That's exactly the same as saying "but, assuming that the future mimics the past, I cannot imagine the existence of zombies". — Magnus Anderson

Not really, since the meaning of "2" and "4" is something I can stipulate. I can stipulate that by "2" I mean:

I I

and by "4" I mean:

I I I I

What about this is dubitable? Can I doubt that "2" means what I think it does? Surely not, since I have decided what "2" means. What about this can I doubt then?

Can I doubt that "2" means what I think it does? Surely not, since I have decided what "2" means. What about this can I doubt then? — PossibleAaran

If you want to decide whether something is true or false, and you don't want this to be an arbitrary decision, there must be a standard. There must be something that is fixed.

Is 2 + 2 = 4 true or is it false? If it is an arbitrary decision, you can choose any of the two. But if it is not an arbitrary decision, then there must be something else, something other than your momentary will, that decides. It could be, for example, your earlier decision. For example, you might have said at some point in the past that 2 + 2 = 4 is true. This might have been an arbitrary decision. You could have said 2 + 2 = 4 is false but you didn't. You chose to say that 2 + 2 = 4 is true. It does not matter. You chose what you chose and now you want to remain consistent with that decision. You can't say 2 + 2 = 4 is false because that's not what you said in the past. And this is why doubt makes perfect sense: you want to verify that you are consistent. You want to make sure that what you say in the present corresponds to what you said in the past. You can never be sure that you are consistent due to the fact that memory is fallible. It's easy to forget. And that's how analytic propositions can be doubted. When people say that analytic propositions cannot be doubted what they mean is that they cannot be doubted in the same way that synthetic propositions can be doubted.

Am I right to understand that what makes 2+2=4 dubitable is that although I might decide the meanings of "2" and "4" such that it is indubitable, its still possible that any time I entertain 2+2=4 I am misremembering my own meanings of "2" and "4"?

Exactly.

If you go down that path all discourse becomes meaningless. How could we discusses anything, or make sense of anything, if we radically doubted the veracity of our memories?

Sure. The issue is whether or not certainty as a propositional attitude is justified. If there's a 10% chance that something will happen, is it reasonable to be certain that it will happen? What if it's 99%? What if it's 100%? The claim MU and others are making is that if something isn't certain to be true then it is reasonable to be uncertain (doubt). Of course that's not to say that it's reasonable to believe that it's false, which is where I think there's been a misunderstanding between you and them.

I can strongly believe that something is the case and still have doubt. The skeptic can still believe all the same things you do; that this is a hand and that there's a cat on the mat. — Michael

One's attitude, may or may not be justified, it depends on the reasonableness of the doubt, which is part of what you seem to be getting at. The attitude itself doesn't justify anything, not that you're making this claim, at least you don't seem to be. If there is a 10% chance that something will happen, then generally it would be unreasonable to claim that it will happen, and one's doubt that it won't happen seems reasonable enough. Would it be reasonable to doubt whether you will survive a fall if there is a 10% chance of survival? Most people would probably say no. Though the lines can get a bit blurry between what's reasonable and not reasonable to doubt when we're talking about a 50, 60, or 70% chance. So let's say your 70% sure that X will happen, would it be reasonable to express an attitude of doubt in such a situation, sure, even though you're reasonably sure that X will happen.

Whether someone can strongly believe something, and still express a doubt, depends on the situation or context. I can understand a doubt if one is only 70% certain that X will happen, so an expression of an attitude of doubt in such a situation is reasonable, as already mentioned. However, my belief that I'm sitting at my computer typing these words is beyond doubt. Doubt in such a situation seems senseless. Moreover, if you could doubt such a thing, then maybe you could even doubt that you're having the doubt. The fact that you doubt, shows your existence, so there are some doubts that are senseless or meaningless.

Whether one can strongly believe X, and still reasonably express one's attitude of doubt, depends on what we're talking about. My earlier example of someone doubting the expert chess player as they teach chess, is just such an example. The point isn't that you can't find reason to doubt the chess expert in some situations. We can always create a scenario in which it would be reasonable to doubt the chess expert. Most people, especially if we have good reasons to believe that the person is a chess expert, wouldn't doubt that the chess expert knows the basic rules of chess. Thus, to doubt the expert's explanation that bishop's move diagonally, and that bishops always remain on the same color in any given game, is an unreasonable doubt.

There are some propositions, in some contexts, that are not only immune to doubt, but also immune to knowledge claims. Such propositions, as Wittgenstein pointed out, are bedrock, i.e., they provide a backdrop which enables us to talk about knowledge and doubt. They are in a way, required, if we are to have meaningful discussions on epistemology, and by extension, meaningful discussions of what it means to doubt.

Whether one can strongly believe X, and still reasonably express one's attitude of doubt, depends on what we're talking about. My earlier example of someone doubting the expert chess player as they teach chess, is just such an example. The point isn't that you can't find reason to doubt the chess expert in some situations. We can always create a scenario in which it would be reasonable to doubt the chess expert. Most people, especially if we have good reasons to believe that the person is a chess expert, wouldn't doubt that the chess expert knows the basic rules of chess. Thus, to doubt the expert's explanation that bishop's move diagonally, and that bishops always remain on the same color in any given game, is an unreasonable doubt.

There are some propositions, in some contexts, that are not only immune to doubt, but also immune to knowledge claims. Such propositions, as Wittgenstein pointed out, are bedrock, i.e., they provide a backdrop which enables us to talk about knowledge and doubt. They are in a way, required, if we are to have meaningful discussions on epistemology, and by extension, meaningful discussions of what it means to doubt. — Sam26

I'm not sure if you're using the term "doubt" the same way that MU and others are. What they mean by it is "not certain". Are you saying that "you can't find reason to [not be certain of] the chess expert in some situations"? I don't think that's right. If it is possible that what they're telling you isn't true then there is a reason to not be certain that what they're telling you is true (even if you nonetheless strongly believe them). Being certain of something that isn't certain seems unreasonable.

Belief and doubt are complementary. You can't have one without the other as each is the ground of the other, and it is only together that you have any epistemology at all.

The majority of the posts appear aimed at arguing for either one or the other as somehow foundational, indubitable, primary, or whatever. The usual monistic response when faced with a dialectical choice.

But they are simply the opposing limits of the process of inquiry. And what matters is the way that they are balanced against each other.

A systems science or organicist understanding of balance says a dichotomy is a symmetry breaking, and a metaphysically complete symmetry-breaking is an asymmetry. An asymmetry, in turn, is a hierarchical organisation - a breaking that is local~global in its organisation.

So doubt and belief must be balanced in this fashion. Belief is the global or backdrop scale or epistemology - the broad and general ground of things not in doubt. While doubt is the local and particular scale - the various individual things which could be considered as failing to fit this background in some significant fashion.

A well-organised mind would have this well-developed hierarchical arrangement. There would be a robust backdrop of habitual or ingrained belief. And against that, doubts would arise in highly focused and meaningful fashion. Doubt could not be a general activity. But it would be a useful localised activity.

And again, belief and doubt would be just ideal limits, never absolute. A well-organised mind would simply approach those ideal limits by the end of its process of inquiry.

And also, a further important pragmatic principle is that this "truth seeking" behaviour has to have a purpose if it is indeed going to be optimised by a complementary principle of unconcern.

Again, a duality or dichotomy.

To have knowledge that is meaningful - that speaks to some purpose - means that the knower also has to be able to discard noise. The mind has to be able to filter out all the possible facts, doubts, uncertainties or unknowns that are the differences which make no difference ... to "it".

So meaningful knowledge is self-centred. The autonomous self arises - in contrast to the world in which it exists - to the degree it can effectively ignore that world in pursuit of its wishes.

It is fundamental to a pragmatic epistemology - the one that recognises selfhood to be a further epistemic constraint on knowledge - that this self gets to determine where to draw its own boundary of indifference. It is not a bug but the feature that this self can be indifferent to localised doubting - whether that is seemingly justified or unjustified.

The mistake is to think that the world is the ultimate arbiter. Out there, the actual truth of the matter lies.

That may be so, but first there has to be a genuine reason to care. Doubt only comes into play if a difference would make a difference. To some purpose. And hence the "self" that such intentionality would represent.

One of the frustrations of discussing philosophy in an open forum is that the interesting topics disappear in the noisy background.

So take the sentence either way:

If something is possibly (modal) false then it is reasonable to lack a full conviction that it is true.

If something has a non-zero probability of being false then it is reasonable to lack a full conviction that it is true. — Michael

Not relevant to the thread. Really, this thread ought be about the classification of certainties, as set out in the OP; but instead it is overrun by folk who want to argue something else.

So in some possible world my foot would not be on the arm of this chair as i write this; and yet it is, and it would be quite unreasonable to doubt that it is.

Same sort of counterexample can be set for a probabilistic interpretation of certain.

This is why I could not join middle management in this forum; I would have blocked you and Magnus long ago for being off-topic.

The mistake is to think that the world is the ultimate arbiter. Out there, the actual truth of the matter lies. — apokrisis

Perhaps that is one mistake. Another would be to suppose that there is an ultimate arbiter. The world is complex. There's something odd about thinking that one epistemological approach, perhaps one that looks good for science, will work in geometry; and organisational management; and ethics.

One thing that I worth doubting is any theory that claims to provide an ultimate answer.

Edit:

I'm not sure if you're using the term "doubt" the same way that MU and others are. — Michael

Hm. I suspect Sam might agree. It's as if he started a thread on sports cars and it turned into a thread about sewing.

One thing that I worth doubting is any theory that claims to provide an ultimate answer. — Banno

What about a theory that claims merely to provide a better answer?

And indeed, a pragamatic theory of epistemology that says there are no ultimates as such, so a theory that would benefit from the self-endorsement of the very attitude it adopts?

Perhaps that is one mistake. Another would be to suppose that there is an ultimate arbiter. The world is complex. — Banno

But you often speak as if you believe the world is the ultimate arbiter. Curious.

Anyway, my pragmatic point is that the best epistemology has this self-limiting nature. Instead of taking the world as some brutely ultimate limit on inquiry, it sees inquiry as itself relative to a self-centred limit of interest. We enquire into the facts so far as they seem to matter to us. Beyond that, there is no particular point of view being served.

It gives epistemology a self-grounding basis while also allowing it to grow or develop as large and complex as it likes. It is a closed and reliable system, yet also open and adaptive at the same time.

And so far, I haven't seen your argument against it. That is probably because you are basically a pragmatist but hate to be identified as such. You have some strong bias towards a linguistic level of semiosis - an interest in "truth" as a language game - and so resist Peirce's more universal model of such games.

As I've said, a problem there is that it tends to conflate ordinary language games with mathematico-logical ones. And that is a very big problem in the social history of AP. It has been a bad turn in philosophical thought.

You want language games to stand for something epistemically generic. Yet you don't actually want to get forced too far from an ordinary language ontology. So your instinct for pragmatism lacks the semiotic machinery to cash itself out. It remains a vague gesture without the internal means to sustain a full theory as such. Therefore it has a considerable self-interest in decrying the very business of "having and arguing for an ultimate theory".

The self-interest at the heart of philosophical quietism is pretty transparent. ;)

There's something odd about thinking that one epistemological approach, perhaps one that looks good for science, will work in geometry; and organisational management; and ethics. — Banno

Odd? Or empirical evidence that it qualifies as being better?

The argument is, roughly, that in a given language game (and it is all language games), there are certain things that cannot sensibly be doubted. So in geometry the three angles of a triangle add to a straight angle and in Chess the bishop moves only diagonally.

However, language games themselves are subject to change. So in some geometries the angles of a triangle add to more than a straight angle, in others to less; once the pawn could only move one square, but to speed the game this was changed to two squares for its initial move.

In such cases it is very important to understand which game is being played. — Banno

As a point of interest, note how the quietist likes to confuse regulative and constitutive principles.

Arbitrary human-invented rule-based systems like chess are a favourite as they clearly have the least metaphysical-strength necessity. A bishop travels the diagonal just because we agree to say so to get a game going.

And then - in sly conflation - the same is suggested of geometric truths.

If we say the world is flat - make that arbitrary constraint - then the three angles of a triangle sum to a rotation of exactly pi. But if we relax that rule about the world being flat, then - hey presto - we have a new game called non-Euclidean geometry.

And I guess now we are not supposed to stop and ask what further games lie beyond curved metrics? We should continue to treat the situation as being as arbitrary as a game as chess?

It is a transparent quietist gambit.

Quickly - whenever the anti-metaphysicist senses that the removal of constraints is arriving at some fundamental limit - s/he will switch attention to the possibility of instead adding constraints in arbitrary-feeling fashion. As we get too near the bedrock of what might be constitutive, there is a bait and switch so we find ourselves safely talking about the merely regulative again.

Hey, step away from that foundational vagueness! It can really mess with your mind. Step away from the abyss and think instead about all the arbitrary rules we can freely invent to create a metaphysics-free structure for our reality.

We can understand our world in simple terms like the bishop that moves on the diagonal simply because that is a convention of a language game.

But you often speak as if you believe the world is the ultimate arbiter. Curious. — apokrisis

So far as hands and chairs and capitals of France go, it doesn't do too bad a job.

We can understand our world in simple terms like the bishop that moves on the diagonal simply because that is a convention of a language game. — apokrisis

Yes. That's rather the point.

I'm not sure if you're using the term "doubt" the same way that MU and others are. What they mean by it is "not certain". Are you saying that "you can't find reason to [not be certain of] the chess expert in some situations"? I don't think that's right. If it is possible that what they're telling you isn't true then there is a reason to not be certain that what they're telling you is true (even if you nonetheless strongly believe them). Being certain of something that isn't certain seems unreasonable. — Michael

If I say, "I am not certain that the chess expert knows what he's talking about?" - how is this different from "I doubt what the chess expert is telling me?" Expressing a doubt about X, in many cases is the same as saying, I'm not certain of X. There are also cases where one could replace the words "I know X..." with "I'm certain of X," and mean the same thing. However, there is a difference between an expression of certainty as an attitude, which might be expressed in the way one emphasizes words, or it might be expressed in the way one gesticulates. However, even the expression of an attitude of doubt in my chess example seems out of place.

Yes, I'm saying that in some contexts or situations there are not good reasons to doubt the expert's claims. I gave an example above, namely, when the chess expert is explaining the basic rules of chess. However, that doesn't mean that we can't find contexts or situations in which it would be meaningful to doubt the chess expert.

I don't agree that because it's possible that the expert could be wrong, that that in itself is sufficient reason to doubt the expert. The same is true when it comes to knowledge. I for example, could make the claim that I know my car will start, but it's certainly possible it might not. So because it's possible that I could be wrong, does it follow that I don't know it? Do knowledge claims require absolute epistemic certainty? No. The same is true with regard to doubting, just because it's possible that the expert could be wrong, that in itself doesn't give me good reasons to doubt the expert. What's possible does not give sufficient reason to doubt, or to make a knowledge claim.

I'm not saying you should be certain of something that isn't certain. The problem is that you're using the term certain in a way that requires absolute knowledge. You seem to think that one can reasonably doubt something even if we have a very high probability that we're certain, or that we know. I definitely would disagree with this. For example, would it be reasonable to doubt the car will start if there's a 99% chance that it will start? The answer is no. It would not be reasonable to doubt the car will start, especially based on the notion that it's possible it will not start.

Let's give another example, it's logically and ontologically possible that I'm the only mind in the universe, but does that possibility mean that I have good reason to conclude that I am the only mind in the universe, or to doubt that there are other minds? No.

And yes, I am using the term doubt different from how some are using it in this thread

I could be wrong but I think the central point of this thread is Wittgenstein's claim that Moore's propositions such as "Here is a hand" are neither true nor false. I don't agree with this regardless of how you interpret the statement. And there are two ways you can interpret it. One way to interpret it is as an analytic proposition where "Here is a hand" simply means "let this [the experience of a hand] be one of the things the word 'hand' symbolizes". It appears to me this is how Wittgenstein interprets it. Not sure why because you can also interpret it synthetically where it means "this thing that we experience matches our definition of the word 'hand'". It's a subtle distinction. In the first case, the experience is necessarily that of a hand (which isn't really true but let's ignore that for now.) It is not a question of whether what we're experiencing is a hand or not. We are simply declaring that it is (thereby creating a new concept.) In the second case, we are declaring that what we're experiencing is what is symbolized by an existing concept. This can be either true or false. If I say "this is a dragon" while looking at my hand I'd be wrong. It's not a freaking dragon. Unless, of course, I mean it in the first sense "here, let this be a dragon". I can call my hand "dragon" if I want to, right?

I could be wrong but I think the central point of this thread is Wittgenstein's claim that Moore's propositions such as "Here is a hand" are neither true nor false. — Magnus Anderson

I agree with this statement, but maybe not in the way you think.

One way to interpret it is as an analytic proposition where "Here is a hand" simply means "let this [the experience of a hand] be one of the things the word 'hand' symbolizes". It appears to me this is how Wittgenstein interprets it. — Magnus Anderson

Wittgenstein isn't saying that Moore's propositions aren't true or false because they're analytic propositions. This is clear if you read the complete text of OC. He's saying that they're not true of false, or not knowledge claims, because these propositions hold a special place in our language.

I have a thread under Philosophy of Language, called A Wittgenstein Commentary that explains this in much more detail.

Well, a synthetic version of "Here is a hand" appears to me to be a knowledge claim. This means it can either be true or false; or if you prefer to think in continuous rather than in discrete terms, it means it is true or false to a degree. Clearly, I am wrong when I say "this is a dragon" while looking at my hand. Would you agree? On the other hand, restricting yourself to the analytic version produces a more convincing but nonetheless incorrect argument.

Again I answer these questions in my other thread on OC.

So far as hands and chairs and capitals of France go, it doesn't do too bad a job. — Banno

So to the extent that we neither have to question ourselves nor our worlds to any degree, commonsensicalism works fine as an epistemology?

It does appear that your philosophical ambitions are mightily limited.

Yes. That's rather the point. — Banno

Nope. The point was that there are constitutive principles as well as regulative ones. And that your game of always diverting the conversation away from the natural or necessary to the artificial or arbitrary is a transparent gambit.

I can imagine that "4", in my language, means this many distinct units: — PossibleAaran

This is not correct. "4" must necessarily refer to one unit. Each of the numerals, "2", "3", etc., refer to individual units. If "4" referred to four distinct units we would not be able to carry out the mathematical proceedings which we do. For instance, 4x1 would be 1x1x1x1x1 if "4" referred to four distinct units. Instead, "4" must refer to one unity, a unity with the value of four individuals.

Thus, there is a sense in which I couldn't really doubt that 2+2=4. — PossibleAaran

You ought to doubt this, because the way you've described what "4" and what "2" means, is clearly incorrect.

Here is the issue which Banno needs to consider. We can know, and follow a rule without understanding that rule. It is only when we doubt the rule, and thereby analyze it for validity, that we actually come to understand it.

Am I right to understand that what makes 2+2=4 dubitable is that although I might decide the meanings of "2" and "4" such that it is indubitable, its still possible that any time I entertain 2+2=4 I am misremembering my own meanings of "2" and "4"? — PossibleAaran

If you do not actually understand the rules which you are following, then you might misrepresent what is meant by the rules, as you misrepresented what is meant by "2", and "4", above. When we doubt the rule, we proceed toward understanding it.


Keep in mind how Wittgenstein defined certainty in On Certainty, as logically excluding the possibility of mistake. At this point it is implied that this is what is required to render doubt unreasonable.

He later waffles though, and defines certainty in a different way, such that if it doesn't make sense to doubt it, then it is certain. The bedrock is the fundamental things we agree on, and so it doesn't make sense to doubt them. However, agreement only makes doubt unreasonable for all those who agree. If there are others outside of this agreement, it may be reasonable for them to doubt it. So those bedrock propositions are not really beyond doubt.

We can understand our world in simple terms like the bishop that moves on the diagonal simply because that is a convention of a language game. — apokrisis

I find the very term "language game" rather strange. It apparently means nothing other than "set of restrictions". Still, it bothers me that there are people who choose to call it "language game" instead of something simpler such as "set of rules". There must be some kind of strange process going on behind the scenes. I am not following what is popular, apparently. Certainly not Wittgenstein's train of thought.

Again I answer these questions in my other thread on OC. — Sam26

I am looking into it. I have to say this is all very confusing. We have this weird guy who calls himself Moore and who wants to prove the existence of an external world and that by waiving his hands. And then we have these skeptics who question the existence of this same external world. What does that even mean? That's the first question we have to ask. But Moore skips this step and proceeds to counter the skepticism using a rather dull argument. And then Wittgenstein goes on to make a career out of this. Sorry if I can't take this stuff seriously. Fortunately for me, Banno isn't a moderator, so he can't ban me. The statement "there is an external world out there" must mean something specific so that we can test it and thus either verify or falsify it, and again, only to a degree. I can interpret it to mean "there is a world out there that is not under our control". This makes perfect sense. Lots of things that are not under our control. So it's pretty clear: there is an external world out there. But I am pretty sure these guys don't see it in this light, and in fact, I have a feeling they have no clue what they are talking about. Either that or we simply don't understand what they are talking about and we should first make an attempt to understand them before we proceed to dedicate an entire philosophy to them.

↪Michael ↪Sam26
Keep in mind how Wittgenstein defined certainty in On Certainty, as logically excluding the possibility of mistake. At this point it is implied that this is what is required to render doubt unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein, as far as I know, never defined certainty as logically excluding the possibility of a mistake. In OC 194 Wittgenstein asks, "But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?" The answer to this question is seen in the way Wittgenstein deals with these questions throughout OC. There are propositions, bedrock propositions, and they are grounded in a way of acting, they are not grounded in some epistemic or psychological certainty (objective or subjective certainty). So when he is talking about a mistake being logically excluded, it's not in reference to knowledge or certainty, but in reference to his hinge-propositions, which are outside any epistemic considerations. In fact, doubt is something that is part and parcel to knowledge, which is why Moore's propositions aren't the kind one can know, and it follows that they're not the kind that one can doubt. The answer to his question is in the negative, and that is seen in the overall picture of what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish.

Then I agree.

If you go down that path all discourse becomes meaningless. How could we discusses anything, or make sense of anything, if we radically doubted the veracity of our memories? — Janus

Fascinating. I hope you are right about this. Could you tell me, what is it about doubting the veracity of memory that entails that all discussion (thought?) is meaningless?

This is not correct. "4" must necessarily refer to one unit. Each of the numerals, "2", "3", etc., refer to individual units. If "4" referred to four distinct units we would not be able to carry out the mathematical proceedings which we do. For instance, 4x1 would be 1x1x1x1x1 if "4" referred to four distinct units. Instead, "4" must refer to one unity, a unity with the value of four individuals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Note first that I didn't say that "4" refers to four distinct units. I said that 4 means four distinct units. It is usual to recognize a distinction between the intension of a word - what it is that I have in mind when I use the word - and the extension of the word - the thing or set of things that the word is used as a label for. Take the concepts of "having a heart" and "having a kidney". Everything that has a heart has a kidney and so the extension of the concepts is the same. But the intension of the words is clearly different, since what I have in mind when I say "I have a heart" is different from what I have in mind when I say "I have a kidney".

For all I know, it might be that the extension of "4" must be one unity with the value of 4. Or, to put it differently, it might be that "4" is the name of a platonic form, FOUR. That doesn't change the fact that when I say "4", what I have in mind is four distinct individuals. Literally, what I picture when I picture "4" is four distinct units.

Now, you say that if the intension of "4" were four distinct units, it would follow that 4x1 is 1x1x1x1 and you say this is objectionable. That just sounds like you don't understand what multiplication is. The intension of "4" is

I I I I

and we are saying that we want this many units, once. If we said 4x2, we would be saying we want this many units, twice:

I I I I I I I I

Hence I don't see the issue.

There must be some kind of strange process going on behind the scenes. I am not following what is popular, apparently. Certainly not Wittgenstein's train of thought. — Magnus Anderson

I don't follow it either. He is enormously popular, but whenever I have interacted with an advocate of his views, they have begun by advocating something apparently novel, controversial and interesting and then after persistent questioning, it is revealed that they are really saying something trivial and uninteresting in some very pompous language - "language game" being one such example.

There is an interesting insight in OC 402 where Wittgenstein seems to reject that Moorean propositions are empirical propositions. Wittgenstein seems to indicate that Moorean propositions are a kind of foundational proposition, but not foundational "...in the same way as [a] hypothesis which, if they turned out to be false, are replaced by others."

Reality itself is a kind of framework that allows us to act in certain ways, it is bedrock to a way of life. Language and language-games develop within this framework, which seems to indicate that what we come to know, what we are certain of, happens based on this framework. I'm allowed to form epistemological language-games because of the existence of the framework. Reality is the hinge upon which everything else swings. The certainty that is the result of the reality we find ourselves in, doesn't fit within our epistemology, but our epistemology is allowed to occur because of it. My subjective certainty which may be expressed by an attitude of certainty, does seem to reflect the feelings we have about Moorean propositions, a kind of sureness about his propositions, but it's not epistemic. "There is something universal here; not just something personal (OC 440)." It's this universality that makes it more than my subjective certainty, more than an attitude, that attitude is able to gain a foothold because of it. Just as objective certainty (knowledge) is able to gain a foothold because of it.

Wittgenstein says in OC 415 that "...certain propositions underlie all questions and all thinking." It's this thinking that makes me think of Moorean propositions (bedrock propositions) as a kind of foundation. If we think of the foundation and the framework of a house, it is because of the framework and the foundation that life within the house occurs. It's foundational to all that occurs within. It's not part of the life that occurs within, but allows that life to occur - it is bedrock or foundational in an important sense.

For some reason this last paragraph shows up as italicized, but I have no idea why.

Wittgenstein, as far as I know, never defined certainty as logically excluding the possibility of a mistake. In OC 194 Wittgenstein asks, "But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?" The answer to this question is seen in the way Wittgenstein deals with these questions throughout OC. — Sam26

Right, this confirms what I said. Wittgenstein claims at 194 that objective certainty is when the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded. "When a mistake is not possible." "Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?"

The answer to this question is seen in the way Wittgenstein deals with these questions throughout OC. There are propositions, bedrock propositions, and they are grounded in a way of acting, they are not grounded in some epistemic or psychological certainty (objective or subjective certainty). So when he is talking about a mistake being logically excluded, it's not in reference to knowledge or certainty, but in reference to his hinge-propositions, which are outside any epistemic considerations. In fact, doubt is something that is part and parcel to knowledge, which is why Moore's propositions aren't the kind one can know, and it follows that they're not the kind that one can doubt. The answer to his question is in the negative, and that is seen in the overall picture of what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish. — Sam26

I think you demonstrate a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein here. Clearly, Wittgenstein associates objective certainty with when the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded. So for you to go on and say " when he is talking about a mistake being logically excluded, it's not in reference to knowledge or certainty, but in reference to his hinge-propositions", you completely misrepresent Wittgenstein. When the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded, this is objective certainty.

What is the case, is that at 203 he goes on to talk about "certainty" in relation to when an hypothesis is in "agreement", with the world of facts. We might say we are certain if we find it difficult to disagree. He continues to discuss this notion of "agreement", and by 270 he produces a new definition for "objective" certainty:

270. “I have compelling grounds for my certitude.” These grounds make the certitude objective.

This is what I meant when I said that Wittgenstein "waffles". First, he says that objective certainty is when the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded. Then he produces a compromised "objective certainty", notice how he refers to this as objective "certitude".

So, when you speak about the hinge-propositions, and how they are the grounds for certainty, what is really the case is that they are the grounds for this "objective certitude". Since the objective certitude is defined by "I have compelling grounds for my certitude", (the grounds being hinge-props), and not defined as "the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded", there is a substantial difference between "objective certainty" and "objective certitude".

We know that objective certainty would remove any rational doubt, because it would be irrational to doubt when the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded. However, the issue is with respect to objective certitude. Is it rational to doubt, even though I have compelling grounds for my certitude? I think that in our activities of daily life, it is not rational to doubt in any case that I have compelling grounds for my certitude, despite the fact that mistake is still possible. However, when we are seeking fundamental principles of epistemology, in which case we are seeking the highest level of certitude possible, it is rational to doubt until the compelling grounds for certitude reach the level of mistake having been logically excluded.

There is an interesting insight in OC 402 where Wittgenstein seems to reject that Moorean propositions are empirical propositions. — Sam26

Sort of what I said? Why is this so? It's clear to me Moore's propositions are empirical. "Here's a hand" means "what I'm looking at right now is what is symbolized by the word 'hand'". This is either true or false.

Wittgenstein appears to be saying that Moore and skeptics are violating the rules of language. Who cares? The important thing is are they stating a belief, and if so, what is this belief and is it true?

So if you don't care why are you in this thread?