When h. sapiens evolve to the point of being able to — Wayfarer

That would be the other reason to approach the issue the way I am.

He's good with lists, that Peirce guy.

Thanks for the explanation. I am in general agreement.

It seems to me that whilst the representation is physical, the idea that is being transmitted is not physical, because it is totally separable from the physical form that the transmission takes. One could, after all, encode the same information in any number of languages, engrave it in stone, write it with pencil, etc. In each instance, the physical representation might be totally different, both in terms of linguistics and medium; but the information is the same.

How, then, could the information be physical? — Wayfarer

By having a physical presence and not merely a physical representation.

This is the difference between Aristotelian realism (where the abstract is present in the concrete particulars) and Platonic realism (where the physical world is a representation of the forms).

For a physics example, consider the double-slit experiment. If there is information about which slit each photon went through then no interference pattern forms. So information cannot be a purely abstract entity - it has a physical footprint that makes an observable difference.

I don't want to go down the QM rabbit-hole, there's another discussion about that, other than to say that 'the act of observation' is noetic rather than physical. That's why it's such a paradox - it's not as if you're physically altering the trajectory of particles, but merely by observing them, you're determining the outcome. I would have thought that a powerful argument against physicalism, and indeed one of the reasons that people are constantly trying to defuse the Copenhagen interpretation. (But, as I say, perhaps that is something that could be taken up in this thread).

However, that is an interesting point about the contrast between the Aristotelean and Platonic attitude; as it happens, I have just borrowed Gerson's Aristotle and Other Platonists, which I hope will have some discussion of these points.

Our understanding nature is not the same as nature, — Cavacava

Our understanding of nature is indistinguishable from nature.

A theory of the development of semantics is more than just a list, surely?

other than to say that 'the act of observation' is noetic rather than physical. — Wayfarer

Per Aristotelian realism, it's not either-or. Observation involves a physical process.

However, that is an interesting point about the contrast between the Aristotelean and Platonic attitude; as it happens, I have just borrowed Gerson's Aristotle and Other Platonists, which I hope will have some discussion of these points. — Wayfarer

Should be interesting. The relevant issue here is Aristotle's solution to the problem of universals.

So information cannot be a purely abstract entity - it has a physical footprint that makes an observable difference. — Andrew M

Everything is real but information is a construct of the mind to convey and share with another mind. There is nothing informative about quantum with the interest of an interested mind.

Trying my best to figure out something to debate about, what would your take be on the hypothesis that meaning, of itself, is non-phenomenal information?* So, for instance, in the examples of the OP where the same meaning applies to different phenomenal information, the meaning itself is non-phenomenal information (and hypothetically the same) whereas the various means of obtaining it will all be phenomenal information and thereby uniquely different. — javra

Here again, we have the issue of "the 'same' meaning" assigned to different phenomenal information. As I explained, I take this to be contradictory. If the two distinct phenomenal occurrences really had the same meaning to you, you would not be able to tell them apart, because it is by virtue of differences in what each of them means to you, that you distinguish one from the other.

A different example in my attempts to keep this simple: “four”, “4”, and “IV” serve as three different bodies of visually phenomenal information yet they all convey the same non-phenomenal information (the same meaning being identical to itself in all three, phenomenally different cases). — javra

I do not believe that these three really have the same meaning to anyone. What I believe is that we have been trained to focus on the essential points of meaning, while disregarding the accidentals. So it is through this training that we come to assert that all these different symbols have "the same meaning". But really they have no more the same meaning than two human beings are the same by virtue of being human beings.

So the meaning of “4” has a form different from the meaning of “5”, for instance, but its form as meaning is noumenal: and thereby ontically distinct from the phenomenal information it is conveyed by to those who can so interpret the meaning of the given phenomena. (Alternatively, from the phenomenal information of the imagination one uses to convey the meaning to oneself.) — javra

The point is, if I describe to you what 4 means to me, and also what IV means to me, these descriptions will not be the same. I will surely refer to the second as a Roman Numeral, and I will not use this to refer to the first. Likewise, "4" means something different to me depending on the context. It could be a person's age (Joe is 4), the time (meet me at 4), etc.. And I think that if you asked a number of different people what four means, they would likely not use the same words to describe this. That is why I think that this premise, that the same meaning is conveyed by different phenomena is not an acceptable premise.

Meaning is located in a persn's mind, nowhere else. — Galuchat

There are many problems with this perspective. First, as I described, it dissolves the distinction between creating meaning, and interpreting meaning. If all instances of meaning are within one's mind, then each instance is a case of creating meaning. So we can proceed to ask, what is it which exists in the physical world which we interpret. And in the case of language, we can answer this by saying that it is something created with the intent of making you create a certain meaning in your mind. Now we have two acts of creation to account for, creating the physical symbols, and creating the meaning in the mind.

From my perspective, the author creates meaning, within the physical world, by rearranging existing things, creating a particular order, which is meaning. The interpreter interprets the meaning, and what exists in the mind is an interpretation, not the meaning itself. There is only one act of creation, and this is when the symbols are given physical existence. The act of interpreting cannot be an act of creating, or else the interpreter is free to create whatever meaning one wants when interpreting.

It's a very extensive argument to go through the different points for and against these two positions, but I can point to some difficulties with yours. You will have difficulty with "correct meaning", or "objective meaning", as the meaning of a statement is dependent on subjective interpretation. You will also have difficulty giving context its appropriate role in meaning.

An author encodes the semantic information in their mind into a physical form (e.g., a book) suitable for transmission to others. When that transmission (physical information) is received (read) and decoded (interpreted) it becomes semantic (meaningful) information in another person's mind. — Galuchat

From your stated premise, you cannot call this a transmission of meaning, because the meaning is only created within the mind. You might call it "information", that which is transmitted, but this creates an unnecessary divide between information and meaning, when "information" is generally used to refer to a type of meaning, objective, or correct meaning. So you would have to say that the person creates meaning, then converts the meaning into information, which is transmitted to the other, and the other converts the information back into meaning.

But what really happens, is that the person has the words, which are the symbols, right inside one's mind. So there is no transformation between what is in one's mind, and the physical words. The same symbols (words) exist within one's mind as do outside of one's mind. We must not be distracted by that unnecessary division.

If we separate what the words mean, from the words themselves, then we could say that the meaning is in the mind only. But since the words, as well as the meaning exist within the mind, this separation is not easy. We could ask what is meant by a particular statement, and the answer would be more words, so this doesn't help with the separation. Meaning and words are still united. I think that we can only bring into effect such a separation if we point to things outside the mind. Then we have a separation, the words are in the mind, and the meaning, which is the things referred to by the words, is outside the mind. So to uphold that separation we have to say that meaning is outside the mind.

I agree that your concept of "meaning" presents this difficulty. However, information is not a property, it is an object which can be physical and/or psychophysical. — Galuchat

I do not think that any object can be both physical and psychophysical (though I don't know exactly what you mean by this), because this would be a category error. I understand psychophysical to refer to the relationship between physical and psychological. It appear to me, like you have just made up another category, such that if you cannot determine whether X is a property of the physical, or a property of the psychological, you make another category, saying that X is not a property of either of these, but it's an object in the newly created category of psychophysical.

In addition to providing a definition of "information", it would be helpful if you could provide a definition of "data", otherwise I have no idea what you mean when using these terms (though I suspect it is substantially different from what I mean). — Galuchat

I don't like the word "data", and I rarely use it. You were using it, so I tried to reply in a way consistent with your usage. It appears like I don't understand your usage, so l'll refrain from using it and only ask for clarification from you, when necessary.

Good argument. Here is another argument to prove that information is indeed non-physical.

P1: All that is physical abides to the law of conservation of mass and energy. E.g. if I give you a physical thing, I have less of it.
P2: Information does not abide to this law. E.g. if I give you information, I don't have less of it.
C: Therefore information is not physical.

(Y)

Seriously guys?

The usual model among humans would be that I'm making a copy of a piece of information I have, and then giving you the copy. My copy is instantiated in memory; yours in sound waves or ink or pixels, whatever. On your end, you can copy the copy into your memory, or not.

Every step here will consume free energy.

(Y)

One two three four
I declare a thumb war

Every step here will consume free energy. — Srap Tasmaner

The only thing that 'consumes free energy' is the manufacturing of whatever physical copy you make. Samuel's point was simply that the actual information - it might be a story, for example, or a formula - can be transmitted, but you still retain it. And you do more that 'copy the copy' - you understand it, you learn it. It might, for instance, impart a new skill, a piece of knowledge - how to make something. That's because it's an idea.

What's the difference between a hard drive full of information, and a hard drive with nothing on it? They both weigh the same, they're physically identical - the only difference is that the 'full' drive 'contains' information, which comprises the sequence of zeros and ones on that drive. It's not as if by 'filling' it with information, anything material is added - the existing matter is simply organised a particular way. Is the organisation physical? Well, sure, but as per the OP, the information that it contains can be represented in binary code, or it could all be represented in books. The information is represented physically, but it belongs to a different kind of level than the physical representation.

are we forced to say there's a thing, an immaterial, eternal thing, that they both say? — Srap Tasmaner

I wanted to come back to this comment The problem is one of reification. Consider for example, a number - is that 'a thing'? I say not. Now, what number is, is actually a notoriously complex problem - the Wikipedia article on Philosophy of Math is a very large article, with many references. So I'm not proposing a solution to the question of 'what number is'. But I will say that, whatever a number is, it can only be grasped by a mind capable of counting. That is the sense in which it is an 'intelligible object' - but the word 'object' is misleading, or perhaps metaphorical, as there really is no such 'object' (other than the symbol, but the symbol only denotes the value).

I think part of the resistance to the Platonist view of number (i.e. Platonic realism) is because it understands the Platonist view to be that numbers are real, in the same sense that phenomenal objects are real. Hence the common objection that they must exist in 'some ghostly realm' - something for which there is no evidence.

But I think the Platonist view is that there are different levels or kinds of reality - that number (for example) is real in a different way to sensory objects. That, at any rate, is the implication of Platonic epistemology, i.e. that there are different forms of knowledge (pistis, dianoia, noesis) that pertain to different levels of reality ( see the analogy of the divided line.)

The reason why modern philosophy, in particular, won't accommodate that, is because there is no conception of ontological levels in modern philosophy. A modern philosopher will generally say something either exists or it doesn't; so the number 7 exists, but the square root of 2 does not. If numbers are real at all, they are real 'in our heads', i.e. they are grounded in neurology, instantiated by the brain, they're a function of the way the brain works. That effectively means they can be understood to exist in the same way as any other kind of thing.

I think in pre-modern philosophy, there was an understanding of an hierarchy of being, such that number was at a higher level than sensory objects, on account of their timelessness. Being timeless, they're 'higher', or nearer the origin of things. That at any rate was one of the themes of Platonism and NeoPlatonism, but it was that understanding which was lost (or 'flattened') by nominalism and, later, by empiricism in late medieval/early modern times (see What's Wrong with Ockham?)

Here again, we have the issue of "the 'same' meaning" assigned to different phenomenal information. As I explained, I take this to be contradictory. If the two distinct phenomenal occurrences really had the same meaning to you, you would not be able to tell them apart, because it is by virtue of differences in what each of them means to you, that you distinguish one from the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Looks like we might be addressing different things in reference to meaning.

It seems that by the same arguments you’ve articulated, no two languages could share any meaning whatsoever, since the two languages are utterly different in their phenomenal information—and, as your given argument goes, for them to share the same meaning is for whatever so shares the same meaning to be indistinguishable phenomenally. But this would result in the conclusion that all translations are fully untrue in their correspondence to any meaning conveyed in the original language.

I’ll argue that meaning itself has multiple layers such that, for example, the core meaning to “yes”, “da”, and “si” is identical to itself while there is additional meaning which, for instance, endows recognition of the specific language utilized to express the core referent of meaning. This, then, is noncontradictory to the reality of language translations (granting exceptions where meanings may overlap but will not be the same in different languages).

The only thing that 'consumes free energy' is the manufacturing of whatever physical copy you make. — Wayfarer

In my case, since you asked, the main inputs to keep me running are caffeine, nicotine, and peanut butter. I think maintenance of my memories is paid for by the peanut butter.

Samuel's point was simply that the actual information - it might be a story, for example, or a formula - can be transmitted, but you still retain it. — Wayfarer

Yes, you keep your copy, if you're getting enough peanut butter. I think I mentioned that you keep your copy. Or are you suggesting that, peanut butter aside, I can just have the actual information instead, the real thing, and not bother with having a copy?

What's the difference between a hard drive full of information, and a hard drive with nothing on it? They both weigh the same, they're physically identical - the only difference is that the 'full' drive 'contains' information, — Wayfarer

Seriously? "Physically identical"?

A hard drive with the collected works of Peirce on it-- let's say it's a big hard drive-- is physically identical to a hard drive fresh from the factory?

Supposing there were a physical difference, do you think electricity might be required to produce that difference?

A hard drive with the collected works of Peirce on it-- let's say it's a big hard drive-- is physically identical to a hard drive fresh from the factory? — Srap Tasmaner

All the same stuff, but arranged differently. And indeed, electricity is required to encode the information on the hard drive, as it's an electro-mechanical device.

Or are you suggesting that, peanut butter aside, I can just have the actual information instead, the real thing, and not bother with having a copy? — Srap Tasmaner

I read once the Arabs used to play chess, whilst riding camels, with no board.

Information appears to be massless, is perhaps what you wanted to say, and that is interesting.

Blindfold chess is a thing. It takes a ton of energy.

P2: Information does not abide to this law. E.g. if I give you information, I don't have less of it. — Samuel Lacrampe

How exactly can you give me information? Say you have some bitstring that you want to give me. You need to input energy into the system to send that bitstring out over a communication network. You don't have less information than you started with, but you did have to expend energy to reproduce that information and transmit it across a distance. The information itself has to be stored somewhere, on a hard drive for example that takes a constant input of energy to keep spinning.

Leave electronics out of it. Take a classical technology like a book. A book sits in a library, in physical form. Someone had to mash up some dead trees and mark up the paper with ink and run it off a printing press and truck it over to the library. These are all physical actions that require an input of energy.

Now I show up at the library or bookstore and I read the book. The information has been transmitted to me. Well that's amazing, except that in order for that to happen, some light had to hit the paper and bounce onto my retina and get transmitted to my brain. All physical processes whose energy content could be calculated by a biophysicist.

And eventually that book will disintegrate into dust from exposure to the air and the light. If instead you seal it up so that no air and no light can ever get to it, you can preserve it forever. But then you can never transmit that information.

So I challenge your assertion that you can duplicate information for free, and that you can send someone information without having less of it yourself. It's a subtle point, you might be able to save or at least sharpen your argument. It may be true that abstract information -- the story told by the book -- is nonphysical. But any representation of the information is physical; and it's the representations that are transmitted, not the abstract information. Abstract information has no physical existence; and therefore you are going to be hardpressed to say that it has any existence at all. When I dream, my neurons and brain processes are working like crazy, and using energy derived from what I ate for lunch. It's all physical.

Now I am not making an argument against Platonism. But I'm asking if you are making an argument FOR Platonism. And if "information" lives out there in the Platonic non-physical realm, what else lives there? The baby Jesus? The flying spaghetti monster? The number 5? Your argument depends on information living somewhere that's not physical. That's a lot of ontological baggage to carry.

You can only transmit physical representations of information. Your argument fails on that point I think. And even the abstraction of information only lives in the mind, and mind (as far as we know) is a function of brain, and brain is a physical process that stops if you don't keep putting in energy from outside the system.

Our understanding of nature is indistinguishable from nature.

When you have a deliriously cool creamy ice cream cone, where do you think that deliciousness, cool, creamy taste is... in the thing? Do you think something exists in the same way as it is given to you, Aren't these qualities dependent on you, and what the ice cream cone is in it self quite different.

You might call it "information", that which is transmitted, but this creates an unnecessary divide between information and meaning, when "information" is generally used to refer to a type of meaning, objective, or correct meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Herein lies the essential difference in our positions on "meaning". I do not conceive of information as semantic only, but also physical. Thanks very much for your comments, but we will have to agree to disagree on this matter.

I do not think that any object can be both physical and psychophysical (though I don't know exactly what you mean by this), because this would be a category error. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a fair point (as stated).

The operation of the human mind consists of psychophysical (simultaneously mental and physical) processes. Whether I choose to focus on the mental or physical aspect (or both) depends entirely on the conceptual task at hand.

In fact, mental conditions and functions, and their anatomical and physiological correlates, are one of the best (or most complex) examples of the interaction of physical and semantic information.

Aren't these qualities dependent on you, and what the ice cream cone is in it self quite different. — Cavacava

What the ice cream cone is in itself is an incoherent concept.

Good argument. Here is another argument to prove that information is indeed non-physical.

P1: All that is physical abides to the law of conservation of mass and energy. E.g. if I give you a physical thing, I have less of it.
P2: Information does not abide to this law. E.g. if I give you information, I don't have less of it.
C: Therefore information is not physical. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is like the argument for independent Ideas in Plato's Parmenides. The Idea is said to be like the day. It doesn't matter how many different places partake in the day, the day loses nothing of itself. And no matter how many things partake in the Idea, it loses nothing of itself.

It seems that by the same arguments you’ve articulated, no two languages could share any meaning whatsoever, since the two languages are utterly different in their phenomenal information—and, as your given argument goes, for them to share the same meaning is for whatever so shares the same meaning to be indistinguishable phenomenally. But this would result in the conclusion that all translations are fully untrue in their correspondence to any meaning conveyed in the original language. — javra

That's right, my argument is that all interpretations are subjective. Because of this, no two interpretations are the same. So even two people interpreting the same statement in the same language get something different from it, they see different meaning in it.

I’ll argue that meaning itself has multiple layers such that, for example, the core meaning to “yes”, “da”, and “si” is identical to itself while there is additional meaning which, for instance, endows recognition of the specific language utilized to express the core referent of meaning. This, then, is noncontradictory to the reality of language translations (granting exceptions where meanings may overlap but will not be the same in different languages). — javra

The problem though, is that the same word has different meanings dependent on the context of usage. So you claim "the core meaning" of a word "is identical to itself". But what do you mean by this? There is no such thing as the core meaning, it is just an assumption that you make to support your claims. Each instance of usage has a particular meaning, and of course there are similarities, but to claim that there is a core meaning is just to claim that you could make some inductive conclusion concerning these similarities. Even if you could actually make such an inductive conclusion, like the authors of a dictionary do, where does that leave you? All you would do is create a descriptive rule about how the word is used. There's a big gap between being able to produce a descriptive rule about how a word is used, and the claim that a word has "a core meaning".

Herein lies the essential difference in our positions on "meaning". I do not conceive of information as semantic only, but also physical. Thanks very much for your comments, but we will have to agree to disagree on this matter. — Galuchat

Now you're showing less disagreement. I conceive of information as physical as well. So we agree here. But I also conceive of meaning as physical, and this is where we disagree. I think that you are attempting to create an unwarranted separation between information and meaning, in order to support your untenable premise that meaning only exists in minds.

The operation of the human mind consists of psychophysical (simultaneously mental and physical) processes. Whether I choose to focus on the mental or physical aspect (or both) depends entirely on the conceptual task at hand.

In fact, mental conditions and functions, and their anatomical and physiological correlates, are one of the best (or most complex) examples of the interaction of physical and semantic information. — Galuchat

The issue here is related to objects. I think you referred to psychophysical objects. We can identify, as Plato does, sensible objects and intelligible objects. We can also note that there is interaction between the two, and you might call this psychophysical processes. But this doesn't justify "psychophysical objects".

So if we attempt to understand psychophysical processes, we need to distinguish between the activities (as properties) of sensible objects, and the activities (properties) of intelligible objects, in order to develop this understanding. To mix these two together, claiming some type of vague psychophysical objects, when we are really referring to processes, is to invite category error. This conflation, and consequent category error is evident in concepts like "mental state", and "inter-subjective object"

We can identify, as Plato does, sensible objects and intelligible objects. We can also note that there is interaction between the two, and you might call this psychophysical processes. But this doesn't justify "psychophysical objects". — Metaphysician Undercover

Moods and emotions are mental conditions produced by affect (a mind-body response to sensory stimulation and/or interoception). So, I don't have a problem referring to moods, emotions, and affect as psychophysical objects.

Yeah. Coyne was part of one sentence in my previous post (the rest of which was on-topic) to you and that is the one thing you focused on.

You're not even making an attempt to rebut what I wrote. All you're saying is "I don't like Coyne's point of view". Idealists reduce everything to mind. Materialists reduce everything to the physical. Apo is reducing everything down to a triangular relationship. So, what's your point?

I am saying the "reality" is the wholeness of the modelling relation. So it is the co-ordination between the two - the modeller and the world. And then the point that the mechanism of the co-ordination is not some naive realist "veridical representation", but in fact a useful "irreality" in terms of experiential sign. — apokrisis

I'm not arguing for naive realism. I'm not saying that we see the world as it really is, or that we could ever see the world as it really is. Seeing is a process of representing the world via the information in visible light. To ask how the world looks independent of looking at it, as if you were trying to compare how it looks to you to how it really looks, is an irrelevant question. The way the world looks is how the local part of it interacts with a visual sensory system.

What I'm saying is that we are informed about the world through the transfer of information by causation.

By reading your post, am I informed of your intent, or am I informed of my own intent? Am I reading your post as you type it? How do you explain it taking time to type your post and for me to read it? You can only explain communication by using causation. I am only informed of your post AFTER you type it and submit it. How do you explain that except by causation?

That is silly. An epistemology that includes the fact that our view of reality is a purpose-soaked model, a semiotic umwelt, is truer than naive idealism or naive realism.

Explaining why and how the goal of "reaching truth" is naive realism is rather the point here. — apokrisis

How can you go about testing your theory when the outcome of any test will have your purpose imposed on it? All you are saying is your theory is the result of YOUR purposes and your interests, which means that it is only useful to you, not anyone else. I don't see how you don't get that. I think you do, which is why you avoided answering this question from my previous post.

That is contradicted by the facts of psychology and neuroscience.

Just one example that always struck me. Compared to chimps, humans have a proportionately larger foveal representation in their primary visual cortex, a proportionately smaller peripheral vision one.

So we have evolved less need to process the edges of our visual field as we are more certain about where we need to focus our attention. A larger brain makes us better at predicting the part of the world which is going to be interesting to us.

Think also of colour vision. Why do birds and bees have more cone pigments than we do? We make do with just three. They get four or five. And it would seem trivial for evolution to generate any number. Why is less also more in hue discrimination? — apokrisis

This can be explained by conservation of energy. Natural selection must make compromises in "designing" sensory systems as the amount of energy available isn't infinite, and it would probably take an infinite amount of energy to be informed of the world in it's completeness. So, we would be limited by the amount of energy, not some self deciding which parts of a sensory system are more useful than another part.