If I take your money via taxation, then I am coercing you by forcibly appropriating your wealth for the rest of society. — Pneumenon

Coercion means to obtain something (obedience, a confession, money) by the use of force or the threat of force -- perhaps in the form of a beating, torture, and so forth.

Taxation is not coercion in that one accepts taxation as part of citizenship. If natural citizens took the oath of naturalized citizens, it would record their willingness to support the laws of the United States. Taxation is one of several laws one is pledged to obey. Obeying the law and paying taxes, or being reminded that one must pay the taxes levied, is not coercion.

One may think taxes are too high, that tax revenue is being wasted, or that what the various levels of government are doing with tax revenue are foolish. Disliking the way taxes are spent doesn't make the collection of taxes coercive.

The government has the authority to use coercion to collect your taxes if you refuse to pay, just as the government has the authority to punish you coercively through a prison term for committing murder.

The egalitarian answer would appear to be a containment of everyone at the same level, so that everyone has roughly equal power over everyone else. There could be minor power differences, but there must always be the possibility of upward mobility. — Pneumenon

I agree. The liberty of every individual must be equal (excluding those who are deemed an unacceptable risk to the liberty of others).

... it seems to me that, whether it's censorship or taxation, you are ultimately either containing someone or allowing them to contain everyone else. The egalitarian answer would appear to be a containment of everyone at the same level, so that everyone has roughly equal power over everyone else. — Pneumenon

It isn't possible for everyone to contain everyone else, or for everyone to have equal power over everybody else. There is enough "social and psychological distance" between people that one can have no involvement at all with most other people, neither containing them nor being contained by them. We can work out your "containing/contained positions with our various friends, partners, and children. It makes for peacefulness if one can both submit and impose within one's circle of friends as needed.

It is best for society (IMHO) for coercion to be minimized. The need for coercion can be minimized by emphasizing the cooperative, mutually beneficial roles which we can play with each other. Or, the need for coercion can be maximized by minimizing mutuality, and operating a ruthlessly competitive society where mutual benefit is scorned. I'll take the former over the latter.

The question, then, is not, "Is coercion acceptable?" but "When is coercion acceptable?" — Pneumenon

Correct. When not if. Coercion eventually becomes necessary because we are not good at always regulating our self-centered, sometimes overtly aggressive interactions with others. Our ungoverned wishes can lead us into confrontations with our neighbors, co-workers, friends, and enemies. Various agencies are authorized to use force to suppress unauthorized force.

The exercise of coercion is dangerous. When police move to kill disturbed people because they are "behaving in a threatening manner" at a distance of 40 feet (rather than using a disabling shot or a taser, or just waiting when there is no gun present) trust between the police and citizens is rapidly eroded. When riot police make a massive show of power at a small demonstration, the clear intent of the police to coerce undermines community police relations. When people walk into a factory where they work and shoot at everyone in sight, killing several, the sense of trust between people is seriously damaged. A society where too much trust has been lost begins to disintegrate.

Interesting thoughts, everyone. But before I get to anything in depth, I wanted to respond to this:

Taxation is not coercion in that one accepts taxation as part of citizenship. — Bitter Crank

This would seem to imply that citizenship is voluntary. That's not necessarily the case. It's the same problem as with Hobbes' social contract; when the hell did I get the choice to sign that contract?

This would seem to imply that citizenship is voluntary. That's not necessarily the case. It's the same problem as with Hobbes' social contract; when the hell did I get the choice to sign that contract? — Pneumenon

You don't have to sign the contract. But if you don't, then you cannot expect others to respect your right to property, freedom of movement, or life.

In that case, one is coerced into signing the contract, and anything resulting from the contract, including taxation, is also coerced behavior.

@Pneumenon Only the way tigers coerce you to stay out of the jungle.

I disagree. Tigers don't deliberately keep me out of the jungle. A hungry one might want me to come in!

@Pneumenon A hungry law court might want you not to pay your taxes.

To put it more abstractly, the notion of coercion presumes social relations. The philosophical psychopath does not sign the social contract and takes prudential precautions against tigers and political authorities in the same spirit.

This would seem to imply that citizenship is voluntary. That's not necessarily the case. It's the same problem as with Hobbes' social contract; when the hell did I get the choice to sign that contract? — Pneumenon

Your involuntary citizenship is a problem you will have to take up with your parents. Had they the foresight to reside in a stateless region of the earth, or had they annulled their own citizenship and arranged for your birth in international waters, then you could have chosen.

Most people, though, acquire the obligations of citizenship by receiving the benefits of citizenship. Your gestation and birth was likely supervised by doctors trained (at least in part) at state expense. You were educated (unless home schooled) at schools supported by the community, taught by teachers trained (at least in part) at state expense. You (seem to have) attended a college, and colleges are supported (at least in part) at state expense. You have traveled around the country on roads provided (at least in part) at state expense in vehicles whose level of safety (whatever that is) is regulated by the state. You have been more or less protected from predation by thieves, murderers, and (if you are old enough) the Soviet Armed Forces--provided entirely at state expense. The food that you choose to eat is less toxic than it might otherwise be because of the offices of the state.

It is a quid pro quo situation, Asinus asinum frisât [that last word is supposed to be "fricat" which the AI spell check wants to change first to "frisât" (third-person singular imperfect subjunctive of friser--Fr., to curl) and then "frigate", a fast naval vessel. This is what happens when artificial intelligence decides that it never signed any social contract and can decide for itself when it should start correcting properly spelled Latin by substituting French verbs more to its liking. So, I guess it wants to say something along the lines of, "one jackass would have curled another jackass, had it a fast ship" instead of the homelier "one jackass scratches another jackass".] Mutuality is the idea in the Latin proverb. That's what the social contract is about--mutuality (not curling jackasses).

April 15 is coming up, so make an appointment with your accountant.

If I take your money via taxation, then I am coercing you... — Pneumenon

Here it is right at the start; there is no 'your money' or your anything except by way of the social contract. We agree not to break down the fence round 'your' pumpkin patch, as long as you agree to pay 'your' taxes.

If it makes things any easier, I am not arguing against taxation. Remember when I said that it's a matter of when to coerce, not whether?

Anyway...

Here it is right at the start; there is no 'your money' or your anything except by way of the social contract. We agree not to break down the fence round 'your' pumpkin patch, as long as you agree to pay 'your' taxes. — unenlightened

But ownership did not come into existence through someone suddenly inventing ownership and everyone else agreeing to it. The agreement is tacit. And taxation is not a universal constant of human societies.

That being said - we don't have to read your (and Bittercrank's) arguments as indicating the absence of coercion. You can easily take them to show that coercion is constitutive for human societies. We can only exist in human societies because we limit one another, and force one another to do things.

Ownership came into being with agriculture, because you have to invest work for future reward. So you need ownership for culture. It is always open to you to be a hunter gatherer or robber pillager. There's nothing tacit about the social contract unless you don't bother to think about it and the alternatives.

I don't suppose it was sudden, but it was certainly invented and agreed.

I doubt that ownership was consciously invented, in the same way as a widget used to make other widgets in a factory. And what is "unconscious invention," if not tacit?

Also, I don't think "This is written into the fabric of society" implies "This is not coercive." If something coercive is written into the fabric of society, then coercion is written into the fabric of society.

Remember when I said that it's a matter of when to coerce, not whether? — Pneumenon

So, we may not like it, we probably don't like it, but authority and coercion are intrinsic pieces of creating and maintaining a social existence. Why? Because we are not automatons and we tend to seek self-satisfaction, even if that harms the common good and ultimately destroys the community which makes our life possible. To curb this chaotic tendency, we grant authority to one or several of our members to make decisions about the common good, and coercion is employed to enforce the decisions. By these means the group and individuals both flourish.

Authority needs to be renewed periodically. Rules need to be established about coercion -- how much, how severe, how long, when, where, who does it to whom, and so on.

It isn't necessary, of course, to recognize someone/anyone's authority. However, if someone has power to coerce, they don't need your or my recognition. These are the circumstances in which we begin to resent authority, coercion, centralized power, and so forth -- when we are forced to do something we don't want to do by people with power whose authority we don't recognize, and/or are punished.

Resenting authority and coercive force is probably not all that unusual. We do have to come to terms with it if we can't avoid it. Coming to terms may mean changing behavior or leaving the jurisdiction of the resented authority, or it may mean finding better defense attorneys.

Is there a way out of these problems? I think not. As long as individual wishes are out of sync with those who wish to enforce the social will, there will be conflict and the individual will usually lose. Conflict isn't the worst thing that can happen. It is possible to wish for more conflict as an opportunity to challenge the social will. (Just because society wants something to happen--the social will--doesn't mean it is good. Much of American society was, at one time, supported--lived off--slavery. Keeping people as slaves was the social will. It was once the social will to punish homosexuality. In both of these cases, in some societies, the social will was overthrown by concerted individual action -- until the combined individual resistance became the new social will.

The question I'm interested in is this: given that coercion is part of what makes a bunch of humans hanging around into a society, how much sense does it make to have "minimizing coercion" as your big end-game?

cynically... you want to keep the level of coercion low so that it can be raised as needed. Sort of like the prime interest rate. You want to keep it as low as possible so that raising it will have the desired effect. It isn't out of beneficence that the level of coercion is kept low, it's just good stewardship of a useful tool. Waste it not by excessive and unnecessary violence. Rather meter it so that each increment has the maximum effect.

If your best tools for social control are amped out from the get go, what additional resources do you have? none. And then you, as top Gestapo leader, are screwed. You have already spent your resources. And just as the forces of counterrevolution descend on you, you have nothing to defend yourself with.

Similarly, it doesn't make good sense to fight an infection with the strongest possible antibiotic. Begin, rather, with the weakest appropriate antibiotic and work upwards. Preserve your strongest options for the worst infections.

Of course, coercion isn't the only tool of social control.

This appeared in the March 3, 2016 Daily Mail

French president insists Britain WILL face Brexit 'consequences' as David Cameron has to deny a 'conspiracy' over claims the Calais jungle could be sent to Kent

Francois Hollande claims he doesn't want to scare anyone with his warning
But amid a new scaremongering row, the PM denies there is a 'conspiracy'
France threatened to relocate thousands of migrants from Calais 'Jungle'
French economy minister claimed Brexit would provoke France into move
But Out campaign insists the move has been orchestrated to scare voters

Hollande aims to keep Britian from leaving the EU
Hollande communicates that if Brexit, Hollande's EU will bring consequences that would make Brexit less desirable to Britian than staying in the EU.
Hollande's claim is credible to Britian
...[argument structure based on Nozik's model in SEP]

I think the word "credible" need to be unpacked. Perhaps this is why under Nozik's model, coercion can only be successful... non-successful, attempted coercion is not coercion.

For me a human being begins, finds themselves unavoidably in a social situation. How shall we get along together? Any group rapidly finds some minimal rules are necessary, if only, initially, to *prevent* coercion, i.e. to curb bullying and enable mutuality. Even the simplest social group finds it needs infrastructure, work-sharing, role-allocation, some loose definition of aims.

That's the place I begin. There will be sanctions against certain kinds of behaviour; then there will be sanctions if the first sanctions are disregarded. Here's one place coercion begins, starting I suppose from something like an imagined 'state of nature' (as both Rawls and Nozick start).

Another place to begin of course would be among the bullies, among groups that like fighting and competing, who think coercion is 'natural'. There are of course some quite hi-falutin theories built on that idea.

Wherever one begins, it's hard to see how one doesn't eventually arrive at a social contract of some kind, unless one simply accepts power/hierarchy/violence as self-managing. Then, within a social contract, to me it's a confusion to group all forms of supposed coercion together.

A society has to have some form of taxation, a human is a social animal, there is no opting out of all societies; one can move if one has the resources, or one can come to terms with where one is.

The supposed coercion involved in giving birth seems to me similarly a strange philosophy of impossibilism. These two activities, social grouping and making new humans, are going to keep happening and the search for wisdom involves partly working out how to come to terms with these things. To live by resentment of taxation or birth-giving seems a futile, nihilistic path.

Beyond that, I'm for minimising coercion. Kindness and overtures for peace generally make life more endurable, and even pleasant. But there are many occasions when it's necessary to oppose bullies and coercers, and it certainly isn't possible to oppose them effectively without sometimes giving them some of their own medicine. The danger then alas is that the process of such violence or quasi-violence gives people a taste for it. (We should be clear though that there are some little-explored areas where the modern State is coercive, for instance in the grotesque incarceration rates in the US, Russia and nowadays here in the UK too)

My eyes glaze over when fables such as "state of nature" and "social contract" are brought into play. Power circulates anonymously behind us and through us. The rich finance the discussion of taxation as coercion because despite all of their resources for avoiding taxes they still pay some, and they don't feel a shred of social responsibility. Or - more to the point - they see themselves as "individuals" (eyes glazing over) who create wealth ex nihilo, and choose to ignore the social goods such as labour and infrastructure that enable them.

With all due respect, the "taxation-as-coercion" thing is just a jumping-off point for discussing the fact that our society won't work unless people get forced to do things and forbidden from doing things, which casts some doubt on the whole idea of "minimizing coercion."

I suppose I should have picked a different example, since the knee-jerk reaction seems to have been to ignore the overarching point I've made over the last few posts (and described above) and instead recoil in horror because my example sounded vaguely non-Leftist, despite my repeated statement that I am not arguing against coercion or taxes. You can discuss the issue without becoming a mind-controlled zombie minion of the Koch brothers, I promise.

Yes, but I wasn't really focusing on that example so much as turning it to thinking of conscience as a kind of self-coercion that is intricated in the very notion of self.

Yes, but I wasn't really focusing on that example so much as turning it to thinking of conscience as a kind of self-coercion that is intricated in the very notion of self. — photographer

I sense irony, but I'll take it seriously because I don't see the point in continuing barbs. Can you explain this further, and its relation to your previous post? I didn't see anything in that post about conscience or self-coercion, but maybe I'm missing some background here.

I brought up 'state of nature' and I think your strictures are wide of the mark. From Rousseau to Rawls thinkers have addressed these issues by working from these 'fables', because they arguably make good starting-points, they're not cunning devices conjured up by the Koch Brothers so we don't see things clearly.

I think they were both initiated by Hobbes mcdoodle. While the Koch brothers may not have read Hobbes, I'm sure they would find his thinking congenial to them.

The question I'm interested in is this: given that coercion is part of what makes a bunch of humans hanging around into a society, how much sense does it make to have "minimizing coercion" as your big end-game? — Pneumenon

I think none. Given that painful truth, you have basically two broad options: (1) stick to your guns and deny that coercion is acceptable, and since all life is coercive, conclude that life is therefore unacceptable; (2) admit (in practice, if not in principle) that coercion is acceptable, and work toward coercing the world into a desired state (become a Muslim, or a liberal, or whatever).

I prefer the first route, but I think it's a matter of taste: whether you think your (nonexistent) visions are worth the (real) suffering.

--

Also, while I see the rhetorical purpose of the taxation point was badly misconstrued, it still never ceases to amaze me how far people will go to convince themselves that something so obviously coercive as taxation is not coercive somehow. Why not just own up to it instead and admit you approve of coercion when it suits your world view? You're not going to think yourself out of contradictions, and straight up lying about them helps no one.

Sorry, slow to respond. I suppose I think of the two strands, appealing to the same core notion, as trailing back to Hobbes and Locke, and therefore representing quite different notions of the role of rulers, reason and the social contract.

Ownership came into being with agriculture, because you have to invest work for future reward. So you need ownership for culture. It is always open to you to be a hunter gatherer or robber pillager. There's nothing tacit about the social contract unless you don't bother to think about it and the alternatives. — unenlightened

'Ownership' is a legal contrivance created to regulate a situation and set of practices that were already at work in society before it was written into law. Much of early (and even Medieval) agriculture was done on "commons". As it happened as a matter of historical material circumstances, land was often taken by force and without the general consent of society and was often met with resistance (see the practices of enclosure in England for example). The 'owners' were only recognized and designated as such later in the law, complete with a host of legal protections, often because they and other more wealthy peasantry used their influence and control over the state to benefit their own interests.

Of course 'ownership' in a broad sense, that is, the effective control of something (and exclusivity to whatever surplus is gained from it), existed in varying forms in pre-modern times. But 'ownership' is a legal concept, and it would do us good not to project our modern sense of the term onto history, or to justify our modern legal conception of it as 'natural' through the use of ahistorical fictions, such as...

I brought up 'state of nature' and I think your strictures are wide of the mark. From Rousseau to Rawls thinkers have addressed these issues by working from these 'fables', because they arguably make good starting-points, they're not cunning devices conjured up by the Koch Brothers so we don't see things clearly — mcdoodle

The 'state of nature' is a fiction, and as such functions as to frame the discussion and our general orientation toward the question. It sets limits and boundaries on what is a possible or acceptable answer. Fictions are useful, but as they are written, they are useful toward certain ends. In Hobbes' case, it was particularly useful to justify a particular nexus of power, to make this particular form of power and hierarchy seem natural in the general course of man's secular rise from a fallen state, and of course the imposition of British settler and colonial states on indigenous populations. Locke's depiction of life in the 'state of nature' is different from Hobbes' 'nasty, brutish, and short' one, yet of course it's interesting that he manages to smuggle modern concepts of property ownership into the 'necessary' development of civilization, which of course proved handy as the British were dispossessing native Americans of their land.

A starting point of a fiction such as the 'state of nature' of course has its particular instrumental and discursive conveniences, especially with a particular philosophical methodology in mind, than the complex, messy, and diachronic one of history. But I think it's more beneficial to approach coercion (and power in general) it at it exists in a continuous historical dialectic, because that is where we must (and any human in any moment in time), must always already find ourselves starting from.

Our approach to the question is then transformed from a largely metaphysical-moral one to a largely historical and political one. There isn't a set of necessary and sufficient conditions as to 'when' coercion is acceptable to be universally applied across disparate concrete historical situations. Yes, rephrasing the question from 'is coercion acceptable' to 'when is it acceptable', as does, is on the right track. But I would go further and say it is a question of, who is using coercion and to what ends? And what particular historical 'problem' are they responding to?

Of course 'ownership' in a broad sense, that is, the effective control of something (and exclusivity to whatever surplus is gained from it), existed in varying forms in pre-modern times. But 'ownership' is a legal concept... — Shevek

It matters not to my point whether it is more broad or more legal of a contrivance; To claim it is already to claim the validity of the self same social contract which is then repudiated in the op when it comes to paying taxes.

As one revolutionary put it, "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's'. The laws and practices that constitute property (or any other) rights of whatever formality or informality cannot be claimed without the quid pro quo of relevant undertakings. Well I suppose it can be claimed, but not justifiably; either a social contract with rights and obligations both, or else 'property is theft'.