Then what did you mean by this?
"We've known that all Turing machines are equivalent since 1930s" — charleton
The paper that proves that any finite physical system may be emulated... — tom
The statement of the Church-Turing principle (1.2) is stronger than what is strictly necessitated by (1.1). Indeed it is so strong that it is not satisfied by Turing’s machine in classical physics. Owing to the continuity of classical dynamics, the possible states of a classical system necessarily form a continuum. Yet there are only countably many ways of preparing a finite input for T . Consequently T cannot perfectly simulate any classical dynamical system.
Finite might be an important qualification don't you think? — apokrisis
Of course I realise that you take as unarguable that the MWI interpretation (your so-called non-interpretation interpretation :) ) is proven and quantum computation tapping unlimited resources is as good as a done thing. But I wonder what Popper would have said about such unqualified conviction? — apokrisis
The entire observable universe is finite. — tom
A bit like the old questions, only more pressing. — tom
The last time I tried to make up my own rules in a game I got kicked out of the game. No one yet has denied me the right to use language, though Sam26 might like to kick me out of the thread. — Metaphysician Undercover
I went through this, I interpret the symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover
Right, that's another reason why the game analogy fails. Not only do we follow "the rules of the game", we make up our own strategies, private rules, which are part of the play, but not part of "the game" itself. So the rule-following employed in actually playing the game goes far beyond the actual rules of "the game". We could not even understand playing a game, by studying the game itself, because how one plays a game goes far beyond the game itself. To understand how different people play a particular game, we must refer to something other than "the game". If studying a game cannot even provide us with an understanding of how different people play that game, and we must turn to something else to obtain that understanding, then clearly the game analogy can only go so far, and it must be dropped at this point. If we cling to it, it will mislead us. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's clearly relevant to the principles or "rules" of language use, because I choose my words in a similar habitual way. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's not very relevant to "rules" of games though, and that's the point. We use "rules" in numerous ways and we ought not to equivocate when doing philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you were to speak nothing but gibberish (e.g. Forest the upon warmly eight marshmallow Lebanon it unicycle), then you might get kicked out of a conversation. — Luke
That's a huge dodge. You claim that the rules are not part of any external object such as a game, yet you refer to the written rules of the game to help settle disputes? Clearly the written rules of the game are external to you. If the rules are entirely "within the individual's mind" (which individual, btw?) then why do you need to consult the external written rules? Are they not the rules? — Luke
Either the rules are entirely "within the individual's mind", as you claim, or else the external written rules printed in the game's instructions are not rules at all. But if they aren't the rules of the game, then why do we call them that? Is everybody but you using the word "rules" incorrectly? — Luke
Strategies aren't rules of the game. The rules set the boundaries of permissible moves; strategies are employed within these boundaries. — Luke
Okay, but you aren't the only one using the language, and if language is a "method of communication", as you say, then you might want to adopt the habit of using language in mostly the same ways that everyone else does if you want your communication to be effective. — Luke
Right, don't conflate actual rules, such as the written rules of a board game, with some imaginary private mental "rules" that only apply to you. — Luke
It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. — Sam26
Statements can and do reflect beliefs (what's happening in our minds, viz., private thoughts), but statements themselves are not private things, and moreover, statements are completely dependent upon something that's not private, viz., language. So unlike actions, statements serve a duel purpose. However, where actions are used to communicate, then these actions would be similar in kind to statements, so not all actions have the requisite privacy I'm referring to, i.e., they too can serve a duel purpose. — Sam26
Being stateable doesn't require that the believer do the stating. If the content of belief is propositional, then it only follows that it can be stated. Earlier I address the linguistic aspect when talking about the coherency aspect of JTB(epistemologists). If propositions are not existentially contingent upon language, then belief can be propositional in it's content, stateable, and not linguistic.
— creativesoul
I understand that "being stateable" doesn't imply that someone actually state the belief. Yes, it seems quite obvious that if a belief is in the form of a proposition, then necessarily it can be stated. — Sam26
Contingency, being a subset of possibility, implies that things could happen differently, but how is it that propositions are only contingent upon language? Can propositions arise apart from language? I think not, unless you can provide an example. I would say that propositions are necessarily a feature of language. Thus, propositions, in terms of existence, are necessarily dependent upon language, not contingently dependent on language. — Sam26
Your final statement "...then belief can be propositional in it's content, stateable, and not linguistic," seems strange, since if it is linguistic (definition - relating to language), then a proposition is necessarily linguistic. To say that a proposition is stateable, is also to say that a proposition is linguistic. Stating something is a linguistic endeavor, is it not? It seems to me that being stateable is a subset of linguistics. — Sam26
For me it's quite clear that beliefs can be shown in what we do apart from what is sayable. I can't make any sense out of the idea that pre-linguistic man did not have beliefs apart from language. If pre-linguistic man was observed building something, then necessarily his actions of gathering material shows his belief that the materials are in a certain spot, and that the materials are used for a specific purpose. Thus, he shows his beliefs quite apart from any statements or propositions. Moreover, it seems to me that one of the functions of language is to convey my thoughts and/or beliefs to someone else. — Sam26
I also can't make sense of animals having beliefs, if beliefs are necessary to language. Animals also show what they believe apart from saying something. For example, a dog may express its belief that its master is home by jumping up and down and barking - thus, the dog also shows what it believes based on its actions.
Thoughts/beliefs are pre-existent necessarily, if not then language would develop in a vacuum.
"William James, in order to show that thought is possible without speech, quotes the reminiscences of a deaf-mute, Mr Ballard, who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had had thoughts about God and the world. -What could that mean!- Ballard writes: 'It was during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the question: how came the world into being?" - Are you sure - one would like to ask - that this is the correct translation of your wordless thoughts into words?...... (PI 342)." — Sam26
Also you can't just dismiss OC 284 and 285 by saying that Wittgenstein just didn't have time to edit his remarks, as though he would have edited this out of the final draft. If this is your position, then any of Wittgenstein's remarks could be dismissed based on this criteria.
Post #1
First, since my theory starts at states of mind or mind states, whichever you prefer, let me say something briefly about what's meant by this phrase. A state of mind is only meant to point out that there is something going on in the mind that is prelinguistic. This, it seems, is undeniable; you may want to call it something else, you may say that states of mind is not an accurate way of portraying what's happening in the mind, but that something is occurring is undeniable. Moreover, that something is happening in the mind, is also a precursor to linguistics or to language development. This subjective reality is indubitable, i.e., it cannot be doubted sensibly. So this is the first presupposition to this theory. — Sam26
Second, how do we know that anyone else has a private thought life, we know it by what they do, i.e., it's reflected in their actions. How can it be otherwise? We know, because we are familiar with how we act, and how our actions are associated with our own thought lives. Thus, when we see others acting in similar ways, therefore, we reasonably infer their private thought life too. In fact, this is how we can reasonable say that there are other minds. If there were no acts associated with a thing, how in the world could we say that that thing has a mind, or that the thing can think or have thoughts associated with thoughts/beliefs. After all, how do we know that rocks don't have minds? We know because there is nothing associated with rocks (no acts, as it were) that can be reasonably said to point to the rocks mind or thinking. Thus, there is a kind of correspondence between a mind and the products of minds. This correspondence is a necessary ingredient to the inference that something has a mind/brain. This is not to say that all acts of living things reflect the same level of consciousness, or that all actions are associated with beliefs. Some actions are instinctual. So the second presupposition to this theory is that acts are reflections of mind states, thoughts, beliefs, self-awareness, consciousness, etc. — Sam26
Third, it's the contention of this theory that not only are actions reflections of a thought life, but that language is also a reflection of a thought life. Therefore, it's a twofold reflection of what's happening in our mind. However, there is a difference in these two reflections. Actions are a necessary feature of minds (thought life), but language isn't. Prelinguistic man can be said to have a mind similar to our own, because their actions reflect these similarities. But note that although actions are a necessary byproduct of a mind, language isn't. In fact, it's easy to imagine the existence of only one person (one mind), and the actions that reflect the kind of mind states we see in ourselves, and this is imagined quite easily apart from any language.
Language is primarily used to communicate with other minds, and the rules of usage are developed within a community of language users. The rules of correct usage are not dependent upon any one person, but are dependent on how the users use the words, statements, or propositions. And when one speaks of the logic of correct usage, one is speaking of the agreed upon (implicit or explicit rules) rules of language within a community.
It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. Note that our actions are completely private (actions as reflected in OC 284 and 285), they reflect private thoughts, and can be directly traced to private thoughts. There is a one-to-one correspondence between these actions and one's thoughts.
Statements can and do reflect beliefs (what's happening in our minds, viz., private thoughts), but statements themselves are not private things, and moreover, statements are completely dependent upon something that's not private, viz., language. So unlike actions, statements serve a duel purpose. However, where actions are used to communicate, then these actions would be similar in kind to statements, so not all actions have the requisite privacy I'm referring to, i.e., they too can serve a duel purpose.
So the third presupposition of this theory is noting the difference between statements and actions and their corresponding differences in demonstrating or showing a belief. — Sam26
We agree here Sam, particularly regarding whether or not propositions are existentially contingent upon language. We both hold that propositions are existentially contingent upon language. — creativesoul
That's not what I said, I was arguing that propositions are necessarily a feature of language, not arguing that propositions are a contingent feature of language. Why would you say this, when I explicitly said, "...propositions, in terms of existence, are necessarily dependent upon language, not contingently dependent on language." Are you following the difference between propositions being existentially contingent on language, as opposed to their existence being necessarily dependent on language? — Sam26
Rather, when I say that propositions are existentially contingent upon language, it means that propositions require language, depend upon language... for their very existence. No language. No propositions. — creativesoul
I know what it means, and this a disagreement still. Contingent means that something could be otherwise, correct? — Sam26
But propositions cannot not be part of language, they're a necessary feature of language. So this is not a misunderstanding, since you have just reiterated the very thing I was arguing against. Do you follow? By the way, I'm not angry, just so you know. — Sam26
No. When something is existentially contingent upon X, it cannot exist without X. — creativesoul
Do we agree that propositions cannot exist without language? — creativesoul
So we agree, I hope, that we cannot have a statement without a language?
In philosophy, contingent does tend to be used for things true but not necessarily true. While it might be true that a language might not contain any statements, it would not be possible to have a statement without a language.
A side issue, I hope. — Banno
I don't mind saying that rules exist externally to me, in the form of symbols on paper, just like I don't mind saying that concepts exist in that way. Someone might hand me a paper and say "here is my concept". But I do respect the fact that in order to follow such a rule, I must interpret the symbols, and accept the meaning which I derive, as a principle to adhere to. So if I am "following a rule", I am adhering to this principle in my mind which I have derived from my interpretation. You seem to have no respect for this fact. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, we us the word "rules" in different ways, and we must be careful not to equivocate. I have words in my mind, and there are also spoken words. You seem to be implying that I ought only refer to one or the other as "words". You say either the "rules" exist in my mind or the "rules" exist on the paper, in ignorance of the fact that we use "rules" in both ways. But that's just you being completely unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover
Right, now you're starting to understand. When we play games, we use strategies, and strategies are private rules, which are not part of "the game", they are part of the player. This is where we reach the limits of the game analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover
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