↪The Great Whatever Do you accept that to be un caballo is to be a horse? — Michael

Yes.

So why can I substitute the English word "horse" with the Spanish alternative but not my New English alternative?

Because you have been trying to make an argument in English, not an invented language. If you make the argument in an invented language, in translating it back into English, you would have to translate 'horse' as 'rabbit,' which would result in the conclusion that rabbits would be rabbits, not that horses would be rabbits, which is what you want to say.

On the other hand notice that if you translated back from Spanish, 'caballo' translates 'horse,' not 'rabbit,' as would the translation be back from your invented English.

Because you have been trying to make an argument in English, not an invented language. — The Great Whatever

No I haven't. I have repeatedly said that I haven't. I have gone to great pains to avoid any such equivocation. You're trying to force such an equivocation upon me, against my wishes, and despite my calling you out on it.

On the other hand notice that if you translated back from Spanish, 'caballo' translates 'horse,' not 'rabbit,' as would the translation be back from your invented English.

No it wouldn't. If we translated it back then it would be "horse".

If you're not going to listen to what I say then I really am going to just stop responding to you.

Okay, think of it this way. An argument should be good no matter what language it's presented in. Therefore, no matter what the result of swapping in your new language's words, we should be able to translate back into English and get the same, good, argument.

Now, when you translate back, one of two things will happen. Either you will have found that your argument merely states a tautology -- that horses are horses or rabbits are rabbits -- which is not what you wanted to show (rather, you wanted to show something about the relation between language use and what it is to be some animal), or your argument will come out false.

Do you see the problem? Notice that the use of Spanish is irrelevant to the argument, but you want the use of your made up language to be essential to your argument. This is I suspect because your argument hinges on an equivocation, and you want to use the made up sense of the word while slipping through the back door an implication that you have made some point, in English, about how language affects which creatures are which animals, or what conditions it takes to be a sort of animal.

None of this validates the disquotational schema, which remains false, and it remains false that to what it is to be a horse in any way depends on language. To be a horse is to be a certain kind of animal; what the language has to say about it doesn't matter.

What I'm trying to say is that identity is a linguistic imposition. Which is not the same as saying that physiology or marital status is a linguistic imposition. You seem to accept this about proper nouns like "Michael" but for some reason reject this about common nouns like "horse". I honestly don't see why there would be any difference.

↪The Great Whatever What I'm trying to say is that identity is a linguistic imposition. Which is not the same as saying that physiology or marital status is a linguistic imposition. You seem to accept this about proper nouns like "Michael" but for some reason reject this about common nouns like "horse". I honestly don't see why there would be any difference. — Michael

Proper nouns and common nouns are different linguistic items. They have different morphology, syntax, and semantics. Common nouns are proprety-denoting; they are true of individuals that bear a certain property. Proper names are directly referential; they refer to individuals independently of what properties they bear. Whether or not one bears a name is a linguistic matter, but whether one bears a certain property is not.

Then forget the individuals that bear the properties in the case of the common noun. So on the one hand we have a proper noun that denotes an individual and on the other hand we have a common noun that denotes a set of properties. If you accept that the identity of the former is a linguistic imposition then surely you should accept that the identity of the latter is a linguistic imposition?

You said that the truth of the sentence used on the right-hand side is determined by facts about the extra-linguistic world and not by whatever definitions were stipulated on the left-hand side. — Michael

This is confused because the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side of the T-shema doesn't stipulate anything. Rather the whole T-shema expresses one specific consequence of a Tarskian truth theory for the object-language. The meanings of the words used on the right-hand side of the shemas are the meanings that they have in the meta-language used by the theorist in order to state the consequences of the theory. Those meanings are presupposed in the act of stating the theory. Hence they can't be affected by the stipulations expressed by the T-shemas.

So even if the words "horse" and "rabbit" mentioned on the left-hand side mean what they do now, the sentence used on the right-hand is true iff horses are equine animals, and as horses are equine animals then the sentence used on the right-hand side is true. And if it's true then the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side is also true.

I am unsure what you are trying to say. If the words ""horse" and "rabbit" mentioned on the left-hand side mean what they do now, then your T-shema would express incorrect truth conditions for sentences written (or spoken) in the English language. That's because the antecedent would be false in circumstances while the consequent is true (i.e. the actual circumstances where horses indeed are equine animals, but horses aren't rabbits).

I may have misunderstood you, but were you saying that the T-schema only works if the sentence used on the right-hand side says something true about the actual world?

Which property a word denotes is a linguistic matter. Your confusion is thinking that therefore the property somehow is. To be a horse is to have a certain property; and this property does not change with the meanings of the words changing. It is, as always, the property of being a certain kind of animal. Whether or not any words at all pick out this property is irrelevant.

Which property a word denotes is a linguistic matter. — The Great Whatever

Wouldn't you say that to be a horse is to have the properties denoted by the word "horse".

Wouldn't you say that to be a horse is to have the property denoted by the word "horse". — Michael

Absolutely not, and this is the core of the confusion. To be a horse is to have the property of being a certain animal. It so happens that to be that kind of animal, and to be the bearer of the property denoted by 'horse,' accidentally coincide in current English. But they need not.

Absolutely not, and this is the core of the confusion. To be a horse is to have the property of being a certain animal. It so happens that to be that kind of animal, and to be the bearer of the property denoted by 'horse,' accidentally coincide in current English. But they need not. — The Great Whatever

If the word "horse" denotes properties A, B, and C (or the things that have them) then to be a horse is to have properties A, B, and C. I can't make sense of it any other way.

I may have misunderstood you, but were you saying that the T-schema only works if the sentence used on the right-hand side says something true about the actual world? — Michael

They state truth conditions -- i.e. in what conditions the sentence mentioned on the left hand side is true. The sentence used on the right hand side may state something that is always false (i.e. in all circumstances). In that case the sentence mentioned on the left hand side would be false in all circumstances also. The stipulation of the truth conditions, on the right hand side, just are the stipulations of the conditions under which the sentence mentioned on the left-hand side would be true as interpreted in the object-language.

Then I still don't understand why you think that the T-schema should baffle me. I understand it quite well.

If the "horse" denotes properties A, B, and C then to be a horse is to have properties A, B, and C. I can't make sense of it any other way. — Michael

To be a horse is to have properties A, B, and C, regardless of the words used or regardless of whether there is any language at all. There were horses, and they were horses precisely because they were a certain kind of animal, long before there was any language. The creation of language did not create horses, nor what it takes to be a horse.

What part of this do you disagree with?

Do you agree that:

1) There were horses before the word 'horse'

2) They were horses because they were a certain kind of animal

3) Now, horses are horses because they are a certain kind of animal

So clearly, what it takes to be a horse didn't change, and so is in no way dependent on, the existence or meaning of the word 'horse.'

Then I still don't understand why you think that the T-schema should baffle me. — Michael

That's because the way you are reading it, as applied to the description of counterfactual linguistic stipulations (e.g. a hypothetical language as used in counterfactual circumstances) has an incidence on the meaning of the terms used on the right hand side. Hence you have a habit of saying such things as 'If "rabbits" meant "horses" then rabbits would be horses'. And you invoke Tarski's T-shema as a support for the intelligibility of this use. But the disquotational shema doesn't warrant such a use. What it warrants may be the shema:

(1) "Rabbits are horses" is true iff rabbits are horses

This homophonic shema works for the English language since both the antecedent and the consequent are false in all circumstances. But it doesn't warrant your counterfactual conditional claim.

If the word "horse" denotes properties A, B, and C (or the things that have them) then to be a horse is to have properties A, B, and C. I can't make sense of it any other way. — Michael

But horses had properties A, B, and C before we called them horses. And that's why we know them as horses and not rabbits or any other animal.

Perhaps Michael could embrace a kind of linguo-idealism, whereby the existence of anything is language-dependent. (At times Banno seemed to espouse such a position.) Perhaps Michael could profitably deny TGWs repeated assertions that we can't change rabbits into horses by changing the meaning of words.

To be a horse is to have properties A, B, and C, regardless of the words used or regardless of whether there is any language at all. There were horses, and they were horses precisely because they were a certain kind of animal, long before there was any language. The creation of language did not create horses, nor what it takes to be a horse.

What part of this do you disagree with?

Do you agree that:

1) There were horses before the word 'horse'

2) They were horses because they were a certain kind of animal

3) Now, horses are horses because they are a certain kind of animal

So clearly, what it takes to be a horse didn't change, and so is in no way dependent on, the existence or meaning of the word 'horse.' — The Great Whatever

If I say that "horse" denotes having properties A, B, and C and if I say that this animal is a horse then I am saying that this animal has properties A, B, and C.

Your claim that I'm saying that the animal has properties X, Y, and Z, where having properties X, Y, and Z is what "horse" denotes in current English, is a misinterpretation. Your criticism is directed against a straw man.

But horses had properties A, B, and C before we called them horses. — Marchesk

I'm not saying they didn't.

What it warrants may be the shema:

(1) "Rabbits are horses" is true iff rabbits are horses

This homophonic shema works for the English language since both the antecedent and the consequent are false in all circumstances. — Pierre-Norman

And the schema works for the New English language, where "horse" means "rabbit", since both the antecedent and the consequent are true in all circumstances. Your interpretation of the sentence in English proper is a misinterpretation.

And the schema works for the New English language, where "horse" means "rabbit", since both the antecedent and the consequent are true in all circumstances. Your interpretation of the sentence in English proper is a misinterpretation. — Michael

Yes, it would work in New English as used by New English speakers. But then you have to specify in advance that, when you are stating such a shema, you are meant to be understood as speaking New English. Else you are inviting equivocation. When you say something like 'If "horse" meant the same thing as "rabbit" then rabbits would be horses' this is still nonsense in English and equally nonsense in New English since, while the consequent might be true as expressed in that language, it doesn't depend on the truth of the antecedent. From the point of view of speakers of New English, the thought expressed by them when they use the sentence "rabbits are horses" is true quite independently of any linguistic convention.

As I had suggested, properly interpreted (as Tarski meant it to be interpreted as a theorem in a recursive truth theory for a formal language), the biconditional:

(1) "Horses are rabbits" is true iff horses are rabbits

would be true, but the counterfactual (subjunctive) conditional:

(2) If "horse" meant the same as "rabbit" then horses would be rabbits

would still be nonsense. In both cases the consequent is expressed in English. The antecedent of the subjunctive conditional claim doesn't tell you in what language the consequent must be read. It rather tell you relative to which counterfactual circumstances the claim expressed (in English) in the consequent ought to be evaluated.

Yes, it would work in New English as used by New English speakers. But then you have to specify in advance that, when you are stating such a shema, you are meant to be understood as speaking New English. Else you are inviting equivocation. — Pierre-Normand

I have repeatedly said that the conclusion is to be understood as speaking New English, where "horse" means "rabbit", and have repeatedly said that The Great Whatever's criticism rests on the very same equivocation which you mention - as he interprets the conclusion in English proper. See my post to him above.

... but the counterfactual (subjunctive) conditional:

(2) If "horse" meant the same as "rabbit" then horses would be rabbits

would still be nonsense. In both cases the consequent is expressed in English. The antecedent of the subjunctive conditional claim doesn't tell you in what language the consequent must be read. It rather tell you relative to which counterfactual circumstances the claim expressed (in English) in the consequent ought to be evaluated.

You need to read it like this:

Given that "horse" means "rabbit" in this language, horses are rabbits.

I have repeatedly said that the conclusion is to be understood as speaking New English, where "horse" means "rabbit", and have repeatedly said that The Great Whatever's criticism rests on the very same equivocation which you mention - as he interprets the conclusion in English proper. — Michael

Even with the provision of this explicit disclaimer, as I explained, the counterfactual conditional statement still is nonsense since the truth of the consequent (even understood in New English) is unconditional. But what you mean to say is that it is conditional on the truth of the antecedent.

Even with the provision of this explicit disclaimer, as I explained, the counterfactual conditional statement still is nonsense since the truth of the consequent (even understood in New English) is unconditional. But what you mean to say is that it is conditional on the truth of the antecedent. — Pierre-Normand

If the truth of "horses are rabbits" depends on "horses" meaning "rabbits" (in this language), and if horses are rabbits if "horses are rabbits" is true (in this language), then horses being rabbits depends on "horses" meaning "rabbits" (in this language).

The Great Whatever accepts the first premise, the T-schema shows the second premise, and so the conclusion follows.

And if we apply the above to current English then we can say that because "horses" doesn't mean "rabbits" (in this language) horses are not rabbits. Using the rules of language we can conclude a fact about the world.

You need to read it like this:

Given that "horse" means "rabbit" in this language, horses are rabbits. — Michael

The above statement may be true as written in 'this language', but it is false as written in English.

Compare:

(1) Given that Germans put verbs at the end of their sentences, they sausages eat.

This is nonsense because stating a convention that applies to another language in the antecedent of a conditional doesn't entitle you to switch language mid-sentence.

The above statement may be true as written in 'this language', but it is false as written in English.

Compare:

(1) Given that Germans put verbs at the end of their sentences, they sausages eat.

This is nonsense because stating a convention that applies to another language in the antecedent of a conditional doesn't entitle you to switch language mid-sentence. — Pierre Normand

I haven't switched languages. The "this sentence" is a recursive reference. The sentence "given that 'horses' means 'rabbits' in this language, horses are rabbits" is written in a language in which "horses" means "rabbits" – and the sentence explicitly tells you this. Thus any equivocation with English proper isn't justified.