claims (in the form of subjective events i.e. truth-claim P1, P2, P3, and so on) about such objective relations at time T1, T2, and T3, etc. That seems consistent and coherent to me, obviously. The truth-claims refer to actual states of affairs. In other words, the subjective events refer to the objective events.

Does that help answer your question?