When h. sapiens evolve to the point of being able to — Wayfarer
It seems to me that whilst the representation is physical, the idea that is being transmitted is not physical, because it is totally separable from the physical form that the transmission takes. One could, after all, encode the same information in any number of languages, engrave it in stone, write it with pencil, etc. In each instance, the physical representation might be totally different, both in terms of linguistics and medium; but the information is the same.
How, then, could the information be physical? — Wayfarer
other than to say that 'the act of observation' is noetic rather than physical. — Wayfarer
However, that is an interesting point about the contrast between the Aristotelean and Platonic attitude; as it happens, I have just borrowed Gerson's Aristotle and Other Platonists, which I hope will have some discussion of these points. — Wayfarer
So information cannot be a purely abstract entity - it has a physical footprint that makes an observable difference. — Andrew M
Trying my best to figure out something to debate about, what would your take be on the hypothesis that meaning, of itself, is non-phenomenal information?* So, for instance, in the examples of the OP where the same meaning applies to different phenomenal information, the meaning itself is non-phenomenal information (and hypothetically the same) whereas the various means of obtaining it will all be phenomenal information and thereby uniquely different. — javra
A different example in my attempts to keep this simple: “four”, “4”, and “IV” serve as three different bodies of visually phenomenal information yet they all convey the same non-phenomenal information (the same meaning being identical to itself in all three, phenomenally different cases). — javra
So the meaning of “4” has a form different from the meaning of “5”, for instance, but its form as meaning is noumenal: and thereby ontically distinct from the phenomenal information it is conveyed by to those who can so interpret the meaning of the given phenomena. (Alternatively, from the phenomenal information of the imagination one uses to convey the meaning to oneself.) — javra
Meaning is located in a persn's mind, nowhere else. — Galuchat
An author encodes the semantic information in their mind into a physical form (e.g., a book) suitable for transmission to others. When that transmission (physical information) is received (read) and decoded (interpreted) it becomes semantic (meaningful) information in another person's mind. — Galuchat
I agree that your concept of "meaning" presents this difficulty. However, information is not a property, it is an object which can be physical and/or psychophysical. — Galuchat
In addition to providing a definition of "information", it would be helpful if you could provide a definition of "data", otherwise I have no idea what you mean when using these terms (though I suspect it is substantially different from what I mean). — Galuchat
Every step here will consume free energy. — Srap Tasmaner
are we forced to say there's a thing, an immaterial, eternal thing, that they both say? — Srap Tasmaner
Here again, we have the issue of "the 'same' meaning" assigned to different phenomenal information. As I explained, I take this to be contradictory. If the two distinct phenomenal occurrences really had the same meaning to you, you would not be able to tell them apart, because it is by virtue of differences in what each of them means to you, that you distinguish one from the other. — Metaphysician Undercover
The only thing that 'consumes free energy' is the manufacturing of whatever physical copy you make. — Wayfarer
Samuel's point was simply that the actual information - it might be a story, for example, or a formula - can be transmitted, but you still retain it. — Wayfarer
What's the difference between a hard drive full of information, and a hard drive with nothing on it? They both weigh the same, they're physically identical - the only difference is that the 'full' drive 'contains' information, — Wayfarer
A hard drive with the collected works of Peirce on it-- let's say it's a big hard drive-- is physically identical to a hard drive fresh from the factory? — Srap Tasmaner
Or are you suggesting that, peanut butter aside, I can just have the actual information instead, the real thing, and not bother with having a copy? — Srap Tasmaner
P2: Information does not abide to this law. E.g. if I give you information, I don't have less of it. — Samuel Lacrampe
Our understanding of nature is indistinguishable from nature.
You might call it "information", that which is transmitted, but this creates an unnecessary divide between information and meaning, when "information" is generally used to refer to a type of meaning, objective, or correct meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
I do not think that any object can be both physical and psychophysical (though I don't know exactly what you mean by this), because this would be a category error. — Metaphysician Undercover
Good argument. Here is another argument to prove that information is indeed non-physical.
P1: All that is physical abides to the law of conservation of mass and energy. E.g. if I give you a physical thing, I have less of it.
P2: Information does not abide to this law. E.g. if I give you information, I don't have less of it.
C: Therefore information is not physical. — Samuel Lacrampe
It seems that by the same arguments you’ve articulated, no two languages could share any meaning whatsoever, since the two languages are utterly different in their phenomenal information—and, as your given argument goes, for them to share the same meaning is for whatever so shares the same meaning to be indistinguishable phenomenally. But this would result in the conclusion that all translations are fully untrue in their correspondence to any meaning conveyed in the original language. — javra
I’ll argue that meaning itself has multiple layers such that, for example, the core meaning to “yes”, “da”, and “si” is identical to itself while there is additional meaning which, for instance, endows recognition of the specific language utilized to express the core referent of meaning. This, then, is noncontradictory to the reality of language translations (granting exceptions where meanings may overlap but will not be the same in different languages). — javra
Herein lies the essential difference in our positions on "meaning". I do not conceive of information as semantic only, but also physical. Thanks very much for your comments, but we will have to agree to disagree on this matter. — Galuchat
The operation of the human mind consists of psychophysical (simultaneously mental and physical) processes. Whether I choose to focus on the mental or physical aspect (or both) depends entirely on the conceptual task at hand.
In fact, mental conditions and functions, and their anatomical and physiological correlates, are one of the best (or most complex) examples of the interaction of physical and semantic information. — Galuchat
We can identify, as Plato does, sensible objects and intelligible objects. We can also note that there is interaction between the two, and you might call this psychophysical processes. But this doesn't justify "psychophysical objects". — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not arguing for naive realism. I'm not saying that we see the world as it really is, or that we could ever see the world as it really is. Seeing is a process of representing the world via the information in visible light. To ask how the world looks independent of looking at it, as if you were trying to compare how it looks to you to how it really looks, is an irrelevant question. The way the world looks is how the local part of it interacts with a visual sensory system.I am saying the "reality" is the wholeness of the modelling relation. So it is the co-ordination between the two - the modeller and the world. And then the point that the mechanism of the co-ordination is not some naive realist "veridical representation", but in fact a useful "irreality" in terms of experiential sign. — apokrisis
How can you go about testing your theory when the outcome of any test will have your purpose imposed on it? All you are saying is your theory is the result of YOUR purposes and your interests, which means that it is only useful to you, not anyone else. I don't see how you don't get that. I think you do, which is why you avoided answering this question from my previous post.That is silly. An epistemology that includes the fact that our view of reality is a purpose-soaked model, a semiotic umwelt, is truer than naive idealism or naive realism.
Explaining why and how the goal of "reaching truth" is naive realism is rather the point here. — apokrisis
This can be explained by conservation of energy. Natural selection must make compromises in "designing" sensory systems as the amount of energy available isn't infinite, and it would probably take an infinite amount of energy to be informed of the world in it's completeness. So, we would be limited by the amount of energy, not some self deciding which parts of a sensory system are more useful than another part.That is contradicted by the facts of psychology and neuroscience.
Just one example that always struck me. Compared to chimps, humans have a proportionately larger foveal representation in their primary visual cortex, a proportionately smaller peripheral vision one.
So we have evolved less need to process the edges of our visual field as we are more certain about where we need to focus our attention. A larger brain makes us better at predicting the part of the world which is going to be interesting to us.
Think also of colour vision. Why do birds and bees have more cone pigments than we do? We make do with just three. They get four or five. And it would seem trivial for evolution to generate any number. Why is less also more in hue discrimination? — apokrisis
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