I'm saying that that is what some materialists will claim. See The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Contrary to your repeated claims, materialism doesn't entail epiphenomenalism. — Michael

This article had epiphenomenalism written all over it and then punts on the question by simply referencing a myriad of opinions on the subject. It's easy to hide nothingness in spaghetti as this article evidences. Materialism in any guise still says nothing about the nature of consciousness other than "heck it just happens - persistently, again, and again, and again. The Greatest Miracle of All.

If someone posits that Mind-Body are identical (they are) then they are. Neither holds a superior position in such an ontology. In addition, there is no evidence whatsoever that the brain is the sole origin of all communication. On the contrary, all evidence is quite the opposite. This idea that all actions are governed by the brain is not only antiquated, it is totally manufactured.

All life interacts with its environment in some manner. Our organism is aware of itself acting in the world. That self-awareness is thought. The cogito enables the unity of appreception, the act of thought. It is only though our awareness of interaction with the world that we have thought. If an organism can't act spontaneously, causally then it can't be for itself, it must be in itself. ((pour-soi vs en-soi)

This article had epiphenomenalism written all over it — Rich

I'm not sure how you read that into it.

But I'm really not sure what to else to say but that identity theory isn't epiphenomenalism, and is something that materialists do accept (among other theories that also aren't epiphenomenalism). So to argue against materialism by arguing against epiphenomenalism just doesn't make sense.

I'm not sure how you read that into it. — Michael

It is the author's choice of words and description of events. Here either clearly suggesting epiphenomenalism and has zero idea how to support it - so he rambles. Materialists have to use obfuscation, otherwise they have to answer how and why? How does this persistence of mind come about and persist??? NO THEORY at all.

However, as I indicated, if anyone takes the position that Mind and Body are identical, well I guess that is it. Mind is causal and identical to the Body (neither are material or physical in the normal sense of the word).

How does this persistence of mind come about??? NO THEORY at all. — Rich

You mean "how does this persistence of certain brain processes come about"? What do you mean by that, and why wouldn't the materialist be able to explain it?

No, I'm saying MIND. The experience of Life.

As I said earlier, materialists just pretend that such a thing doesn't exist, they (their Minds) are so involved in denying it.

No, I'm saying MIND. The experience of Life.

As I said earlier, materialists just pretend that such a thing doesn't exist, they (their Minds) are so involved in denying it. — Rich

Your criticism doesn't make any sense. The identity theorist argues that consciousness is identical to certain brain processes, and you respond by saying that they can't make sense of consciousness as something to be distinguished from brain processes? Well, obviously. Their claim is that there isn't a distinction. To describe certain brain processes is to describe consciousness (and vice versa).

The identity theorist argues that consciousness is identical to certain brain processes, — Michael

The article was a rambling mess but he clearly takes the position of mind somehow, someway springing from the brain. He doesn't even define "the brain". You know the "brain" is spread out throughout the body, right?

If the Mind-Body are identical, then that's that. Mind, brain, brain waves, neurons, cells, etc. are identical. Materialism vanishes since there is no longer an opposite. Some may call this monism.

Materialism vanishes since there is no longer an opposite. Some may call this monism. — Rich

There are different kinds of monisms, materialism being one.

I'm saying that that is what some materialists will claim. See The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Contrary to your repeated claims, materialism doesn't entail epiphenomenalism. — Michael

But there are several objections to identity theory (quoted from Mind: A Brief Introduction by John R. Searle):
"There were a number of objections to the identity theory. I find it useful to distinguish between the technical objections and the common-sense objections. The first technical objection was that the theory seemed to violate a principle of logic called “Leibnitz’s Law.”11 The law says that if any two things are identical, then they must have all their properties in common. So if you could show that mental states had properties that could not be attributed to brain states, and brain states had properties that could not be attributed to mental states, it looks like you would refute the identity theory. And it did not seem difficult to provide such examples. So I can say, for example, that the brain state that corresponds to my thought that it is raining is 3 cm inside my left ear; but, according to the objectors, it does not make any sense to say that my thought that it is raining is 3 cm inside my left ear. Furthermore, even for conscious states that have a location, such as pain, the pain may be in my toe, but the brain state that corresponds to that pain is not in my toe, but in my brain. So the properties of the brain state are not the same as the properties of the mental state. Therefore, physicalism is false."

I'm not saying that identity theory doesn't have any problems. I'm saying that materialism doesn't entail epiphenomenalism, and so to attack materialism by attacking epiphenomenalism doesn't make sense.

As I said, if there is no difference between the mind and matter, if they are identical, then that is that. There are mind-waves directing the actions of our being and all matter is mind. Materialism vanishes. The brain, however one defines it, is inconsequential.

As I said, if there is no difference between the mind and matter, if they are identical, then that is that. There are mind-waves directing the actions of our being. Materialism vanishes. — Rich

So you say. But given that there is a rich history of the competing monisms of materialism, idealism and neutral monism, I'm going to need more than just a few sentences to convince me to abandon these traditional distinctions.

Besides, what you're saying isn't quite right. The materialist will claim that mind is matter, not that (all) matter is mind. There is non-mind matter, too. The mind is just one type of material thing.

So you say. But given that there is a rich history of the competing monisms of materialism, idealism and neutral monism, I'm going to need more than just a few sentences to convince me to abandon these traditional distinctions. — Michael

Well, it's your philosophy. Mind and Body are identical. You've chosen.

Parenthetically, in choosing, you've also adopted a viewpoint that the Mind had Choices.

Well, it's your philosophy. Mind and Body are identical. You've chosen. — Rich

It's not my philosophy. It's materialist philosophy.

I'm not saying that identity theory doesn't have any problems. I'm saying that materialism doesn't entail epiphenomenalism, and so to attack materialism by attacking epiphenomenalism doesn't make sense. — Michael

Do you agree with the definition of materialism in OP? If yes, there is no room left for consciousness since physical process determine everything. We also know that identity theory is not right therefore consciousness and physical process cannot be same.

It's not my philosophy. It's materialist philosophy. — Michael

Ok. Materialism says that Mind directs the body and makes Choices. I can live with that.

Do you agree with the definition of materialism in OP? If yes, there is no room left for consciousness since physical process determine everything. We also know that identity theory is not right therefore consciousness and physical process cannot be same. — bahman

Identity theory might not be right, but it doesn't then follow that materialists cannot be identity theorists. If materialism allows for identity theory (i.e. they're consistent positions) then you can't disprove materialism by disproving epiphenomenalism.

I don't understand why this is so hard to understand.

I don't understand why this is so hard to understand. — Michael

You have unilaterally redefined materialism as some sort of Identity Theory, in such a way that obliterates the differences between material and non-material ( no problem with this, quantum theory did the same 100 years ago), yet still permits you to call it materialism. Sort of having your cake and eat it.

For me, I don't care about this sort of word gymnastics. You have agreed that Mind and Body are identical. That defines your philosophy.

You have unilaterally redefined materialism as some sort of Identity Theory — Rich

No I haven't. I've said that materialists can be identity theorists. Contrary to bahman's repeated claims, materialism doesn't require epiphenomenalism. In fact, some (most?) materialists might say that materialism precludes epiphenomenalism, given that epiphenomenalism posits something like qualia which are non-material.

You have agreed that Mind and Body are identical. That defines your philosophy. — Rich

No I haven't. I've said that, according to identity theorists, which presumably is one of the major theories of mind accepted by materialists, mental activity is identical to certain physical activity, e.g. brain activity.

I haven't said that I'm an identity theorist (or a materialist).

Also, as you may have missed something I edited into an earlier comment: the materialist will claim that mind is matter, not that (all) matter is mind. There is non-mind matter, too. The mind is just one type of material thing.

No I haven't. I've said that materialists can be identity theorists. — Michael

Fine they can be anyone they want. I guess for some people the word is most important. "I am a materialist!!!" quietly .... but I believe that mind and material are identical.

People run their lives as they choose.

materialist will claim that mind is matter, — Michael

No, according to you Mind and Brain (matter) are identical. In other words, brain is mind.

Fine they can be anyone they want. I guess for some people the word is most important. "I am a materialist." quietly .... but I believe that mind and material are identical. — Rich

Except that's not what it is at all, as I've said above. They might believe that the mind is identical to some material thing (e.g. brain activity), but that's not the same as believing that "mind and material are identical". Consciousness is just one type of matter, and there's a whole lot of matter in the world that has nothing to do with the mind.

No, according to you Mind and Brain (matter) are identical. In other words, brain is mind. — Rich

Yes, but the materialist will argue that there's more to the world than just the brain. There is matter in the world that has nothing to do with consciousness.

Compare with another monist - the subjective idealist - who argues that everything in the world has something to do with consciousness.

This is why it is false to say that materialism "vanishes" if monism is the case. There are different kinds of monism, materialism being one.

They might believe that the mind is identical to some material thing (e.g. brain activity), — Michael

materialist will claim that mind is matter, — Michael

Well then, you have to come up with a Theory on how some matter is identical to Mind and others aren't and how it persists. But again, no matter. You have already said that you believe (I really dislike speaking for this ambiguous they), that some matter and mind are identical. Well, that is a mouthful for materialism.

When the human body moves, it is the Mind that is moving it. What's more, the Mind is making choices. Sounds fine to me. I would just be reticent to claim that materialists believe this.

Well then, you have to come up with a Theory on how some matter is identical to Mind and others aren't and how it persists. — Rich

Why? Does the materialist need to explain how some matter is identical to brain activity and others aren't, and how it persists? Does he need to explain how some matter is identical to a tree and others aren't, and how it persists?

Some material things are cats. Some material things are rain. Some material things are a falling rock. Some material things are consciousness.

Some material things are consciousness. — Michael

Or, consciousness and material is identical. That is what you claim. How does that sound with you? That's my belief.

Why? Does the materialist need to explain how some matter is identical to brain activity and others aren't, and how it persists? Does he need to explain how some matter is identical to a tree and others aren't, and how it persists? — Michael

Yes, otherwise it's magic, or more precisely a religious Miracle.

Or, consciousness and material is identical. That is what you claim. How does that sound with you? That's my belief. — Rich

That's not what I claim. It's not what the materialist claims either. There is matter that isn't consciousness.

What I've said is that, according to the identity theorist, the mind just is certain kinds of brain activity. But, again, there is much more to the world that just brain activity.

Yes, otherwise it's magic, or more precisely a religious Miracle. — Rich

It's magic that trees aren't chairs, or that cats aren't dogs, or that brain activity isn't a fusion reactor?

My god you have a lot of patience. I would have smashed my laptop in frustration by now. I can't add anything you haven't already said, just wanted to voice my admiration for your calm tenacity.

My god you have a lot of patience. I would have smashed my laptop in frustration by now. I can't add anything you haven't already said, just wanted to voice my admiration for your calm tenacity. — Pseudonym

Thanks. As a moderator it's my duty to remain calm. ;)